RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN MODERN RUSSIA

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1. INTRODUCTION

Faith, Freedom, and the Varieties of Russian Religious Experience

RANDALL A. POOLE

In 1917 Sergei Bulgakov (1871–1944), then on his way to becoming one of the century's great theologians, published *Unfading Light: Contemplations and Speculations*. The overarching theme of this classic work of Russian religious philosophy is that the basis of religion is human experience of the divine. Bulgakov emphasizes that religion is essentially experiential and not primarily conceptual or intellectual: "Religious experience assures the human being of the reality of another, divine world, not so as to demonstrate its existence or by various conclusions to convince him of its necessity, but so as to lead him to a living, immediate bond with religious reality, and show it to him."[1] Religious experience, he continues, is distinctive compared to other types of human experience (e.g., scientific, philosophical, aesthetic, or ethical); it "remains the sole path for real, living comprehension of God" (18). It is utterly authoritative, immediately credible, and convincing "by a different higher persuasiveness than the facts of external reality" (17). The immediate credibility of religious experience is called faith, "the assurance of things hoped for, the evidence of things unseen" (Hebrews 11:1). Faith is another way of specifying the distinctiveness or autonomy of religious experience: such experience necessarily comes from within, since it is experience of the transcendent.[2] Its "object" is not ordinary, immanent sense data, of course, but the divine, which does not reveal itself externally, in the manner of empirical objects. It is the "unseen order," as William James characterized it in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, an order no less real for those who experience it.[3]

The inward character of faith and religious experience led Bulgakov to identify religion as a core quality or capacity of personhood and to relate both religion and personhood to freedom. "Faith," he writes, "is a function of human freedom; it does not compel the way the laws of nature compel us. To impose the truths of faith from the outside would not meet the fundamental requirements of religious consciousness; to coerce our person, whether by logical constraint or force of knowledge, would not correspond to the dignity of the Divinity who respects our freedom" (29–30). To say that God respects human freedom is to defend it in the strongest possible terms. Not only is the "dignity of the Divinity" at stake but so too is human dignity. Freedom is the very condition of the "truths of faith" and of the whole inner

world of ideals. By their very nature such truths and ideals can be only freely posited, recognized, and pursued.[4] To coerce them is to destroy them and to strike at the heart of what it is to be a person.

Bulgakov says that faith involves "the whole person in its entirety" and that in this sense "religion is a *personal* work in the highest degree and thus it is a continual, creative work" (30). Clearly he thought religion was a highly distinctive type of human experience, perhaps even the most human type of experience. It should be noted, however, that persons are the only possible subjects of any type of experience, not just of religion. Groups are not subjects and do not have experiences; only the individual persons who constitute them do. (Bulgakov did not suggest otherwise, but the difference is worth mentioning because it is not always well appreciated, and because it is relevant to the distinction between toleration, which pertains to groups, and freedom of conscience, which pertains to persons.) It is true that humans are social beings and that a person's consciousness forms in interaction with others (especially through language). Our communities enable and enrich our experiences, but still only individual persons have experiences. In empirical experience the external object limits (or is correlated with) the personal or subjective element. In religious experience the personal quality is much deeper because such experience is inner or spiritual, even when evoked by an external object or event (e.g., an icon or prayer service). As Bulgakov affirms, God "'knocks on the door' of the human heart" but "in all his omnipotence he cannot force it open, for this would mean the annihilation of freedom, i.e., of the human being itself" (30). The content of religious experience is transcendent reality, which is not given as an object but posed as an ideal. "It is identified not by the coercion of external senses, not violently, but by the free, creative aspiration of the spirit, *by the quest* for God, by the intense actuality of the soul in this direction. In other words the element of freedom and personhood, i.e., creativity, is irremovable from religious faith" (35). The quest for God in religious experience is also a quest for human personhood.

Since 2000 scholars of Russian history and culture have returned to the insights of Bulgakov, James, and other thinkers (e.g., Émile Durkheim and Rudolf Otto) of a century ago.[5] They have produced a remarkable body of scholarship exploring the experiential aspects of religion. "Lived Orthodoxy" designates a thriving area of research about the ways people (laity, clergy, peasants, workers, women, intellectuals) experienced, practiced, and understood their religion.[6] Beyond Russian Orthodoxy, to give just one example, Heather Coleman has studied the Russian Baptists by focusing on their individual spiritual experience, as described in their conversion nar-

ratives.[7] This scholarly attention to lived religious experience proceeds from the recognition that such experience is a window onto believers' faith and thus onto their understanding of themselves and their world. (Collingwood said that the historian's main task is the reenactment of past experience.)[8] Through this window we can discern, to an extent, inner processes of human spiritual development and how people value themselves in relation to God. In their seminal edited volume on Russian religious experience Coleman and Mark Steinberg found that such experience, narrated and preserved in "sacred stories," reveals how spiritual seekers and believers discovered "self-knowledge, personal dignity and will, and self-realization"—in short, personhood.[9] Their approach, like Bulgakov's, informs my effort in this introductory study to make a case for the experiential basis of Russian religious freedom.

Ideal Self-Determination, Freedom of Conscience, and Liberalism

The subject of this volume is religious freedom, both in its internal and external meanings. That freedom, if we accept Bulgakov's argument, is essential to religion because it is the very condition of faith and religious experience. The premise of the argument is that human beings, in their innermost nature, are free. Inner freedom is free will, or the capacity for self-determination by one's own ideals. As the power to override external determination by sensible-empirical causes, free will refutes "determinism" in the usual naturalistic sense of the term. (It is thus a good argument for theism, as Bulgakov very well understood.) This core human capacity, which might be called "ideal self-determination," also describes morality (in which case the self-determining ideal is the good).[10] It is what Bulgakov had in mind in relating faith, freedom, and personhood so integrally. Religious experience, because it comes from within, depends on freedom. At the same time, it reveals (or clarifies) the ideals that drive self-determination—as do other types of human experience, although moral-religious experience is paradigmatic.

Bulgakov was following a long tradition in Western intellectual history that identified the capacity for ideal self-determination as central to human dignity, called it *freedom of conscience*, and recognized it as the first and most fundamental natural or human right. That tradition is liberalism. It maintains that inner freedom is the source of external freedom (secured through natural rights), and that the very purpose of the state is to guarantee natural rights by the rule of law. Freedom of conscience is the core of the tradition because of its dual meaning as inner freedom (the capacity for ideal self-determination) and as external freedom (the right to seek, express, and

live according to one's ideals or beliefs). Generally liberalism relates the two dimensions of freedom of conscience in another way as well, contending that the ever fuller realization of the inner capacity depends on the free exercise of the external right.

The ideals that make self-determination possible must, by their very nature as ideals, be freely recognized. It bears emphasizing that the *concept* of freedom of conscience does not imply (though the *term* might seem to suggest) that the ideals themselves are "free," in the sense of being merely subjective or lacking objective truth or value. To the contrary: it is the free recognition of the ideals as true or valid that gives them (or rather persons) the power of self-determination. Truth, in short, must be made one's own, which can happen only through free recognition and "*personal* work," as Bulgakov put it. Proceeding from this understanding of freedom of conscience and of its centrality to human dignity and personhood (*lichnost'*), Bulgakov and other Russian neo-idealist philosophers made an important contribution to the liberal tradition (see the penultimate section below, "Russian neo-idealism"). For them philosophical idealism was, in part, a theoretical articulation of the ideals that were lived and felt in religious experience (or in moral-religious experience).

Russian idealism was closely related to another key intellectual development, which Paul Valliere has identified as Russian theological liberalism—an approach to the problems of church and society that, he says, affirms two axioms with respect to religious life: freedom of conscience and the relative autonomy of the secular spheres of life, such as science, politics, economics, and art. "As a liberal axiom," Valliere writes, "freedom of conscience means not just inner, spiritual freedom, which is conscience by another name, but outward freedom as well."[11] In another place he distinguishes between two methods that shaped theology in nineteenth-century Russia. The first was the historical method, the foundations of which were laid by the century's most influential hierarch, Metropolitan Filaret (Drozdov) (1782–1867), with his call to "return to the sources." The second was "the experiential or anthropological method, which appealed to religious experience and the data of conscience to elucidate, support or confirm theological beliefs." Its aim "was to give voice to the believing conscience, to articulate the *living* Word." The experiential method, with the primacy it gave to conscience, was, according to Valliere, the indispensable one for liberalism.[12]

Toleration as Russian Religious Policy

This volume explores the complex contours and contested meanings of religious freedom in Russia. The first essential distinction to be made is be-

tween toleration and freedom of conscience. In European thought toleration developed in the early modern period from the negative, expedient sense of the idea ("mere toleration," or forbearance from religious persecution) into the positive concept of freedom of conscience. This intellectual development was essentially complete by 1700.[13] By then, "toleration" could be used synonymously for freedom of conscience.[14]

In the context of imperial Russia, however, the two concepts must be carefully distinguished, because the first did not imply the second. By the end of the nineteenth century "toleration" could mean freedom of conscience, but even then that was not its primary meaning. The ambiguity could be exploited for tendentious purposes, as K. K. Arsen'ev (1837–1919), the editor of the liberal historical journal *Vestnik Evropy*, complained. In the introduction to his important collection of articles, *Freedom of Conscience and Toleration*, he wrote, "words are more elastic than concepts, and never, it seems, has this elasticity been clearer than in the interpretations that the word 'toleration' has among us." As an example he points to the conservative paper *Moskovskie vedomosti*. In a lead article on toleration in 1896 it asserted that existing Russian laws on toleration granted the right of freedom of conscience, but also that the "principle of toleration" was "completely inapplicable" if it contradicted state laws. According to Arsen'ev, the first assertion was disingenuous, and the second misunderstood the idea of right. His critique is an admirable formulation of the liberal concept of freedom of conscience as a natural right: "'The principle of toleration,' if made dependent on changeable 'state laws,' ceases to be a *principle*—that is, a criterion by which the worth [*dostoinstvo*] of positive law is measured. . . . It is not the principle of toleration that must be sacrificed to state laws, but state laws that must be brought into accord with the principle of toleration," in the sense of freedom of conscience.[15]

The tsarist regime used a number of terms to describe its religious policy. They included religious toleration and freedom of faith, religion, and confession. These terms meant something very different from freedom of conscience as an inalienable individual right.[16] Toleration in imperial Russia was a revocable privilege or concession granted by the state to recognized religious groups or communities. It is worth emphasizing that tsarist toleration, far from being a right limiting autocratic power, was rather an instrument of that power. As Peter Waldron wrote in an influential essay in 1989, "religious policy was only one part of the regime's general strategy" to keep "the strength and authority of the autocracy as intact as possible." Waldron argues that freedom of conscience was inimical to the idea of autocracy (especially in the mind of the last two tsars), was granted only as a political

necessity in the 1905 revolution, and was thwarted after 1905 as the regime recouped and reneged on its promises.[17]

Laura Engelstein clarified the picture further with an essay published a decade after Waldron's. In it she labeled tsarist toleration or "freedom of religion" (*svoboda very*) a "peculiar grant." "In the first place," she writes, "the freedom to worship consisted of the right to persist in the faith of one's ancestors, that is, to continue to belong to the religious community into which one had been born. It did not endow individual believers with the right to change religious affiliation," unless it was to Orthodoxy. "In the second place," she continues, "the price of recognition was subordination to administrative authority. And third, recognition did not mean equality."[18] The Russian Orthodox Church was defined by law as the empire's "preeminent and predominant faith," and it alone had the right to proselytize. To help make the distinction between the state's policy of tolerating certain religious communities for its own purposes and liberal recognition of the individual's right to freedom of conscience, Engelstein draws on the work of the Russian legal scholar Mikhail Reisner (1868–1928). In 1900 he wrote that Russian law "does not observe the division between the state and the religious communities. It acknowledges neither their freedom, nor the freedom of personal belief and conscience." Tsarist law, according to Reisner, treats religion from the instrumental perspective of state interests, "not as one or another form of a person's relation to God." "Our law," he continues, "supposes that religion is not practiced by individual persons but by national-spiritual entities—peoples, nations, tribes. But in fact religion will always be religion, and its true receptacle is not the nation but the individual human heart."[19]

Robert Crews has likewise offered incisive insights into the autocracy's "peculiar regime of religious toleration," which policy he regards as anything but noninterference. Rather, the tsarist state attempted to maintain religious conformity and to suppress dissent within the recognized confessions in the empire. "Heresy in any community constituted a political issue in tsarist Russia: to the police, religious dissent and heterodoxy almost invariably involved a broader challenge to the existing order," Crews writes.[20] His case study is Islam, which, he argues, came to rely on or "capture" state institutions in the policing and disciplining of its own communities. The result was that the tsarist state and the Muslim authorities whom it backed were drawn together, as Crews puts it, "in the common enterprise of curtailing liberty of conscience."[21]

Russian scholarship is well represented by Aleksandr Safonov. An article he published in 2012–2013 provides a succinct overview of imperial Russia's religious policy of toleration, which he contrasts clearly to freedom of con-

science.[22] He indicates that the semantic field of the concept "freedom of conscience," as used in late imperial Russian public discourse, included elements of freedom of confession, religious freedom, and religious toleration, terms that were often equated in prerevolutionary Russian jurisprudence.[23] The title of his article refers to "freedom of conscience and of confession," which itself might seem to conflate them. Compared to full freedom of conscience (freedom of thought and belief), freedom of confession implied something more limited: freedom of choice, equality, and nondiscrimination among religious confessions, usually with the intention of excluding nonconfessional options. In a commendable account Safonov reconstructs the liberal and conservative contours of Russian public debate over freedom of conscience and identifies the positions of the main political parties on the issue after 1905. Despite significant support for freedom of conscience in Russian civil society by the early twentieth century, the autocracy and its monarchist supporters impeded its implementation (after the Manifesto of 17 October 1905 conceded it) because, according to Safonov, it was sharply at odds with their allegiance to the traditional confessional state in which non-Orthodox religions were merely tolerated.[24] They resisted a liberal order based on freedom of conscience because, most fundamentally, "the radical overhaul of religious law necessarily entailed a thorough modernization of the entire edifice of Russian statehood."[25]

The appearance of Paul Werth's *The Tsar's Foreign Faiths* in 2014 marked the culmination of this stage of scholarship on religious policy in imperial Russia. It is a comprehensive, extensively researched history of the Russian Empire as "a multiconfessional Orthodox state—that is, a polity that established several religions while constituting only one of them as dominant."[26] Establishment in the tsarist context meant that the empire's recognized religions were under state control, including (and in many ways especially) the Russian Orthodox Church. The multiconfessional establishment was the institutional structure of toleration. Although Werth is mainly concerned with the policy and practice of toleration, he also analyzes its "rhetoric and content"—that is, its intellectual history. He gives detailed consideration to the movement toward expanded religious freedom, especially in the form of freedom of conscience—to its sources, prospects, and the reasons for its failure. His book has fundamentally deepened our understanding of tsarist religious policy and the fate of religious freedom in imperial Russia.

Religious Freedom in Modern Russia: An Overview

The focus of the present volume is not religious policy (although it is by no means absent) but rather the various meanings that religious freedom,

toleration, and indeed freedom of conscience had in Russia among nonstate actors—meanings that to various degrees bore the state's deep imprint. Two chapters (those by G. M. Hamburg and Victoria Frede) are reprinted from a 2012 forum on freedom of conscience in the journal *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*, which forum served as the foundation for the present volume. The remaining five are published here for the first time. The book's focus is imperial Russia, with one chapter (by Eugene Clay) that reveals the striking continuities in religious policy between the imperial and post-Soviet periods. The chapter by G. M. Hamburg won the Distinguished Scholar Prize of the Association for the Study of Eastern Christian History and Culture (ASEC) when it was first published. It is a remarkable history of religious toleration in the political thought of the Muscovite and early imperial periods, one that gives us a richer understanding of the subsequent history of religious toleration in Russian thought and practice.[27]

In the book's third chapter Patrick Lally Michelson demonstrates that not just the broad category of religious freedom but "freedom of conscience" itself had contested meanings in Russia. According to him, "Freedom of conscience could be expressed in a variety of discrete, even antagonistic idioms that were almost exclusively intelligible to the ideological, sociocultural, and interpretive frameworks in which they originated and operated." There was a state administrative discourse on freedom of conscience, a radical intelligentsia discourse, a liberal discourse, and an Orthodox ecclesiastical discourse. His chapter expertly reconstructs the emergence of a specifically ecclesiastical discourse about freedom of conscience, concentrating on Archimandrite Ioann (Sokolov). Michelson makes it abundantly clear that Sokolov's ecclesiastical conception of freedom of conscience had very little in common with the liberal conception. Rather, Ioann largely understood it to be freedom from error and sin, as externally determined and proscribed by the Church. Michelson writes that his broader purpose "is to decenter all normative claims made by historical actors in Russia that they alone possessed the correct interpretation of freedom of conscience."

The state administrative discourse of freedom of conscience, which intersected with the liberal discourse, has been closely examined by Paul Werth. Victoria Frede takes up the radical intelligentsia discourse in her chapter, and Heather Coleman explores the (international) liberal discourse in chapter 5. In a fascinating account Frede shows how radicals in Russia's first revolutionary group, Land and Freedom, deployed the promise of religious freedom in propaganda directed at Old Believer and sectarian peasants. They thereby hoped to recruit dissident peasants for the revolutionary movement, which was actually hostile to religion. That fact discloses some-

thing about the revolutionaries' demand for religious freedom—namely, that it was instrumental, much like the tsarist policy of toleration.[28]

Coleman focuses on another set of the regime's critics: international evangelicals and liberals. But they, too, looked to peasant sectarians (in this case the stundists)—and found in them "martyrs for . . . the liberal value of freedom of conscience." She deftly turns the international campaign for the stundists into a highly revealing historical source for understanding Western attitudes and beliefs about religious freedom, liberalism, and Russia and for analyzing how Western evangelicals and liberals saw themselves and their societies. Coleman quotes the English investigative journalist W. T. Stead's striking statement of his belief in the normativity of liberalism: "As water boils at 212° and freezes at the freezing-point in St. Petersburg as well as in London, so the general principles of religious toleration and the right of man to full religious liberty are truths which do not depend for their application upon parallels of latitude, and which therefore must ultimately prove fatal to the system now in vogue in Russia."[29] Of course, these truths did not prove fatal to the Russian autocracy, or not in the way Stead expected—the development of liberal democracy. Coleman's essay nicely illustrates that there was an international context to matters that might otherwise seem to have been entirely internal to Russia itself.

In *The Tsar's Foreign Faiths* Werth expressed the hope that scholars will explore "the social history of religious freedom in Russia."[30] In chapter 6 Daniel Scarborough sets an example for scholarship in that direction. He argues that ordinary Russian Orthodox parishioners were not predisposed toward religious intolerance; in fact they seemed to resist the highly intolerant official diocesan missionaries in their midst. After the position was created in 1886, the diocesan missionaries were the new agents of state intervention into religious life. They usurped the task of interacting with other religious groups, a role that should have belonged to ordinary parish clergy and parishioners. Scarborough sees evidence for the possibility of tolerant and respectful Orthodox Christian attitudes and practices toward other religions, but the opportunity was thwarted by the diocesan missionaries, who often employed the police in enforcing their ideology of "Orthodox patriotism" (as John Strickland calls it).[31] These agents perpetuated religious intolerance in late imperial Russia. "Thus," Scarborough writes, "a comparatively small minority within the Orthodox Church inhibited processes that otherwise boded well for the emergence of a civil society with a multiconfessional religious component." That is a bold and provocative thesis.

In chapter 7, Norihiro Naganawa pursues what might be called the Muslim discourse on freedom of conscience (*hurrîyat-i dînîya*). It, too, was dif-

ferent from the liberal discourse. This is clear in Naganawa's argument that the most prominent issue that Muslim Tatar intellectuals addressed in the name of "freedom of conscience" was preserving and even expanding the particularistic collective rights that the state assigned to the Muslim community under the Orenburg Mohammedan Spiritual Assembly. Something like that goal might have been expected under the tsarist policy of toleration. But after the October Manifesto of 1905 Muslims in the Volga-Urals region sought to modify the degree of state control over Islam and to expand their autonomy. In doing so, Naganawa contends, they "created a new public sphere between themselves and the state." His chapter, as he puts it, "seeks to understand the meanings of religious freedom for Muslims as they were elaborated in this burgeoning public sphere by analyzing reform plans for the Orenburg Mohammedan Spiritual Assembly." It is a most impressive undertaking.

Eugene Clay concludes our volume by examining the religious situation in the Russian Federation today in the aftermath of the 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations (and the new laws, policies, and legal interpretations that followed it).[32] To place the 1997 law in its historical context, Clay provides an excellent, succinct overview of religious policy in imperial Russia and the Soviet Union (in a section titled "From 'Confessional State' to Official Atheism and Back"). He shows that the religious order in the Russian Federation bears striking similarities to that of imperial Russia. It favors the traditional religions of Russia, it establishes a hierarchy among religions, it tends to value religions according to their perceived contributions to national and ethnic communities, and it regards religious freedom more as a collective right than an individual one. To ascertain how minority religions have fared in this environment, Clay examines four groups: two Buddhist denominations, the growing Presbyterian movement, and a new religion called the Orthodox Church of the Sovereign Mother of God. He finds that the worst fears of critics of the 1997 law have not been realized. The religious groups forming his case studies have been able to adapt to the new regulatory environment through creative and entrepreneurial strategies, in particular by portraying themselves as "traditional," as having historical ties to Russia, and as being loyal.

In what follows, I offer a broad historical-philosophical conceptualization of the problem of religious freedom in Russia. It seeks to provide the historical context and detail necessary for a comprehensive introduction to the general topic, while also advancing a distinctive interpretation specifically relevant to this volume's main theme: the multiple contested meanings of Russian religious freedom, including freedom of conscience.

I argue that while the autocracy imposed tight constraints, nonetheless there was enough external religious freedom for "the varieties of religious experience." In fact the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed a long religious revival, which I reconstruct through presenting a synthesis of the rich historical scholarship on lived Orthodoxy (together with work on Russian religious history more generally). This scholarship shows how believers, through their faithful experience, became highly conscious of their ideals, freedom, and dignity as persons—how their faithful experience was simultaneously a process of self-discovery. By the twentieth century many believers recognized that autocratic government was incompatible with their freedom and dignity. Their demand for religious freedom, together with demands for other basic freedoms, led to the 1905 revolution. At the same time, Russian philosophers like Bulgakov theoretically formulated the experiential basis of religious freedom in their neo-idealist defense of liberalism. As a defense of human rights, freedom of conscience first of all, they held that their liberal theory was indeed normative. How could they not?

I focus here on Russian Orthodoxy for four reasons: first, that is where the religious-philosophical nexus was most evident and important; second, the basic model for the empire's multiconfessional establishment was state control of the Russian Orthodox Church through the Holy Synod; third, the fate of religious freedom in Russia was most closely tied to the status of the Russian Orthodox Church; and fourth, the co-editor of this volume has written an entire book on the regime's policy of toleration of non-Orthodox religions in the Russian Empire.

Repression and Revival

Russian religious life unfolded in the inhospitable political environment of Russian autocracy. In 1721 Peter the Great abolished the patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church and replaced it with a collegiate board of bishops called the Holy Synod, which would govern the Church until 1917.[33] The Synod was supervised by a lay official, the chief procurator, whose power greatly increased in the nineteenth century. The Fundamental Laws of the Russian Empire (first codified in 1832) made it clear that "in the administration [*upravlenie*] of the Church, the Autocratic Power acts through the Most Holy Governing Synod, established by this Power."[34] The aptly named *Spiritual Regulation* (*Dukhovnyi reglament*, 1721), which established the Petrine system of church-state relations, regulated Russian religious life in numerous ways. For example, it condemned "whatever may be called by the term 'superstition,'" such as "false miracles" and officially suspect shrines and holy places, icons, saints, and relics.[35] At issue, according to Vera Shevzov,

was "religious authority and the prerogative to discern what events or experiences were authentically revelatory and therefore 'of the community.'"[36]

Peter's reforms also regulated the clergy—first of all by turning it into a closed estate. Parish priests lost many of their rights and privileges, suffered from poverty and low status, and were subject to tight control by both state and episcopate.[37] Notoriously, the supplement to the *Spiritual Regulation* required that priests "expeditiously report" any criminal intentions heard in confession, especially those directed against the sovereign or state.[38] Catherine II continued Peter's policies. In 1764 she decreed the secularization of ecclesiastical lands. Monasteries suffered a catastrophic decline; more than half were closed.[39] In the nineteenth century the state increased its control of the Church through powerful chief procurators, notably N. A. Protasov (1836–1855) and K. P. Pobedonostsev (1880–1905).[40] They were assisted by other lay officials who staffed the synodal and diocesan chancelleries (bureaucracies). As the Synod's lay archivist wrote in the 1890s, "it is not the hierarchs who govern the Church, but Synod officials."[41]

The Church's subordination to the autocratic state produced two very different responses in Orthodox religious society. One was irreligion or indifference, doubt, and full-blown atheism, though the latter did not clearly emerge until the mid-nineteenth century. Atheism represented the culmination of people's alienation from the autocratic order and a reaction to the state's instrumental use of religion for its own purposes.[42] The other type of response was, ironically, religious revival, which became possible because the Synodal Church could not monopolize Russian Orthodoxy altogether; room for robust religious development and expression remained despite the external constraints and controls. Believers found diverse ways to encounter the divine, to cultivate their religious consciousness, and to deepen their faith. Their determination and persistence sustained the nineteenth-century religious revival, which culminated in the Russian religious-philosophical renaissance at the end of the century.[43] By then many religious believers and seekers were beginning to demand constitutional recognition of the spiritual freedom they had discovered within themselves. Through "independent religious innovation" they had become "religious agents," as Paul Werth characterizes the process.[44] An inner dynamic of the long religious revival drove many people toward recognition of freedom of conscience as a human right and, therefore, toward liberalism and constitutionalism. Russian neoidealist philosophers like Bulgakov sought to make the logic of this dynamic explicit and inescapable. But there were powerful obstacles—the autocracy first of all—that impeded and ultimately thwarted the dynamic.

Philokalic Foundations

The long religious revival began with hesychastic spirituality and contemplative monasticism.[45] Hesychasm (from the Greek word *hesychia*, "stillness") is a mystical tradition of contemplative prayer going back to the fourth-century Cappadocians. It achieved prominence in Eastern Orthodoxy through the work of the fourteenth-century Byzantine theologian St. Gregory Palamas (1296–1359). In the "hesychast controversy" St. Gregory defended the position (against Barlaam the Calabrian) that through strict ascetic discipline and prayer (especially the Jesus Prayer) the hesychast could experience God (in his divine energies or grace) and aspire toward *theosis* or deification—Orthodoxy's supreme ideal.[46] Hesychasm was revived in the late eighteenth century by the *Philokalia*, a collection of patristic and medieval mystical-ascetic texts prepared by Greek monks on Mount Athos and published in Venice in 1782.[47] A Church Slavonic edition of the *Philokalia*, known as the *Dobrotoliubie*, was published in Moscow in 1793. It was prepared under the direction of the Ukrainian monk Paisii Velichkovskii (1722–1794).[48] St. Paisii spent seventeen years on the Holy Mountain before moving in 1763 to Moldavia, where he and his disciples at the Neamt Monastery revived the hesychastic tradition of spiritual eldership (*starchestvo*).[49]

Thus it happened that "neo-hesychasm" came to Russia from Moldavia. Optina Pustyn' emerged as the main center of spiritual eldership in Russia. A hermitage or skete was built near the main monastery in 1821; until then the Petrine *Spiritual Regulation* had banned them.[50] The Optina Pustyn' hermitage was home to three famous elders (*startsy*): Leonid (Nagolkin) (1768–1841), Makarii (Ivanov) (1788–1860), and Amvrosii (Grenkov) (1812–1891).[51] Their illustrious predecessor was St. Serafim of Sarov (1754–1833).[52] Serafim and the Optina elders modified, even transformed, certain traditional aspects of *starchestvo*. First, they "advocated the interiorization of spiritual life," in contrast to an emphasis on strict physical asceticism and meticulous observance of church canons and rituals. Second, they expanded the audience for elders' spiritual guidance from primarily other monks to all those who sought it. Such guidance was offered in person and by letter; when collected and published, the letters formed a distinctive type of Russian spiritual literature.[53] More and more people, from cultural elites to large numbers of lay believers and pilgrims, came to revere elders as models of spiritual perfection. Gradually *starchestvo* came to be regarded as the "quintessence of Orthodox spirituality."[54] One need only think of Dostoevskii: Zosima in *The Brothers Karamazov* was modeled on Amvrosii (St. Ambrose of Optina) after Dostoevskii's pilgrimage to the hermitage in June 1878.[55]

Slavophilism

Before Dostoevskii the Slavophiles eagerly promoted spiritual elders and the philokalic tradition more generally. This was one way they played such an important role in Russia's long religious revival. The key figures were Ivan Kireevskii (1806–1856) and Aleksei Khomiakov (1804–1860). The first experienced a "conversion," as his pious wife Natalia Petrovna née Arbeneva (1809–1900) called it, which was completed by 1842 under her influence and that of her spiritual adviser, the monk Filaret (1758–1842) of the Novospasskii Monastery. Kireevskii immersed himself in the religious world of Optina Pustyn', located near his family estate.[56] According to V. V. Zenkovsky, "his whole personality and spiritual world were shot through with the rays of religious consciousness. His was a genuine and profound religious *experience*, and in giving it meaning he drew very close to the immense spiritual wealth that was opened to him in the Optina Cloister."[57] The Optina elder Makarii was the most important spiritual and intellectual influence on Kireevskii's life from 1845 on.[58] They collaborated on an important project: translating and publishing Greek patristic texts, in effect continuing Velichkovskii's work. Their publication program resulted in sixteen volumes by 1860.[59]

Through Orthodox spiritual experience and faith Kireevskii arrived at his landmark concept of "believing reason" or faithful reason, which would have a formative role in the future development of Russian religious thought.[60] By integrating faith and reason, it strives to achieve "the inner wholeness of the mind essential for the comprehension of the integral truth."[61] Kireevskii insisted that spiritual wholeness—the preeminent Slavophile principle—was an ideal and aspiration; as a moral task it depended on human freedom. Referring to both Kireevskii and Khomiakov, Nikolai Berdiaev called Slavophile philosophy "the philosophy of the integral life of the spirit," which was impossible without freedom.[62] While integral reason must be faithful, so too should faith be reasonable. Khomiakov wrote of "intelligent faith," and Kireevsky asked, "What kind of faith is it that is incompatible with reason?"[63] Both thinkers deplored blind faith and religious fanaticism. They firmly defended freedom of conscience as the very condition of genuine faith, which can only come freely from within, not from coercion by external authority. Berdiaev remarked that the Slavophiles' "love of freedom was astonishing."[64]

Religious experience was no less formative for Khomiakov than for Kireevskii.[65] Their fellow Slavophile Iurii Samarin (1819–1876) was the first to emphasize the experiential character of his theology, especially for his ecclesiology or theory of the Church.[66] For him the Church was an expe-

riential reality, a "living organism of truth and love" (as Samarin put it). The true Church is one through its free communal experience and embodiment of the Holy Spirit.[67] The idea of *sobornost'* (conciliarity)—a neologism coined later, by others, to express Khomiakov's vision—was premised on inner freedom. S. S. Khoruzhii defined it as "*the freedom of self-realization in truth.*"[68] Samarin celebrated Khomiakov's ideas as a ringing defense of freedom of conscience, writing that he "represented an original *manifestation of total freedom in religious consciousness*, one nearly unprecedented in our land." According to Samarin, his legacy affirms that the Church and faith are perfectly compatible with civil freedom, "in the sense of the absence of external compulsion in matters of conscience," and with freedom of thought, "the most precious, most sacred, most necessary of all the freedoms."[69] While the Slavophiles' teaching on conscience as inner truth and freedom was not yet the liberal concept of freedom of conscience as an individual right guaranteed by law, nonetheless it helped promote the rise of such a concept.[70]

Monastic Encounters with the Divine

Having discovered the ideal Orthodox Church through the Optina elders and patristic writings, the Slavophiles despaired at the reality of the Petrine state church. Yet they could find hope in the new Russian monasteries. The spiritual authority of elders was a major factor in the growth of Russian monasticism after the disaster of secularization in the eighteenth century. Their authority came not primarily from the institutional Church but from their own spiritual experience and charisma. Elders helped make monasteries holy places, as did saints' relics and miracle-working icons. As Scott Kenworthy remarks in his masterful history of the Trinity–St. Sergius Lavra, monasteries became "the destination for the massive upsurge of pilgrimage in the nineteenth century, as millions of believers from all social backgrounds were annually drawn to the relics of famous saints, the solemn liturgies, and the living holy men who were the real-life Zosimas." They were, he says, places "par excellence of encounter with the divine."[71]

The nineteenth century saw a dramatic increase in the number of monasteries and in the number of monks, nuns, and novices, with female monastics substantially outnumbering their male counterparts by the early twentieth century.[72] Women monastics were inspired by the ideal of ascetic life and by the example of spiritual elders, but they were also devoted to educational, charitable, and otherwise philanthropic service.[73] Russian monasticism became a "mass phenomenon," in Kenworthy's characterization, not only because monks and nuns were now largely commoners by social origin

but also (which is more important) because of its success in communicating its contemplative ideals (hesychasm and *starchestvo*) and in meeting the spiritual needs of lay believers.[74] The main reason for their success was that Russian monasteries were places of meaningful religious experience, both for their tens of thousands of community members and for millions of pilgrims and visitors.[75]

Elders exemplified the essential role of spiritual experience in the pursuit of holiness and *theosis*. Among ordinary believers, religious experience could take a variety of forms and have diverse meanings. (Following James, I use "religious experience" to mean an awareness, feeling, or sense of the presence of the divine or of the holy. Merely viewing an icon is not a religious experience; venerating one is, if it evokes a feeling of the presence of the divine.) It could be inspired by contact with elders, priests, and other revered figures.[76] It could flow from conventional religious practices such as prayer, liturgy and other forms of worship, the sacraments (including confession), pilgrimage, and veneration of saints, icons, and holy relics. It could accompany wonder at being and creation, or it could be evoked by beauty, perhaps especially by music. It could be elicited by compassion and love for human persons and in reverence for their dignity. One path to religious experience was through education and learning—from the saints' lives and popular religious literature to theological scholarship but also secular learning and self-improvement. Another path was through "good works," from dutiful action to philanthropic service, charity, and, ultimately, building the kingdom of God on earth.

For a person of faith a wide range of human activities could elicit or become religious experience, thereby clarifying and empowering the ideals that drive self-determination. Ultimately for such a person life as a whole could be approached prayerfully, lived in accordance with higher spiritual ideals, and filled with a living awareness of the presence of the divine—*Shekhinah*, to use the beautiful and evocative Hebrew word. What is essential to this conception of religious experience is human agency and initiative, or faith in Bulgakov's sense of the term. For him faith involves human will, first to open oneself to religious experience and then to deepen one's faith and ideals through cultivating such experience. In short, Bulgakov understood faith as spiritual work—asceticism (*podvizhnichestvo*), as he put it in the title of his famous *Vekhi* essay.[77] In nineteenth-century Russia monastic life, with its ascetic discipline (especially in the hermitages), was a powerful demonstration of spiritual work and religious experience. Surely it is striking, as Kenworthy notes, that "massive numbers of individuals—from a variety of classes and social backgrounds—sought to pursue the most rigor-

ous path of spiritual life" by joining monastic communities.[78] Their example inspired still larger numbers of people.

Each year, especially after 1861, millions of Russian pilgrims traveled to monasteries and other holy sites. Pilgrimage was one of the main forms of religious devotion in nineteenth-century Russia.[79] For many who embarked on a journey, pilgrimage was both its own type of religious experience and a pathway to other types.[80] Pilgrims went to holy places for different reasons, including spiritual guidance, to experience the holiness of the sacred site, or to venerate a miracle-working icon or a saint's relics. In the case of the Trinity–St. Sergius Lavra, Kenworthy writes: "Thus the monastery drew pilgrims because it represented heaven on earth. It was holy because of all the prayers that had been said and all the people in it who had engaged in spiritual struggles and worked out their salvation for centuries, many of them saints."[81] If prayers and spiritual struggles made monasteries holy, then faith—the human act of veneration—activated the miracle-working power of icons and saints' relics.

Icons and Women's Religious Experience

Icon stories tell us something about the religious experiences that generated the stories in the first place. These sacred stories recount the life of famous icons, from the circumstances of their discovery to the healings and other miraculous or heroic events associated with their veneration. Typically the stories begin with the experience of individual believers, with their prayers and dreams, then show how the icon became central to a particular faith community (such as a monastery). Interestingly, *startsy* frequently appeared in icon stories, usually as part of a dream or a vision. Vera Shevzov explains why this is significant: "Icon stories in this respect often pulled the dynamics of religious experience back to the inner world of the individual and demanded an independent exercise of will and discernment."[82] In these stories the *starets* was internalized as a type of second conscience, as if to ensure that no one would mistake his role for an external preacher of the truth. Part of the message was that faith was the inner core of religious experience. It could even work miracles.

The veneration of miracle-working icons and saints' relics (in and outside of monasteries) has attracted special interest among scholars of religion in Russia.[83] There are two related reasons for this interest. The first, as I have just suggested, is what the veneration of icons and holy relics reveals about faith and its relation to religious experience. Shevzov has done fundamental work exploring this relationship. She emphasizes that for everyone who experienced a miracle-working icon, faith was the enabling condition of the

experience. The faithful came "to a specially revered icon as a locus of divine presence, as a possibility of immediate personal encounter with the holy that was itself beyond history." Together with the individual experience, it was believed that the collective and historical faith of the community that venerated the icon could increase its miracle-working power. Thus veneration was also an act of remembering all the faithful who had come before to experience God's grace. "Remembering was integral to an icon's efficacy," Shevzov writes.[84]

The Slavophile Ivan Kireevskii seems to have understood the veneration of icons in just the way Shevzov indicates. There is a remarkable passage in Alexander Herzen's memoirs in which he is quoted as follows:

> I once stood at a shrine, gazed upon a miracle-working icon of the Mother of God, and thought of the childlike faith of the people praying before it; some women, infirm people, and old men knelt and, crossing themselves, bowed down to the earth. With ardent hope I beheld the holy features, and little by little the secret of their miraculous power began to become clear for me. Yes, this was not simply a board with an image—for ages it had absorbed these streams of passionate hopes, the prayers of afflicted and unfortunate people; it must have become filled with the power pouring from it and reflected upon believers. It had become a living organism, a meeting place between the Creator and people. Thinking about this, I looked again at the old men, at the women with children prostrate in the dust, and at the holy icon—then I myself saw the animated features of the Mother of God; she looked with mercy and love at these simple people . . . and I fell to my knees and meekly prayed to her.[85]

For Kireevskii, "the secret of their miraculous power" was that icons were conduits for divine-human encounter. The faithful were not merely passive recipients of supernatural agency; they were themselves agents in the divine-human process.

Pursuing a research interest closely related to the veneration of icons, Shevzov has analyzed Russian Orthodox thought about miracles, selecting a group of academic theologians (generally those who were graduates of, or professors in, the theological academies). In a subtle distinction she found that while these thinkers did not maintain that faith was necessary for miracles to occur, faith "did matter in the process of *identifying* a phenomenon or event as miraculous"—that is, in the process of discernment and perception. In this sense miracles were dependent on faith, as Pavel Florenskii (1882–1937) in particular concluded.[86] If inner spiritual effort (faith) could help someone to "see" or apprehend the miraculous, then the exercise of

faith could deepen the individual's sense of personal agency and self-worth. It could be empowering and liberating. This emphasis on the inner role of faith helped counter the fear that miracles, if taken as external coercive events, could be enslaving because they paralyzed the will. According to Shevzov: "In contrast to modern enlightened rationalists and Deists who denied miracles and revelatory acts of God in the name of freedom of spirit and independence of thought, Orthodox thinkers argued that those who embrace the notion of divine revelation 'know that they do not lose freedom but discover it.'"[87]

The second reason for scholarly interest in the veneration of icons and holy relics is that such veneration demonstrated that believers could take the initiative, assert their independence, and challenge the official Church. Shevzov shows how the Synodal Church's efforts to regulate piety and suppress "superstition" were resisted by the laity, who wanted to maintain control of their own religious experiences.[88] In one striking case from 1887 "believers from the Kursk diocese criticized church officials for conducting a scientific analysis of the spring water in which a particular icon had been found and that was now being credited with healing powers. They claimed that they would never attribute the power of healing to the water. That power was to be found in 'the deep faith in the miracle-working nature of the icon which drew [believers] from hundreds and thousands of miles for prayer and repentance before it.'" In the next decade there appeared to be a growing crisis of episcopal authority as the laity defended the veneration of icons that they held to be miracle-working. Shevzov refers to a stark comment made in 1900 by residents of the town of Mozdok (Vladikavkaz Diocese) and filed with the Holy Synod: "the bishop is subordinate to the icon, and not the icon to him."[89]

Russia's religious culture was Marian-centered, and Shevzov has been rightly credited with undertaking "the first systematic examination of Marianism in 19th-century Russia."[90] In Russia believers have experienced Mary not primarily through visions and apparitions (as in the Christian West) but rather through Marian icons. A rich tradition of icon stories grew from these experiences. In the nineteenth century many of these stories, at least half, related the religious experiences of women. Through them "the experiences of women entered into the annals of Russian Church history," Shevzov writes. Here are some of her conclusions from Marian icon stories immortalizing these experiences:

> She [Mary] was the face of hope to which believers would turn to find their own "faces" when their identity was critically threatened by the

> ravages of physical or emotional ailments. The believers described in such stories did not simply blend into a faceless mass. . . . While they assembled around a Marian icon, believers did so as distinct persons, and they remained as unique persons before the image, each with his or her own unrepeatable fate. The corporate prayer into which their cries may have blended still preserved the distinct voice of every person present. The power of healing, as the lives of Marian icons testify, consequently remained rooted in the faith and hope of the person.

Like icon stories telling of dreams or visons of *startsy*, Mary's image "often accompanied stories that related the exercise of independent will and discernment by lay men and women."[91] Or, we might say, the exercise of freedom of conscience.

The experiences depicted in Marian icon stories were not, of course, the only type of women's religious experience in Russia. As noted above, in the nineteenth century there was a great increase in the number of women's monasteries and other religious communities (*zhenskie obshchiny*).[92] Women's asceticism had a very strong service ideal, and women religious were deeply engaged in social welfare, educational, and charitable activities.[93] Their social engagement was held up as a model for (male) monastic reform in this direction. Apart from monastic communities, women found more and more opportunities in society (especially from the 1860s) for education, work outside the home, cultural engagement, social and civic activity, public service and involvement, and, in general, for greater autonomy and self-realization. The Russian Orthodox Church itself was increasingly a source of some of these opportunities. For many women their work and service held deep religious meaning. Such a sensibility was highly consequential, as William Wagner has shown in an incisive essay. For one thing, it led in the early twentieth century to a movement for the restoration of the office of deaconess in the Church. The Church Council of 1917–1918 heard petitions to this effect and was generally supportive.[94]

Women's religiosity helped shape and reshape images of womanhood that were articulated and debated by Orthodox writers (almost exclusively male). Although a conservative, domestic image remained dominant, there was also a more liberal variant of this "Orthodox ideal of domesticity." One of Wagner's liberal Orthodox writers is Aleksei Govorov, who wrote a treatise on the "woman question" (1907).[95] In it Govorov argued that Christianity established the principles of "equality of rights for men and women" and "the moral dignity of the individual personality." Historical progress consisted in the realization of these principles.[96] Wagner also calls to our

attention one E. Liuleva, a Christian woman writer whose ideas were even more progressive and far-reaching. In her 1906 pamphlet *The Free Woman and Christianity* she wrote, "Christ posited the principle of the liberation of women and gave them access to the only work necessary for humanity, the seeking of the Kingdom of God." With its historical growth in power the Church betrayed Christ's message of full equality and participation, but in the modern era "women slowly have conquered for themselves the rights given them by Christ and have struggled ceaselessly for their human dignity, independence, and freedom." Women, she concluded, "not only can but must insist on their independence and freedom, and their obligation before God and humanity, to throw off the chains placed on them."[97] It is difficult to determine to what extent Govorov and Liuleva appreciated that freedom of conscience was intrinsic to the concept of human dignity to which they appealed, but Liuleva in particular seems to have spoken from the depths of religious experience.

Seeking Spiritual Freedom in the Theological Academies

Russia's theological academies were integral to the country's religious revival and thus to the problem of spiritual freedom.[98] The four academies—in Kiev, Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Kazan—were established in their modern form by Alexander I's reform of the whole system of ecclesiastical education, which also included the diocesan seminaries and lower-level schools (parish and district).[99] Filaret (Drozdov), first as rector of the St. Petersburg Theological Academy (1812–1819) and then as metropolitan of Moscow (1821–1867), sought to give the academies and thus the Church a new intellectual direction. He opposed the dominance of Latin scholasticism in the church schools (and the use of Latin instead of Russian) and turned to rediscovery of the church fathers and the Eastern patristic tradition, through which he wanted to bring about a reawakening of Orthodoxy. According to Robert Nichols, "Filaret's ascendency among the school reformers marks the beginnings of a Russian Orthodox theology." Yet he did not neglect philosophy and made both theology and philosophy central to the curriculum of the new ecclesiastical schools, thus laying the foundations for the rich Russian tradition of philosophical idealism and religious philosophy.[100]

Georges Florovsky devoted a chapter section of his classic *Ways of Russian Theology* to "theology in the reformed ecclesiastical schools." Several of his observations are worth remembering in the present context, beginning with his first sentence: "Filaret was one of the most influential and prominent representatives of the new 'theology of the heart' taught in the reformed ecclesiastical schools." Quoting from the reform statute (30 Au-

gust 1814), he continues: "The aim of this instruction was 'the education of the inner man,' by imparting a living and well-founded personal conviction in the saving truths of faith. 'The inner education of youths for an active Christianity will be the sole aim of these schools.'"[101] This "theology of the heart" in the church schools corresponded to the broader experiential nature of the Russian religious revival. Florovsky indicates that Kirill Bogoslavskii-Platonov (1780–1844), rector of the Moscow Theological Academy, was close to the disciples of the Moldavian *startsy* and that the academy itself became a "semi-hermitage," a kind of learned monastery of the heart.[102] By the early twentieth century this milieu produced, in Paul Valliere's words, "perhaps the most thorough-going theological liberal of his time" in the person of Mikhail Tareev (1866–1934), professor of moral theology at the Moscow academy. Freedom of conscience was at the center of his "theory of Christian freedom."[103]

Florovsky opposed the "theology of the heart" to another current (which he disliked), the "moral-rationalistic school," but it too was experiential. According to him, its best representative was Father Gerasim Pavskii (1787–1863), chair of Hebrew at St. Petersburg Theological Academy and professor of theology at St. Petersburg University. Florovsky says that Pavskii professed a highly personal religious-moralistic idealism and quotes him as follows: "Religion is the feeling by which man's spirit inwardly embraces and is blessed by the Invisible, Eternal, and Holy. The study of religion is designed only to awaken, enliven, and nourish this holy feeling, so that it might strengthen, enlighten, and enflame the inner man." Clearly spiritual freedom was integral to Pavskii's understanding of religion as human experience of the holy.[104]

The theological academies undertook a remarkable research program that involved extensive translations of patristic texts and a large body of historical and theological scholarship. Initiated in the 1820s and continuing for the rest of the century, this massive project focused on the fourth-century Cappadocian fathers (Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Gregory of Nyssa) and on Maximus the Confessor in the seventh century.[105] These and other church fathers, especially in the Byzantine East, developed a theological anthropology (or conception of human nature) based on Genesis 1:26, "Let us make man in our image, according to our likeness." They interpreted the verse to mean that while human beings are graciously created in God's image, they must assimilate to God's likeness by their own free will and spiritual effort—in short, by self-determination. The transcendent culmination of this divine-human process is *theosis*. This "similitude anthropology" closely related human dignity to the capacity

for self-determination, perfectibility, and free assimilation to the divine likeness.[106]

What Michelson calls "the sacred tradition of theocentric humanism" entered into Russia's public sphere when the theological academies began to translate the patristic writings into Russian. The most extensive effort was the Moscow Theological Academy's *Works of the Holy Fathers in Russian Translation*, which began publication in 1843 and eventually ran to forty-eight volumes. In addition, there was a series of supplemental volumes containing a wide range of biographical, historical, and scholarly materials.[107] By the 1860s Russian academic theologians were promoting a moral (rather than strictly mystical or ascetic) understanding of *theosis*, according to which salvation follows from human striving for moral perfection.[108] Among the studies that Michelson highlights is Pavel Soliarskii's *Orthodox Moral Theology*, which was commonly used as a seminary handbook in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Soliarskii wrote that the human soul possesses "free will, according to which it can determine its actions based on the idea of what is good and holy; based not on external coercion but on the law of its own reason and conscience."[109] Only through reason, conscience, and free will could human beings approximate to the divine likeness and make progress toward *theosis*. This was "an entirely new anthropology of moral perfectibility, human dignity, and theocentric freedom." By the end of the nineteenth century this neo-patristic anthropology, Michelson concludes, offered theological support for the defense of freedom of conscience and for Russian liberalism more generally.[110]

The "Clerical Question" and an Administrative Discourse of Freedom of Conscience

In the second half of the nineteenth century the parish clergy formed another vital element in Russia's religious revival. Their newfound role was a consequence of their education in the reformed ecclesiastical schools. Gregory Freeze refers to the "radical improvement in clergy's educational standards." He reports that by 1860, 83 percent of all priests in the empire held a seminary degree. Twenty years later the figure had increased to 97 percent (though by 1904 it dropped to 64 percent). Educated clergy were painfully aware of the discrepancy between their sense of self-worth and aspirations, on the one hand, and their status, income, and opportunities, on the other. Further, they increasingly resented their ecclesiastical superiors, "whose high station—at least in part—derived from their once superior education, not their spiritual superiority as monastic ascetics." The result, Freeze concludes, "was rising dissatisfaction among parish clergy—over their meagre

incomes, humiliating dependence upon parishioners and total subordination to the whims of 'tyrannical' bishops."[111] In 1858 a famous statement of the emerging new clerical consciousness was published abroad and smuggled back into Russia. It was written by Father Ioann Belliustin (1819–1890), who saw priests as the natural moral and religious leaders of their communities but thought their role was thwarted by the privileged and powerful episcopate. "Altogether, Belliustin's essay offered a devastating portrait of the Church," in Freeze's summation.[112]

Belliustin's sensational essay prompted public discussion for the first time of "the clerical question" and raised expectations that the Church might participate in and benefit from the unfolding era of Great Reforms. The new minister of internal affairs, Petr Valuev (appointed in 1861), was a champion of clerical reform—and beyond that of freedom of conscience. In September 1861 he submitted a lengthy report, "On the Present Condition of the Orthodox Church and Clergy." In it he wrote that the Church "resorts to the display of force and relies primarily upon its ties with civil authorities" to combat non-Orthodox religions. Its reliance on the state deprived the Church of spiritual independence and energy. He deplored the clergy's low social status, demoralization, and "feeling of profound, bitter abasement." Diocesan hierarchs reign over priests, Valuev wrote, "with the most cruel despotism, and that despotism is all the more oppressive because it is exerted mainly through the avarice of diocesan chancelleries and consistories."[113] His analysis of the condition of the Russian Orthodox Church, together with his efforts to deal with problems confronting non-Orthodox religions in Russia (such as forced conversions and laws on mixed marriage in the Baltic region), led Valuev to advocate a broad policy of freedom of conscience for the empire. He was the first senior government official to do so, and his efforts abetted the emergence of "freedom of conscience" as an administrative discourse in the 1860s.[114] Several years earlier, in 1857, Boris Chicherin called freedom of conscience "the first and most sacred right of a citizen."[115] It was the first of the seven core principles that Chicherin identified—on the eve of the Great Reforms—as constituting Russian liberalism as a political program.[116]

Dmitrii Tolstoi, chief procurator of the Holy Synod from 1865 to 1880, also wanted priests to have more authority, autonomy, and influence. His reform program was designed to achieve those ends. "The overarching goal," according to Freeze, "was to reconstitute the clergy into a more dynamic, more effective, more committed class of pastors—a change intended to serve primarily the interests of the Church." The aim was to transform the clergy "from a moribund hereditary estate into a more dynamic pro-

fession of zealous, dedicated pastors."[117] The prospect of reform, set against the background of the clergy's higher educational achievements and professional ambitions, led to the emergence of what Freeze has called "clerical liberalism" among younger priests. Initially it concentrated on estate (*soslovie*) concerns but later developed in the direction of broader social issues, "suggesting that a true pastor must be concerned with temporal issues as well as spiritual ones."[118] This evolution followed naturally from the new conception of priest as pastor, which gave more attention to moral-spiritual development and social ministry, in contrast to the previous primary emphasis on liturgical and sacramental functions.

Orthodox Pastoral Service: From Parish Charities to the ORRP

The development of a pastoral sensibility, even a sense of mission, among Orthodox clergy was a significant aspect of church life in the postreform period.[119] Pastoral service, compared to traditional conceptions of the priestly role, was more experiential and "lived." It involved preaching, charity, popular religious enlightenment and education more generally, various other forms of social engagement and outreach, and even, by the early twentieth century, politics. It was premised on (and helped deepen) respect for lay persons as responsible religious agents and as active participants, moved by faith and conscience, in the Church's work of building a more Christian society. (Of course, lay participation in pastoral work, and more generally the laity's increasing engagement with Orthodoxy and parish life—the way they lived and experienced Orthodoxy—deepened their own faith, conscience, and self-respect.) Beginning in the 1860s, especially in St. Petersburg and Moscow, pastors worked to revitalize their parishes and turn them into faithful and socially committed communities.[120] They organized educational and charitable associations in the hope that the revival of parish life would reverberate throughout Russian society and base it more firmly on Christian moral and social principles.[121] Indeed, as Jennifer Hedda has written of Russian pastors, "they were motivated in large part by their shared ideal of bringing the Kingdom of God into reality through preaching and acting on an ethic of Christ-like love and service to others."[122] Charitable work was especially important to this mission and in creating a sense of Christian community. In the 1860s and 1870s most Moscow and St. Petersburg parishes established charities, involving clergy and laity in a common endeavor that fostered mutual respect.[123] In Hedda's words, "ideally, Christian charity respected the dignity and humanity of those who received it and ennobled the souls of those who gave it."[124]

Two parish priests stand out as pioneers of the pastoral movement. The

first was Father A. V. Gumilevskii (1830–1869), whose parish, the Sands, was one of the poorest in St. Petersburg. There, in the early 1860s, he founded a Sunday school for workers, a regular day school, and the capital's first confraternity (*bratstvo*)—the latter hailed as "the first open experiment in Christian social work in Russia."[125] He disseminated his ideas about church and society in the journal he helped found and edit, *Spirit of a Christian*. The second pioneer was Ioann Sergiev (1829–1908). This was Father John of Kronstadt, perhaps the most famous Russian priest of the postreform period.[126] He combined charismatic, even ecstatic fulfillment of his priestly duties (prayer, liturgical services, performing the sacraments) with selfless devotion to Christian social work, poor relief, and charity. In both of these aspects of his pastoral calling Fr. John proceeded from lived experience of the divine, just as he wanted to help others achieve, in Kizenko's words, "a personal, intellectual, and emotional internalization of Orthodoxy." But in his political views he was no liberal.[127] He rejected freedom of conscience on the Augustinian grounds that human beings are fallen and corrupt, creatures of passion whose sinful conscience cannot guide them to the good. This conservative theological approach, while hardly rare, was not typical of the Russian pastoral movement (see below).[128]

The St. Petersburg Theological Academy, beginning with the academy statute of 1869, played an important role in training clergy for pastoral work and in promoting a social mission for the Church.[129] The 1884 statute, a product of the era of counterreforms, increased administrative control over students and faculty but also improved academic standards. The statute specified that the academies were "to provide higher theological education in the spirit of Orthodoxy for the enlightened service of the Church in the pastoral, educational and other fields of activity."[130] The St. Petersburg academy admirably met this goal. Its graduates were well educated and prepared for leadership roles in church and society. Many students at the academy came to understand their vocation as Christian service to others. They served in the Sunday school movement, in parish charities, and in the Society for the Dissemination of Moral-Religious Enlightenment in the Spirit of the Orthodox Church (ORRP). The academy thrived under the direction of Bishop Antonii (Vadkovskii) (1846–1912), who served it as inspector (1885–1887) and rector (1887–1892) before becoming metropolitan of St. Petersburg in 1898.[131] According to Hedda, "Bishop Antonii had a decisive influence in affirming and articulating the importance of the school as a center of the church's public religious mission." He saw that Russian society was experiencing a "strong upsurge of religious feeling," which he thought should be met by an effective pastoral response. For him this involved not

only teaching but also charity or "preaching by deeds." In Hedda's estimation, "Bishop Antonii's pastoral leadership had an electrifying effect on the students of the St. Petersburg academy."[132]

Under Bishop Antonii the St. Petersburg Theological Academy became closely connected with the ORRP.[133] The ORRP was another vehicle of the Russian religious revival and indication of its experiential quality.[134] Founded in 1880–1881 by local clergy, its original mission was to counter the influence of the English evangelist Lord Radstock (Granville Waldegrade) and his Russian disciple Colonel Vasilii A. Pashkov.[135] Soon, however, the ORRP began to take a less defensive and more positive role in responding to the educated public's growing interest in religious and philosophical questions. The society organized lectures and meetings outside of church services for the purpose specified in its name, broadly interpreted to include more philosophical topics such as the relation between faith and reason. The lectures drew large audiences, primarily from St. Petersburg *obshchestvo* (educated society), the ORRP's main target in its first five years. But within a few years of the government's suppression of Pashkovism in 1884, the ORRP broadened its pastoral mission. In the 1890–1906 period ORRP lectures (often in the form of *besedy* or colloquia) dramatically expanded their reach to include the whole urban population. In 1904, for example, six thousand lectures were presented at eighty-one locations throughout the city to a total audience of about 2.2 million. At the same time, the ORRP sponsored a range of other activities and institutions such as charities, amateur choirs, public libraries, schools, publications, church construction, and church-based temperance societies. By 1904 the ORRP and one of its offshoots, the Aleksandr Nevskii Temperance Society, had become, according to Hedda, "the capital's largest and most successful public organizations."[136]

In the course of the 1880s a central aspect of the ORRP's work became its mission to the working class.[137] Students from the St. Petersburg Theological Academy, who made up a large percentage of the society's active membership, established ORRP outreach centers in the city's factories and working-class neighborhoods. Bishop Antonii strongly encouraged this mission. In his address to the graduating class of 1889, he described it as part of the human work of building the Kingdom of God.[138] Many workers welcomed the Church's mission of "moral-religious enlightenment."[139] This reception was one aspect of the broader phenomenon of workers' religious life, which historians such as Mark Steinberg and Page Herrlinger have explored most fruitfully as another variety of Russian religious experience. The experience of workers (of being wounded and humiliated, of suffering and exploitation) lent itself to a religious type of interpretation, and some of them (the

worker-poets) expressed their experience in sacred and poetic language. "Preoccupied with the self (the individual, the inward person, *lichnost'*) and with the soul (*dusha*, *dukhovnost'*), workers wrote constantly about the natural dignity of each human being and the suffering of the self," as Steinberg evocatively puts it. Their wounds, and the spiritual "wandering" that ensued, "can be seen as analogous to one of the central narratives and functions of religion: the promise and the journey of suffering and healing, but also the search to know God."[140] This wandering and searching, within and beyond Orthodoxy, led more and more people to recognize freedom of conscience from within and to demand it as a right for themselves and others. Thus Page Herrlinger, referring mainly to working-class attitudes in the post-1905 period, writes, "the laity exhibited a more critical attitude toward religious issues, marked by a greater desire for knowledge and a higher expectation of self-determination in religious matters, both on an individual and parish level."[141]

Pastoral Work and Liberal Theology

To return to the broader pastoral movement: its ultimate ideal, as Hedda has emphasized in *His Kingdom Come*, was the Kingdom of God. For both clergy and laity, pastoral service was primarily experiential: it was the experience of working in community with one's fellow human beings to build the Kingdom of God on earth (or at least to make the earth ready for its advent). Scott Kenworthy is right to characterize it as a moral endeavor.[142] Pastoral experience fostered respect for freedom of conscience as pastors, parishioners, students, and other participants in the movement came to appreciate that they were all capable of freely recognizing the ideal of the Kingdom of God (i.e., the supreme good through love and justice), of freely determining their will by that ideal, and of freely working to realize the ideal. Freedom of conscience, as the human capacity for "ideal self-determination" (which is the anthropological basis for freedom of conscience as a human right), is the very precondition of the Kingdom of God as a moral endeavor, although, of course, not everyone involved in pastoral work recognized it as such. To become more conscious of it, they could turn to the nascent Russian liberal theological tradition, which supported pastoral experience and gave it intellectual articulation.

Liberal theology, which had its origins in German idealism, was an international trend emphasizing that "the goal of Christianity was the moral integration of humanity into the Kingdom of God," as Kenworthy succinctly puts it.[143] It acquired an explicit social justice dimension with the American Social Gospel movement, to which Russian pastoral and theological devel-

opments have been compared.[144] In Russia Archimandrite Fedor (Bukharev, 1824–1871) helped establish the new "this-worldly" direction in theology. He taught theology at Moscow Theological Academy (1846–1854) and Kazan Theological Academy (1854–1858), then worked as an ecclesiastical censor in St. Petersburg (1858–1862). The central theme of his work was that the Church should enter into the modern world and fully engage it, using all its resources for the purpose of Christianizing it and ultimately bringing about the Kingdom of God. Conservatives denounced his ideas (expounded in his 1860 book, *On Orthodoxy in Relation to the Modern World*) as a dangerous innovation. The controversy, which became known as the "Bukharev affair," led to the archimandrite's laicization in 1863.[145] By the turn of the twentieth century there was a revival of interest in him.[146] Significantly, the first chapter of the 1906 collection *The Free Conscience* was devoted to him as an example of someone who refused to compromise his conscience, although he paid dearly for it.[147]

Following Bukharev, the new direction in theology was pursued by Vladimir Solov'ev (1853–1900), Sergei Bulgakov, and other Russian religious-philosophical thinkers, who gave it profound development. In general, the liberal theological approach, in Russia and elsewhere, repudiated the Augustinian emphasis on human depravity and original sin, instead recognizing the possibility of human progress toward the ideal of the Kingdom of God and presupposing freedom of conscience as a condition of such progress. Salvation depended on moral effort, not on unmerited grace alone. The liberal theological approach, again in Russia and elsewhere, was (and is) opposed by conservatives who adhered to the Augustinian view that the human will was so corrupted by sin that any capacity for self-determination by the good was radically impaired. Therefore the conservatives rejected freedom of conscience and the possibility of human progress. For them, salvation was possible only by God's grace, channeled through the Church, the sacraments, and prescribed dogma (departure from which was heresy and threatened salvation). There was little or no place for human agency in the coming of the Kingdom of God.

Pastoral theology was one branch of theology that developed the new liberal approach. It did so in response to and as part of the pastoral movement, and thus was experiential in its foundations. Hedda indicates that one notable change in the pastoral literature was that by the 1880s the term *pastyr'* (pastor) was increasingly used in preference to *sviashchennik* (priest) in order to convey the "good shepherd" ideal of a parish priest who lovingly serves his flock instead of presiding over it as an authority figure uniquely invested with the power to perform the sacraments necessary for salvation.

She provides several examples of theological writers who expounded this pastoral ideal. One figure, Sergei Sollertinskii, professor of pastoral theology at St. Petersburg Theological Academy (and an early ORRP member), stressed that the essence of pastoral service was moral guidance through personal example (rather than doctrinal instruction). He thought the pastor's greatest responsibility was to cultivate the development of the individual's moral consciousness so that, as Hedda puts it, "the individual living in the world could strive consciously toward the good, working toward his own salvation and contributing to the salvation of others as well."[148]

These developments in pastoral theology coincided with further theological-philosophical expositions of the meaning of the idea of the Kingdom of God.[149] In the nineteenth century the most powerful exposition in the liberal direction was advanced by Russia's greatest religious philosopher Vladimir Solov'ev. He conceived the Kingdom of God as a divine-human project. He called it *bogochelovechestvo* (Godmanhood, theanthropy, divine humanity, or the humanity of God)—the central concept of his philosophy. He held that Godmanhood could not be achieved; salvation could not happen, and the Kingdom of God could not arrive without human aspiration and perfectibility toward the divine ideal, a process dependent on freedom of conscience. He was a principal figure in the Russian neo-idealist defense of freedom of conscience, as we will see in more detail below. The liberal theological approach did not necessarily entail political liberalism (constitutionalism and the rule of law) for everyone who took such an approach, but it did for Solov'ev.[150] It did, too, for a priest influenced by him, Father Grigorii Petrov (1867–1925), a graduate of the St. Petersburg Theological Academy and leading member of the ORRP.[151] His pastoral work, lectures, and writings brought him great popularity at the beginning of the twentieth century. His main theme was the Kingdom of God and human responsibility for building it. Very much like Solov'ev, he declared the full realization of the kingdom to be the "universal ideal of all humanity" and the purpose of history. God would fulfill that purpose once human beings learned to live in the spirit of truth, love, and justice and internalized "the Gospel as the foundation of life" (the title of his first book).[152]

By the Kingdom of God, Petrov understood "perfect life on earth—life based not on the dominion of force, of crude egoism, but on the principles of universal love, full justice, the recognition of all the legitimate rights of persons."[153] This conception led to his liberal political commitments. He has been called "the most prominent clerical figure" in the liberation movement that led to the revolution of 1905.[154] He joined the Constitutional Democratic (Kadet) Party and was elected on its ticket to the Second Duma in 1906.

He saw no incompatibility between political liberalism and what Solov'ev called "Christian politics," which held that social and political life should be guided by the ideal of the Kingdom of God.[155] Petrov deplored Peter the Great's subordination of the Church to state interests, all the more so in that such interests had nothing to do with creating the type of society conducive to the coming of the Kingdom of God. By the time of the 1905 revolution he came to support disestablishment of the Church. He believed that an independent church, no longer compromised by involvement with state power, could more effectively fulfill its primary purpose of building the Kingdom of God on earth. He wrote that the parish clergy had developed their own distinctive "pastoral sensibility" oriented to that very purpose and that it was precisely they who should lead the Church along the path of reform and renewal.[156]

The Russian Religious-Philosophical Renaissance

By the beginning of the twentieth century the pastoral movement, as well as the emerging movement for church reform (i.e., for ending the Synodal system), converged with the Russian religious renaissance, or rather with the Russian religious-philosophical renaissance. That it was a religious-philosophical renaissance indicates the involvement of cultural elites and educated society. In certain respects this distinguished it from the more popularly based long nineteenth-century religious revival. The religious renaissance contributed mightily to the vibrant cultural movement known as the Russian Silver Age, usually dated from about 1890 to the 1920s.[157] Intellectually the whole period was a "revolt against positivism," and therefore a revolt against the ideology that had formed the worldview of the Russian intelligentsia since the mid-nineteenth century.[158] In its religious-philosophical forms the revolt constituted another variety of Russian religious experience: it was experienced as an inner moral reaction against the positivist reduction of reality to the external empirical world, and for many that moral experience (the realization that "ought," and the freedom to act on it, cannot be explained away) precipitated religious searching and conversion. The revolt against positivism resulted in the intelligentsia's "God-seeking" (*bogoiskatel'stvo*), the very premise of which was freedom of conscience.[159] This was among the more visible aspects of the Russian religious renaissance.

The renaissance found recurrent inspiration in a constellation of sources and events that appeared around 1880. The publication that year of Dostoevskii's *The Brothers Karamazov* revealed to his readership the depths of Russian Orthodox spirituality. Dostoevskii's lifelong exploration of what he

called the "mystery of man" was taken up by his young philosopher friend, Vladimir Solov'ev, who delivered his famous *Lectures on Godmanhood* in 1878 to audiences of nearly a thousand. Two years later he defended his brilliant doctoral dissertation, *Critique of Abstract Principles*. In these and subsequent works he advanced a philosophically sophisticated, ecumenical vision of Christianity that had great spiritual and intellectual appeal. As noted above, Solov'ev made the realization of Godmanhood (*theosis*) dependent on freedom of conscience. From the early 1880s he sharply criticized the subordination of church to state in Russian history and religious intolerance in the Russian Empire.[160] Another source of God-seeking was Lev Tolstoi (1828–1910), whose experience of religious conversion forms the subject of *A Confession*, written in the late 1870s and published in Switzerland in 1884. An earlier set of proofs was copied, circulated, "and debated nationwide in private conversations and correspondence," according to Inessa Medzhibovskaya. She writes that Tolstoi "drew the attention of the whole nation to the precedent he set for wrestling with the oppressive state and its ideology for freedom of conscience."[161] The struggle for freedom of conscience occupied him in many subsequent works and was dramatically epitomized by his excommunication in 1901.

The ORRP, founded in 1880, also deserves to be seen as an integral part of the Russian religious renaissance or as a conduit for the merging of the century-long revival with the fin-de-siècle renaissance. Recall that in its first five years the ORRP drew audiences primarily from the St. Petersburg educated public, which showed a keen interest in religious and philosophical questions. After that, its reach extended to the whole urban population. In 1887, according to Hedda, "the annual report of the society stated it had adopted religious life in America as the model to imitate." This remarkable moment came in response to a lecture delivered the previous year by Aleksandr Lopukhin, a professor at the St. Petersburg Theological Academy and a specialist on comparative religion. In his lecture before the ORRP membership Lopukhin described religious life in the United States as free, flourishing, and deeply involved in society.[162] There was an obvious contrast to the state church in Russia. Following Lopukhin, Russian scholars often referred to the example of North American religious history in support of their arguments for religious freedom and beyond that for liberalism. Some argued quite specifically that liberalism developed from the demand for freedom of conscience and that its continued growth and vitality depended on a free and flourishing religious life.[163]

By the turn of the century the time was ripe for dialogue between the God-seeking intelligentsia and Orthodox clergy. In 1899 and 1900 the

ORRP held a series of meetings for clergy eager to respond to the intelligentsia's new religious-philosophical interests. No doubt many priests perceived a possible challenge to the Church. "The situation," Hedda writes, "was reminiscent of the atmosphere at the end of the 1870s, which had originally led to the founding of the ORRP," in response to the challenge posed by Radstock and Pashkov.[164] But the intervening two decades of pastoral experience meant that liberal clergy by and large welcomed a "mission to the intelligentsia," discerning a Christian ethos in the intelligentsia's aspiration for social justice.[165] Metropolitan Antonii (Vadkovskii) was deeply troubled by the alienation of the intelligentsia and sought its reconciliation with the Church. He supported the efforts of a group of prominent lay intellectuals and artists led by Dmitrii Merezhkovskii and Zinaida Gippius to begin a series of discussions with church figures. The result was the St. Petersburg Religious-Philosophical Assemblies, one of the most visible features of the Russian religious renaissance.[166] There were twenty-two sessions between November 1901 and April 1903, before Pobedonostsev suspended them. With Antonii's support, the Religious-Philosophical Assemblies were chaired by Bishop Sergei (Stragorodskii) (1867–1944), rector of the St. Petersburg Theological Academy and future patriarch. They were attended by academy faculty and students, clergy from the capital, and educated society. The meetings abetted the development of a "new religious consciousness" and the formation of a full-fledged religious intelligentsia, with subsequent religious-philosophical societies, journals, and publishing houses.[167]

John Basil refers to the St. Petersburg Religious-Philosophical Assemblies as a "semi-official platform" for public discussion of religious freedom.[168] Three sessions were devoted to the problem of freedom of conscience. Prince S. M. Volkonskii opened the discussion with a paper strongly defending the principle of freedom of conscience.[169] Coercion, he said, had no place in matters of faith. Coercion exercised over the non-Orthodox on behalf of the Orthodox majority was also coercion over the majority itself; it violated the conscience of everyone. In Russia, he continued, freedom of conscience depended on liberating the Church from state interference and on restoring its autonomy and spiritual authority (that is, on ending the Synodal system).[170] The Synod official V. M. Skvortsov replied that Russia was, as it should be, an "Orthodox autocratic state," which sharply limited the application of freedom of conscience.[171] (Skvortsov's position was held by the regime until it collapsed in 1917, dooming the prospects of freedom of conscience in Russia.) Other participants were also wary or critical of the concept of freedom of conscience, fearing in particular that rural areas of the empire would oppose or simply not understand it.[172] Bishop Sergei (Stragorodskii)

agreed with Volkonskii on one essential point: the state must stop using the Church as a means for its own purposes. "Then the question of freedom of conscience can be raised." He meant "then and only then," for in Russia the fate of freedom of conscience rested on freeing the Orthodox Church from state control. Without basic church reform, the introduction of freedom of conscience would keep the Church's hands tied while unbinding those of its competitors, as Sergei put it.[173] Yet the tsarist regime, while raising the hope of such reform in 1905, ultimately proved unwilling to proceed with it, fearing that an autonomous church posed a threat to autocracy—the very reason Peter the Great created the Holy Synod.

Russian Neo-Idealism

At the St. Petersburg Religious-Philosophical Assemblies Prince Volkonskii was replying in part to a speech given two months earlier by Mikhail A. Stakhovich (1861–1923), marshal of the nobility in Orel Province. Stakhovich, speaking before a diocesan missionary conference in Orel, had dramatically called for the Church to defend freedom of conscience against intrusion by the state—in sharp contrast to Tolstoi's excommunication the preceding February. Stakhovich's speech, which was widely reported in the domestic and even the foreign press, created a sensation.[174] When Petr Struve, who had not long since converted from Marxism to idealism and liberalism, read about it, he sent the Moscow University legal philosopher Pavel Novgorodtsev a plan for a collection of essays devoted to liberty of conscience and its importance in liberalism. The result was *Problems of Idealism*, published in November 1902.[175] It was a milestone in the Russian religious-philosophical renaissance and marked the ascendency of Russian neo-idealism—a revival both of the Russian idealist tradition founded by the Slavophiles and Westernizers in the 1840s and of classic German idealism, especially Kant.

Problems of Idealism was published by the Moscow Psychological Society (1885–1922), which, despite its name, was the first and main center of the growth of Russian philosophy in this period.[176] For the preceding fifteen years the Psychological Society had advanced neo-idealism as a trenchant critique of positivism and an innovative theory of liberalism. In both respects Russian neo-idealism was a powerful defense of personhood (*lichnost'*)—that is, the quality of being a person and therefore of having intrinsic and insuperable value (human dignity). As Novgorodtsev wrote in his foreword to *Problems of Idealism*, the contemporary idealist movement gave "primary importance to the principle of the absolute significance of personhood."[177] Here he pointed to the legacy of Boris Chicherin and Vlad-

imir Solov'ev, nineteenth-century Russia's greatest idealist philosophers. Both closely related personhood to freedom of conscience, in its dual meaning of inner self-determination and external right.

Recall that in 1857 Chicherin proclaimed freedom of conscience to be "the first and most sacred right of a citizen." Initially he qualified this right in important ways, but over the next two decades of his long career he moved from conservative to "classical" liberalism.[178] His 1879 book *Science and Religion* was a threshold. In it he adopted a liberal, Kantian interpretation of Hegelianism, writing that "the significance of the human person is not limited by the fact that he is an organ of the world-historical process. As a bearer of the absolute principle, a human being has absolute significance in himself."[179] Human beings have the capacity to freely recognize the absolute (experienced or conceived in moral or religious terms) and to determine themselves according to this recognition: this capacity is conscience, and it is the source of personhood and human dignity.[180] That is why freedom of conscience is the "first and most sacred right." Chicherin now declared, more resolutely than ever before: "freedom of conscience is the inviolable sanctuary of the human soul, which the state has no right to infringe, and freedom of thought, even with all its errors, constitutes the necessary condition of development."[181]

Thus by 1880 Chicherin had come to conceptualize freedom of conscience as inner liberty or self-determination by freely recognized absolute ideals (Kantian autonomy). He called this its "supreme meaning."[182] Directly following Kant, Chicherin regarded moral autonomy as the essential property of personhood and the basis of human dignity.[183] In his masterpiece *Philosophy of Right* (1900), written on the eve of the formation of the Russian liberation movement, he wrote: "The great moral significance of the secular enlightenment was never expressed so clearly as in the modern recognition of freedom of conscience as the most sacred and inviolable of human rights. It is the cornerstone of the inner freedom of man, and therefore of human dignity as well."[184] A year later *Science and Religion* was reissued in a second edition. In the circumstances the classic text no doubt resonated. In it Chicherin understood freedom of conscience both in the core sense of moral autonomy and, as Paul Valliere has nicely demonstrated, as the relative autonomy of the various distinct spheres of human need, experience, and aspiration: not only church and state, or religion and politics, but also morality, philosophy, science, economy, and art. The autonomous development of each sphere, Chicherin held, is necessary for the integrity of the whole (whether self or society).[185] This broader conception of freedom of conscience was an important theme in *Problems of Idealism*.

Freedom of conscience was a no less important principle for Solov'ev. In *Lectures on Godmanhood* (1878–1880), *Critique of Abstract Principles* (1880), and elsewhere, Solov'ev stipulates that human beings combine in themselves three principles: the absolute or divine principle, the material principle, and (between them) the distinctively human principle, which is rational autonomy or the capacity for self-determination.[186] He derived the middle, human principle of autonomy almost entirely from Kant.[187] (Earlier Chicherin had specified that human beings are both rational and sensible, that they combine in themselves infinite and finite principles, and that freedom consists in our capacity to choose between the two principles.)[188] Godmanhood is the free human realization of the divine idea in ourselves and in the world. Solov'ev always maintained that it cannot be achieved without human autonomy: "The divine content must be appropriated by a human being *from within himself*, consciously and freely."[189] Otherwise human dignity would be deprived of its basis. Salvation apart from human free will would violate human dignity, or at any rate be accomplished past it.

For Solov'ev Godmanhood was necessarily a social and cultural project, since human perfectibility, the ever fuller realization and development of human potential, was inconceivable apart from society and history. He called his social ideal "free theocracy"—"free" precisely because it purported to respect human autonomy, not only in the form of freedom of conscience but also as the rule of law.[190] In the 1880s he devoted himself to practical aspects of his project, working for the reunification of the Christian churches and for religious freedom in the Russian Empire. In the second half of the decade, following his break with Slavophilism, Solov'ev started to collaborate with the editors of the liberal "thick journal" *Vestnik Evropy*, which consistently defended freedom of conscience.[191] Beginning in 1888, the journal ran a series of his articles defending the empire's ethnic and religious minorities against nationalism and Russification. These articles, among others, were published in two volumes as *The National Question in Russia*.[192]

In the last decade of his life Solov'ev returned to his earlier philosophical work. His magnum opus, *Justification of the Good*, appeared in 1897.[193] In it Solov'ev insists that the Kingdom of God is a human project. "Universal history is the realization of this possibility for everyone," he writes. "This perfection attained by ourselves, this full, conscious, and free union with the Divine, is precisely what God ultimately wants—the unconditional good."[194] It is clear that freedom of conscience must be an intrinsic element of this unconditional good, since the process of perfectibility depends on the subject of progress freely choosing the good and realizing it in him or herself.

Therefore Solov'ev is adamant that the inner or spiritual world of man be free from the coercive power of state and society. What he calls spiritual goods cannot be compulsory but must be freely accepted. Ultimately there are two such spiritual goods, virtue and truth:

> All compulsory external action in this sphere is, in the first place, *a fraud*. The end of *externally* compelling or forcing a man to have an inner, i.e. an *inwardly* determined, disposition for the good, or an inner receptivity for the true, cannot possibly be achieved, and is indeed a logical contradiction or absurdity; and to use compulsion to no purpose is obviously an evil. Hence, all compulsory measures with regard to spiritual things in the supposed interests of truth and virtue are nothing other than the use of evil means for a false purpose—an abuse in the fullest sense.

Indeed Solov'ev calls society's or the state's intrusion into one's spiritual life, "with the false purpose of safeguarding the inner goods," a type of violence that is wholly false and evil, "and may therefore justly be called *diabolical*." It would be hard to find a stronger condemnation of the violation of freedom of conscience.[195]

By the turn of the century Chicherin, Solov'ev, and other Psychological Society philosophers such as Sergei Trubetskoi (1862–1905) had elaborated a rich neo-idealist conception of human nature. They held that human beings are conscious of the absolute (or the infinite or divine) through their ideals (e.g., the good, truth, and beauty) or through more immediate religious experience. They understood freedom of conscience as the capacity for self-determination according to human consciousness of the absolute, which consciousness, in order to have the power of self-determination, must itself be freely formed. In *Philosophy of Right* Chicherin wrote that consciousness of the absolute is the source of the "supreme dignity of the human being" and that this idea is captured in the biblical verse that we are created in the image and likeness of God.[196] Solov'ev put it more precisely in *Justification of the Good*. He wrote that our consciousness of absolute or divine perfection is the *image* of God in us, while our *likeness* to God is our capacity for self-determination or perfectibility according to the image.[197] This "double infinity" of the image and likeness belongs to every person. "It is in this that the absolute significance, dignity, and worth of human personhood consist, and this is the basis of its inalienable rights."[198]

The neo-idealist defense of personhood and freedom of conscience made quite an impression on Struve, at just the time he was organizing the Russian liberation movement that would culminate in the 1905 revolution. In 1901, in the Psychological Society's journal, he published (pseudon-

ymously) a famous essay, "What Is True Nationalism?"[199] He dedicated it to Solov'ev, presumably to associate his own conception of "true nationalism" with Solov'ev's ideas in *The National Question in Russia*. In his essay Struve lays out his theory of liberalism, which he conceives as the defense of personhood and human rights. He extols the Kantian principle of individual self-determination, stating that it ought to be the moral foundation of any just social or political order.[200] True liberalism demands "recognition of the inalienable rights of the person," which rights cannot be trumped by any higher national or state values. Thus it is "also the only form of true nationalism."[201] Struve traces the historical origins of liberalism to the post-Reformation growth of religious toleration. He points in particular to the English Independents and to Roger Williams, who for the first time established a government—in Providence, Rhode Island (1636)—on the principle of unlimited religious liberty. He calls Williams the first apostle of the idea of inalienable rights, beginning with freedom of conscience—the "first word of liberalism."[202]

Struve arrived at his neo-idealist theory of liberalism not only by learning from the Psychological Society's senior philosophers but also through personal experience. He was the first of the four "legal Marxists" to convert to idealism. Bulgakov, Nikolai Berdiaev, and Semen Frank followed, sooner or later. Their journey "from Marxism to idealism," as Bulgakov put it in the title of his 1903 collection of articles, was one of the more dramatic developments in the Russian religious renaissance.[203] All four thinkers contributed to *Problems of Idealism*, which publicly marked their conversion (although Frank still stood aside from the metaphysical idealism of the others).[204] Their turn toward idealism took place through moral experience, by which they recognized the authenticity of ideals and the freedom to act on them. The philosophical formulation of such experience was called "ethical idealism," which was the common ground of *Problems of Idealism*. On that ground Russian neo-idealists typically drew the metaphysical, theistic conclusion that our ideals are a form of human consciousness of the absolute. There was a fairly direct path from ethical to metaphysical idealism.

The spiritual trajectory of the four former Marxists was an experiential one. The moral experience that took them from positivism to idealism deepened into religious experience, whereby their metaphysical idealism took the form of Christian faith. According to Nicolas Zernov, "Their primary similarity lay in the intensity and vitality of their faith; they all passed through genuine conversion, which gave them an overwhelming sense of the living God who acts in history and hears and speaks to individuals as well as to the whole body of mankind." He adds an important remark: "They firmly

defended the dignity and significance of the individual, and the importance of social justice, so often disregarded by conventional Christians."[205] By this Zernov suggests that, at least for them, conversion was an experience that carried with it liberal convictions. Bulgakov was the most explicit about his religious experiences, which he movingly described in his *Autobiographical Notes*. The experience which brought him back to the Orthodox Church itself took place in 1908 at the Zosimova Hermitage, through the intercession of its abbot German (Gomzin).[206]

Their experiential path to religious idealism made the former Marxists resolute defenders of freedom of conscience in the Russian liberation movement. In 1902–1903 Bulgakov and Berdiaev contributed a series of short articles on religious freedom to Struve's famous émigré newspaper, *Osvobozhdenie* (Liberation). In his articles Bulgakov deplored the multifarious disastrous consequences of the autocracy's subjugation of the Russian Orthodox Church. He called on the Church to fight for freedom of conscience—which, as he made clear, necessarily meant fighting for political freedom against the autocracy. Berdiaev emphasized the connection among freedom of conscience, human personhood, and liberalism as the defense of natural rights.[207]

Struve founded the liberation movement on his neo-idealist conception of liberal principles, freedom of conscience first among them, and some historians (such as John Basil and Patrick Michelson) have seen the demand for religious liberty as indeed central to the whole movement.[208] According to Basil, "the desire for religious freedom in the empire had . . . accomplished what seemed beyond the capacity of all other public issues," by uniting "for one purpose all but a handful of Russians."[209] The liberation movement culminated in the 1905 revolution, which began on 9 January, henceforth known as "Bloody Sunday," when troops massacred a massive but peaceful procession of workers led by a Russian Orthodox priest, Father Georgii Gapon.[210] Among the people's demands was religious freedom, the point being given special emphasis: "*Separation of the church from the state.*"[211] One member of Fr. Gapon's Assembly of Russian Mill and Factory Workers gave a speech that morning in which he reportedly said: "Our Church has been enslaved by the government. The Church needs to be free, so that each can pray according to his or her own conscience."[212] Religious freedom was clearly an integral part of the assembly's commitment to social justice, which reflected the broader Russian Orthodox pastoral movement from which it came. Thus the liberation movement and ensuing revolution drew not only on the "moral-idealist" type of religious experience among intellectuals in the Russian religious renaissance but also on more popular

types of religious experience in the pastoral movement and elsewhere in the long Russian religious revival.

The Failure of Reform

The demand for religious freedom in Russia seemed to be achieved when Nicholas II issued the Manifesto of 17 October 1905. However, as historians have shown, the October Manifesto granted freedom of conscience as a promise that was to be implemented through future legislation—legislation that was in fact never enacted. Strikingly, the empire's new Fundamental Laws, enacted on 23 April 1906, made no reference to "freedom of conscience."[213]

Ultimately, recognition of freedom of conscience as a right depended on the fate of church reform (and thus on the autocracy), since such recognition was scarcely feasible until the Russian Orthodox Church was free of state control.[214] Church reform gathered momentum with the onset of the 1905 revolution. The immediate catalyst for reform was an imperial decree on 12 December 1904, which reaffirmed the autocracy's commitment to the principle of "religious toleration" and instructed the government to initiate a comprehensive review of existing legislation pertaining to the toleration of non-Orthodox groups.[215] The review was undertaken by the Committee of Ministers and its chairman, Sergei Witte, from January to March 1905. Its purview immediately came to include the Orthodox Church, since expanded freedom for other confessions would disadvantage the Church relative to them, assuming it remained under state control. Accordingly, Metropolitan Antonii (Vadkovskii) participated in the committee's deliberations. Since 1903 he had served as a consulting member of the committee. In that role he firmly defended religious toleration, arguing, for example, that laws against mixed marriages "violated every principle of respect for individual conscience," as Cunningham characterizes his position.[216] In February 1905 Antonii submitted a memorandum to the committee in which he posed a series of seven fundamental questions about church-state relations in Russia. In the second of them he asked "whether now is not the proper time to abolish (or at least moderate) the constant tutelage and all too vigilant control exercised by secular authorities over the life of the Church and its administrative activities, which deprives the Church of its independence and initiative, and which also, by limiting the Church's sphere of authority almost wholly to worship and the performance of rites, virtually silences its voice in both private and public life?"[217]

Witte consulted also with Bishop Sergei (Stragorodskii), rector of the St. Petersburg Theological Academy, and with several theology professors

and canon lawyers from St. Petersburg and Moscow. Their combined efforts resulted in his memorandum, "On the Present Situation of the Orthodox Church."[218] It was a searing indictment of the Petrine Synodal system and called for its abolition, for the restoration of church autonomy and canonical order, *sobornost'* in church life, and the convening of a Russian church council (*sobor*). There was broad consensus on these goals among advocates of church reform, whether liberal or conservative. The goals did not necessarily imply freedom of conscience (certainly they did not for episcopal and theological conservatives), but they were made more urgent by the imperial decree of 17 April 1905, "On the Strengthening of the Principles of Religious Toleration," which was the result of the Committee of Ministers' work to implement the December 1904 decree.[219] For the first time, it legalized transfer from Orthodoxy to other Christian confessions.

Meanwhile, on 13 March, discussion of church reform was moved at Pobedonostsev's behest from the Committee of Ministers to the Holy Synod, where the chief procurator hoped to exercise more control over it. Instead, the Holy Synod promptly requested that the emperor authorize a church council. Nicholas II deferred it to a more suitable time but approved the idea in principle. Public discussion of church reform had begun in earnest following the publication on 17 March in *Tserkovnyi vestnik*, the Church's newspaper, of a liberal manifesto by the "Group of Thirty-Two St. Petersburg Priests." The manifesto was addressed to Metropolitan Antonii, who approved its publication after presenting it to the Holy Synod. The priests declared that all true members of the Russian Orthodox Church could not but joyously welcome "the forthcoming liberation of religious conscience" for the non-Orthodox peoples of the empire and for Old Believers, but they warned that the Church also had to be liberated from state control if it were to fulfill its proper mission of providing religious and moral leadership to Russian society and of building the Kingdom of God. This mission, they said, required the reestablishment of canonical order and freedom, realized through convening a Russian church council.[220]

The Group of Thirty-Two St. Petersburg Priests represented the position of "clerical liberalism" on church reform. Clerical liberalism, which had developed together with the pastoral movement, understood church reform within the context of its commitment to social justice. Father Grigorii Petrov was a prominent member of the group. Their outlook was shaped by common experience in the St. Petersburg Theological Academy, the ORRP, and (to an extent) the St. Petersburg Religious-Philosophical Assemblies.

Following the October Manifesto, the group expanded to become the Union of Church Renovation—the "renovationists" (*obnovlentsy*). Accord-

ing to Hedda, the union had 102 active members, 52 from the clergy. About one in seven priests in St. Petersburg joined, among them some of the capital's most prominent pastors. In addition, there were at least forty-three laymen, including the neo-idealists Bulgakov, Berdiaev, and Evgenii Trubetskoi.[221] The renovationists remained committed to the (Solov'evian) ideal of Christian politics. In general, they recognized that church reform was highly unlikely without the liberal transformation of the regime, which recognition allied them with the political opposition to autocracy—the Kadets and parties further to the left.[222] The restoration of tsarist power in the aftermath of the revolution led to the closing of the Union of Church Renovation in 1907.[223]

Clerical liberals were not the only advocates of church reform. Episcopal conservatives were also firm supporters.[224] In the summer of 1905 the Holy Synod conducted a survey of the views of diocesan bishops on a wide range of questions pertaining to a prospective church council. The bishops expressed their views at length.[225] They were virtually unanimous in condemning the Synodal system as uncanonical and in demanding church autonomy, restoration of the patriarchate, and other basic reforms. However, their motivations in supporting church reform were very different from those of the clerical liberals. Few of them supported freedom of conscience; indeed that may be a good criterion for defining "episcopal conservative." For example, Archbishop Antonii (Khrapovitskii), a fierce critic of the Synodal system and a staunch advocate of restoring the patriarchate, dismissed "freedom of conscience" as an "absurd expression."[226] For the hierarchy, autonomy was not a path to freedom of conscience; rather it was a way to keep the state from imposing even toleration on the Church (as in the matter of mixed marriages).[227]

In 1906 Nicholas II permitted the establishment of a pre-council commission (*predsobornoe prisutstvie*), which met for several months to prepare for the anticipated church council. In 1912 a similar commission (*predsobornoe soveshchanie*) was held. But the emperor never convened a council, for two basic reasons. First, the council's very purpose was to establish an autonomous church under a restored patriarchate, which by its very nature could challenge the power of autocracy. Second, Nicholas II saw the Russian Orthodox Church as a vital source of legitimacy for the monarchy; it was integral to his "scenario of power."[228] It seems likely that he feared that an autonomous church, separate from his imperial person, might not serve that legitimizing function. Similar reasons explain why the regime did not enact freedom of conscience into law. First, recognition of freedom of conscience as a right was incompatible with autocracy as unlimited state power. In Oc-

tober 1905 Nicholas apparently granted that right, but he did so to quell the revolutionary threat; he reneged once the regime was able to reconsolidate power. Second, for the emperor, the episcopate, and other conservatives and servitors freedom of conscience "demeaned" their understanding of the Church, an understanding that was essential to their identity, prestige, and power.[229] There were, of course, other understandings of Russian Orthodoxy that emphasized spiritual values directly opposed to autocracy. In using Orthodoxy to bolster its legitimacy, the regime inadvertently risked invoking those values and thus undermining itself.[230]

The Russian religious revival, culminating in the religious-philosophical renaissance, is a history of rich and diverse religious experience. Through that experience believers became highly conscious of their freedom and dignity as persons. By the twentieth century many of them were demanding that their inner freedom and dignity be externally recognized and guaranteed through freedom of conscience and other basic rights. Of course, not everyone drew liberal conclusions from their religious experience. Russian neo-idealists sought to convince them that they should. Philosophers like Bulgakov believed that the depths of human dignity and personhood (freedom of conscience in its inner meaning as ideal self-determination) were most transparent to the type of moral-religious consciousness formed from faithful experience. Therefore they concluded that the faithful should be the first to recognize and defend freedom of conscience as everyone's right. The number of people who recognized this right and were willing to defend it is an important measure of the strength of civil society. Historians have long debated the strength of Russian civil society, but in the first years of the twentieth century it was strong enough to bring about the 1905 revolution. Russia's long religious revival had provided the experiential basis and then the philosophical articulation of freedom of conscience. But that right was inimical to the autocracy, which continued to resist it.

NOTES

1. Introduction

1. Sergius [Sergei] Bulgakov, *Unfading Light: Contemplations and Speculations*, trans. and ed. Thomas Allan Smith (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012), 7. For a Russian edition, see S. N. Bulgakov, *Svet nevechernii: Sozertsaniia i umozrenia* (Moscow: Respublika, 1994).

2. For Bulgakov the possibility of experience of the transcendent in immanent reality was a deep mystery.

3. James wrote that the life of religion "consists of the belief that there is an unseen order, and that our supreme good lies in harmoniously adjusting ourselves thereto." See William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature* (New York: Penguin, 1985), 53. Bulgakov refers to James (*Unfading Light*, 26).

4. Of course, Bulgakov did not think that such truths and ideals were merely subjective ones. Inner (or a priori) truths can be objective, like those of mathematics, for example. He held that the "truths of faith" are authenticated by the Church and the community of the faithful, but that ultimately they must be freely and inwardly recognized by persons—persons whose process of discerning and recognizing truth is formed/informed by church community and tradition. I am grateful to Dr. Gary Boelhower for his insights on this point.

5. Émile Durkheim's *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse* was published in 1912. The modern English edition is Émile Durkheim, *Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, trans. and ed. Karen E. Fields (New York: Free Press, 1995). Rudolf Otto's *Das Heilige: Über das Irrationale in der Idee des Göttlichen und sein Verhältnis zum Rationalen* was published in 1917. The English edition is Rudolf Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, trans. John W. Harvey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1923). Bulgakov discusses their predecessor in the study of religious experience or feeling, Friedrich Schleiermacher (*Unfading Light*, 39–44, 46–47). He remarks: "It may appear unexpected if we place Kant along side of Schleiermacher in a 'theology of feeling.' Yet, as far apart as they might be in theoretical philosophy, in their understanding of the nature of faith they converge. If Schleiermacher acknowledges feeling as the domain of religion in general, Kant considers for that domain *moral* feeling, which is the organ of *faith*" (46). Bulgakov's observation has direct bearing on my effort in this essay to relate Russian religious experience to the Russian (and Kantian) neo-idealist defense of freedom of conscience.

6. Major works in English, focusing on the imperial period, include Brenda Meehan, *Holy Women of Russia: The Lives of Five Orthodox Women Offer Spiritual Guidance for Today* (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1997 [1993]); Nadieszda Kizenko, *A Prodigal Saint: Father John of Kronstadt and the Russian People*

(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000); Christine D. Worobec, *Possessed: Women, Witches, and Demons in Imperial Russia* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2003); Mark D. Steinberg, *Proletarian Imagination: Self, Modernity, and the Sacred in Russia, 1910–1925* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002); Chris J. Chulos, *Converging Worlds: Religion and Community in Peasant Russia, 1861–1917* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2003); Valerie A. Kivelson and Robert H. Greene, eds., *Orthodox Russia: Belief and Practice under the Tsars*, (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003); Vera Shevzov, *Russian Orthodoxy on the Eve of Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Page Herrlinger, *Working Souls: Russian Orthodoxy and Factory Labor in St. Petersburg, 1881–1917* (Bloomington, IN: Slavica Publishers, 2007); Steinberg and Heather J. Coleman, eds., *Sacred Stories: Religion and Spirituality in Modern Russia* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), which includes chapters on non-Orthodox Christian, Jewish, and Muslim religions; Jennifer Hedda, *His Kingdom Come: Orthodox Pastorship and Social Activism in Revolutionary Russia* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2008); Laurie Manchester, *Holy Fathers, Secular Sons: Clergy, Intelligentsia, and the Modern Self in Revolutionary Russia* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2008); Irina Paert, *Spiritual Elders: Charisma and Tradition in Russian Orthodoxy* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2010); Robert H. Greene, *Bodies Like Bright Stars: Saints and Relics in Orthodox Russia* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2010); Scott M. Kenworthy, *The Heart of Russia: Trinity-Sergius, Monasticism, and Society after 1825* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); and Patrick Lally Michelson and Judith Deutsch Kornblatt, eds., *Thinking Orthodox in Modern Russia: Culture, History, Context* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014). Catherine Evtuhov, *The Cross and the Sickle: Sergei Bulgakov and the Fate of Russian Religious Philosophy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), is attentive to how Bulgakov's own religious experiences helped form his religious thought. For good syntheses, see Simon Dixon, "The Russian Orthodox Church in Imperial Russia, 1721–1917," and Chris Chulos, "Russian Piety and Culture from Peter the Great to 1917," both in *The Cambridge History of Christianity*, vol. 5: *Eastern Christianity*, ed. Michael Angold (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 325–70; and Gregory L. Freeze, "Russian Orthodoxy: Church, People, and Politics in Imperial Russia," in *The Cambridge History of Russia*, vol. 2: *Imperial Russia, 1689–1917*, ed. Dominic Lieven (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). See also the following review essays in *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*: Gregory L. Freeze, "Recent Scholarship on Russian Orthodoxy: A Critique," 2, no. 2 (2001): 269–78; Christine D. Worobec, "Lived Orthodoxy in Imperial Russia," 7, no. 2 (2006): 329–50; Paul W. Werth, "Lived Orthodoxy and Confessional Diversity: The Last Decade on Religion in Modern Russia," 12, no. 4 (2011): 849–65; and William G. Wagner, "Religion in Modern Russia: Revival and Survival," 15, no. 1 (2014): 151–68.

7. Heather J. Coleman, *Russian Baptists and Spiritual Revolution, 1905–1929* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005).

8. R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956), 282–302.

9. Steinberg and Coleman, *Sacred Stories*, 15.

10. Essentially, "ideal self-determination" is Kant's concept. He distinguishes between negative and positive aspects of free will, the first being the capacity for choice and thus basic freedom from external determination, the second being autonomy or self-determination. See *Critique of Practical Reason* and *The Metaphysics of Morals*, both in Immanuel Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor, intro. Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 166, 373–82. In *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant wrote that autonomy is "the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature" (*Practical Philosophy*, 85). Terry Pinkard has written of the Kantian revolution in philosophy: "Overthrowing the old metaphysics, it inserted a new idea into the vocabulary in terms of which modern Germans and Europeans spoke about their lives: self-determination. After Kant, nothing would be the same again" (*German Philosophy, 1760–1860: The Legacy of Idealism* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002], 15).

11. Paul Valliere, "Theological Liberalism and Church Reform in Imperial Russia," in *Church, Nation, and State in Russia and Ukraine*, ed. Geoffrey A. Hosking (London: Macmillan, 1991), 108. Here his case studies of Russian theological liberalism are Boris Chicherin (1828–1904) and Mikhail Tareev (1866–1934).

12. Paul Valliere, "The Liberal Tradition in Russian Orthodox Theology," in *The Legacy of St. Vladimir: Byzantium, Russia, America*, ed. John Breck, John Meyendorff, and E. Silk (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1990), 98–99.

13. In John Plamenatz's reliable judgment, the concept of freedom of conscience had "fully emerged" by the end of the seventeenth century. See his excellent essay "Liberty of Conscience," in Plamenatz, *Man and Society: A Critical Examination of Some Important Social and Political Theories from Machiavelli to Marx*, 2 vols. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), 1:67.

14. The history of this idea has been written numerous times, including very well by Perez Zagorin, *How the Idea of Religious Toleration Came to the West* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003). Zagorin traces the development of the concept of freedom of conscience in the writings of such figures as Roger Williams, whose book *The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution* (1644) anticipates and goes deeper than John Locke's *A Letter concerning Toleration* (1689); the Quaker William Penn, whose book *The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience* appeared in 1670; Spinoza, whose *Tractatus theologico-politicus* was published the same year in Amsterdam; and finally Pierre Bayle, whose *Commentaire philosophique* was published three years before Locke's *Letter* and emphasized that an erring but sincere conscience deserves the same re-

eration, Freedom of Conscience, and Russian Liberalism," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 13, no. 3 (2012): 617–19.

28. For my further remarks about Frede's chapter, see Poole, "Religious Toleration," 623–24.

29. Aleksandr Polunov also refers to Stead's statement ("Poniatie *svoboda sovesti* i *veroterpimost'* v obshchestvenno-politicheskom diskurse Rossii kontsa XIX–nachale XX veka," in *"Poniatiia o Rossii": K istoricheskoi semantike imperskogo perioda*, ed. Aleksei Miller, Denis Sdvizhkov, and Ingrid Shirle [Schierle] [Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2012], 1:563n7). Polunov concentrates on K. P. Pobedonostsev's understanding of toleration as Russian religious freedom, contrasting it to the views of Stead, M. A. Reisner, K. K. Arsen'ev, and others.

30. Werth, *Tsar's Foreign Faiths*, 8.

31. John Strickland, *The Making of Holy Russia: The Orthodox Church and Russian Nationalism before the Revolution* (Jordanville, NY: Holy Trinity Publications, 2013).

32. See also John Witte Jr. and Michael Bourdeaux, eds., *Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia: The New War for Souls* (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2009 [1999]); and Zoe Knox, *Russian Society and the Orthodox Church: Religion in Russia after Communism* (New York: Routledge, 2005).

33. Perhaps the most widely cited history of the Russian Church in this period is Igor Smolitsch, *Geschichte der russischen Kirche 1700–1917* (Leiden: Brill, 1964). There are now Russian translations, including vol. 8 in the new and expanded edition of Makarii (Bulgakov), *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 10 vols. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Spaso-Preobrazhenskogo Valaamskogo monastyria, 1994–1997). A useful handbook, with an extensive bibliography of works in Russian, as well as sources and documents, is V. A. Fedorov, *Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov' i gosudarstvo: Sinodal'nyi period, 1700–1917* (Moscow: Russkaia panorama, 2003). In English, see Dimitry Pospielovsky, *The Orthodox Church in Russian History* (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1998).

34. Article 64 of the 1906 Fundamental Laws, as quoted by Marc Szeftel, "Church and State in Imperial Russia," in *Russian Orthodoxy under the Old Regime*, ed. Robert L. Nichols and Theofanis George Stavrou (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1978), 131. According to Szeftel, the rule was formulated in 1721 and made part of the Fundamental Laws in 1832. The classic study of Peter's ecclesiastical reform is P. V. Verkhovskoi, *Uchrezhdenie Dukhovnoi kollegii i dukhovnyi reglament*, 2 vols. (Farnborough: Gregg, 1972 [1916]). See also James Cracraft, *The Church Reform of Peter the Great* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1971); and V. M. Zhivov, *Iz tserkovnoi istorii vremen Petra Velikogo: Issledovaniia i materialy* (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2004).

35. Alexander V. Muller, ed. and trans., *The Spiritual Regulation of Peter the Great* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), 13–15, 29. An abridged version of the

Russian text of the *reglament* and its supplement can be found in Fedorov, *Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov' i gosudarstvo*, 310–47.

36. Shevzov, *Russian Orthodoxy*, 20.

37. Gregory L. Freeze, *The Russian Levites* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977).

38. Muller, *Spiritual Regulation of Peter the Great*, 60–61.

39. Kenworthy, *Heart of Russia*, 15–18; Gregory L. Freeze, "Russian Orthodoxy," 290.

40. David W. Edwards, "The System of Nicholas I in Church-State Relations," in *Russian Orthodoxy under the Old Regime*, 154–69; Robert F. Byrnes, *Pobedonostsev: His Life and Thought* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968), esp. 165–209, 238–315; A. Iu. Polunov, *Pod vlast'iu ober-prokurora: Gosudarstvo i tserkov' v epokhu Aleksandra III* (Moscow: AIRO-XX, 1996); Polunov, *K. P. Pobedonostsev v obshchestvenno-politicheskoi i dukhovnoi zhizni Rossii* (Moscow: Rosspen, 2010).

41. Quoted by Gregory L. Freeze, *The Parish Clergy in Nineteenth-Century Russia: Crisis, Reform, Counter-Reform* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 450.

42. Victoria Frede, *Doubt, Atheism, and the Nineteenth-Century Russian Intelligentsia* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011). She shows how doubt and atheism could be a liberating, self-affirming response to the autocracy's efforts to use religion to control its subjects. Frede pinpoints the actual articulation of atheism to 1849 among the merchants.

43. The classic study is Nicolas Zernov, *The Russian Religious Renaissance of the Twentieth Century* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963).

44. See the title of the first section of chap. 7 in Werth, *Tsar's Foreign Faiths*.

45. Georges Florovsky, "The Reawakening of Russian Monasticism," in his *Ways of Russian Theology (Part One)*, trans. Robert L. Nichols (Belmont, MA: Büchervertriebsanstalt/Notable and Academic Books, 1979), 156–61. Florovsky writes of "an unmistakable intensification and increase of spiritual life" by the end of the eighteenth century (156). For another concise and characteristically insightful account of the revival of hesychasm and monasticism, see James H. Billington, *The Icon and the Axe: An Interpretive History of Russian Culture* (New York: Vintage, 1970), 200–205.

46. Timothy Ware, *The Orthodox Church* (New York: Penguin, 1993), 62–70.

47. For a concise overview, see Paul Valliere, "Introduction to the Modern Orthodox Tradition," in *The Teachings of Modern Christianity on Law, Politics, and Human Nature*, ed. John Witte Jr. and Frank S. Alexander, 2 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 1:507–12. He organizes his account around the philokalic and philosophical streams in modern Orthodoxy. The *Philokalia* is available in English: *The Philokalia: The Complete Text*, trans. and ed. G. E. H. Palmer, Philip Sherrard, and Kallistos Ware, 4 vols. (London: Faber and Faber, 1979–95). For a valuable collection

did not approve the publication of Khomiakov's works until 1879 (Walicki, *Slavophile Controversy*, 199). Berdiaev, in *Aleksei Stepanovich Khomiakov*, also stressed the experiential character of Khomiakov's religious thought, as did Georges Florovsky and Sergey Horujy [Khoruzhii] in Florovsky, *Ways of Russian Theology (Part Two)*, trans. Robert L. Nichols (Belmont, MA: Büchervertriebsanstalt/Notable and Academic Books, 1987), 38–53; Sergey Horujy, "Slavophiles, Westernizers, and the Birth of Russian Philosophical Humanism," in *A History of Russian Philosophy, 1830–1930: Faith, Reason, and the Defense of Human Dignity*, ed. G. M. Hamburg and Randall A. Poole (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 45–48; S. S. Khoruzhii, "Khomiakov i printsip sobornosti," in Khoruzhii, *Posle pereryva: Puti russkoi filosofii* (St. Petersburg: Aleteiia, 1994), 17–31; and Khoruzhii, "Bogoslovie sobornosti i bogoslovie lichnosti: Simfoniia dvukh putei pravoslavnogo bogomudriia," in *A. S. Khomiakov: Poet, Philosopher, Theologian*, 38–65. Laura Engelstein states that Khoruzhii understands *sobornost'* "not as an abstract idea susceptible to systematic elaboration, but as a formulation expressing the lived experience of Eastern Orthodoxy in its Russian form" ("Holy Russia in Modern Times: An Essay on Orthodoxy and Cultural Change," *Past and Present*, no. 173 [2001]: 146).

67. See Khomiakov's famous essay, "The Church Is One," written in 1846 but first published in 1864. There is an excellent translation by Robert Bird in *On Spiritual Unity*, 29–53.

68. Khoruzhii, "Khomiakov i printsip sobornosti," 20–21.

69. Samarin, "Introduction to the Theological Writings," 165, 167, 168.

70. According to Leonard Schapiro, the Slavophiles did not use the language of natural rights, "but it is not very far off from what they believed." See his *Rationalism and Nationalism in Russian Nineteenth-Century Political Thought* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), 71–72. From the 1850s to the 1880s Konstantin Aksakov (1817–1860) and his younger brother Ivan (1823–1886), although they were not liberals (Ivan was a pan-Slavist), forcefully championed freedom of conscience and church autonomy. See Poole, "Religious Toleration," 620.

71. Kenworthy, *Heart of Russia*, 3, 6. On the monastic revival, see also Kenworthy, "Monasticism in Modern Russia," in *Monasticism in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Republics*, ed. Ines Angeli Murzaku (London: Routledge, 2016), 265–84; Fedorov, *Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov' i gosudarstvo*, chap. 3; P. N. Zyrianov, *Russkie monastyri i monashestvo v XIX i nachale XX veka* (Moscow: Verbum, 2002); and N. V. Sinitsyna, ed., *Monashestvo i monastyri v Rossii, XI–XX veka: Istoricheski ocherki* (Moscow: Nauka, 2005). Igor Smolitsch, *Russisches Mönchtum: Einstehung, Entwicklung und Wesen, 988–1917* (Würzburg: Augustins-Verlag, 1953) is now available in Russian translation.

72. Kenworthy, *Heart of Russia*, 2–3; William G. Wagner, "Paradoxes of Piety: The Nizhegorod Convent of the Exaltation of the Cross, 1807–1935," in *Orthodox Russia*,

211–38, tables on 236–38; Wagner, "The Transformation of Female Orthodox Monasticism in Nizhnii Novgorod Diocese, 1764–1929, in Comparative Perspective," *Journal of Modern History* 78, no. 4 (2006): 793–845; Wagner, "Fashioning Ideals of Monasticism and Womanhood: The Nizhnii Novgorod Convent of the Exaltation of the Cross, 1802–1857," in *Everyday Life in Russian History: Quotidian Studies in Honor of Daniel Kaiser*, ed. Gary Marker et al. (Bloomington, IN: Slavica Publishers, 2010), 85–102.

73. Brenda Meehan, "The Authority of Holiness: Women Ascetics and Spiritual Elders in Nineteenth-Century Russia," in *Church, Nation, and State in Russia and Ukraine*, 38–51; Meehan, *Holy Women of Russia*; O. V. Kirichenko, *Zhenskoe pravoslavnoe podvizhnichestvo v Rossii (XIX–seredina XX v.)* (Moscow: Sviato-Aleksievskaia pustyn', 2010).

74. Kenworthy, *Heart of Russia*, 5, chaps. 1–5.

75. See Kenworthy, *Heart of Russia*, 110, for one statement of this thesis.

76. Such as Father John of Kronstadt (1829–1908), whose personal charisma, liturgical celebration, charity and ministry to the poor, and healing abilities made him a saint. Kronstadt became one of the leading pilgrimage sites in Russia. See Kizenko, *Prodigal Saint*. One of the merits of Kizenko's study is the detailed attention it gives to the religious experiences of Father John's people (especially women).

77. Sergei Bulgakov, "Heroism and Asceticism: Reflections on the Religious Nature of the Russian Intelligentsia," in *Vekhi/Landmarks: A Collection of Articles about the Russian Intelligentsia*, trans. and ed. Marshall S. Shatz and Judith E. Zimmerman (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), 17–49.

78. Kenworthy, *Heart of Russia*, 109–10.

79. Kenworthy, *Heart of Russia*, chap. 5; Chulos, *Converging Worlds*, chap. 5; Greene, *Bodies Like Bright Stars*, chap. 3; Roy R. Robson, *Solovki: The Story of Russia Told through Its Most Remarkable Islands* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), chap. 13; Robson, "Pilgrimage at Solovki in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries," *Les cahiers slaves* 7 (2004): 281–302; Robson, "Transforming Solovki: Pilgrim Narratives, Modernization, and Late Imperial Monastic Life," in *Sacred Stories*, 44–60; Christine D. Worobec, "The Long Road to Kiev: Nineteenth-Century Orthodox Pilgrimages," *Modern Greek Studies Yearbook* 30–31 (2014–2015): 1–22.

80. Kenworthy refers to Ivan Shmelev's *Pilgrimage* (1931), a fictionalized account of the author's own first pilgrimage to the Trinity–St. Sergius Lavra: "In Shmelev's portrayal, the characters experience a sense of liminality during the pilgrimage. . . . Everything on the road, even the road itself, is somehow touched with a sense of holiness that sets it apart from the ordinary" (*Heart of Russia*, 190).

81. Kenworthy, *Heart of Russia*, 177.

82. Shevzov, *Russian Orthodoxy*, 236.

83. In addition to the work of Kenworthy and Shevzov highlighted here, see especially Greene, *Bodies Like Bright Stars*.

84. Shevzov, *Russian Orthodoxy*, 194. See also Shevzov, "Icons, Miracles, and the Ecclesial Identity of Laity in Late Imperial Russia," *Church History* 69 (2000): 610–31.

85. A. I. Gertsen, *Byloe i dumy*, 2 vols. (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1987), 1:390 (ellipsis in original).

86. Shevzov, "The Struggle for the Sacred," in *Thinking Orthodox in Modern Russia*, 140, 143.

87. Shevzov, "Struggle for the Sacred," 140, quoting I. Nikolin, "O sverkhestestvennom otkrovennii," *Dushepoleznoe chtenie*, pt. 2 (1902): 63.

88. Similarly, the laity's desire to control its ecclesial life was expressed through its construction of chapels, which were dedicated to various holy places, objects, and events significant in the lives of the faithful. See Shevzov, *Russian Orthodoxy*, chap. 3. Chris Chulos's observation is relevant here: "the ascetic and eremitic traditions of the faith, which emphasized independent piety, resonated with the peasantry, and challenged the institutional authority of the church" (*Converging Worlds*, 27). See also Gregory L. Freeze, "Institutionalizing Piety: The Church and Popular Religion, 1750–1850," in *Imperial Russia: New Histories for the Empire*, ed. Jane Burbank and David L. Ransel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 210–49.

89. Shevzov, *Russian Orthodoxy*, 199, 209.

90. Worobec, "Lived Orthodoxy in Imperial Russia," 344.

91. Shevzov, *Russian Orthodoxy*, 233, 235–36, 261.

92. On women's religious communities, see Brenda Meehan, "To Save Oneself: Russian Peasant Women and the Development of Women's Religious Communities in Pre-Revolutionary Russia," in *Russian Peasant Women*, ed. Beatrice Farnsworth and Lynne Viola (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 121–33; and Meehan, "Popular Piety, Local Initiative, and the Founding of Women's Religious Communities in Russia, 1764–1907," in *Seeking God: The Recovery of Religious Identity in Orthodox Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia*, ed. S. K. Batalden (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1993), 83–105. O. V. Bukova, *Zhenskie obiteli prepodobnogo Serafima Sarovskogo: Istoriia desiati nizhegorodskikh monastyrei* (Nizhnii Novgorod: Knigi, 2003), is a study of women's religious communities founded on the initiative or under the influence of St. Serafim of Sarov.

93. Brenda Meehan, "From Contemplative Practice to Charitable Activity: Russian Women's Communities and the Development of Charitable Work, 1861–1917," in *Lady Bountiful Revisited: Women, Philanthropy and Power*, ed. Kathleen D. McCarthy (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1990), 142–56.

94. William G. Wagner, "'Orthodox Domesticity': Creating a Social Role for Women," in *Sacred Stories*, 119–45.

95. A. V. Govorov, *Zhenskii vopros v sviazi s istoricheskimi sud'bami zhenshchiny* (Kazan: Tsentral'naia tipografiia, 1907–1908), as cited by Wagner, "'Orthodox Domesticity.'"

96. Wagner, "'Orthodox Domesticity,'" 125, 126, 128–29.

97. Wagner, "'Orthodox Domesticity,'" 136–37. His citation is E. Liuleva, *Svobodnaia zhenshchina i khristianstvo* (Moscow, 1906).

98. The Russian is *dukhovnaia akademiia*, literally "spiritual academy" or "clerical academy" (the Russian word for clergy is *dukhovenstvo*). The literature includes B. V. Titlinov, *Dukhovnaia shkola v Rossii v XIX stoletii*, 2 vols. (Farnborough: Gregg, 1970 [1908–1909]); Maria Koehler-Bauer, *Die Geistlichen Akademien in Russland im 19. Jahrhundert* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1997); V. A. Tarasova, *Vysshaia dukhovnaia shkola v Rossii v kontse XIX–nachale XX veka: Istoriia imperatorskikh pravoslavnykh dukhovnykh akademii* (Moscow: Novyi khronograf, 2005); N. Iu. Sukhova, *Vysshaia dukhovnaia shkola: Problemy i reformy (vtoraia polovina XIX veka)* (Moscow: PSTGU, 2006); and Hyacinthe Destivelle, *Les sciences théologiques en Russie: Réforme et renouveau des academies ecclésiastiques au début du XXe siècle* (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2010).

99. For concise accounts of the reform, see Florovsky, *Ways of Russian Theology (Part 1)*, 175–81; and Fedorov, *Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov' i gosudarstvo*, 93–104.

100. Robert L. Nichols, "Orthodoxy and Russia's Enlightenment, 1762–1825," in *Russian Orthodoxy under the Old Regime*, 84–85. On Filaret, see Vladimir Tsurikov, ed., *Philaret, Metropolitan of Moscow, 1782–1867: Perspectives on the Man, His Works, and His Times* (Jordanville, NY: Variable Press, 2003). Sean Gillen, "V. D. Kudriavtsev-Platonov and the Making of Russian Orthodox Theism," in *Thinking Orthodox in Modern Russia*, 111–25, highlights one of the fruits of Filaret's efforts: Kudriavtsev-Platonov's philosophical defense of theism in the Moscow Theological Academy. This defense relied heavily on Kant, so much so that Gillen remarks, "Kudriavtsev's intellectual career can be seen as a profound engagement with Kant" (112).

101. Florovsky, *Ways of Russian Theology (Part 1)*, 220.

102. Florovsky, *Ways of Russian Theology (Part 1)*, 222–23, 227.

103. Valliere, "'Theological Liberalism and Church Reform,'" 125–28, referring to M. M. Tareev, *Osnovy khristianstva: Sistema religioznoi mysli*, 4 vols. (Sergiev Posad, 1908), 4: *Khristianskaia svoboda*. Kudriavtsev-Platonov (1828–1891) can be regarded as another theological liberal at the Moscow Theological Academy. Theological liberalism was not the only product of the academies. Simon Dixon argues that by the 1880s the search, which began with Filaret, for an authentic Russian Orthodoxy "had crystallized into a sharply confessionalized sense of *tserkovnost'* (churchmindedness) derived from research at the theological academies of Moscow, Kiev, St. Petersburg and Kazan" ("Russian Orthodox Church in Imperial Russia," 332).

104. Florovsky, *Ways of Russian Theology (Part 1)*, 230–32.

105. Patrick Michelson has established the project's importance in his "In the Image and Likeness of God: The Patristic Tradition of Human Dignity and Freedom in Nineteenth-Century Russia," chapter 1 of "'The First and Most Sacred Right': Re-

on him is Antonii (Vadkovskii), *Rechi, slova, i poucheniia*, 3rd ed. (St. Petersburg: Sinodal'naia tipografiia, 1912).

132. Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*, 47–49.

133. Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*, 46–51; Dixon, "Church's Social Role in St. Petersburg," 173–74. Among the founders of the ORRP was Father Ioann L. Ianyshev (1826–1910), the rector of the St. Petersburg Theological Academy from 1866 to 1883. On Ianyshev's role as rector, see Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*, 35–40.

134. Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*, 86–99, gives detailed consideration to the ORRP, and its mission to the working class is central to Page Herrlinger, *Working Souls: Russian Orthodoxy and Factory Labor in St. Petersburg, 1881–1917* (Bloomington, IN: Slavica Publishers, 2007). The main sources for the ORRP are *Otchet o deiatel'nosti Obshchestva rasprostraneniia religiozno-nravstvennogo prosveshcheniia v dukhe pravoslavnoi tserkvi za [1881–1912]* (St. Petersburg: ORRP, 1882–1913) and its weekly journal, *S. Peterburgskii dukhovnyi vestnik* (1895–1901).

135. Radstock visited St. Petersburg in 1875 and again between 1877 and 1880 and found a warm welcome there. See Edmund Heier, *Religious Schism in the Russian Aristocracy: Radstockism and Pashkovism* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970). One of Radstock's Russian followers was Fedor Terner, a minor state official. In 1876, speaking before the Society of Lovers of Spiritual Enlightenment, he proposed the legal recognition of freedom of conscience and criticized the Synodal system as violating Orthodox teaching, going back to the Byzantine period, on church-state relations, according to which the ideal of "harmony" (the Greek *symphonia*) should govern such relations, not subordination of church to state. His speech caused something of a sensation and was widely reported in the press. Terner published his ideas: F. G. Terner, "Svoboda sovesti i otnosheniia gosudarstva k tserkvi," in *Sbornik gosudarstvennykh znanii*, ed. V. P. Bezobrazov, 8 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1874–1880), 3:1–57. See Basil, *Church and State in Imperial Russia*, 75; and Werth, *Tsar's Foreign Faiths*, 194.

136. Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*, 87–91, 96–105 (quotation on 87).

137. Herrlinger, *Working Souls*, chap. 1.

138. Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*, 48–51.

139. In addition to her book, see K. Page Herrlinger, "The Religious Landscape of Revolutionary St. Petersburg, 1905–1918," *Journal of Urban History* 37, no. 6 (2011): 842–57; see also Simon Dixon, "The Orthodox Church and the Workers of St. Petersburg," in *European Religion in the Age of Great Cities, 1830–1930*, ed. Hugh McLeod (London: Routledge, 1995), 119–41; and Kenworthy, "Orthodox Social Gospel," 15–17.

140. Mark D. Steinberg, "'A Path of Thorns': The Spiritual Wounds and Wandering of Worker-Poets," in *Sacred Stories*, 306; Steinberg, *Proletarian Imagination: Self, Modernity, and the Sacred in Russia, 1910–1925* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002).

141. Herrlinger, "Religious Landscape of Revolutionary St. Petersburg," 850. She bases her conclusion on her study of the spiritual lives and religious experiences of St. Petersburg workers in *Working Souls* (the index entry for "freedom of conscience" refers to cases of workers who recognized this right through their own experience).

142. Kenworthy, "Orthodox Social Gospel," 6.

143. Kenworthy, "Orthodox Social Gospel," 3.

144. Hedda frames her book partly in response to the question, "Did the social gospel movement have any influence in Russia, or was there any parallel in the Russian Orthodox Church stimulated by similar developments?" (*His Kingdom Come*, 5). Paul Valliere made the comparison to the American Social Gospel in his early article, "Modes of Social Action in Russian Orthodoxy: The Case of Father Petrov's *Zateinik*," *Russian History/Histoire russe* 4, no. 2 (1977): 142–58.

145. Gregory L. Freeze, "Die Laisierung des Archimandriten Feodor (Bucharev) und ihre kirchenpolitischen Hintergründe: Theologie und Politik im Russland der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts," *Kirchen im Osten: Studien zur osteuropäischen Kirchengeschichte und Kirchenkunde* 28 (1985): 26–52.

146. On Bukharev, see Paul Valliere's classic work on the liberal theological tradition in Russia, *Modern Russian Theology: Bukharev, Soloviev, Bulgakov. Orthodox Theology in a New Key* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000), part 1. *On Orthodoxy in Relation to the Modern World* was reprinted early in the twentieth century: Arkhimandrit Feodor (A. M. Bukharev), *O pravoslavii v otnoshenii k sovremennosti* (St. Petersburg: Sinodal'naia tipograiia, 1906), as cited in Valliere, *Modern Russian Theology*, 35. On Bukharev, see also Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*, 54–58.

147. A. S. Bukhareva, "Aleksandr Matveevich Bukharev (Arkhimandrit Feodor): Iz materialov dlia biografii," *Svobodnaia sovest': Literaturno-filosofskii sbornik*, bk. 1 (Moscow: I. D. Sytin, 1906), 1–20. The chapter was written by Bukharev's widow, née Anna Sergeevna Rodyshevskaia. The unidentified editor/compiler of the volume makes the point that Bukharev's fate, which turned on his refusal to compromise his conscience, represented "profound social interest" in the circumstances of Russia in 1905–1906 (1–2n). Bukharev himself said that his decision to leave the clergy in 1863 was motived by his desire not to betray his conscience, which was no longer possible while remaining under monastic vows and ecclesiastical authority (Valliere, *Modern Russian Theology*, 73). The *Svobodnaia sovest'* volume also includes, among others, a chapter by Boris Vysheslavtsev on B. N. Chicherin and a chapter by Sergei Kotliarevskii, "Svoboda sovesti." Further, the volume contains G. A. Rachinskii's translation of Vladimir Solov'ev's "Troichnoe nachalo i ego obshchestvennoe prilozhenie," the third part of Solov'ev's *La Russie et l'Église universelle* (1889), which was not included in his collected works. Chicherin, Solov'ev, and Kotliarevskii were important figures in the Russian neo-idealist defense of freedom of conscience. It is very likely that the volume's editor/compiler was P. Astrov, the author of the last two chapters,

"Pravda marksizma" and "Na puti k svobode sovesti," both of which are notable and make clear Astrov's admiration for Solov'ev. No doubt this was Pavel Ivanovich Astrov, who was a judge on the Moscow District Court and an organizer of a Moscow religious-literary circle. According to Zernov, he was "a man of integrity and a convinced member of the Church." A member of the Russian Orthodox Church council (*sobor*), he was executed by the Bolsheviks in 1918. See Zernov, *Russian Religious Renaissance*, 107. For his role on the church council, see James W. Cunningham, *The Gates of Hell: The Great Sobor of the Russian Orthodox Church, 1917–1918* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Modern Greek Studies Program, 2002).

148. Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*, 64–72, quotation on 68.

149. P. Ia. Svetlov, *Ideia Tsarstva Bozhiia v ee znacheniia dlia khristianskogo mirosozertsaniia: Bogoslovsko-apologeticheskoe issledovanie* (Sergiev Posad: Sviato-Troitskaia Sergieva Lavra, 1905).

150. For a classic account of Solov'ev as a philosopher of Russian liberalism, see Andrzej Walicki, *Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), chap. 3.

151. Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*, chap. 6; Kenworthy, "Orthodox Social Gospel," 17–19.

152. G. S. Petrov, *Evangelie kak osnova zhizni*, 2nd ed. (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia "Artilleriiskogo Zhurnala," 1898). It went through seventeen editions by 1905. For summary and analysis, see Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*, 108–11; and Valliere, "Modes of Social Action," 142–58.

153. Petrov, *Evangelie kak osnova zhizni*, 8, 81, as quoted in Valliere, "Modes of Social Action," 147.

154. Dixon, "Russian Orthodox Church in Imperial Russia," 343.

155. Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*, 122, 244n74.

156. Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*, 123–25, 244n79.

157. In addition to Zernov, *Russian Religious Renaissance*, see Billington, *Icon and the Axe*, 464–518; Gleb Struve, "The Cultural Renaissance," in *Russia under the Last Tsar*, ed. Theofanis George Stavrou (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969), 179–201; Georges Florovsky, "On the Eve," in *Ways of Russian Theology (Part Two)*, 233–83; Christopher Read, *Religion, Revolution, and the Russian Intelligentsia, 1900–1912: The Vekhi Debate and Its Intellectual Background* (London: Macmillan, 1979); Ruth Coates, "Religious Renaissance in the Silver Age," in *A History of Russian Thought*, ed. William Leatherbarrow and Derek Offord (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 169–93; Hamburg and Poole, *History of Russian Philosophy, 1830–1930*, parts 2–4; and P. P. Gaidenko, *Vladimir Solov'ev i filosofiia Serebrianogo veka* (Moscow: Progress-Traditsiia, 2001).

158. The "revolt against populism" was a Europe-wide movement characteristic of fin-de-siècle culture. See H. Stuart Hughes, *Consciousness and Society: The Reori-*

entation of European Social Thought, 1890–1930, rev. ed. (New York: Vintage, 1977).

159. The term "God-seeking" was probably coined in response to Maksim Gor'kii's "God-building." See George L. Kline, *Religious and Anti-Religious Thought in Russia* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 102–27.

160. For Solov'ev's views on the subordination of church to state in Russian history, see his series of articles published from 1881 to 1883 in Ivan Aksakov's *Rus'*: "O dukhovnoi vlasti v Rossii," "O tserkvi i raskole," and "Velikii spor i khristianskaia politika." An edition with useful editorial matter is V. S. Solov'ev, *Sochineniia*, 2 vols., vol. 1: *Filosofskaia publitsistika* (Moscow: Pravda, 1989). For summary and analysis, see E. N. Trubetskoi, *Mirosozertsanie Vl. S. Solov'eva*, 2 vols. (Moscow: Put', 1913), 1:437–48; A. F. Losev, *Vladimir Solov'ev i ego vremia* (Moscow: Progress, 1990), 342–47; Konstantin Mochul'skii, *Vladimir Solov'ev: Zhizn' i uchenie* (Paris: YMCA Press, 1951), 134–44; and Dimitri Strémooukhoff, *Vladimir Soloviev and His Messianic Work*, trans. Elizabeth Meyendorff (Belmont, MA: Nordland, 1979), 141–46, 187–88. An important essay for Solov'ev's views on religious intolerance is *Evreistvo i khristianskii vopros* (Jewry and the Christian Question, 1884), in *Sobranie sochinenii Vladimira Sergeevicha Solov'eva*, ed. S. M. Solov'ev and E. L. Radlov, 2nd ed., 10 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1911–1914), 4:135–85.

161. Inessa Medzhibovskaya, *Tolstoy and the Religious Culture of His Time: A Biography of a Long Conversion, 1845–1887* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008), 250. This work is the focus of my review essay, "'Russia's First Modern Man': Tolstoy, Kant, and Russian Religious Thought," *Tolstoy Studies Journal* 22 (2010): 99–117.

162. Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*, 92. Five years earlier Lopukhin published a book on the topic (*Religiia v Amerike* [St. Petersburg: S. Dobrodeev, 1882]). According to Werth, who cites the book, Lopukhin did not argue that freedom of conscience was absolute but rather that it was dependent on historical circumstances. In this connection Werth also refers to Fr. Ioann Ianyshev, who in 1876 remarked, "Conscience cannot be free because it represents the consciousness of [one's] dependence on an internal moral law" (*Tsar's Foreign Faiths*, 193). Ianyshev's statement is an example of the semantic difficulties associated with "freedom of conscience": as I indicated above, the *term* might seem to suggest a relativistic notion of morality and conscience, but the *concept* holds that the ideals of conscience (including truth and the moral law) must be freely recognized from within in order to have the power of self-determination. The concept does not imply moral relativism (as Ianyshev and other Russian ecclesiastical critics thought).

163. Michelson reviews some of these historical arguments ("'First and Most Sacred Right,'" 236–44, 254–70). The prominent Russian liberals Petr Struve and Pavel Novgorodtsev made these arguments, as did their colleague Sergei Kotliarevskii, on whom see my articles: "Sergei Kotliarevskii and the Rule of Law in Russian Liberal Theory," *Dialogue and Universalism* 16, no. 1–2 (2006): 81–104; and "William James

in the Moscow Psychological Society: Pragmatism, Pluralism, Personalism," in *William James in Russian Culture*, ed. Joan Delaney Grossman and Ruth S. Rischin (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003), 131–58.

164. Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*, 95.

165. Gregory L. Freeze, "'Going to the Intelligentsia': The Church and Its Urban Mission in Post-Reform Russia," in *Between Tsar and People: Educated Society and the Quest for Public Identity in Late Imperial Russia*, ed. Edith W. Clowes, Samuel D. Kassow, and James L. West (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 221–23.

166. The protocols of the meetings were first published in the journal *Novyi put'* and then collected in a separate volume: *Zapiski Peterburgskikh religiozno-filosofskikh sobranii (1902–1903 gg.)* (St. Petersburg, 1906), republished as S. M. Polovinkin, ed., *Zapiski Peterburgskikh religiozno-filosofskikh sobranii, 1901–1903* (Moscow: Respublika, 2005). Also see Jutta Scherrer, *Die Petersburger religiös-philosophischen Vereinigungen: Die Entwicklung des religiösen Selbstverständnisses ihrer Intelligencija-Mitglieder (1901–1907)* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1973).

167. James P. Scanlan, "The New Religious Consciousness: Merezhkovskii and Berdiaev," *Canadian Slavic Studies* 4, no. 1 (1970): 17–35; Robert Bird, "Imagination and Ideology in the New Religious Consciousness," in *History of Russian Philosophy, 1830–1930*, 266–84; Chris Alan Stroop, "Providential Empire: Russia's Religious Intelligentsia and the First World War" (PhD diss., Stanford University, 2012); Stroop, "Nationalist War Commentary as Russian Religious Thought: The Religious Intelligentsia's Politics of Providentialism," *Russian Review* 72, no. 1 (2013): 94–115; M. A. Kolerov, *Ne mir, no mech: Russkaia religiozno-filosofskaia pechat' ot 'Problem idealizma' do "Vekh' 1902–1909* (St. Petersburg: Aleteiia, 1996); Evgenii Gollerbakh, *K nezrimomu gradu: Religiozno-filosofskaia gruppa "Put'" (1910–1919) v poiskakh novoi russkoi identichnosti* (St. Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2000); A. V. Sobolev, "K istorii Religiozno-Filosofskogo Obshchestva pamiati Vladimira Solov'eva," *Istoriko-filosofskii ezhegodnik '92*, ed. N. V. Motroshilova (Moscow: Nauka, 1993), 102–14; Kristiane Burchardi, *Die Moskauer "Religiös-Philosophische Vladimir-Solovyov-Gesellschaft" (1905–1918)* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1998); *Vzyskuiushchie grada: Khronika chastnoi zhizni russkikh religioznykh filosofov v pis'makh i dnevnikakh*, ed. V. I. Keidan (Moscow: Iazyki russkoi kul'tury, 1997).

168. John D. Basil, *Church and State in Late Imperial Russia: Critics of the Synodal System of Church Government (1861–1914)* (Minneapolis: Minnesota Mediterranean and East European Monographs, 2005), 77–81, quotation on 77.

169. S. M. Volkonskii, "K kharakteristike obshchestvennykh mnenii po voprosu o svobody sovesti," in *Zapiski Peterburgskikh religiozno-filosofskikh sobranii (1902–1903 gg.)* (St. Petersburg, 1906), 113–32.

170. Volkonskii, "K kharakteristike obshchestvennykh mnenii," 121, 131–33.

171. V. M. Skvortsov, in *Zapiski Peterburgskikh religiozno-filosofskikh sobranii (1902–1903 gg.)*, 147.

172. Basil, *Church and State*, 79–81.

173. Bishop Sergei (Stragorodskii), in *Zapiski Peterburgskikh religiozno-filosofskikh sobranii (1902–1903 gg.)*, 163–64, 169; in this paragraph I have generally followed the exposition in Sergei Firsov, *Russkaia Tserkov' nakanune peremen (konets 1890-kh–1918 gg.)* (St. Petersburg: Kruglyi stol po religioznomu obrazovaniiu i diakonii, 2002), 115–17. There is also a good account in Safronov, "Right to Freedom of Conscience," 36–40.

174. Basil, *Church and State*, 76–77; Werth, *Tsar's Foreign Faiths*, 194–95.

175. Randall A. Poole, ed. and trans., *Problems of Idealism: Essays in Russian Social Philosophy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003); M. A. Kolerov, ed., *Problemy idealizma: Sbornik statei* (Moscow: Tri Kvadrata, 2002), with introductory essays by Kolerov and N. S. Plotnikov.

176. On the Psychological Society, see the introductory essays in the English and Russian editions of *Problems of Idealism*.

177. Poole, *Problems of Idealism*, 83.

178. On this intellectual evolution, see Walicki, *Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism*, chap. 2, esp. 132–39, 155–64; Hamburg, *Boris Chicherin and Early Russian Liberalism*, 244–342; and Hamburg, "An Eccentric Vision: The Political Philosophy of B. N. Chicherin," in *Liberty, Equality, and the Market*, 1–65, esp. 53–65.

179. B. N. Chicherin, *Nauka i religiia*, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Kushnerev, 1901), 132.

180. Chicherin, *Nauka i religiia*, 103–34 ("The Moral World"), esp. 103, 111–16, 119–20, 126.

181. Chicherin, *Nauka i religiia*, 231.

182. B. N. Chicherin, *Mistitsizm v nauke* (Moscow: Martynov, 1880), 62. Chicherin makes the distinction between external and inner liberty in several places, including the key first chapter ("Liberty") of *Sobstvennost' i gosudarstvo*, 2 vols. (Moscow: Martynov, 1882–1883), translated in *Liberty, Equality, and the Market*, 353–79. Here Chicherin writes that "legal constraints upon freedom of conscience, once so common, are now rejected as violations of the most sacred rights of the individual" (373).

183. In *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785), Kant wrote that autonomy is "the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature" (*Practical Philosophy*, 85). Chicherin explicates Kant's argument in a number of places: in an essay on Kant in his *Istoriia politicheskikh uchenii*, 5 vols. (Moscow, 1869–1902), 3:324–74, which contains a good exposition of the *Groundwork* (330–36); in *Nauka i religiia*, 113–14; and in his *Filosofiia prava* (Moscow: Kushnerov, 1900), 170–77. (In the last two works he presents the main conclusions of the *Groundwork* as his own.) Autonomy is the very concept of freedom of conscience, which for Kant, as for his Russian followers, was the first foundation of liberalism. See Paul Guyer, "Kantian Foundations for Liberalism," in his *Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 235–61. Freedom of conscience as

autonomy or self-determination is a "global concept" in Kant, but he also deals with it in the specific context of religion. See the concluding section ("Concerning the Guiding Thread of Conscience in Matters of Faith") of *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* in Immanuel Kant, *Religion and Rational Theology*, trans. and ed. Allen W. Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 202–15.

184. Chicherin, *Filosofiia prava*, 191–92. See also G. M. Hamburg, "Boris Chicherin and Human Dignity in History," in *A History of Russian Philosophy, 1830–1930*, 111–30 (he quotes the last sentence on 125). In this essay Hamburg reconstructs Chicherin's philosophy of history, showing how it achieved a powerful synthesis of Kant and Hegel.

185. Valliere, "Theological Liberalism and Church Reform," 119–24.

186. This section draws on my essays: "Vladimir Solov'ev's Philosophical Anthropology: Autonomy, Dignity, Perfectibility," in *A History of Russian Philosophy, 1830–1930*, 131–49; and "Kant and the Kingdom of Ends in Russian Religious Thought (Vladimir Solov'ev)," in *Thinking Orthodox in Modern Russia*, 215–34.

187. In *Critique of Abstract Principles*, Solov'ev closely paraphrases and directly translates large parts of the *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*. See *Kritika otvlechennykh nachal*, in V. S. Solov'ev, *Sobranie sochinenii Vladimira Sergeevicha Solov'eva*, 2nd ed., ed. S. M. Solov'ev and E. L. Radlov, 10 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1911–1914), 2:44–62. In addition to these two chapters, he devotes three more, plus an appendix, to Kant's ethics and conception of rational autonomy, drawing also on (paraphrasing and quoting at length) the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Critique of Practical Reason*. See Solov'ev, *Sobranie sochinenii*, 2:62–72, 89–116, 371–97.

188. Chicherin attributes this conception of human nature and the type of idealism that follows from it specifically to Kant. "There is not and cannot be any other foundation of inner freedom and morality," he declared. See his essay on Kant in *Istoriia politicheskikh uchenii*, 3:339–40; and *Liberty, Equality, and the Market*, 360–63.

189. Solov'ev, "Istoricheskie dela filosofii" (1880), in *Sobranie sochinenii Vladimira Sergeevicha Solov'eva*, 2:410.

190. Solov'ev, *Kritika otvlechennykh nachal*, viii–ix. His combination of autonomy and theocracy confounded his fellow Russian idealists, beginning with Chicherin, who was an implacable critic of the younger philosopher. Chicherin wrote an entire book (*Mistitsizm v nauke*) against *Critique of Abstract Principles*, taking issue with "free theocracy" in particular, which he saw as plainly incompatible with freedom of conscience, Solov'ev's assurances aside. In a long essay against *Justification of the Good* (1897), Chicherin compared Solov'ev to Torquemada. See Chicherin, "O nachalakh etiki," *Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii*, 8, no. 4, bk. 39 (1897): 644–45; and Walicki, *Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism*, 188–89, 206–9. The most sophisticated and sensitive treatment of Solov'ev's ideal of free theocracy can be found in Valliere, *Mod-*

ern Russian Theology, 127–37; and Paul Valliere, "Vladimir Soloviev (1853–1900)," in *Teachings of Modern Christianity*, 1:547–51.

191. The journal was the "flagship of Russian liberalism," as Anton Fedyashin describes it in his study, *Liberals under Autocracy: Modernization and Civil Society in Russia, 1866–1904* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012), part 2. Konstantin Arsen'ev was one of four liberal intellectuals who edited it (the others were Mikhail Stasiulevich, Aleksandr Pypin, and Leonid Slonimskii). In the journal's April 1882 issue, Arsen'ev published a "liberal program" that listed freedom of the press and freedom of conscience as liberalism's primary demands (Fedyashin, *Liberals under Autocracy*, 149). In the course of nearly twenty-five years Arsen'ev published many articles in *Vestnik Evropy* on religious freedom, which were collected in his important book *Freedom of Conscience and Toleration* (1905).

192. V. S. Solov'ev, *Natsional'nyi vopros v Rossii*, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg: M. M. Stasiulevich, 1888, 1891). Also Solov'ev, *Sobranie sochinenii*, 5:3–401; and Solov'ev, *Sochineniia*, 1: *Filosofskaia publitsistika*. For an excellent analysis of these and related writings, see Greg Gaut, "Can a Christian Be a Nationalist? Vladimir Solov'ev's Critique of Nationalism," *Slavic Review* 57, no. 1 (1998): 77–94.

193. Solov'ev, *Opravdanie dobra: Nravstvennaia filosofiia*, *Sobranie sochinenii*, 8:3–516. Conceived as a new edition of *Critique of Abstract Principles*, the project grew into a new book.

194. Vladimir Solovyov, *The Justification of the Good: An Essay on Moral Philosophy*, trans. Natalie A. Duddington, ed. and annotated Boris Jakim (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2005), 150. I have modified the translation in accordance with the Russian text.

195. Solovyov, *Justification of the Good*, 324–25. The philosopher himself adds here that one of the consequences of the necessary autonomy of virtue and truth is "the principle of unlimited religious tolerance." In his conception of the autonomy of virtue, Solov'ev likely drew on Kant's *Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Virtue*, the second part of *The Metaphysics of Morals*. See Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. and ed. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

196. Chicherin, *Filosofiia prava*, 55.

197. Solovyov, *Justification of the Good*, 145.

198. Solovyov, *Justification of the Good*, 176. According to Solov'ev, we become conscious of the "double infinity" through our moral-religious experience. The nature of religious experience (reverence) occupies Solov'ev in the second part of *Justification of the Good*. See Poole, "Vladimir Solov'ev's Philosophical Anthropology," 145–49. It is clear that Bulgakov's understanding of the experiential basis of religion, with which I began the present essay, owes very much to Solov'ev.

199. P. Borisov [Struve], "V chem zhe istinnyi natsionalizm?," *Voprosy filosofii i*

psikhologii 12, no. 4, kn. 59 (1901): 493–528; reprinted in his collection *Na raznye temy* (St. Petersburg: A. E. Kolpinskii, 1902), 526–55. For analysis, see Richard Pipes, *Struve: Liberal on the Left, 1870–1905* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), 300–307.

200. Borisov [Struve], "V chem zhe istinnyi natsionalizm?," 503, 504, 511, 520.

201. Borisov [Struve], "V chem zhe istinnyi natsionalizm?," 507, 512. Struve later reversed himself on nationalism. In his famous 1908 essay, "Great Russia," he advanced a Darwinian conception of the state as a "special organism" that lived by its own supreme laws of existence (such as the striving for power) and was not subject to any higher law. See P. B. Struve, "Velikaia Rossiia: Iz razmyshlenii o probleme russkogo mogushchestva," *Russkaia mysl'* 29 (January 1908): 143–57. For analysis, see Richard Pipes, *Struve: Liberal on the Right, 1905–1944* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 88–92.

202. Borisov [Struve], "V chem zhe istinnyi natsionalizm?," 505–8. Struve identifies his source: Novgorodtsev, whose course, "The History of the Philosophy of Law," provides "an extraordinarily clear and elegant exposition of this important moment in the development of man's legal consciousness." Struve does not provide a specific citation for Novgorodtsev. In the fourth edition of his *Lektsii po istorii filosofii prava: Ucheniia novogo vremeni, XVI–XIX vv.* (Moscow: G. V. Vasil'ev, 1918), Novgorodtsev's consideration of Williams is on 66–68. Both Novgorodtsev and Struve refer to a series of articles by M. M. Kovalevskii, "Rodonachal'niki angliiskogo radikalizma," *Russkaia mysl'* (January–March 1892).

203. S. N. Bulgakov, *Ot marksizma k idealizmu: Sbornik statei (1896–1903)* (St. Petersburg: Obshchestvennaia pol'za, 1903).

204. Bulgakov's essay, "Basic Problems of the Theory of Progress," opens *Problems of Idealism*. In it he argues that the idea or category of the absolute is intrinsic to human consciousness but that it must be freely and candidly recognized. Otherwise, it will enter into thought as a type of "contraband," resulting in various conflations and distortions of the relative and absolute. His case study is the positivist theory of progress.

205. Zernov, *Russian Religious Renaissance*, 293.

206. S. N. Bulgakov, *Avtobiograficheskie zametki*, ed. L. A. Zander (Paris: YMCA Press, 1946), 61–66; Zernov, *Russian Religious Renaissance*, 145–48; Evtuhov, *Cross and the Sickle*, 38–45. On the Zosimova Hermitage and German (Gomzin), see Kenworthy, *Heart of Russia*, 106–9, 238–53. According to Kenworthy, German revered the *starchestvo* tradition and was himself widely regarded as an elder (109).

207. Michelson, "'First and Most Sacred Right,'" analyzes the articles at some length (290–92, 321–31); I rely on his exposition. He provides the following citations: Ak. [Sergei Bulgakov], "Pis'ma iz Rossii, II: Samoderzhavie i pravoslavie," *Osvobozhdenie*, no. 4 (2 August 1902): 59–60; no. 5 (19 August 1902): 72–73; and no. 6 (2

September 1902): 86–87; K. T-n. [Nikolai Berdiaev], "Politicheskii smysl religioznogo brozheniia v Rossii," *Osvobozhdenie*, no. 13 (2 December 1903): 218–20; and no. 14 (25 December 1903): 242–45.

208. In March 1903, on the pages of *Osvobozhdenie*, Struve, referring specifically to Solov'ev and *Problems of Idealism*, wrote that the liberation movement should base its "self-consciousness and dignity" on the ideas and principles that idealism showed to be irrefutable. See P. B. Struve, "O chem dumaet odna kniga?," *Osvobozhdenie*, no. 18 (2/15 March 1903): 311–12; and Catherine Evtuhov, *Cross and the Sickle*, 88. On the centrality of religious liberty, see Michelson, "'First and Most Sacred Right,'" 335–36.

209. Basil, *Church and State*, 74. "All but a handful of Russians" surely overstates the degree of popular support for freedom of conscience. Werth writes that freedom of conscience had achieved "broad currency" in early twentieth-century Russia ("Emergence of 'Freedom of Conscience,'" 586). The extent of popular support for freedom of conscience would seem to be an important measure of how many Russian subjects had become aware of themselves as "citizens"—that is, as bearers and defenders of rights. I suggest (though it is virtually a tautology to do so) that freedom of conscience had wide support in civil society—the body of self-conscious citizens, a small but dynamic and growing part of the Russian population as a whole—but much less support outside it.

210. Cunningham, *Vanquished Hope*, 83–94; Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*, 126–52; and Herrlinger, *Working Souls*, 165–75, give much more attention to the religious context of Gapon's movement than does Walter Sablinsky, *The Road to Bloody Sunday: Father Gapon and the St. Petersburg Massacre of 1905* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). Also see Kenworthy, "Orthodox Social Gospel," 1–2, 19–24.

211. The petition prepared by Gapon for presentation to the emperor listed, in its first paragraph of "principal needs": "1. The immediate release and return of those who suffered for their political and religious convictions. . . . 2. *An immediate* proclamation of freedom and inviolability of the person, freedom of speech, press, association, and worship. . . . 6. *Separation of the church from the state.*" The petition is included as an appendix to Sablinsky, *Road to Bloody Sunday*, 344–49.

212. Herrlinger, *Working Souls*, 200–201.

213. Werth, *Tsar's Foreign Faiths*, 218.

214. Firsov, *Russkaia Tserkov' nakanune peremen*, emphasizes this interpretation: "the question of freedom of conscience was connected with a solution to the question of church reforms and wholly depended on it" (352). Church reform has been extensively studied. For my overview, I drawn on Firsov; Cunningham, *Vanquished Hope* (which remains highly valuable); A. A. Bogolepov, "Church Reforms in Russia, 1905–1918," *St. Vladimir's Seminary Quarterly* 10, no. 1 (1966): 12–66; Werth, *Tsar's Foreign Faiths*; Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*; Basil, *Church and State*; John Meyendorff,

"Russian Bishops and Church Reform in 1905," in *Russian Orthodoxy under the Old Regime*, 170–82; and Paul Valliere, "The Idea of a Council in Russian Orthodoxy in 1905," in *Russian Orthodoxy under the Old Regime*, 183–204. An important collection of documents (which remained beyond my reach) is I. V. Preobrazhenskii, ed., *Tserkovnaia reforma: Sbornik statei dukhuvnoi i svetskoi periodicheskoi pechati po voprosu o reforme* (St. Petersburg: E. Arnol'd, 1905).

215. Werth, *Tsar's Foreign Faiths*, 202–3.

216. Cunningham, *Vanquished Hope*, 80.

217. Antonii's memo, "Voprosy o zhelatel'nykh preobrazovaniiakh v postanovke u nas pravoslavnoi tserkvi," can be found in Fedorov, *Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov' i gosudarstvo*, 387–90 (quotation on 388). Freeze, *Parish Clergy*, 469, quotes the first part of the passage.

218. Witte's memo, "O sovremennom polozhenii pravoslavnoi tserkvi," can be found in Fedorov, *Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov' i gosudarstvo*, 390–402.

219. The decree can be found in Fedorov, *Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov' i gosudarstvo*, 402–5.

220. Gruppa peterburgskikh sviashchennikov, "O neotlozhnosti vozstanovleniia kanonicheskoi svobodi pravoslavnoi tserkvi v Rossii," in the group's *K tserkovnomu soboru: Sbornik* (St. Petersburg: M. Merkushev, 1906), 1–8, quotation on 1. The manifesto appeared first in *Tserkovnyi vestnik* under the title "O neobkhodimosti peremen v russkom tserkovnom upravlenii."

221. Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*, 164–65, 205–9.

222. Firsov, *Russkaia Tserkov' nakanune peremen*, 338–42.

223. Firsov, *Russkaia Tserkov' nakanune peremen*, 340; Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*, 191. In 1917 it was revived as the Living Church.

224. On the role of these two groups, see Gregory L. Freeze, "Church and Politics in Late Imperial Russia: Crisis and Radicalization of the Clergy," in *Russia under the Last Tsar: Opposition and Subversion, 1894–1917*, ed. Anna Geifman (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1999), 269–97. On clergy and autocracy in the last years of the old regime, see also Argyrios Pisiotis, "Orthodoxy versus Autocracy: The Orthodox Church and Clerical Political Dissent in Late Imperial Russia, 1905–1914" (PhD diss., Georgetown University, 2000); and M. A. Babkin, *Dukhovenstvo russkoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi i sverzhenie monarkhii (nachalo XXv.–konets 1917 g.)* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennaia publichnaia istoricheskaia biblioteka Rossii, 2007).

225. Their replies were published and are an important historical source: *Otzyvy eparkhial'nykh arkhiereev po voprosam o tserkovnoi reforme*, 3 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1906). They have been extensively analyzed by Meyendorff, Cunningham, Basil, and Firsov, among others.

226. Werth, "Emergence of 'Freedom of Conscience,'" 608–9. For a biographical portrait of Khrapovitskii, see Cunningham, *Vanquished Hope*, 59–66. Another exam-

ple is Nikon (Rozhdestvenskii), who became bishop of Vologda in 1906, a member of the State Council in 1907, and a member of the Holy Synod in 1912. He was a staunch conservative and thought autocracy had a "religious character." He was a harsh critic of freedom of conscience, indeed of freedom more generally. In the State Council he worked hard to ensure that freedom of conscience did not become law. See Kenworthy, *Heart of Russia*, 263–65.

227. Cunningham, *Vanquished Hope*, 173–76, 267–69.

228. Richard S. Wortman, *Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy*, 2 vols. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995, 2000), 2, pt. 3. The monarchy's new myth of power, which took shape in the reign of Alexander III, held that the Russian Orthodox Church, autocratic state, and Russian people (*narod*) were one. The myth continued under Nicholas II but emphasized the tsar's personal divine authority, unencumbered by institutions of church and state; in both forms it excluded freedom of conscience and liberalism more generally.

229. Dorskaia was among the first to emphasize the basic reasons for the failure of the post-1905 legislative program to enact freedom of conscience into law: freedom of conscience was incompatible with the autocracy and its ideology, which was essentially a form of divine right located in the state church (*Svoboda sovesti v Rossii*, esp. 120). Dorskaia's book is among those included in Paul Werth's review essay "Toward 'Freedom of Conscience': Catholicism, Law, and the Contours of Religious Liberty in Late Imperial Russia," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 7, no. 4 (2006): 843–63.

230. As Gregory Freeze argued in one of his most admired essays: "Subversive Piety: Religion and the Political Crisis in Late Imperial Russia," *Journal of Modern History* 68, no. 2 (1996): 308–50.

2. Religious Toleration in Russian Thought, 1520–1825

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1. See John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty*, in *Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, vol. 18: *Essays on Politics and Society* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 225–26.

2. Mill, *On Liberty*, 222.

3. Amartya Sen, *The Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian History, Culture, and Identity* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2005), 3, 15–19.

4. Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 3.

5. This point is made by Jeffrey R. Collins in "Redeeming the Enlightenment: New Histories of Religious Toleration," *Journal of Modern History* 81, no. 3 (2009): 607–36.

6. Jonathan Israel, *Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man, 1670–1752* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).