

HUSSERL AND SOVIET MARXISM

Only fairly recently have Soviet philosophers turned their attention to an examination of Husserlian phenomenology. Prior to 1957 there was virtually no discussion or recognition of the work of Husserl. In the late 1960's a stream of articles and short books appeared on the subject. Yet even at the present time the number of Russian translations of Husserl is limited to only two of his earliest works, both translated before the Revolution: the *Logical Investigations* in 1909 and the article, *Philosophy as a Rigorous Science*, in 1911. The pages devoted to Husserl in the Russian *History of Philosophy (Istorija Filosofii)* reveal a familiarity only with these two translations. Perhaps quite naturally, most other commentaries on Husserl deal most extensively with these two works and the problems raised therein.

The Russians recognize with admiration the rigor and intent of much of the *Logical Investigations*. However, they appear to be alarmed, as might be expected, at Husserl's critique of historicism, not so much because of a sympathy for Dilthey as for what they take to be Husserl's rejection of meaning in history. Some Soviet commentators demonstrate a limited knowledge of Husserl's later writings, particularly the *Crisis of the European Sciences*, while most turn to secondary sources, e.g., the writings of Levinas, Berger *et al.*, for a clarification of a difficult concept or merely for the sake of emphasis. The Russian *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, unfortunately, only *briefly* mentions the various phenomenological techniques, e.g., the reductions, intuition, etc.

Many Soviet philosophers are quite willing to admit that the initial aims and goals of phenomenology are commendable. After all, phenomenology initially began as a response to psychologism, relativism, agnosticism, and positivism.¹ On the whole Husserl's studies bear a definite rationalistic character and a notable purpose. He was concerned for most of his life with the concept of reason.² But despite his rationalism Husserl, in the Soviet view, inaugurated a philosophical method which utilized irrational techniques to achieve a rational end. In this way he quite un-

intentionally gave rise to that most irrational philosophy of our time – existentialism. Soviet philosophers therefore criticize Husserl on a number of points, all of which in their opinion lead to existentialism.

For the Soviet commentators one of the most irrational (or ‘mystical’) aspects of Husserl’s philosophy is his concern for ‘essences’. Phenomenology has as one of its major tasks the investigation of essences. As early as 1900 in the first volume of the *Logical Investigations* Husserl outlined his theory of ‘eidos’. However, for Husserl, according to the Soviets, these essences are universal, ideal, and eternal.³ “Thus, in the treatment of truth, of the criterion for truth, in the early works of Husserl, the inclination towards the side of objective idealism is easily detected.”⁴ If essences are assigned an eternal, universal character, they would seem to be of an almost mystical character. “That phenomenological truths ultimately turn out to be truths not of ‘rigorous science’, but of religion by no means appears by chance.”⁵ What further adds to the irrational nature of essences is the very means by which we go about discovering them – intuition. Although the Soviet philosophers never clearly state just why such intuition is irrational, nor why essences are truths of religion, they seem to be of the opinion that discursive thinking has no role whatever in the intuiting of essences.

Husserl maintained that we *can* perform an explicit operation, the eidetic reduction, which will allow us to seize essences in an ‘actively intuiting grasp’. “The intuitive description of essences in all of its strictness is possible, according to Husserl, only as a result of a definite operation, which he calls *the method of reduction*.”⁶ Unlike Lukàcs in *Existentialisme ou Marxisme?*, however, many Soviet philosophers not only will claim that the notion of intuition of essences is basically irrational but also completely refuse to allow intuition to play any role in the acquisition of knowledge. This irrational element, of intuition of essences, in the rationalist philosophy of Husserl, according to one Soviet philosopher, V. I. Koljadko, is pointless.⁷ Koljadko further goes on to claim that the timeless character of essences leads to an irrational objective idealism and that to regard intuition, as Husserl did, as the chief instrument of knowledge precludes the asking of many important philosophical questions such as the origin of thought. In such a framework, practice as the criterion of truth is ruled out and for it is substituted an immediate awareness. The connection between Husserl and Bergson in this way becomes readily

apparent. Again, the Soviet commentators, and here particularly Koljadko, do not provide any reasons for these contentions.

What the Soviet philosophers fail to see is that the intuition of essences in Husserl's philosophy is not at all an irrational process. In fact the means by which we become cognizant of essences is very much a discursive process. By means of memory, changes in perception, and particularly acts of imagination we examine what modifications can be made in the object we are investigating without having the object cease to be what it is. The 'invariant' before us can then be grasped as the essence of all the individuals of the species of the object under examination.

Although Soviet commentators nowhere explicitly argue the point, they nevertheless to some extent 'Platonize' Husserl's notion of essences. This, however, is an incorrect interpretation of Husserl's views. If the Soviet philosophers are correct, we would be led to think that essences are fixed, definite, and defined. We would be faced, according to their reading of Husserl, with a static reality. Surely such a world would be devoid of the dialectic and so counter to Marxism. It should be no surprise to us, then, that Husserl would be characterized by the Soviets as just another bourgeois philosopher. Yet even as early as the *Logical Investigations* Husserl distinguished 'idea' in the Kantian sense from 'idea' in the Platonic sense, leading him to introduce a new term – 'eidos' in the *Ideas*.⁸ The eidos, or essence, is of an individual object taken in its concrete aspects. But it is not exact; rather, there is a certain vagueness inherent in it which is not due to a failure on our part. An attempt exactly to determine essences would only result in a loss of their concrete nature. But to ask as Koljadko does for the origin of thought merely reflects his naturalistic standpoint. He would have us use thought for a determination of its genesis. But in order to do so we must presuppose the existence of thought in a place where it does not exist, which is quite impossible.⁹ Koljadko's question concerns a state of affairs in which thought does not yet exist. But if thought does not exist, how can we ask for the thought of its origin, for to do so implies that thought *does* exist?

In order to proceed in a rigorous, scientific manner we must proceed in a phenomenologically descriptive manner, but not within the naturalistic attitude. To discover essences we do not proceed in the manner of the natural sciences with their ideal constructs which are 'forced' on reality and ideally mathematize the immediately intuited nature. The ideal con-

structs found in the natural sciences have their origin purely in the mind of the scientist. Essences, however, are not the invention of the phenomenologist but are found in experience as 'out there'. Yet it is the Soviet view that we should proceed in the naturalistic manner characteristic of the natural sciences in our investigation of the world in general and essences in particular.

The Soviet philosophers are quite justified in pointing out the excessively 'intellectualistic' attitude of Husserl, at least the early Husserl. But this only shows their failure to reckon with the Husserl of the *Crisis of the European Sciences*. In fact the later Husserl seeks answers to the very problems posed by Koljadko and others. Intuition is not to be taken as an 'armchair' operation. Rather, it requires us actively to reject the naturalistic attitude and return to the *Lebenswelt*. But it is through praxis that essences are created under concrete-historical conditions. Man creates the world around him under specific conditions through his labor. Given the raw materials provided to him by nature, he molds and shapes them to his choosing for a reason. In other words, man endows the raw materials with an essence by giving them a form as a totality which they did not possess in nature. Thus to grasp the essence of these man-made objects is to seize once again the purpose for the objects' creation. Man through his labor creates the rational order by endowing nature, in the form of raw materials, with purpose, to fulfill a need.

To say that intuition is irrational would be equivalent to the claim that man's praxis is irrational – a claim that Soviet philosophers certainly do not want to make. This same reply adequately deals with the contention that the intuitionism of Husserl leads to the existentialism of Heidegger and others. If understood properly, the intuition of essences can also be employed as a highly valuable methodological tool for the study of social phenomena as, e.g., has been done by Karel Kosik and Tran Duc Thao. The existential phenomenologists either were not aware of the later work of Husserl or outrightly disclaimed it. Heidegger, neglecting the writings of his former teacher after the *Logical Investigations*, sees the notion of essence in just the manner that Husserl was later to reject. Though it is unfortunate that Husserl in his early writings treated essences in a dogmatic, reified manner, which thereby led to Heidegger's reified philosophical anthropology, the important point is that Husserl later broadened his view of essences. Thus we can see that his early conception of essences is

not to be rejected as the Soviet philosophers wish to do. Instead it is to be taken as a 'moment' of a more comprehensive theory. The early Husserlian theory of essences is a phenomenological description of bourgeois scientific practice which does not question the origin or source of the essences. In his reification of essences Heidegger occludes all social phenomena owing to an uncritical acceptance of Husserl's early philosophy. The extension of this reification to man himself was then quite natural. The Soviet philosophers, in other words, were quite correct in seeing the transition from the early Husserl to the early Heidegger. Yet they are wrong for placing the responsibility for Heidegger and existentialism in general on Husserl who was to denounce his former student's philosophy.

Heidegger, taking Husserl's early theory of essences but without the all-important phenomenological reduction, claimed that man is doomed to an alienated existence, forever fraught with anxiety. The blame for this view, if it makes sense to speak in such a way, belongs to Heidegger and the other existentialists for misinterpreting the reductions in phenomenological philosophy. It would not be surprising that Heidegger and others of that ilk refused to follow Husserl's lead to transcendental phenomenology. To do so would have meant the destruction of their very existential outlook. The deceptively intellectualistic stance of the early Husserl is what led so many phenomenologists to be surprised at the appearance of the *Crisis*¹⁰ and is what led the Soviet philosopher G. D. Sul'ženko to remark, "...philosophy was for Husserl truer, the further it stood from life, from natural sciences, from the practical needs of people".¹¹

The various reductions in phenomenology all imply a certain structure of consciousness which is called 'intentionality'. It is the primary characteristic of our consciousness to be always directed to something which it itself is not. Consciousness is always consciousness of something. However, intentionality is not a passive feature which characterizes how consciousness adapts itself to whatever it encounters. Husserl wishes to stress the active nature of consciousness in that it bestows meaning and constitutes its objects.

Most Soviet philosophers have correctly seen the importance of intentionality in Husserl's philosophy but have attributed the wrong significance to it. I shall shortly take up the issue of idealism in greater detail, but for now let it suffice to say that charging Husserl with idealism is one

of the central concerns of the Soviet critics. Intentionality is to them openly idealistic.¹² Whether it is to be characterized as subjective or objective idealism, however, is a question on which there is some ambiguity. N. V. Motrošilova, maintains in one of her articles that while Husserl was an objective idealist with respect to the *Logical Investigations* and its view of essences and universal ontology, he held a subjective idealist view of the inseparability of the *ego cogito* and the intended object. For Motrošilova, at least, this problem in Husserl demonstrates the contradictory nature of his philosophy.¹³ Others, such as Gajdenko, do not give an opinion on the matter. The Soviet position, apparently, is still in the process of formation. But Soviet philosophers are quick to point out that the theory of intentionality somewhat segregates the individual from society. To view the individual as a 'pure consciousness' in communion with a particular object is to view the individual in abstraction and as alienated. It is no wonder then, according to the Soviet philosophers, that Heidegger and the existentialists, adopting the notion of intentionality – albeit without the phenomenological reduction – utilized it to picture man as forever removed from society and faced with 'Angst'.¹⁵ The fault supposedly lies with the subjective starting point adopted by Husserl; Husserl would have us be a-social beings, say the Soviets. But man cannot be understood apart from society and the attempt to perform a phenomenological reduction in order to see the nature of intentionality is 'at bottom a fiction'.¹⁶

Again, the Soviet philosophers have failed to take account of Husserl's later writings, particularly the *Crisis*. The early Husserl does readily open himself to such a subjective, 'a-social', interpretation. However, with the mediation of the *Crisis* such a view of Husserl's intention in general becomes untenable. The phenomenological reduction is not a mystical operation which would have us each withdraw from the world to a solipsistic ego. Rather, it is the operation which allows us to view the dialectic in its totality.¹⁷ The reduction allows us to see how the individual fact, the object of the intended act, is related to all the facts connected to it. Thus a reduction to subjectivity allows us to understand intersubjectivity. The examination of my own ego within the epoché is really the examination of the intersubjective character of subjectivity, genetically as well as descriptively. In the words of Husserl: "Thus in whatever way we may be conscious of the world as universal horizon, as coherent universe of

existing objects, we, each, 'I-the-man' and all of us together, belong to the world as living with one another in the world; and the world is our world, valid for our consciousness as existing precisely through this 'living together'."¹⁸

Phenomenology does not end with solipsism, but, on the contrary, removes the categorizations of the naturalistic attitude thereby revealing the relations among the elements constituting the *Lebenswelt*. Sul'zenko claims that the definite separation of subject and object rigidly maintained by phenomenology is recognized by dialectical materialism, though overcome through practice. As such diamat is the more 'flexible', dynamic philosophy. "Phenomenologists see the need for contact, the contact of subject and object in the process of knowledge, but they do not understand the importance of the material reality of people in the creation of this contact and attempt to attain the goal, declaring subject and object qualitatively homogeneous categories."¹⁹ Yet the force of this argument is largely removed in light of our earlier comments.

Phenomenology, like diamat, views practice as essential to an understanding of the subject and object. Both philosophies seek to eliminate practically the separation between the knower and the known. As I have said earlier, phenomenology, unlike diamat, recognizes that the individual through his labor constitutes both the world, through the creation of essences, and himself. The world is known insofar as I constitute it through my practice. But this world in turn affects my very being and how I look at the world. In other words, there is a dialectical relationship between the individual and his world. The diamat view of knowledge and truth as correspondence is static and void of the dialectic. Such a theory of truth takes the world as completely pre-constituted and man only as an observer not a maker. The diamat view of knowledge and truth, for the most part, disregards the active aspect of man's inquiry and particularly the absolutely crucial role played by labor in obtaining knowledge. The Soviets, despite the many years since the first appearance of Lenin's *Philosophical Notebooks*, still have not fully recognized the worth of many ideas contained therein. Instead, the majority of them remain bound to the very un-dialectical view of truth contained in the earlier work by Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*. Since I know the world only through my practice, truth is not the correspondence between concept and object, not merely a matter of reflection, as the Soviet philosophers maintain,

but rather of *adequacy*. The truly dialectical view of truth is as a correspondence between the concept and the “fulfillment of the goal for which the concept was originally devised”.²⁰ Since all concepts are brought forth in a definite social context with social implications and have the goal fulfilled in a social environment, the notion of truth is integrally social. It is *diamat* which poses a material reality existing quite independently of the individual, which man through his actions only approaches insofar as he changes himself to conform to that ‘reality’. That is, *diamat*, not phenomenology, is the philosophy which separates subject and object.

I have already mentioned how Husserl is characterized by the Soviet philosophers as an idealist.²¹ In so doing, they quickly point out that Husserl himself characterized his world-view as idealism.²² Some, e.g., Motrošilova, in one of her articles, claim that while Husserl maintained he was neutral in the age-old struggle between idealism and materialism, his philosophy was evolving from objective idealism to an ever more open subjective idealism.²³ According to Motrošilova, Husserl, starting with the second volume of the *Logical Investigations*, turned more and more noticeably to subjective idealism. For example, in his studies on subjectivity appearing as early as 1906, in *The Idea of Phenomenology*, Husserl already treats the problem in a subjective idealist manner. The ‘subjective idealism’ of Husserl, then, leads directly to the deeply subjective philosophy of the existentialists²⁴, for both have the same starting point – the socially isolated individual.

Perhaps the most cogent and philosophically rigorous article yet to appear on this matter was written by Gajdenko. In it Gajdenko discusses the subjective origins of idealist philosophy with particular reference to Fichte. Fichte, like Husserl, starts out with the I. However, for Fichte the I is a spiritual substance which is the cause of itself. For Husserl we do not remain closed within this I, as is the case with Fichte. Instead, the notion of intentionality is what allows us to emerge from the abstract I. Through an examination of consciousness qua intentional we ‘open’ the consciousness to other objects.²⁵ Thus it is through intentionality, which belongs to the very nature of consciousness, that the subject recognizes both himself, as not a mere Fichtean ego, and the world. But since we constitute the objects of our intentional gaze the question arises for Husserl of the meaning of the objects. If I can philosophically ask for the meaning of the presentations before me, I can ask for the meaning of my

own existence and how it is constituted. These are the very questions posed by Heidegger and Jaspers. The analysis of intentionality in Husserl, according to Gajdenko, will allow us, then, to see the progression from phenomenology to existentialism.²⁶

Gajdenko's argument is quite perceptive and sound. The philosophies of Fichte and Husserl do have some strong epistemological similarities, as has been shown by Hyppolite also.²⁷ But, as Gajdenko points out, the Fichtean ego is theoretically closed within itself and only emerges, almost 'halfheartedly', in positing the material world out of moral considerations. The Husserlian ego, unlike the Fichtean ego, is neither empirical nor psychological but transcendental. It knows itself as an ego in being conscious of something else. The similarity between the two philosophers ends at this point, for Fichte failed to recognize and perform the transcendental-phenomenological reduction which would have removed his final reliance on faith.²⁸ Husserl is not at all left within the idealism of Fichte, for the former refuses to analyze the ego abstractly or naturalistically.

Gajdenko is also correct in pointing out that Husserl in his later writings asked the same questions as Heidegger and that these questions about the meaning of existence can be seen to be logically derived from the analyses contained in Husserl's early writings. Yet these questions do not in themselves possess the pejorative import that Gajdenko appears to ascribe to them. In a sense, Marx himself asked the question of the meaning of man in *Capital*.²⁹ What is important is not only the questions asked but the answers offered. From the latter point of view the philosophies of Husserl and Heidegger could not be farther apart. For Heidegger man is the irrational being whose days are filled with anxiety and concern for death. For Husserl man is the rational being whose telos is the rational, human society free from objectifications and mechanical idealizations. Gajdenko's conclusion is that Husserl is an idealist with strong subjective idealist tendencies and that Husserl has a method and problematic which directly lead to existentialism. Yet, though she does not explicitly claim that Husserl was an existentialist or even sympathetic to existentialism and its outlook on life, her article does invite such a conclusion on the part of the reader.

The question, then, in light of the Soviet comments, is to what extent is Husserl an idealist. Many phenomenologists have written on this question;

but, unfortunately, there is no single unanimous answer. Some see Husserl as a realist, some as an idealist, and still others as neither.³⁰ Even though Husserl himself characterizes his philosophy as a 'Transcendental Idealism' there are certainly well founded reasons for wishing to refrain from outrightly labeling phenomenology as idealist. By no means can I enter into a discussion and examination of these considerations here. But I am largely in sympathy with Kockelman's conclusion that there are several different correlative spheres to phenomenological philosophy. On the one hand, there is the 'phenomenological sphere' in which consciousness and the world are completely correlative and, on the other, the 'transcendental sphere' in which the *ego cogito* is dominant and one brackets the existence of literally everything else.³¹ The first sphere is predominant in the *Crisis*, while the second sphere is predominant in the *Cartesian Meditations*. Soviet philosophers have correctly pointed out the idealistic tendencies in Husserl's work but have failed to take note of the realist tendencies. Phenomenology does transcend the traditional dichotomy between realism and idealism by means of the reduction. Perhaps it is the very insistence on such a dichotomy between realism and idealism on the part of the Soviets which prevents them from adequately dealing with the epoché.

In my analysis of the Soviet position thus far I have relied rather heavily upon Husserl's last work, the *Crisis of the European Sciences*. I do not wish to give the impression that the Soviets are completely unaware of its existence. Several Soviet philosophers allude to it in the course of their respective expositions. But only Motrošilova discusses the *Crisis* at any length, and even then she only deals with it on a superficial level. To her Husserl's work demonstrates the crisis of capitalistic science and capitalistic societies. "The acknowledgment that the crisis of the contemporary capitalist world is wide and universal is all the more valuable in that it rings from the lips of a bourgeois philosopher, a representative of an influential academic philosophy,..."³² Motrošilova looks at the *Crisis* as Husserl's statement on the then contemporary economic and political crisis. For Husserl the way out of the crisis lies in an idealist appeal to philosophers to adopt phenomenology. Like Hegel, Husserl too has blind faith in an ideal spirit manifesting itself in history, working its way to a telos-reason. "Husserl shares with Hegel and other representatives of German idealist philosophy an essential narrowness. In the first

place, he believes in 'rational vital thought', in the teleological movement of European history to immortal spirit and rationality. Therefore, in the second place, it seems to him that it is only necessary to overcome the weariness characteristic of our age, to realize the great goal of the movement, which is attained by the help of philosophical (for Husserl phenomenological) education."³³

Such then is Motrošilova's critique of the *Crisis*. Needless to say, she omits much indeed; but even with what she does deal, she gives a misrepresentation of the *Crisis*. Husserl is not only concerned with the capitalist sciences and society but with all sciences in all societies. Science in both the capitalist nations and in the socialist ones remains the final arbiter of truth. Science in both 'camps' occludes the telos of a rational, human society. Man, in effect, is subjugated by his technology, by his naturalistic attitude, by his science. The sciences have forgotten the purpose for their creation. We have substituted ideal, mathematized constructs in the sciences for the worldly, practical conceptions of the *Lebenswelt*. These ideal constructs have then been turned on man himself, resulting in the naturalistic social sciences, one of the most extreme examples of which is behavioristic psychology.

Motrosilova's other line of attack against Husserl, that he sees philosophy as the 'savior of European civilization', is also a misrepresentation. If Husserl thought that a philosophical education, in the academic sense, would result in the 'emancipation' of mankind, Motrošilova would be warranted in her ridicule and denunciation of him. But Husserl need not be read in such a manner, and in fact there are good reasons for denying that Husserl ever thought of phenomenology, or philosophy as it should be, as a purely academic enterprise. As Paul Piccone well points out, "... phenomenology is not another philosophical castle in the air, designed down to the minutest detail once and for all, to be praised and contemplated by appreciative academicians."³⁴ "... Husserl can only write introductions, i.e., perform concrete phenomenological analyses, so that his followers will not merely parrot his results, which would indicate a total misunderstanding of his phenomenology, but will practice it in their own lives and in the first person."³⁵ Phenomenology can be the savior of civilization, of humanity, if employed not by the professional philosophers but by the proletariat. As Marx said: "Just as philosophy finds in the proletariat its material weapon, the proletariat finds in phi-

osophy its spiritual weapon..." Furthermore, philosophy cannot be abolished before it is realized. The occlusion of man in society, his alienation in socialist *and* capitalist countries alike, etc., is ample proof that philosophy has not yet been realized.

Nor is Motrošilova the only Soviet philosopher to comment on a presumed relationship between Husserl's studies and the particular time in which they were written. For example, Sul'ženko comments that it was during the 'general crisis of capitalism' that Husserl attempted a rapprochement between philosophy and everyday experience.³⁶ In the Soviet mind, phenomenology evolved into existentialism as the crisis of capitalism continued and increased. This, then, provides them with another way of linking the two different philosophies.

The study of Husserlian phenomenology in the Soviet Union is still in its nascent stages. Yet the general line of approach and attack has already been outlined. By linking phenomenology to existentialism the Soviet philosophers have bound the former to an essentially irrational world-view whose appearance on the world-scene is in turn linked to the increasingly degenerate capitalist mentality and society. Husserl is, of course, partly responsible for this state of affairs as he avoided outright social and political statements and analyses. But, on the other hand, Husserl did sever connections with Heidegger and others of an irrational bent. Husserl's last writings are a testimony to his diligence in this regard and are very likely the highest expression of rational thinking in the twentieth century. Perhaps in time the Soviet philosophers will come to realize the real significance of Husserl's work and see its inherent incompatibility with existentialism. For the present, though, they continue to see the work of Husserl only from the standpoint of existential phenomenology. The Soviet philosophers have quite perceptively, and correctly, seen how the early work of Husserl can lead to the moribund philosophy of Heidegger. But they have failed to see the evolution in Husserl's own thought to a genuine dialectical world-view. The later work of Husserl does lend itself to a Marxian reading quite readily. The Soviet view of dialectical materialism itself could be much enhanced by a mediation on Husserlian phenomenology leading to a final rejection of such doctrines as truth as correspondence and alienation as a feature of man's existence solely in a capitalist society.

NOTES

¹ G. D. Sul'ženko, 'Teorija poznanija francuzskogo ekzistencializma', in *Sovremennyj Ekzistencializm: Kritičeskie očerki*, M., 'Mysl', 1966, p. 207: "Husserl Opposed the Relativistic and Agnostic Concepts of Positivism..."

² N. V. Motrošilova, 'Fenomenologičeskaja filosofija i ob'ektivnyj idealizm', in *Sovremennyj Ob'ektivnyj Idealizm*, M., Socekgiz, 1963, pp. 131–134.

³ Motrošilova also mistakenly attributes the term 'eidos' to the *Logical Investigations* whereas in fact it first appeared in the *Ideas*.

N. V. Motrošilova, 'Fenomenologija E. Gusserlja i osnovnoj vopros filosofii', in *VF* 1961,12, 67.

⁴ G. D. Sul'ženko, 'Istina i kriterij istiny v fenomenologii', in *Praktika – Kriterij Istiny v Nauke*, M., Socekgiz, 1960, p. 425.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 427.

⁶ V. I. Koljadko, 'K kritike fenomenologičeskogo metoda E. Gusserlja', in *Voprosy Filozofii i Psixologii*, LGU, 1968, p. 84.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

⁸ Emmanuel Levinas, *The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology*, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1973.

Cf., Edmund Husserl, *Ideas, General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, New York, Collier Books, 1962, p. 42.

⁹ This discussion parallels that of the epistemological question of truth as a correspondence. To ask what the world was like before man presupposes, in some sense, the existence of man. It must be noted, however, that Koljadko's question does 'make sense' from the phenomenological standpoint.

Cf., Antonio Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, International Publishers, New York, 1971, pp. 440–448 and Karel Kosik, 'Man and Philosophy' in *Socialist Humanism*, by Erich Fromm (ed.), Doubleday and Comp., Garden City, N. Y., pp. 162–171.

¹⁰ Cf., Paul Ricoeur, *Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology*, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, pp. 143–174.

¹¹ Sul'ženko, 'Theorija', *op. cit.*, p. 208.

¹² Koljadko, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

¹³ Motrošilova, 'Fenomenologija', *op. cit.*, p. 68.

¹⁴ Sul'ženko, 'Theorija', *op. cit.*, p. 207.

¹⁵ Koljadko, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

¹⁷ See Enzo Paci, *The Function of the Sciences and the Meaning of Man*, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1972, pp. 119–124; and Karel Kosik, *La dialectique du concret*, Paris, Francois Maspero, 1970, pp. 9–44.

¹⁸ Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1970, p. 108.

¹⁹ Sul'ženko, 'Istina', *op. cit.*, p. 431.

²⁰ Paul Piccone, 'Phenomenological Marxism', in *Towards a New Marxism*, by Bart Grahl and Paul Piccone (eds.), St. Louis, Telos Press, 1973, pp. 144–145.

²¹ For example, "Thus Husserl under the flag of anti-psychologism preaches an idealistic understanding of the logical as 'pure consciousness', as if independent not only from experience (as Kant supposed) but even from man himself, and at the same time found in him, in man." *Istorija Filozofii* 5, M., AN SSSR, 1961, p. 492.

²² For example, Sul'ženko, 'Istina', *op. cit.*, p. 421: "Husserl, at least in the early works, does not seriously hide the idealism of his world-view."

²³ Motrošilova, 'Fenomenologija', *op. cit.*, p. 67.

²⁴ Cf., G. M. Tavizjan, 'Fenomenologija E. Gusserlja i francuzskij ekzistencijalizm', *VF* 1968,1, 66-77.

Husserl himself never applied the term 'subjective idealism' to his philosophy but reserved it for characterizing Berkeley's views.

²⁵ P. P. Gajdenko, 'Problema intencional'nosti u Gusserlja i ekzistencijalistička kategorija transcencencii', in *Sovremenyj Ekzistencijalizm: Kritičeskie očerki.*, M., 'Mysl', 1966, p. 88.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

²⁷ Jean Hyppolite. 'The Fichtean Idea of the Science of Knowledge and the Husserlian Project' (in French), in *Husserl et pensée moderne*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1959, pp. 173-182.

²⁸ In the *Vocation of Man* Fichte ultimately appeals to faith. We must, according to Fichte, have faith, in the existence of others and of the material world in general.

²⁹ For Marx man is the economic being. Cf., Kosik, *op. cit.*, pp. 61-82. See also the selections from *Capital* in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, by Robert C. Tucker (ed.), New York, W. W. Norton and Comp. Inc., 1972., pp. 191-320.

³⁰ Joseph J. Kockelmans, *Phenomenology, The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Its Interpretation*, Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday and Comp., 1967.

See Kockelmans' article in the above quoted 'Husserl's Transcendental Idealism', p. 186.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 192-193. Kockelmans mentions another sphere, the 'natural attitude', which presumably is not to be confused with the 'naturalistic attitude'. It is with regard to this sphere that I would raise objections, inasmuch as this sphere is, in my opinion, substantially modified and replaced by the 'phenomenological sphere'. I would also most strenuously disagree with Kockelmans' conclusion that insofar as Husserl's phenomenology is ambiguous and heterodox, it is unacceptable. The great task for phenomenology at present is to show the relationships between the two spheres thereby resolving the ancient realist/idealist problem, though Husserl has already pointed the way.

³² Motrošilova, 'Fenomenologičeskaja', *op. cit.*, p. 142.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 149.

³⁴ Paul Piccone, 'Reading the Crisis', *Telos* 8, 122.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 123.

³⁶ Sul'ženko, 'Istina', *op. cit.*, p. 429.