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er in Russia and Eastern Europe is a most welcome contribution to at least three inquiry. It enriches our understanding of the worldwide reception of Heidegger's y, adds a new dimension to Russian and Eastern European intellectual and cultural d provides a vivid case study in 'misplaced ideas' (Roberto Schwarz), categories and es crossing cultural, linguistic, and historical boundaries and changing circumstan ces in the process."

a Kliger, Associate Professor of Russian and Slavic Studies, New York University

breaking collection provides in one book a wide-ranging, innovative assessment er's interest in Russian literature and his impact on Eastern European philosophy s. The Russian, Czech, and Polish responses to Heidegger are extensive and often and the chapters here present them in an unfailingly accessible, insightful, and ounded fashion."

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's influence in the twentieth century probably outstrips that of any other er, at least in the so-called Continental tradition. The "revolution" Heidegger bout with his compelling readings of the broader philosophical tradition d German philosophy and spread quickly to most of Europe, the United States, *Heidegger in Russia and Eastern Europe* examines Heidegger's influence where his reception has had a remarkable and largely hidden history: Eastern l Russia.

begins by addressing two important literary influences on Heidegger y and Tolstoy. It goes on to examine Heidegger's philosophical influence and ree crucial figures in the reception of Heidegger's thought in Eastern Europe : Vladimir Bibikhin, Krzysztof Michalski, and Jan Patočka. Finally, this book an often vexed issue in current treatments of Heidegger: the importance of s philosophy for politics. Contributors include an international team of leading ives of Heideggerian thought in Russia, which plays a key role in debates n identity and Russia's geopolitical role in the world. This book surveys the l landscape of post-Soviet philosophy, and how the rise of widely differing ons of Heidegger exploits familiar fault lines in the Russian reception of kers that date back to the first stirrings of a distinctively Russian philosophical

is Professor of German and Russian at Clemson University. He is author of *Guide for the Perplexed* (2008) and *The Overcoming of History in Wor* (2004). He has also published an annotated translation of F. W. J. Schelling's *ul Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom* (2006) with Johannes

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HEIDEGGER IN RUSSIA AND EASTERN EUROPE

HEIDEGGER IN RUSSIA AND EASTERN EUROPE

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Chapter 3

Tolstoy and Heidegger on the Ways of Being

Inessa Medzhibovskaya

1889: THOUGHTS IN THE FOREST (TOLSTOY'S ONTOLOGY BY WAY OF INTRODUCTION)

It is 1889. On September 26 of that year, Martin Heidegger would be born at Messkirch in Baden. Tolstoy was in a bad mood at the start of 1889: The publication of his major philosophical work, *On Life*, which it had taken him a year and a half to write and edit, was halted by the authorities on grounds of blasphemy. Its thirty-five chapters and three appendices proposed that we can only find happiness and become its carriers if we follow the guidelines of what Tolstoy terms "reasonable consciousness," the tool for knowing the world, for acting in it ethically, and for serving the causes of unselfish love. Tolstoy made a presentation titled "The Concept of Life," which was the emerging version of *On Life*, on March 14, 1887, at the Moscow Psychological Society, Russia's first professional philosophical society affiliated with Moscow University. The talk was reviewed in the press and consolidated a circle of admirers and opponents, confirming Tolstoy's stable reputation as an iconoclast. On November 25, 1888, Tolstoy noted in his diary: "If Christ arrived and submitted the Gospels for publication, the ladies would attempt to get his autograph and nothing more. We should stop writing, reading, talking, we should *act*."¹ But how?

Taking long walks in the groves, alleys, and thickets of his vast estate at Yasnaya Polyana in the summer and fall of 1889, Tolstoy

summarizes the state of his ontology in the notebooks he carries along on his walks. Later in the day, he transfers short phrases to longer meditations and observations into the pages of his diary.

On the day of Heidegger's birth, he writes:

14 September 1889² what is His Will remains a mystery to us forever. And this must be so. There could be no life, eternal life had the goal that we are striving for were clear to us and henceforth were finite [*konechnaia*]. The signs that we are living according to His will and not against it are given quite indubitably to us, similarly or even more indubitably than they would be for a horse that the reins allow running only in one direction. The first, main, undoubtable sign, which we tend to neglect, is the absence of spiritual suffering (as in a horse, the absence of the feeling of pain from the bit). If you are experiencing complete freedom not violated by anything then you live according to God's will. The other sign, which is a test of the first, is that love of people is not violated. If you are not feeling hostility towards anyone and know that no evil thoughts are felt towards you, you are in God's Will. The third sign, which, again, is testing the first and the second, is spiritual growth. If you are feeling that you are becoming more spiritual, that you are subjugating your animal [*seif*], you are in the will of God.³

The entry for September 15 reads: "I was thinking: To be joyous! Joyous! The cause of life and its purpose—joy!"⁴ The entry on September 16 compared a man with a stone, the foundational unit in the structure of being: "I remember this about a stone: A stone cannot become harmful, it cannot even become useless . . . But a man can be harmful; can be useless."⁵ And so it continues, day after day, years before 1889 and years after: Economics, politics, Tolstoy's reading list, his searches for hope, his encounters, conversations of the day, and, most importantly, his thoughts about the experience of being alive and its hardships as well as delights, are records of his experience of being. Age does not date their intensity or their unparalleled force and clarity. The entry made on December 27, 1889, may be the closest description that year of being cornered into despair by "the they," in anticipation of Heidegger's forthcoming theory of *Dasein*:

It is difficult because of the lie of the life around me and because I cannot find a device with which to point out their delusion without insulting

them. . . . I am ashamed of this insane expenditure amid poverty. I was thinking today while out on a walk: Those who assert that this world is a vale of tears, the place of testing and so on, and that there is the world of bliss, are as if asserting that the whole infinite Divine world is most beautiful and that life is most beautiful in the whole wide world, except for in one place and time, namely where we live. A strange accident that would be!⁶

Until the early spring of 1889, Tolstoy was still in Moscow where his family was spending the winter. A visit of several philosopher friends who smoked cigars, gossiped about Jubilee sessions and festschrift collections, and enjoyed their dinner with fine wine depressed Tolstoy with their "philosophical chatter": "Terrible hypocrites, scribes, and harmfully-mean ones."⁷ The following day he grumbled some more: "Main thing, their brains are busted."⁸ When the first issue of the first professional philosophical periodical in Russia was brought to Tolstoy on November 2, 1889, with pride by its editor, Philosopher Nikolai Grot,⁹ Tolstoy recorded his impressions late at night about the contents and the defining tones of the issue: "Have been reading Grot's journal. [. . .] How much labor spent! The entire journal is a collection of articles lacking in thought and clarity of expression."¹⁰ The task of philosophy, as Tolstoy views it, is to explain the meaning of life in a language that is figuratively clear and vivid.

The image of the horse set out in the September 14 diary entry on Heidegger's birth date was featured also in Chapter XVI of *On Life*, "The Animal Individuality is the Tool for Life."¹¹ The unruly and reluctant horse is broken down into obedience by the routines of its duties, painful as they are.¹² This image is of course quite familiar to everyone raised in the fold of German culture, from Goethe's *Sorrows of Young Werther* (1774), this hallmark of the discontent of modernity written in the form of letters to a forever silent "Wilhelm," and thus a quasi-diary. Consider August 22 in part I:

It is a disaster, Wilhelm, my active powers have deteriorated to a restless indifference, I cannot be idle and yet I can't do anything, either.[. . .], when I think about it again, and remember the fable about the horse that, impatient with its freedom, lets itself be saddled and bridled and is ridden to ruin, I don't know what I should do—and, dear friend, is not perhaps my longing to change my circumstances an inner, restless impatience that will pursue me wherever I go?¹³

How close are these thoughts also to those jotted down by Nietzsche a few months earlier in his "late notebooks" ending in August 1888, in the twilight days of his sane life. Nietzsche speaks of the "will to power as life" necessary for the revival from the fruitlessness of Werther-like restless impatience that can only be realized through our desire for conquest and destruction, without regard of "pleasure and displeasure."¹⁴

Tolstoy starts a few Nietzschean-like initiatives to reform life in 1889. Several momentous albeit unfinished drafts attempt to clarify the relationships between authentic and false disclosure. Art should reveal the light of life hidden in the everyday: "A true work of art is a revelation of a new way of knowing life which is taking place in the soul of an artist in accordance with laws incomprehensible to us, but which, by way of expressing itself, lightens up the path which humanity is walking."¹⁵

Although it begins on a Nietzschean note of destruction, "Carthago delenda est"—a sketch so entitled—is a figural model of the movement of being toward improvement: "The life, that form of life that we, Christian nations, live delenda est, should be destroyed." "I have been saying and will continue saying this until it is destroyed."¹⁶ It should not be destroyed in the sense of elimination, but rebuilt so as to ensure that all parts of its movement are proportionate:

The old form of life is holding up as a tree whose shoots are alive, but which itself seems alive only because the rot eroding it has not yet passed through the core of the trunk. [. . .] If one were to imagine progress as a movement of a quadrangle by means of two straps attached to the two angles at the front then our state is akin to the position that a body would reach if one side of it were to advance incommensurably with the other. There is nothing else to be done than to move the edge that had fallen behind forward so that it catches up with the other edge. The delusion of short-sighted people is natural: they see the irregularity of a position and, in order to rectify it, are willing to push back the advanced edge. But this is impossible. The edge that has moved ahead is reasonable consciousness—and this is the highest force in humankind, and therefore there is no such power that could set it back. One thing remains: to get reality to move forth in keeping with consciousness. Humankind moves only in this way: a step of consciousness, a step of practical activity, which actualizes a new step of consciousness. There are times indeed when reality is apace with consciousness (it appears that this used to be true for a half

of the past century), and then there are times just as they are now, when consciousness has stepped forward far ahead, and is not corresponding to life.¹⁷

The most Nietzschean of the 1889 drafts is not “Carthago delenda est,” but a draft called “An Appeal” [*Vozzvanie*], a result of hearing a prophetic voice calling on Tolstoy over a chorus of voices of temptation. A prophetic voice is instructing him to become a leader of humanity who would lift it out of the mire of its worst delusions and suffering: “And everywhere the same: people are suffering, experiencing torments, while trying not to see that this life is insane.”¹⁸ The loudest of the dissenting voices impresses this on the sleeping prophet: “Do not think! If you start thinking you will see that this life is worse than non-existence.”¹⁹ But think he must; thought is all the power that he has for enduring life and inspiring others.

Even at this initial approach, themes and questions common to Tolstoy and Heidegger are obvious: anxiety about life and its disordered condition and the very burdens of existing, and desperation about the oppression of the social environment and the disproportionate advance of machinery and technology. What is a place in this for philosophizing, and how to express these yearnings for philosophical thought and action? It appears necessary to explain the connection between Tolstoy and Heidegger on a broader substantive and methodological basis than has been done so far. The questions found at the opening of the notorious and ominous *Schwarze Hefte* inscribed “M.H.,” started by Heidegger in 1931 and at last released in 2014 and 2015, already sound familiar to us after the initial perusal of Tolstoy’s thought trajectories in 1889, the year when Heidegger was born: “What should we do? Who are we? Why should we be? What are beings? Why does being happen? Philosophizing proceeds out of these questions upward into unity.”²⁰

In pondering Heidegger’s *Ponderings*—the “Überlegungen” and “Anmerkungen” in the *Schwarze Hefte*—Jeff Love notices a common approach with Tolstoy, a habit of mixing in politics, casual observations, and philosophical problematic that “show[s] a remarkable similarity.”²¹ Whether or not the common ring of terms and the approximate sound of their concerns are members in the same philosophical and intellectual family remains to be discussed. This is the goal of the present chapter.

TOLSTOY AND HEIDEGGER: PREVIOUS APPROACHES

"L.N. Tolstoi hat in seiner Erzählung 'Der Tod des Iwan Iljitsch' das Phänomen der Erschütterung und des Zusammenbruchs dieses 'man stirbt' dargestellt."²²

So far, the reading of Tolstoy and Heidegger has been restricted to the discussion of Heidegger's footnote to Tolstoy, the sole reference he is known to have made to Tolstoy in his published work: in paragraph 51 of division 2 of *Sein und Zeit*. The comparisons are usually conducted narrowly, by trying to find in the text of Tolstoy's famous novella those elements of Heideggerian philosophy that must have prompted him to his moment of recognition. These are frequently hermeneutic exercises focused on identifying an analogy or a parallel between a literary and a philosophical text and between a literary and philosophical genre. They are also attempts to understand Tolstoy's evasively "realist" text, rich in otherworldly, philosophical, and religious semiology, through a rigid terminological explanation. To remind, *DII*²³ has a puzzling reverse structure in addition to containing a host of enigmatic, nonrealist imagery. The story begins with an announcement of Ivan Ilyich's untimely death and with a display of his pleased-looking but reproachful corpse at his wake, in chapter 1. From chapter 2 through the final chapter 12, the novella operates on a "dual time" schedule, one external ("clock-face time"), the other internal (the time of Ivan's thoughts, suffering, and spiritual breakthroughs), and it ends on the words "and died" when Ivan completes his final physical stretch while already in flight toward his tunnel of light. The evaluations are split therefore in deciding whether *DII* is an illustration of, or an attestation to, Heidegger. Some intimate that Heidegger exhibited "reticence" in giving Tolstoy's novella only a footnote because he owed him more. Others insist that Heidegger should have acknowledged Tolstoy's coauthorship.

A good beginning to the discussion is provided by Elisabeth Feist Hirsh (1978).²⁴ She pays attention to the uncommon linguistic charisma of Heidegger's narrative. Tolstoy's inclusion helps Heidegger to enunciate how "everydayness turns 'the courage to face death with anxiety' . . . into fear of an approaching event," and how "authentic existence has the courage to live with the nothing inherent in *Dasein*."²⁵

The second critic to comment on the footnote in detail is Alan Pratt (1992): "In the death analytic, . . . Heidegger . . . mentions neither the

poet nor the philosopher [neither Rainer Maria Rilke nor Karl Jaspers, the traces noted by critics at once] but references only Leo Tolstoy's 'The Death of Ivan Ilyich,' significantly the only prose fiction work mentioned in *Being and Time*. Clearly Tolstoy's novella made a lasting impression on Heidegger because in it he could find dramatically illustrated most of the characteristic behaviors and evasive attitudes uncovered in his own phenomenology of death. 'The Death of Ivan Ilyich,' then, is an illuminating supplement—specific, personal and emotional—to what Heidegger universalized in his philosophy.²⁶ The quoted passage comprises the quintessence of Pratt's argument.

The third critic is Robert Bernasconi (1990). He gives Tolstoy's literary attestation a high pass, but with illuminating caveats: "The footnote seems straightforward enough. It would appear to invite a reading of Tolstoy's story which would serve to illustrate Heidegger's account of the phenomenon of everyday Being towards-death."²⁷ Bernasconi's essay opens the volume titled *Philosophers' Poets*, which must be intended as a compliment: Bernasconi hands the laurel of Heidegger's poet to Tolstoy and not Hölderlin or Rilke or Trakl (Heidegger's all-time favorites). Bernasconi is the first to acknowledge that this is not the point: There is a discomfort with a sense of ownership of literature by philosophy and with the word "attestation" itself. He implies that Levinas rather than Heidegger should have made the reference: "The crucial transformation in Ivan's relation to his own death comes when he is, in Levinas's phrase, 'liberated from the egoist gravitation.' . . . But decisions for and against rival philosophical interpretations of a story cannot be made on the basis of a few details. It would be necessary to attempt a sustained Levinasian reading of 'The Death of Ivan Ilyich'. But to what purpose? And what does it mean to call a reading of a story after the name of a philosopher? Valuable though it might be to explore such a reading on some other occasion, in the present context it would distract from the question of the character and legitimacy of a philosophical reading of literature."²⁸ Just as Ivan Ilyich's death proved a matter of inconvenience (memorably, Petr Ilyich, his friend, thinks that Ivan Ilyich "arranged the affair stupidly" [*glupo rasporiadilsia*]), so a literary intervention inconveniences philosophy, clarifying as it does, a few moments of its density: "Is there not here a basis for an understanding of the violence literary examples perform within philosophy? Such examples—and all examples are in a sense literary—destroy the autonomy and integrity of the philosophical text."²⁹

Bernasconi's essay is the second-longest exploration after the splendid and thorough comparison of Tolstoy's text with Heidegger's term "being-toward-death" performed by Natalie Repin in 2002. Repin writes: "The footnote amounts to Heidegger's unequivocal recognition of Tolstoy's successful comprehension of the question of death, a recognition that has proved not easy to gain."³⁰ Again, we notice that Tolstoy is the complimented party:

Heidegger makes it possible for us to understand Tolstoy better, if only in return for Tolstoy's inspiring Heidegger to create his conception. [. . .] It is Tolstoy's uniquely sophisticated understanding of death that maintains readers' interest in this particular work, considered important even today on philosophical, not only artistic, grounds. To that effect, however, Heidegger's interpretation of death is essential in that it mediates, accommodates, and augments Tolstoy's philosophical relevance, for the former may be viewed as both an inadvertent elucidation of the latter and an incentive to its reappropriation. This, then, is a possible version of what could be retrieved from the reticence of Heidegger's footnote, of how its silence may sound.³¹

There is perhaps nothing wrong about being right, yet again anachronistically. Repin thinks it is important to keep reading Tolstoy and Heidegger together, but she points to a departure of Tolstoy from Heidegger, a paradoxical lapse of an originator from his successor, despite their similarity.

Likewise sophisticated is an excellent piece by A. G. Zavalyi (2010).³² He thinks that what attracts us to the comparison is a set of unknowables about being-toward-death dealt with by Tolstoy and Heidegger: a chronological one (when?) and a meaningful one (why?). But in addition to the similarities apportioned by Tolstoy and Heidegger to the description of absolute abandonedness, and loneliness in the affirmation of the authentically existential at the price of losing one's life, Zavalyi underscores the differences between Tolstoy and Heidegger.³³ The more a human being is dissolved in others, according to Tolstoy, the more illusory is his death: "Only in this way can death lose its ontological substantiality."³⁴ In the end, Tolstoy denies death its primacy and its ontological rights and thus wrongs Heidegger.

Finally, William Irwin (2013) thinks that Heidegger's debt to Tolstoy is larger than a single footnote can express. He feels that an entire edifice

of *Sein und Zeit* is dependent upon Tolstoy's novella: "It is tempting to describe 'The Death of Ivan Il'ich' as an excellent illustration of some major elements of *Being and Time*, but that would not be accurate. More properly, Heidegger owes a debt of inspiration to Tolstoy, a debt not fully repaid by the single footnote to 'The Death of Ivan Il'ich' in *Being and Time*.³⁵ Ivan's initial denial turns to resoluteness [*Entschlossenheit*] "The call of conscience [*Ruf des Gewissens*]" "that can reorient Dasein" and that has brought itself back from falling, allows us to see Ivan's fall through the black sack as one such reorientation.³⁶ But of course Heidegger's conception of authenticity does not fit in well with Tolstoy's denial of death, and Weil chooses not to attend to this aspect at all: Is resolution all that makes Ivan "saved" or simply "safe to die" authentically?

And thus one critic, Bernasconi, thinks that despite similarities, a comparison of two generically dissimilar masterpieces visits violence unto either. Two critics, Repin and Zavalyi, decide that Tolstoy and Heidegger disagree: Tolstoy denies mortality while Heidegger depends on positing it as a ground of his philosophy. Yet both critics think that reading them side by side is useful. Three critics, Pratt, Repin, and Irwin, decide that Tolstoy provides a dramatically vivid illustration to Heidegger's densely phrased philosophy. Repin calls this illustration a case of laudable and precocious foresight, which keeps *DII* relevant. Zavalyi thinks that a comparison is only good if held at a point level with two aspects of questioning, the "when" and the "why."

While many particular insights offered in these excellent pieces of comparative work will remain important, their conclusions are inconclusive at their own insistence. The appearance of the footnote remains mysterious and explicable only on a vaguely suggestive level because a novella is not a philosophical piece. Notably, two eminent companions to *Sein und Zeit*, one by Michael Gelven and another by Stephen Mulhall, do not even mention the footnote.³⁷ Instead, in commenting on paragraph 51, Gelven draws upon the mastery of Dostoevsky: "Few accounts in literature can match the phenomenological power with which Dostoevsky focuses attention on the terrible certainty of ceasing to be."³⁸

Thus, we do not yet have a substantive explication of the pull and draw of Heidegger and Tolstoy as thinkers. Does the footnote point to Tolstoy's unique role in the text of *Sein und Zeit*? How does it fare in

comparison with other footnotes in Heidegger's book? What are the exact location and function and context of the footnote in Heidegger's text and in the overall picture of the book's argument? What could Heidegger's sources and inspirations have been more concretely?

THE FOOTNOTE

Heidegger's footnote sounds nothing like Wittgenstein's illumination, "a profound change of personal outlook" upon his discovery of Tolstoy's *Gospel in Brief* at the front of World War I.³⁹ The footnote looks like a familiar presence, and a decision to credit Tolstoy in this way seems either a matter of haste in which the book was written to meet the deadlines for Heidegger's tenure dossier at Marburg, ultimately unsuccessful, or a matter of shame because it had to be acknowledged somehow, so much was owed it, but it has already too deeply inhabited Heidegger's thought. It was too late to disown or repurpose it.

This is what occurs exactly in paragraph 51, "Being-Toward-Death and the Everydayness of Dasein," which states at the beginning: "Idle talk must make manifest in what way everyday Dasein interprets its being-toward-death. Understanding, which is also always attuned, that is, mooded, always forms the basis for this interpretation. Thus we must ask how the attuned understanding lying in the idle talk of the they has disclosed being-toward-death."⁴⁰ "One dies [*Man stirbt*]" is a tranquilizing linguistic trick of everydayness to an event that "belongs to no one in particular."⁴¹ Thus Tolstoy, in the context of what Heidegger is talking about, has done away with the "cultivation of such a superior indifference."⁴² Before Heidegger makes this point about estrangement of death from the modern everyday as a tactic for its tranquilization and sanitization, he cites Tolstoy. This is how it happens:

The evasion of death which covers over dominates everydayness so stubbornly that, in-being-with-one-another, those "closest by" often try to convince the one who is "dying" that he will escape death and soon return again to the tranquilized everydayness of his world taken care of. This "concern" has the intention of thus "comforting" the "dying person." It wants to bring him back to Dasein by helping him to veil completely his ownmost nonrelational possibility. Thus, the they provides a *constant tranquilization about death*. But, basically, this tranquilization is not only

for the "dying person," but just as much for those "comforting him." And even in the case of demise, the carefreeness that the public has provided for itself is still not to be disturbed and made uneasy by the event. Indeed, the dying of others is seen as a social inconvenience, if not a downright tactlessness, from which the public should be spared.⁴³

Immediately after the sentence explaining that the public should be spared the tactlessness and inconvenience of the dying of others, Heidegger inserts his footnote numbered "12": "12. L.N. Tolstoi in his story 'The Death of Ivan Ilyich' has portrayed the phenomenon of the disruption and collapse of this 'one dies.'"⁴⁴

Heidegger's footnote thus refers Tolstoy's novella not so much to the analytic of one's own existential confrontation with dying, but to human indifference to death, to heartless indifference to the suffering of others, to the estrangement of death from the dying and from their own experience. Anxiety, the correct mood of one's behavior toward death in existential terms, is not connected with Tolstoy's example, but with other examples that Heidegger cites in footnotes 9, 10, 11, and 13 that reference paragraphs 26, 27, 38, and 40, the earlier sections in *Sein und Zeit*, which would have had a closer relation to the customary range of comparisons between Tolstoy's novella and Heidegger's most famous terms ("Dasein with others," "Self and the they," "curiosity," "chatter," "inauthenticity," "falling prey," "thrownness," and "the attunement of anxiety" among them).

This is very curious, and the curiosity increases, in a way far from idle as described in paragraph 36, when one goes on reading what Heidegger has to say about estrangement and about the cultivation of superiority in the paragraphs that follow.

But along with this tranquilization, which keeps Dasein away from its death, the they at the same time justifies itself and makes itself respectable by silently ordering the way in which *one* is supposed to behave toward death in general. Even "thinking about death" is regarded publicly as cowardly fear, a sign of insecurity on the part of Dasein and a **gloomy flight from the world.**^[45] *The they does not permit the courage to have anxiety about death.* The dominance of the public interpretedness of the they has already decided what attunement is to determine our stance toward death. In anxiety about death, Dasein is brought before itself as delivered over to its insuperable possibility. The they is careful to distort this anxiety into the fear of a future event. Anxiety, made ambiguous as

fear, is moreover taken as a weakness which no self-assured Dasein is permitted to know. What is "proper" according to the silent decree of the they is the indifferent calm as to the "fact" that one dies. The cultivation of such a "superior" indifference **estranges [entfremdet] Dasein from its ownmost nonrelational potentiality-of-being.**⁴⁶

Unlike the term *Verfremdung*,⁴⁷ the making something familiar look unfamiliar, that had already been widely practiced across Germany and originated in the theatrical-literary installations of Erwin Piscator and Bertolt Brecht, *Entfremdung* is a Hegelian and Marxist term that more literally means "alienation." Its appearance in the description of Ivan's flight from death into the light of deliverance is quite stark. Heidegger makes it sound as if a romantically hued "gloomy flight from the world" should be privileged over the bourgeois "entangled," "everyday being-toward-death" that is a "constant flight from death." Such an entitlement to a flight from death should be expropriated from the well-off, protected everyday. Only a "gloomy flight from the world" is the liberation of Dasein. Dasein in this presentation is something like a waking-up proletarian still not fully aware of its "ownmost nonrelational potentiality-of-being." It has nothing to lose but its chains, but it will take possession of the historical world. It would be silly to argue that Heidegger nourishes any proletarian-Marxist sympathies. The early National Socialist sympathies might be a closer link. Both ideologies accuse their opponents of using tranquilization tactics. Let us look further at how the quotation unfolds:

Temptation, tranquilization, and estrangement, however, characterize the kind of being of *falling prey*. Entangled, everyday being-toward-death is a **constant flight from death**. Being *toward* the end has the mode of *evading that end*—reinterpreting it, understanding it inauthentically, and veiling it. Factually, one's own Dasein is always already dying, that is, it is in a being-toward-its-end. And it conceals this fact from itself by reinterpreting death as a case of death occurring every day with others, a case that always assures us still more clearly that "one" is "oneself" still "alive." But in this entangled flight *from* death, the everydayness of Dasein bears witness to the fact that the they itself is always already determined as *being towards death*, even when it is not explicitly engaged in "thinking about death."^[48] *Even in average everydayness, Dasein is constantly concerned with its ownmost, nonrelational, and insuperable potentiality-of-being, even if only in the mode of taking care of things in a*

mode of untroubled indifference (Gleichgültigkeit) that opposes the most extreme possibility of its existence.

The exposition of everyday being-toward-death, however, gives us at the same time a directive to attempt to secure a complete existential concept of being-toward-the-end, by a more penetrating interpretation in which entangled being-toward-death is taken as an evasion of death. *That before which one flees* has been made visible in a phenomenally adequate way. We should now be able to project phenomenologically how evasive Dasein itself understands its death.⁴⁹

And so to not fall prey, to not be a victim, a martyr, or a degenerate abettor to the power of the they, the entangled Dasein should disentangle, liberate itself, and establish itself in one's "ownmost, nonrelational way."

When Heidegger wants to tune thoughts about death to the right nonrelational "mood," he is far from wanting to make an existential allegory out of it. Another habilitation thesis, to become a famous book, was not accepted for a tenured university bid in the same year: Walter Benjamin's *Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels* (written in 1925, it would be published in 1928). Benjamin's book discusses the corpse as the melancholy emblem of the ruin. It speaks of the allegorical soullessness of history built off the mood of pensive and mournful martyrdom. Benjamin's erratic Hegelianism voices its concern about the allegorization of Physis, about leaving the character-imprint on a corpse, rendering it *immerlich* ("immediately eternal").⁵⁰ Everything passes and everything has its fate. Benjamin's discussion deals with the survival of the everyday through the historical dialectic in which every snowflake that melts and every building that still stands have their own unrepeatable character. True, their loss is inevitable, but it is redeemed in the transgredient principle of their uniqueness that will continue in their successors without being carved in stone. Everything ordinary is simultaneously extra-ordinary because it will die.

Heidegger's debt to Hegelianism is a key element of division 2. At this point, we should not forget that *DII*, an emblematic story and thus a history of a man whose life is "most simple, most ordinary and therefore most terrible,"⁵¹ is referenced by Heidegger in the first chapter of division 2—that is, closer to the opening of "Dasein and Temporality," which begins, like Tolstoy's novella, with an analytic of Dasein. Division 2 then leads us toward salvation at the end of the book through history,

through "the occurrence of the world in its essential existent unity with Dasein."⁵² Natural history, buildings and institutions, and nature "colonized" in the countryside and on battlefields or as a site of a cult: Just like a human body, these entities are not mere accompaniments to the "inner" history of the soul.⁵³ This is the material in Hegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*. With the last gods prayed to in the organized religious cults dead or in ruin, is Spirit our God, or Light? A God, anything?

Dasein is a construction of one's own inherited possibility. It needs not be told why it exists and wherefore. As Heidegger puts it, "Only a being that is essentially futural in its being so that it can let itself be thrown back upon its factual there, free for its death and shattering itself on it, that is, only a being that, as futural, is equiprimordially having-been, can hand down to itself its inherited possibility, take over its own thrownness and be in the moment for 'its time.' Only authentic temporality that is at the same time finite makes something like fate, that is, authentic historicity, possible."⁵⁴

Is this inherited possibility shared by Tolstoy's Ivan with other literary characters and artists named by Heidegger in *Sein und Zeit*? To understand the footnote to *DII* and its location within Heidegger's text, it is most illuminating to observe how Heidegger lists his other literary debts in the footnotes of *Sein und Zeit*. He owes one of his key terms, Care, to Goethe. The character of Care appears in the final scenes in act 5 of *Faust II*. She is one of the Four Gray Women (Want, Debt, Care, Distress) appearing before Faust when he gazes at the sky from his balcony at the last stroke of midnight. Only Care enters the palace and tells Faust to take her appearance for an affirmation of the nearing of his death. He is reluctant: What need has he to float into eternity? But Care would not leave, explaining that this is her proper place. Care: "Once I make a man my own, / nothing in this world can help him."⁵⁵ The vengeful "companion-cause of fear," she whispers to Faust that it is his time at last, breathes death into him, and vanishes. Faust is blinded and left to the company of Mephistopheles and Lemures. As we know, from this grip of darkness and night, Faust's soul will be taken back to light, by the choir of heavenly spirits who are carrying him on his final flight from earth.

This flight to the sky and toward light is not the gloomy flight of liberation taking place in *Sein und Zeit*. Heidegger brings in Goethe first, in support of his position that as an ontological construction, his Dasein

is “well grounded and has been sketched out beforehand in elemental ways.”⁵⁶ Heidegger explains that Goethe’s source of Care is contained in Hyginus’s medieval remake in Latin of the argument between “care” [Cura] and Jupiter [Job] about what to name humankind, “spirit” or “earth.” Saturn, the god of the Night, is called in to adjudicate the dispute and to deliver his solution: “Let it be called ‘homo,’ for it is made out of humus (earth) [homo vocetur, quia videtur esse factus ex humo].”⁵⁷ In footnote 5, Heidegger lists Goethe’s source: an obscure scholar, a “K.Burdach” by name who wrote an article that had established Goethe’s source. “Faust und Sorge.” *Deutsche Vierteljahresschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte* I (1923).⁵⁸ Heidegger thus turns Goethe, not himself, into a borrower. He cites Goethe’s and not *his* own sources of information.⁵⁹

Heidegger’s other important moment of citation impropriety is the short shrift that he gives in *Sein und Zeit* to Kierkegaard’s existentialist interpretation of the Moment of decision, of the orientation of one’s flight and its authorship.⁶⁰ An especially revealing casualty of Heidegger’s short-changing is Georg Simmel. For not only did Simmel write about Tolstoy in connection with the necessity to individualize and de-universalize the impersonality of unhappiness and grief, he also fastened the discussion of such processes on the example of Caius. Caius, of course, is the logical Everyman who helps Ivan Ilyich to determine that “he is not Caius, but Ivan Ilyich” and to commit the very disruptive operation with ontic logic with its refrain of comfort, “one dies,” because “Caius dies” that interests Heidegger.⁶¹

On Simmel, Heidegger writes only this in footnote 6 of “How the Existential Analysis of Death Differs from Other Possible Interpretations of this Phenomenon” when he discusses the inability of the preceding ontologies of life to recognize its connection with death: “Recently G. Simmel has also explicitly related the phenomenon of death to the definition of ‘life,’ however without a clear separation of the biological and ontic from the ontological and existential problematic.”⁶² And he names precisely “Vier metaphysische Kapitel” (Four Metaphysical Chapters) in Simmel’s book, *Lebensanschauung* (1918).⁶³

But Heidegger also once confessed to Gadamer: “Simmel’s Four Metaphysical Chapters were of fundamental significance for my introduction to philosophy.” This must have been especially in relation to conceptions of death and temporality extracted, again, thanks to Tolstoy, in the projection of Dasein and its possibilities.⁶⁴

In the fourth essay, "The Law of the Individual," Simmel relies on his earlier work on social differentiation (*Über soziale Differenzierung*, 1890), to suggest that shared beliefs result in the downfall of mental activity. This is of course the claim of Heidegger about the ruinance caused by the they:

Thus Tolstoy observes in one passage: "all happy people are as such similar to one another"—as though there were ultimately only *one* happiness, which is also Kant's view—"but the unhappy are each unhappy in their special way." This can only hold if one confuses happiness with its typical causes with riches, social position, successes, "possession" of a beloved person; then it is admittedly something pretty much the same: these goods can be brought under a few very general and qualitatively ratable concepts. However, if one asks, not about the external causes of happiness, but rather about happiness itself, about its subjective actuality (*Tatsächlichkeit*), then it is just as individual and incomparable as life itself, whose momentary excitement and beauty it forms. Simply because suffering cannot be traced back to any such visible external causes—because it often consists only in a lack, in disappointment, a decline—it seems to flow more from the inner, specific essence of the individual than does the happiness that in actuality abides there to no less extent. To the contrary, happiness is for the most part something much more delicate, indefinable and dependent on the favorability of unusual combinations, that it strikes me in much greater measure as something special, individual, and so to speak accidental than does unhappiness, which can be brought about by much more frequent elements always existing, so to speak, in the air.⁶⁵

Simmel takes issue with Kant's "universality of moral" that seems to him to have its root in a "typical tendency towards harmony of values."⁶⁶ For Simmel, there can be no ontic sameness within the most diverse life courses: "How may I conclude, from the mortality of all men and the manhood of Caius, that he too will die, for the former premise is only valid when I am already certain of the mortality of Caius?"⁶⁷ Simmel is not very knowledgeable about the details of Tolstoy's ontology, and he is making his analogy between Tolstoy and Caius taking the opening sentence of *Anna Karenina* for his cue. Still, the importance of a prompt to Heidegger in a book that spoke of humankind's relation to mortality and, for the most part, of its sacrifices to commonality is hard to overestimate.

Yet Heidegger's arguably most important source on Tolstoy is left unacknowledged altogether. His idea about the role of Tolstoy in the interpretation of Dasein must have been informed by Max Weber. In his renowned "Science as a Vocation," Weber spoke, as we all know, of the "disenchantment of the world," characterizing the times overwhelmed by rationalization and intellectualization on the one hand, and the retreat of the most sublime values "from public life into the transcendental" realm, on the other.⁶⁸ These are the times for the advance of a new savagery. It is not as readily remembered that Tolstoy's vision of death and its disappearance from the mortal eye of the modern human helped Weber steer his interpretation of the times.

The savage knows what he does in order to get his daily food and which institutions serve him in this pursuit. The increasing intellectualization and rationalization do *not*, therefore, indicate an increased and general knowledge of the conditions under which one lives. It means something else . . . intellectualization brings disenchantment. Do science and progress have any meanings that go beyond the purely practical and technical? You will find this question raised in the most principled form in the works of Leo Tolstoy. He came to raise the question in a peculiar way. All his broodings increasingly revolved around the problem of whether or not death is a meaningful phenomenon. And his answer was: for civilized man death has no meaning. It has none because the individual life of a civilized man, placed into an infinite "progress," according to its own imminent meaning should never come to an end; for there is always a further step ahead of one who stands in the march of progress. And no man who comes to die stands upon the peak which lies in infinity. Abraham or some peasant of the past, died "old and satiated with life" because he stood in the organic cycle of life; because his life, in terms of meaning and on the eve of his days, had given to him what life had to offer; because for him there remained no puzzles he might wish to solve; and therefore he could have had "enough" of life. Whereas civilized man, placed in the midst of the continuous enrichment of culture by ideas, knowledge, and problems, may become "tired of life" but not "satiated with life." He catches only the most minute part of what the life of the spirit brings forth anew, and what he seizes is always something provisional and not definitive, and therefore death for him is a meaningless occurrence. And because death is meaningless, civilized life as such is meaningless; by its very "progressiveness" it gives death the imprint of meaninglessness. Throughout his late novels one meets with this thought as the keynote of the Tolstoyan art.⁶⁹

Tolstoy's *memento mori* allowed Weber to impress on his audience the idea of a unique value of each human finitude, caught as it is in the horrible slaughter of the war years, and losing individuality in the scientism and dehumanization of technology. Weber then switches the discussion to Tolstoy's rejection of progress and his rebellious "flight" into the future of history from the deadened past of a self-escheated culture: "What stand should one take? Has 'progress' as such a recognizable meaning that goes beyond the technical, so that to serve it is a meaningful vocation? The question must be raised. But this is no longer merely the question of man's calling for science, hence, the problem of what science as a vocation means to its devoted disciples."⁷⁰

Most biographers of Heidegger agree on Weber's impact on the young Heidegger. According to Rüdiger Safranski, Heidegger was present at Weber's lecture in Munich in 1917.⁷¹

THE GERMAN TOLSTOY DURING HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHICAL FORMATION

Richard Wolin credits the staggering success of *Sein und Zeit*, which "fundamentally recast the terms of philosophical thought" to its no less impressive list of contributing influences: "Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Dilthey (not to mention literary sources as diverse as Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, and Rilke)."⁷² The instructional power of the Russian classics on German youths of the turn of the century and the early twentieth century was hard to deny. In his memoir, the writer Klaus Mann, son of Thomas Mann, reminisced about family nights spent reading Tolstoy: "'Well, you'll find a place to sit somewhere,' Father said, confident and distraught. Whereupon he seated himself in the huge armchair, next to the floor-lamp. And then the great entertainment began. His favorites were the Russians. He read to us 'Cossacks' by Tolstoy and the strangely primitive, childlike parables of his latest period. . . . Sometimes he had to interrupt his lecture for a minute or so, all shaken and overwhelmed by his nervous delight."⁷³ The young Klaus was especially impressed with Tolstoy's obstinate urge to escape fame:

The imprisoned giants—but why don't they want to escape? [. . .] Small wonder that Tolstoy groans: he carries huge pieces of stone from one corner of the dingy room to the other, to punish himself. [. . .] Sometimes

he falters and stands motionless for a minute, absorbed in prayers; looking like a very old Russian peasant, or a weather-worn piece of rock. "Let me be simple, my Lord!" mumbles the illustrious old man. "I abominate my fame, my talent, my work. I loathe literature. I disapprove of *Anna Karenina*. I don't want to be Homer. I want to be a peasant. Oh Lord! Let me do a peasant's useful, primitive work!" And he continues to carry the heavy stones.⁷⁴

The theme of Tolstoy's existential flight was powerfully impressed upon the German philosophical imagination. Gustav Shpet, one of Husserl's favorite students before Heidegger, ends his phenomenological study *Iavlenie i smysl* ([Phenomenon and Meaning] 1914), on a paean to experience and expression, which would of course become Heidegger's key terms (*Erlebnis*, *Erfahrung*, and *Aussage*): "A flight from the world is thinkable only as a flight from that world which is familiar, from that life which we have lived through emotionally. Who has experienced nothing will gain nothing from an escape from the world. Life away from society in communion with nature and in the lonely company of one's thoughts cannot lead to a world any other than the one possessed by an animal."⁷⁵

In the philosophical etudes written from 1916 to 1919, Shpet commented on Tolstoy's flight specifically in connection with the homelessness of philosophy. A philosopher has no dwelling: The greatest value of philosophy is its freedom.⁷⁶ It is in this sense that Shpet also uses Tolstoy's term, "reasonable consciousness" or *razumenie* by adding a vowel signifying the phenomenological way of making sense of it, *urazumenie*. From the same point of gaining understanding through flight, Shpet interprets Tolstoy's departure, which to Shpet is an example of an actualization of his ownmost humanity.⁷⁷

Tolstoy's flight from home at age eighty-two and his death two weeks later at a provincial way station, Astapovo, was covered by media the world over and could not have passed unnoticed by a then twenty-one-year-old Heidegger. Tolstoy is discussed routinely in the German philosophical press in the years of Heidegger's tender youth and young adulthood. There was a strong strand of German scholarship that included him in the Schopenhauer school of thought and linked his philosophy of life to Wagner, Feuerbach, Eduard von Hartmann, Nietzsche, Paulsen, and Wundt. Another strand of thought strongly associated Tolstoy with Nietzsche. Notable here is Grot's essay on

Tolstoy and Nietzsche. Published originally in Russian in 1893, it appeared in a Berlin edition in German in 1898.⁷⁸ The basic difference between the two anarchist thinkers in Grot's interpretation is the question of their disobedience or obedience to the higher law. Nietzsche disobeyed it, but Tolstoy obeyed. And thus, for Nietzsche, more evil promised more good; but for Tolstoy, the decrease in evil expanded the realm of good.

Yet another version of Tolstoy was propagated in Germany: He was a Homer of our time. But he was not a happy Greek, happy in war and in love, at the feasts of life or in pursuance of *arête*, *eunoia*, and *phronēsis*. As Walter Benjamin put it in 1916, the happiness of the ancient man was over forever: "The agon—and this is a deep-rooted meaning of that institution—accords to each the measure of happiness which the gods have decreed for him. But, again, was there room here for the empty, idle innocence of the unknowing with which modern man conceals his happiness from himself?"⁷⁹

On the question of Tolstoy's alleged Greekness, Georg Lukács's *Theory of the Novel* (1920) makes one of its central claims, namely that Tolstoy's novels are the only modern epics approximating the totality of Nature, but, fully aware of the dualism of modern life, they attempt to destroy institutions.⁸⁰ Tolstoy shows that nature is alive inside humankind but, when it is lived as culture; it reduces humankind to the lowest, most mindless, most idea-forsaken conventionality."⁸¹ The third layer of reality reveals itself in Tolstoy's description of the *experiences of dying*: "At very rare, great moments—generally they are the moments of death—a reality reveals itself to man in which he suddenly glimpses and grasps the essence that rules over him and works within him, the meaning of life. His whole previous life vanishes into nothingness in the face of this experience."⁸² "Going outside and beyond culture has merely destroyed culture but has not put a truer, more essential life in its place."⁸³ According to Lukács, no flight occurred; Tolstoy remained in the world he created, hard as he tried to take a flight from it.

And there was no flight of Tolstoy's into the future according to Oswald Spengler as well—even if this flight were to be regarded as a revolutionary act. The future belongs to the Russia of Dostoevsky, a saint akin to the "the Apostles of primitive Christianity," and not to Tolstoy, "a Petrine revolutionary."⁸⁴ Spengler added his regret that Goethe's age was over and lost to the occult version of Dostoevsky's Russia that proved irresistible. (Note that Dostoevsky was most surely

associated with this irrationalism, not Tolstoy.) Thomas Mann's seminal "Goethe und Tolstoj" (1922) proposed to consider Goethe a winner over Tolstoy for Germany, a healthier and more necessary modern Greek, a universal man and a standard for culture. Germany had to choose between the two destinies opening up before it: "communistic" and "humanistic." Mann suggests that he is far from proposing "to dwell upon German fascism." To follow after Tolstoy would lead Germany into following a "folk-barbarian" future. And thus, instead of patterning herself "upon Tolstoy's pedagogic bolshevism," it should pattern itself on Goethe's "hedonism of the general humanistic ideal."⁸⁵

But this was still an aestheticism about life, and Tolstoy was believed by many in Germany, most famously by Ernst Bloch (1918), to be its mystic and utopian.⁸⁶ Where was its truth? It could not be in the opposite, in the irrationalism and the shamanism of the occult associated in Germany most closely with Dostoevsky, or with Tolstoy, whose flight was never confused with bourgeois escapism. *Pace* Leo Lowenthal, "German bourgeois escapist literature" embraced Dostoevsky more gladly: "The reception of Dostoevsky's works illuminated significant idiosyncrasies of German society in a time of total crisis . . . infatuation with the so-called irrationalism of the artist; the alleged mystery in the life of the individual; the wallowing in the 'dark regions of the soul,' the glorification of criminal behavior—in short, indispensable elements that were later incorporated into the psychological transfiguration of violence by National Socialism."⁸⁷ The young Heidegger is not fond of irrationalism and the occult.⁸⁸ He is interested in medieval mysticism, which was flattened in Wilhelm Wundt's posthumous memoir, released just when the young Professor Heidegger was compiling his notes on the phenomenology of religious experience that he already was teaching at Freiburg.

In 1920, when a very old Wilhelm Wundt had at last died, his memoir with a very phenomenological-existential title, *Erlebtes und Erkanntes*, went to print. Its fifty chapters covering the period through 1886 supported the Germanic-nationalist ideal of existentialism. The book warned Germans about their hunt for external power and competition for material goods: Instead of applying themselves to attaining the goal of becoming the leading power among the cultural peoples, they were being unfaithful in their decadent self-isolation to the ideal of their predestined world state [*Weltstaat*].⁸⁹

Lest we be happier with casting anchor in Schopenhauer's friendly harbor, also in 1920 Freud bypassed geopolitical matters and pressed,

in "Beyond the Pleasure Principle," for a patient waiting in the disclosure of the mysteries of life and death that Wundt's generation had so thoroughly explored.⁹⁰ We did not succeed in disclosing the mystery of life's beginning: "The attributes of life were at some time evoked in inanimate matter by the action of a force of whose nature we can form no conception."⁹¹ We can only say with certitude that life has a limit in the physical sense: "The fact that there is a fixed average duration of life at least among the higher animals naturally argues in favor of there being such a thing as death from natural causes."⁹² Through our persistent decisionism rather than patient questioning, "we have unwittingly steered our course into the harbor of Schopenhauer's philosophy. For him death is the 'true result and to that extent the purpose of life,' while the sexual instinct is the embodiment of the will to live."⁹³ Moreover, in a final argument predicting the gloom of *Civilization and Its Discontent* for the 1930s, Freud warned that we must either "be patient and await fresh methods and occasions of research."⁹⁴ Or perhaps we should desist: "We must be ready, too, to abandon a path that we have followed for a time, if it seems to be leading to no good end."⁹⁵

Heidegger's formative years display the impact of these influences and explain the trajectory of his developing ontology on the way to the Tolstoy footnote. Until 1933, he did not desist in his questioning of being. However, even his earliest works both explain what would lead him to the footnote as well as explain why he never again named Tolstoy in his work, either negatively or positively. And that was because he embraced Wundt's idea of *Dasein* as a Germanic *Weltstaat* over the rich humanistic and scientific signification of the term in the tradition of German culture, as used by Kant, Hölderlin, Hegel, Feuerbach (in his *hier und da*) and especially in its meaning of "enduring the hardships of Being [*die Schwere des Daseins zu ertragen*]" immortalized by Schiller.⁹⁶ As we have already witnessed from the examples in *Sein und Zeit*, in his ambitious aspiration for the role of the *Führer* of the philosophy of being, Heidegger is not too good about revealing the sources of the philosophical valuables he had borrowed. A good example here is Bergson, whom he only denies. It is true that he cannot agree with Bergson's concept of "duration" during the revision of and departure from the phenomenological approach of Husserl. But he owes a debt to Bergson's idea that only the fundamental self is free.⁹⁷

What prevented Heidegger from pursuing Tolstoy further in the same fashion as he pursued the study of Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Schelling,

pre-Socratics, and Hölderlin—to the advantages of steering his sinking Dasein in the times of the historical catastrophe and the three decades that he was to live after it—was his inability to come to terms with the other precepts on Tolstoy that he had heard from Weber. The first of Weber's lessons on Tolstoy that Heidegger did not take heed of is a deep-rooted sarcasm about the possibility of acquiring existential experience from petty university prophets who, "in their lecture rooms," are grievously unaware of the decisive state of affairs in the world: "The prophet for whom so many of our younger generation yearn simply does not exist."⁹⁸ That is, if "Tolstoy's question reccurs to you: as science does not, who is to answer the question: 'What shall we do, and, how shall we arrange our lives?' or, in the words used here tonight: 'Which of the warring gods should we serve? Or should we serve perhaps an entirely different god, and who is he?' Then one can say that only a prophet or a savior can give the answers."⁹⁹ The second precept on Tolstoy's wisdom not taken away by Heidegger from Weber is that even in our worst ascetic travails, we can be happy.¹⁰⁰

In his early lecture courses, Heidegger is the closest to Weber and Tolstoy. Consider his "Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion, Winter Semester 1920–1921"¹⁰¹ in which Heidegger explores the connection between factual life and history: "The historical through the distancing from a particular, present, word-orienting standpoint opens the eyes to other life-forms and cultural ages."¹⁰² The making factual of one's life experience may require "radical self-extradition" from culture, a flight.¹⁰³ The situation of Dasein enacts historical understanding, reveals its limits and diversity. In the summer semester 1921, he explores Augustinian "curare," the "Being Concerned" as the basic character of factual life. "What am I?" asks Heidegger in his reflections on Augustine. "I have become a question to myself. What do I love?"¹⁰⁴ "The human being is placed before a decision" and his anxiety in the early Heidegger is caused by his inability to choose between sin or virtue.¹⁰⁵ The "living unity of sense of living being," he cannot do without the sense-structure of consciousness as "historical," "the requirement of . . . the specific worldliness of the sphere of experience concerned as a religious one."¹⁰⁶ The phenomenological experience of "having-become" (*Gewordensein*), the idea of "Having-become-from-elsewhere" is, therefore, no characterization of the "I" as opposed to the consciousness of fulfilled moment. The pure "I" is rather the possibility (not logical, but vocational) of "the being-historical of a fulfilled

consciousness."¹⁰⁷ In these evocations of the spiritual "possibility" of living consciousness, Heidegger is the closest to Tolstoy (and Weber).

But a departure is beginning already in his concern for the "greek-anizing of the Christian life-consciousness," sounded in *Phenomenological Interpretation of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research* delivered in 1921 to 1922 at Freiburg.¹⁰⁸ Under the influence of his Nietzsche, of "being alive in life itself,"¹⁰⁹ he is swayed by the easiness of Aristotle who suggests looking up to the universals and moving away from oneself. Heidegger decides that this would lead one toward decline, toward irremediable guilt, into a carefree eudemonic haziness.¹¹⁰ It is here that he posits Angst and Care as his permanent requirements. The Johannine and Augustinian "lux lucet" are also rejected: They are the "light of something that does not shine."¹¹¹ Careful thought is not an empathetic thought, but the thought filled with existential Care, the thought of the "relucet": To become factual, life looks away from itself.¹¹²

Following his transfer to Marburg, Heidegger explores the possibilities of preaching his emerging version of phenomenology to the initiated from the academic podium. Like Nietzsche before him and Weber himself, he sees severe limits. Research is questioning, but the circumstances of ex cathedra lecturing are not a good point of access as long as the evils of cowardice, docility, and convenience that govern the behavior of salaried professors remain in force. Genuine skepticism or apophatic modesty do not attract him. In *Introduction to Phenomenological Research* read at Marburg, 1923 to 1924, Heidegger chooses pheugo over logos: "I am genuinely free if I go towards what I understand," but "res cogitans" owes its birth to traditional ontology because "there is no securing truth in a simple relation to the already known."¹¹³ It is here that Heidegger elaborates the conditions of the "gloomy flight," the flight that eschews flying toward light and the definitiveness of truth: "The structure of being of existence lies in the structure of distorting. We intend to do this by conceiving more incisively what can be gathered from the specific movement of being as being-on-the-run from [*Auf-der-Flucht-sein*, "taking flight in the face of"] itself [. . .] existence's being (in the sense of the manner of being of care about certainty) flees in the face of itself with respect to being known, with respect to its being interpreted. Being in the sense of *being-in-a-world* means *being-uncovered*, standing *visibly* in a world. It is in the face of uncoveredness of existence that *care takes flight*."¹¹⁴

But fly he does not. The most lamentable result of his disobedience to Weber is an attempt to create, out of these insights, a sacerdotal aura of a preacher, a new shepherd of Being. We know too well how this ends, in the secular Nazified branch of onto-theology that, as Lyotard points out, “completely miss[es] the intelligence of the Kantian ethics.”¹¹⁵ and, as Derrida points out, avoids all that is ethically spiritual, and the word “spirit” itself.¹¹⁶ Heidegger’s Hegel lecture course in 1934–1935 is a scandal of the misuse of spirit placed in the service of the *Führerstaat*, and a sacrifice of philosophy’s autonomy of questioning.¹¹⁷ Martin Heidegger, the Nazi-appointed Rector of Freiburg in 1933, is someone. Lyotard reminds us, for whom “the questioning of being becomes a conversation on the ‘destiny’ of historico-spiritual people.”¹¹⁸ Unsurprisingly, the Fichte of 1933¹¹⁹ unfolds a threefold mission of the National Socialism–led Bildung, in which learning (or knowledge) trails behind at a distant third position after military service and labor.¹²⁰ Heidegger’s evasive attempts at rectification are well known. When pressed on the “three services” in an interview with *Der Spiegel* (1966), he retorted, “If you read carefully, you see that although ‘Knowledge Service’ is third in order, it’s first in significance. But you have to be aware that Work and Defense, like all human actions, are grounded in and illuminated by knowledge.”¹²¹

His thought capitulated not only to “a God” of technology to which he accorded the mystic power that moves us and that effectively “ends” philosophy, but also to the unreflective primitiveness of plant life. He leads us back down the ladder of Aristotelian plant-animal-rational animal. *Gelassenheit* (1959) is a great invitation to “keep meditative thinking alive.” The trick is to “strike new roots” in the process of the releasement into the soil of the open. And he directs attention to “the truth of what Johann Peter Hebel says should be renewed: We are plants which—whether we like to admit it to ourselves or not—must with our roots rise out of the earth in order to bloom in the ether and to bear fruit.”¹²² Reverting progress back to plant life as a solution to redeeming human nature is capitulation. No wonder Heidegger’s name never once is mentioned in Hannah Arendt’s *The Human Condition*. Tolstoy’s “The Root of All Evil [*Koren’ zla*]” (1898) is a vivid counterpart to this withdrawal. Our calamitous situation will continue, he writes in this protest against an unthinking submission and tolerant plantlike existence, if we do not uproot the source of evil: injustice, exploitation, inactivity.¹²³

The solidity of one's position is tested in whether or not one is willing to recant. In 1889, the year of Heidegger's birth, Tolstoy started writing *Resurrection*, his last long novel. Its early chapters contain scenes in a prison chapel where convicts are forced to take communion and pledge allegiance to the crown before their sentencing, to bow to the icons of the Mother of God and of Christ the Judge. These scenes, expurgated from all published editions of the book before 1917, were an official pretext for Tolstoy's excommunication from the Russian Orthodox Church by the decree of the Holy Synod of Russia in 1901. Tolstoy refused to recant and said this in his public statement about the decree:

What I believe is this: I believe in God, whom I understand as spirit, and in Love as the beginning of everything. I believe that He is within me and I am within Him. I believe that the will of God is most clearly and understandably expressed in the teachings of the man called Christ, but I consider it the greatest of blasphemies to look on this man as God and to pray to Him. [. . .] Whether or not these beliefs of mine offend, grieve or tempt anyone, whether or not anyone dislikes them or finds them a hindrance, I am no more able to change them than I am able to change my own body. [. . .] Truth corresponds for me to Christianity as I understand it. And I hold to this Christianity; and in so far as I hold to it I live calmly and joyfully, and calmly and joyfully approach my death.¹²⁴

Neither Heidegger's "Letter on Humanism" nor the stony gaze he gave to Bultmann nor his silence to Marcuse in response to exhortations to call himself to account can cover up his evasiveness of the matter. This is not a principled refusal to recant as the one witnessed above. Even the less ominous questions in his *Ponderings* about being and whether to spell it "sein" or "seyn" lose their charm after 1933, and especially during and after the Holocaust and Nuremberg.¹²⁵

Tolstoy's ontology, in contrast, spells humanism and a nonviolent defense of fundamental human rights. He repudiates the state and all encroachments on the autonomy of the individual to choose and decide. He hates dictators and "leaders" of all stripe and is ashamed if he might ever have seen himself in such a role even in a bad dream. Tolstoy adheres to Kant's "second question," "What should we do?" and lives by the light of the Johannine logos, which he translates as *razumenie*, or "reasonable consciousness," a form of practical phenomenology exercised on earth for we are *sent* into the world to expand the

sphere of good rather than thrown there to writhe in the boredom of our *Angst*.

Even the graphs that they would sketch of being from time to time are completely dissimilar. In Heidegger, Being and Man are always forked sideways or crossed through (dispatched) in his fourfold structures.¹²⁶ In Tolstoy, Being and Man form parallel lines, where one existential sequence is continuous with another. So are Tolstoy and Heidegger comparable at all?

THE SACERDOTAL AND THE ANECDOTAL: THE TALE OF THE TWO ONTOLOGIES AND THEIR CRITICS

On the sacerdotal yet ironic note of Weber's unheeded warning we proceed to the conclusion of this long investigation. It is true that Tolstoy's and Heidegger's questions about being and their questioning of being sounded in tune, at least in the earlier Heidegger. Although Heidegger does not notice that Ivan's is a flight toward light, Heidegger's footnote pays tribute to Ivan's "gloomy flight" away from falling prey, from the grip of Care. The theme of a flight into the freedom of authenticity away from the ontic falsehood of "the they" per se and in defiance of Aristotelian logic is one strong point of connection between the younger Heidegger and Tolstoy.

Their second point of connection is a dissatisfaction with the modern state of philosophy, which prompts Heidegger to revamp the tradition of the nineteenth century and to revise the philosophy of his teachers, Husserl and Scheler. We are ourselves the entities to be analyzed since the essence of Dasein lies in its existence, as the beginning sections of *Sein und Zeit* so refreshingly and memorably declaim. Tolstoy formulated the existential burden of explaining our situation and action in a comparable way in "What is Religion and In What Consists Its Essence": "Philosophy should make itself liable to one question: What shall I do?"¹²⁷ But even when it did so on rare occasions through the effort of Spinoza, Rousseau, Kant, and Schopenhauer, their answers came in admixed with useless professorial prattle. Since Hegel, the question is replaced with "What is?" and in this manner it develops in all evolutionary theories. The "boyish posturing of a half-mad Nietzsche" in the latest stage has nothing integral or significant to say except

for fragmentary asides and immoral ditties lacking in substance.¹²⁸ Heidegger would not quite agree to the latter part, but Tolstoy has an excuse of an ongoing questioning. His notebook of November 1900 states: "Any philosophy is a teaching about what to do. Nietzsche."¹²⁹

The third point of connection between Tolstoy and Heidegger is their fondness for their own nontraditional, philosophical idiom. Rich in neologisms, the use of parables and poetry, and live imagery, it is a creation of what Richard Rorty called "conversational philosophy."¹³⁰ In this regard, Heidegger was drawn to Nietzsche, whose parables he discusses frequently and with admiration in his Nietzsche course cycle (1938 to 1940) and in his lectures, commentary, and assignments to students on *Untimely Meditations*. Despite his criticism of Nietzsche's ethics, Tolstoy includes heavily edited selections from Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, on account of their stylistic brilliance, for a weekly assignment in *The Cycle of Reading*, his late-career collection of aphorisms.

The fourth point of coincidence between Tolstoy and Heidegger is their caution against humankind's increasing overdependence on technology accompanied by the desecration of the earth.

The fifth point on which they agree is an utter impossibility to live or exist without a stance toward being, whether one hopes to find meaning in it or not.

The devil is in the details. Even a gentle fleshing out of these agreements yields more disagreements than can be meaningfully explained in a single chapter. I will therefore make recourse to several powerful critiques that respond to the problems I have already raised. Karl Löwith thinks that Tolstoy and Heidegger are rather similar examples of "an unequivocally nihilistic occurrence, namely the destining of Being that 'the suprasensible world, the Ideas, God, the moral law, the authority of reason, progress, the happiness of the many, culture, civilization, and their formative energy forfeit and become null.'"¹³¹ Löwith quotes a lengthy passage from an unidentified text by Tolstoy: "In 1910, in the last year of his life, Tolstoy wrote the following radical critique of European civilization, which according to him is now corrupting not only Europe but also Africans, the Indians, the Chinese, and the Japanese." This text decries the telegraphs and the machines, railroad transportation, university diplomas and hairdressers, all these token sides of so-called civilization that cover up the betrayal of "what is most important in their lives, [. . .] an understanding of life itself, [. . .]

religion."¹³² The text in question is Tolstoy's *On Insanity* (*O bezumii*),¹³³ which is no mere refutation of civilization, but an attack on pessimism, suicide, asylums, prisons, capital punishment, colonial oppression, and militarism. This text explains that to make our being healthy again, we need to keep the advance of civilization in step with basic human needs, the basic conditions of their happiness, the basic condition of their reasonable consciousness. If the theme sounds familiar, it should be: *On Insanity* is none other than a completion of the drafts of "The Address [Vozzvanie]" that Tolstoy started in the year of Heidegger's birth. He also completed *Carthago delenda est* in 1898, one of his most famous antimilitarist texts, published widely in many languages as soon as it was completed. But an interim version, drafted in 1896, contained a comparison of Russian and German militarism and decided the former was worse: It emboldened men wearing uniforms and carrying arms to conduct or perpetrate Jewish pogroms.

Georg Lukács makes only an indirect comparison between Tolstoy and Heidegger, but at around the same time, in 1937. He displays a greater sense of historical sensitivity than Löwith as to the difference between the two. Lukács thinks that a historical "calling to account" is portrayed "most epically . . . in Tolstoy's short story masterpiece, 'The Death of Ivan Ilyich,'" to which no "imperialist decadence" can offer a match in the intensity of its historical sense.¹³⁴ Heidegger's "epistemological hocus-pocus with Being and Dasein," on the other hand, is said to be "no more than the ideology of saddest philistinism, of fear and trembling, of anxiety," in "the crisis period of imperialism" of which Spengler also is a symptom, and in which real history is disparaged as "inauthentic."¹³⁵ So thinks Hannah Arendt in her diary entries, her *Denktagebuch* of 1953, in an observation known as "Heidegger the Fox." In her bitterly playful description, having no sensitivity whatsoever for the historical traps on the ground of real life, her teacher-fox missed the real meaning of all the wounds on his tattered fur. No, he preferred to stay trapped in his burrow, luring others in: "Come here, everyone: this is a trap, the most beautiful trap in the world."¹³⁶ She continues, "Everyone except our fox could, of course, step out of it again. It was cut, literally, to his own measurement. But the fox who lived in the trap said proudly: 'So many are visiting me in my trap that I have become the best of all foxes.' And there is some truth in that, too. Nobody knows the nature of traps better than one who sits in a trap his whole life long."¹³⁷ Two years later, Arendt finds in the "melancholy

haphazardness” of Heidegger’s temporalizing of Dasein “perplexities” posed by the “*vita activa*.” Heidegger’s temporality could never really reconcile itself with the demands of reality, as Hegel would have it; he simply capitulated.¹³⁸

There is a difference between this fox and Isaiah Berlin’s presentation of Tolstoy in the double image of a fox and a hedgehog. For according to Berlin, Tolstoy the fox knew every single thing in the world and about the world, but pretended to know only one, his moral-didactic dicta about life. Berlin finds a problem with this posturing, seeing in it a potential totalitarian threat to liberal democracy.¹³⁹

Emmanuel Levinas finds nothing comic in Heidegger’s Dasein: It is bound by a bond of anxious care only to itself: “Heidegger’s sociality is completely found in the solitary subject. The analysis of Dasein, in its authentic form, is carried out in terms of solitude” and Heidegger’s “situation” is not a situation of an ethical “face-to-face.”¹⁴⁰ Levinas praises Tolstoy for depriving the “I die” of its grave seriousness, for maintaining its expression in the moods of the tragicomic: “No doubt nothing is more comical than the concern that a being has for an existence it could not save from its destruction, as in Tolstoy’s tale where an order for enough boots for twenty-five years is sent by one that will die the very evening he gives his order. That is indeed as absurd as questioning, in view of action, the starts whose verdict would be without appeal. But through this image one sees that the comical is also tragic, and that it belongs to the same man to be a tragic and a comical personage.”¹⁴¹ His example is not *DII*, but “What Do Men Live By? [Chem liudi zhivy?]” (1885). However, one can find similar and even more numerous comic notes in Tolstoy’s novella, not to mention his other parable on death of the same period, “How Much Land Does a Man Need?” (1885).¹⁴²

In a similarly open-minded fashion Tolstoy and Heidegger stand to be compared in Vladimir Bibikhin’s lectures and writings of the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Bibikhin thinks that Tolstoy’s is a vivid example of “practical phenomenology [prakticheskaiia fenomenologiia].”¹⁴³ He takes one of Tolstoy’s forest walks (October 11, 1906) and observes that in the sequence “thought-word-deed” Tolstoy does not even notice that he commits an immediate substitution. “It happens by itself,” and Tolstoy is fine with letting them occur in the order they occur, without privileging one over another.¹⁴⁴ Tolstoy’s phenomenological triptych uncovered by Bibikhin is certainly comparable to Heidegger’s

“Building-Dwelling-Thinking,” but here the sequence is strict and irreversible. This is because Heidegger’s approach to the clarification of the existential situation is by “grabbing it” (*greifen*) and enclosing it into a concept (*Begriff*), Bibikhin claims.¹⁴⁵ We are reminded of the example of ownership of being through history in a similar metaphor used by Heidegger in *Sein und Zeit* and of the refusal of Tolstoy to “grab” and “destroy” in his variants of *Carthago*.

There is on the frontispiece of one of the first appearances of the documents associated with the Heidegger controversy—the American edition of Heidegger’s writings and speeches of the years of the rectorate—an epigraph from “Count Leo Tolstoy”: “There is a yellowish grey wolf, who, winters, joins the pack, roaming the icy tundras of Siberia, sparing neither man, animal, nor child. In the heat of the summer, however, when the brush is dry and lifeless, he crawls into the peasant’s backyard, licking his hands, whining for food. Such is the nature of man and the brevity of memory that the peasant feeds the bloody tooth of this rapacious beast.”¹⁴⁶ This is a fake quote, a remnant of war propagandistic rhetoric. It is tempting to think that the rectorate and Nazi-party membership were the fake periods of Heidegger’s philosophy. Although the quote is a fake too, Tolstoy, like no other companion, may afford the clarity necessary to separate the authentic from the inauthentic within Heidegger’s thought projects and philosophy—just as the footnote itself may have helped Heidegger to separate potentials of the authentic from the inauthentic types of dying in his thinking and building and being.

NOTES

1. L. N. Tolstoy, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii L. N. Tolstogo*, vol. 50, ed. V. G. Chertkov et al. (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1928–1958), 5. All translations into English from this edition are mine.
2. All dates in Tolstoy’s diary are from the Julian calendar used in Russia until 1918. September 14, 1889, Julian-style, corresponds to Heidegger’s birthday on September 26, Gregorian-style.
3. Tolstoy, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 50, 142–43.
4. *Ibid.*, 143.
5. *Ibid.*, 144.
6. *Ibid.*, 194.
7. *Ibid.*, 20–21.

8. *Ibid.*, 21.

9. I cover Grot's participation in Tolstoy's life since 1885 in Inessa Medzhibovskaya, *Tolstoy and the Religious Culture of His Time: A Biography of a Long Conversion* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008).

10. Tolstoy, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 50, 172–73.

11. Tolstoy, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 26, 366.

12. I discuss the connection in detail in Inessa Medzhibovskaya, "Introduction: Tolstoy's *On Life and Its Times*," in *Tolstoy's On Life and Its Times*, ed. Inessa Medzhibovskaya with a new translation of the text of *On Life* co-translated with Michael Denner (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, forthcoming).

13. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *The Sorrows of Young Werther*, trans. Burton Pike (New York: Modern Library, 2005), 60.

14. See notebook 14 [174] in Friedrich Nietzsche, *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, ed. Rüdiger Bittner, trans. Kate Sturge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 264–65.

15. These drafts of 1889–1891 are the beginnings of the future *What Is Art?* and they are first taking shape in a sketch "Ob iskusstve" [On Art; 1889; 30: 213–15 (30: 225)].

16. Tolstoy, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 27, 534.

17. *Ibid.*, 534–35. Tolstoy was dissatisfied with what he wrote and decided to revisit the analogy later. See the concluding part of this chapter.

18. *Ibid.*, 531.

19. *Ibid.*, 533.

20. Heidegger writes these questions in a column. These are his October 1931 "Intimations x Ponderings (II) and Directives," in Martin Heidegger, *Ponderings II–VI: Black Notebooks 1931–1938*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2016), 5.

21. As Jeff Love aptly remarks, "Heidegger's *Black Notebooks* open with the following questions: 'What should we do? Who are we? Why should we be? What is a being? Why does being happen?' . . . There is in these questions as well as in the tentative, experimental structure of the *Black Notebooks* strong similarities with Tolstoy's diaries. And, since the *Black Notebooks* are in a sense philosophical diaries, an unconventional format mixing politics, history, philosophy, they not only show a remarkable similarity, but seem to pursue something akin to . . . Tolstoy: a new medium in which the seeking is more important than the goal." Jeff Love, "Nominalist Tolstoy?" *Tolstoy Studies Journal* 27 (2015): 94–95.

22. Here is one good translation: "L. N. Tolstoy in his story 'The Death of Ivan Il'ich' has portrayed the phenomenon of the disruption and collapse of this 'one dies.'" Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 409.

23. To avoid confusion, I will henceforth abbreviate the long title of Tolstoy's novella to *DII*. Ivan Ilyich will continue to be a reference to the title character of Tolstoy's work.
24. Elisabeth Feist Hirsch, "The Problem of Speech in 'Being and Time,'" in *Heidegger's Existential Analytic*, ed. F. Ellinston (The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1978), 159–78.
25. *Ibid.*, 171.
26. Alan Pratt, "A Note on Heidegger's Death Analytic. The Tolstoyian Correlative," *Analectica Husserliana* 38 (1992): 297–304.
27. Robert Bernasconi, "Literary Attestation in Philosophy: Heidegger's Footnote on Tolstoy's 'The Death of Ivan Ilyich,'" in *Philosophers' Poets*, ed. David Wood (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), 7.
28. *Ibid.*, 19.
29. *Ibid.*, 31.
30. Natalie Repin, "Being-Toward-Death in Tolstoy's *The Death of Ivan Il'ich*: Tolstoy and Heidegger," *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 36, nos. 1–2 (2002): 101.
31. *Ibid.*, 131–32.
32. A. G. Zavalyi, "Kategorii smerti u Tolstogo i Heidegger'a," in *Lev Tolstoy i Vremia*, ed. N.A. Amel'ianchik (Tomsk: Izdatelstvo TGU/Ivan Morozov, 2010), 210–20. Translation of the Russian is mine.
33. *Ibid.*, 211–13.
34. *Ibid.*, 215.
35. William Irwin, "Death by Inauthenticity: Heidegger's Debt to Ivan Il'ich's Fall," *Tolstoy Studies Journal* 25 (2013): 15.
36. *Ibid.*, 21.
37. Michael Gelven, *A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time*, revised edition (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1989); and Stephen Mulhall, *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Heidegger and Being and Time*, second edition (London and New York: Routledge, 1996/2005).
38. Gelven, *A Commentary*, 141.
39. A. C. Grayling, *Wittgenstein. A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988/2001), 8.
40. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, a revised edition of the Stambaugh translation, trans. Joan Stambaugh, revised and with a foreword by Dennis J. Schmidt (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2010), 242.
41. *Ibid.*, 243.
42. *Ibid.*, 244.
43. *Ibid.*, 243–44.
44. *Ibid.*, 244.
45. Emphasis in bold is mine to distinguish it from Heidegger's emphasis in italics.

46. *Ibid.*, 245.

47. The German *Verfremdung* is a cultural borrowing, a derivative of Victor Shklovsky's term *ostranenie* ("defamiliarization") coined in 1916–1917.

48. It should be noted that "Being toward death" and "thinking about death" are not the same and one does not obligate the other.

49. [Fn. 13; cf., with regard to this methodological possibility, what was said about the analysis of anxiety, par 40.] *Ibid.*, 244–45.

50. "Die Allegorisierung der Physis kann nur an der Leiche sich energisch durchsetzen." Walter Benjamin, *Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels*, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1974), 193.

51. The famous and enigmatic beginning of chapter 2 in *DII*. It is here that we get to know Ivan Ilyich after we have seen his corpse and have been to his wake and before his "falls" ill and "flies" to light through dying.

52. Heidegger, *Being and Time* (2010), 370.

53. *Ibid.*, 369.

54. *Ibid.*, 366.

55. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Faust I and II*, in *Goethe: The Collected Works*, vol. 2, ed. and trans. Stuart Atkins (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984): 287–88; lines 11,445–50; 11,457–59.

56. Heidegger, *Being and Time* (2010), 190–91.

57. *Ibid.*

58. *Ibid.*

59. Immediately afterward, without quoting the scenes in Goethe's *Faust* proper, Heidegger cites in the next footnote (number 6) "Das Kind der Sorge," a poem written by Goethe's teacher, Johann Gottfried Herder. Goethe is invoked next within the context of Heidegger's dispute with Ranke and Kant about time. He takes Ranke's cue that scientific history derives knowledge "from hidden sources," and is part of the autochthonic questioning of Dasein (*ibid.*, 381). And again, Heidegger does not quote *Faust* directly, but paraphrases Dilthey on the question of the same ongoing dispute between Nature and Spirit (*ibid.*, 381). In the same fashion, Heidegger makes *passim* references to Homer, Aristotle, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Simmel.

60. When Kierkegaard speaks of "temporality," he means human being's being-in-time. Time as within-time-ness knows only the now, but never a moment. But if the moment is experienced existentially, a more primordial temporality is presupposed, although existentially inexplicit. In relation to the "Moment," cf. Karl Jaspers, *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*, third edition (Berlin: Julius Springer, 1925), 108ff. and the "referat Kierkegaards," 419–32; Heidegger, *Being and Time* (2010), 323. On the important relationship of Kierkegaard to Tolstoy's portrayal of Ivan's flight, see Medzhibovskaya, *Tolstoy and the Religious Culture*, 321–23.

61. A lengthy discussion of this connection with the use of J. G. C. C. Kiewewetter's and Kantian books on logic is found in chapter 11 of Medzhibovskaya, *Tolstoy and the Religious Culture*, 295–332.
62. Heidegger, *Being and Time* (2010), 239. The other two mentions of Simmel in the book are similarly unappreciative brief comments about his failure to establish an existential theory of historicity. Heidegger, *Being and Time* (2010), 375, where history is “an object of a science,” and in II–VI, 80, in the section “Time Taken Care of and Within-Timeness” where Simmel's work is named only to prompt that his work on “the connections between historical numeration, astronomically calculated world time, and the temporality and historicity of Dasein need further investigation”; Heidegger, *Being and Time* (2010), 418.
63. Ibid.
64. Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Erinnerungen an Heideggers Anfänge,” *Dilthey-Jahrbuch* 4 (1986/1987): 13–26. Donald N. Levine and Daniel Silver, “Introduction,” in Georg Simmel, *The View of Life*, trans. John Andrews and Donald N. Levine (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), xxvi.
65. Simmel, *The View of Life*, 116.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
68. Weber's “Science as a Vocation” was a lecture initially given by him in 1917 at Munich University. Max Weber, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, trans. and ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 155.
69. Ibid., 139–40.
70. Ibid., 140.
71. Rüdiger Safranski, *Martin Heidegger Between Good and Evil*, trans. Ewald Osers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 90.
72. Richard Wolin, *Heidegger's Children. Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 16.
73. Klaus Mann, *The Turning Point: The Autobiography of Klaus Mann* (New York: Markus Wiener Publishing, 1984), 57.
74. Ibid., 222.
75. G. G. Shpet, *Iavlenie i Smysl. Fenomenologiiia kak osnovnaia nauka i ee problem* (Tomsk: Vodolei, 1996), 178.
76. G. G. Shpet, *Filosofskie etiuudy*, ed. A. A. Iakovlev (Moscow: Progress, 1994), 177.
77. Ibid., 335.
78. The German translation of N. Grot's *Nietzsche und Tolstoi*, trans. Alexis Markow (Berlin: Hugo Stenitz Verlag, 1898) was based on N. Ia. Grot,

Nravstvennye idealy nashego vremeni: Friedrich Nietzsche i Lev Tolstoy. Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii pod red professor N. Ia. Grota, fourth year, book 16, January 1893 (Moscow: Kushnerev and Co, 1893), 129–54.

79. Walter Benjamin, “The Happiness of Ancient Man,” in *Walter Benjamin, Early Writings*. 1910–1917, trans. Howard Eiland et al. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 230.

80. Georg Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel: A Historico-Philosophical Essay on the Forms of Great Epic Literature*, trans. Anna Bostock (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971), 144.

81. *Ibid.*, 148.

82. *Ibid.*, 149.

83. *Ibid.*, 151.

84. Oswald Spengler. *The Decline of the West*, trans. Charles Francis Atkinson, ed. Helmut Werner (New York: Vintage Books, 2006), 81, 273–74.

85. Thomas Mann, *Goethe und Tolstoi: Vortrag, zum ersten Mal gehalten September 1921 anlässlich der Nordischen Woche zu Lübeck* (Aachen: Verlag “Die Kuppel,” Spiertz, 1923). I am quoting from the English translation of this text, “Goethe and Tolstoy,” in *Thomas Mann, Three Essays*, trans. H. T. Lowe-Porter (New York: Knopf, 1929), 134–36.

86. Ernst Bloch, *Geist der Utopie*. I am making references to the English translation: Ernst Bloch, *The Spirit of Utopia*, ed. and trans. Anthony A. Nassar (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), 245, 298.

87. Leo Lowenthal, *Critical Theory and Frankfurt Theorists. Lectures-Correspondence-Conversations* (New Brunswick, NJ, and Oxford: Transaction Publishers, 1989), 120–21.

88. As Heidegger put it in *Sein und Zeit*, “When irrationalism, as the counterplay of rationalism, talks about the things to which rationalism is blind, it does so only with a squint.” Heidegger, *Being and Time* trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 136.

89. Wilhelm Wundt, *Erlebtes und Erkanntes* (Stuttgart: A. Kröner, 1920), 390.

90. Sigmund Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle,” in Sigmund Freud, *The Essentials of Psycho-Analysis*, trans. James Strachey (London: Vintage Books, 2005), 197–217; 218–68.

91. *Ibid.*, 246.

92. *Ibid.*, 251.

93. *Ibid.*, 256.

94. *Ibid.*, 268.

95. *Ibid.*

96. This phrase from act 1, scene 8 of Schiller’s “Die Braut von Messina” is mentioned by Freud (“Beyond the Pleasure Principle,” 251). Because Freud mentions Fechner in this essay, he must also have in mind Fechner’s famously mischievous book, Gustave Theodor Fechner, *Das Büchlein vom Leben nach*

dem Tode (1836; sixth edition, 1906). In it Dasein reappears multiply and in many variations such as “künftiges Dasein,” “Jetziges Dasein,” “Das neue Dasein,” “Ganzes Dasein,” “Wurzel alles Daseins,” “Anknüpfungspunkte ihres Daseins,” “Nun greifen aber alle Daseinskreise, welche das Leben der jenseitigen Gesichter tragen,” and so on. Plagiarism it is not, perhaps, but arrogant pride in claiming a discovery already made.

97. Henri Bergson, *Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness*, trans. F. L. Pogson (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1913/2001), 231–32. Translated from the original *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience* (1889).

98. Weber, *From Max Weber*, 152–53.

99. *Ibid.*

100. See Weber’s “Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions” in which Weber speaks of a “naïve enthusiasm for the diffusion of happiness” so ubiquitous in Tolstoy’s early work that can be found in its ascetic counterpart in his later work and thought (*ibid.*, 348–49).

101. Martin Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, trans. Matthias Frisch and Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2010), 3–111.

102. *Ibid.*, 25–26.

103. *Ibid.*, 28–30.

104. *Ibid.*, 183.

105. *Ibid.*, 210.

106. *Ibid.*, 246.

107. *Ibid.*, 251.

108. Martin Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2008), 6.

109. *Ibid.*, 65.

110. *Ibid.*, 81.

111. *Ibid.*, 56.

112. *Ibid.*, 96. See Heidegger’s rumination on the “care-full deliberation” in his appendix to *Phenomenological Interpretation*, 139.

113. Martin Heidegger, *Introduction to Phenomenological Research*, ed. and trans. Daniel O. Dahlstrom (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005), 85–88; 111.

114. *Ibid.*, 218.

115. Jean-Francois Lyotard, *Heidegger and “the Jews,”* trans. Andreas Michel and Mark Roberts (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990), 84.

116. Jacques Derrida, *Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question*, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

117. As Susanna Lindberg observes, "Führerprinzip is contrary to Heidegger's own thinking of being because it makes questioning impossible." See "Hegel in 1933," in Martin Heidegger, *On Hegel's Philosophy of Right. The 1934–1935 Seminar and Interpretive Essays*, trans. Andrew J. Mitchell, eds. Peter Trawny, Marcia Sa Cavalcante Schuback, and Michael Marder (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014), 30. In the same volume, see also an illuminating essay by Richard Polt, "Self-Assertion as Founding," 67–82.

118. Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 37.

119. I mean Fichte's speeches to the German nation during the Napoleonic Wars in 1813. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Addresses to the German Nation*, ed. Gregory Moore (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

120. See Martin Heidegger, *German Existentialism*, trans. Dagobert D. Runes (New York: Wisdom Library, 1965), 13–19.

121. Martin Heidegger, "'Only a God Can Save Us Now': An Interview with Martin Heidegger," trans. David Schendler, *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* 6, no. 1 (1977): 9.

122. Martin Heidegger, *Discourse on Thinking*, trans. John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), 56–57.

123. Tolstoy, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 34, 330–31.

124. "Otvét na opredelenie Sinoda ot 20–22 fevralia i na poluchenie mnoi po etomu sluchaiu pis'ma [A Reply to the Synod's Edict of 20–22 February and on Letters Received by Me on the Same Occasion]," Tolstoy, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 34, 245–53, esp. 251–52, 253. I cite here the slightly amended translation of Robert Chandler, from *The Lion and the Honeycomb: The Religious Writings of Tolstoy*, ed. A.N. Wilson (London: Collins, 1987), 129–30.

125. Notice this thought in Heidegger's "The History of Beyng" (1939–1940): The "habitual lived experiencing," writes Heidegger, confuses victory with defeat, essence with existence, the "time-play-space" within which "history receives its future" and is "ascending" thanks to sacrificial descent, in which "death is a process through which Beyng appropriates being into itself." Martin Heidegger, *The History of Beyng*, trans. William McNeill and Jeffrey Powell (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2015), 180. See also multiple examples in *On Hegel's Philosophy of Right* and *Ponderings* that consider whatever deserves to be discarded when it is limiting the conditions of "Race—Community (Socialism)—Leadership—People's Dasein" (esp. no. 229 in *On Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, 184). See Herbert Marcuse's letter to Heidegger of August 28, 1947: "You are today still identified with the Nazi regime. [. . .] A philosopher can go astray politically, but then he ought to expose his mistakes. But he cannot go astray regarding a regime that has killed millions of

Jews merely because they were Jews.” And Rudolf Bultmann’s reminiscence: “I came back again to what he [had] said to me on the telephone: ‘Now you must,’ I said to him, ‘like Augustine write retractions [retractiones] . . . in the final analysis for the truth of your thought.’ Heidegger’s face became a stony mask. He left without saying anything further.” Both quotes are from Victor Fariás, *Heidegger and Nazism*, ed. Joseph Margolis and Tom Rockmore (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), 282–83.

126. On Heidegger’s graph of being and beings, and of deconcealment, see *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*, a course delivered at Freiburg 1932. In Martin Heidegger, *The Essence of Truth: On Plato’s Cave Allegory and Theaetetus*, trans. Ted Sadler (New York: Continuum, 2002), 228. And see David Farrell Krell’s analysis in Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Volumes Three and Four*, ed. David Farrell Krell, trans. Joan Stambaugh, David Farrell Krell, and Frank A. Capuzzi (New York: HarperOne, 1991), 289. On one type of Tolstoy’s many graphs, see Medzhibovskaya, *Tolstoy and the Religious Culture*, 346–47.

127. Tolstoy, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 35, 183. “Chto takoe religia i v chem sushchnost’ ee” ([1901–1902]; *ibid.*, 157–98).

128. *Ibid.*, 183.

129. Tolstoy, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 54, 232. From March 24, 1902, “Three fashionable philosophies in my memory: Hegel, Darwin and now Nietzsche. The first justifies all that exists, the second equates man with an animal, justifies struggle, that is, the evil in men. The third is proving that whatever is resisting evil in the nature of man is a result of false education, a mistake. I don’t know where to go with this any further”; *ibid.*, 272.

130. By “conversational philosophy,” Rorty means the “Nietzsche-Heidegger-Derrida” tradition of post-Nietzschean thought as opposed to the “Quine-Putnam-Davidson” tradition of analytic thought. See Richard Rorty, *The Rorty Reader*, eds. Christopher J. Voparil and Richard J. Bernstein (Malden, MA: Blackwell-Wiley, 2010) xvii and 142. Rorty dwells on the conversationalist aspect of Heidegger’s thought and writing in the essay, “Heidegger, Kundera, and Dickens” (307–20). See also a mention that Nietzsche and Heidegger are a bad idea to specialize in since the one working on these thinkers becomes unsuitable for a professional position in a typical philosophy department (512).

131. Karl Löwith, *Martin Heidegger: European Nihilism*, ed. Richard Wolin, trans. Gary Steiner (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 83.

132. *Ibid.*, 196, 197.

133. Tolstoy, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 38, 395–411.

134. Georg Lukács, *The Historical Novel*, trans. Hannah Mitchell and Stanley Mitchell (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1962), 109, 333.

135. Georg Lukács, “Martin Heidegger,” in *Lukács Reader*, ed. Arpad Kadarkay (Oxford, UK, and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1995), 266, 281.

136. Hannah Arendt, "Heidegger the Fox," in Arendt, *Essays in Understanding 1930–1954. Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism*, ed. Jerome Kolm (New York: Schocken Books, 2005), 361–62.

137. *Ibid.*, 362.

138. Hannah Arendt, "History and Immortality," *Partisan Review* 24, no. 1 (1957): 30–33.

139. Isaiah Berlin, "The Hedgehog and the Fox," in Berlin, *Russian Thinkers*, ed. Aileen Kelly (London: Penguin, 1979), 81.

140. Emmanuel Levinas, *Existence and Existents*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), 95.

141. See "Substitution," in Emmanuel Levinas, *The Levinas Reader*, ed. Sean Hand (Oxford, UK, and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1989/1996), 118.

142. Levinas's summary of the plot is not entirely accurate, but his sense of Tolstoy's meaning is.

143. V. V. Bibikhin, *Dnevnik Tolstogo*, ed. O. E. Lebedeva (St. Petersburg: Ivan Limbakh, 2012), 379.

144. *Ibid.*, 378–79.

145. "We are talking about the taking by conquest and on being taken hostage, or, in the old philosophical idiom we are speaking about a 'concept'" in Bibikhin, *Mir: Kurs pročitannyi na flososkom fakultete MGU vesnoi 1989 goda* (St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2007), 428.

146. The edition is the already cited Heidegger, *German Existentialism*, which is based on Guido Schneeberger's *Nachlese zu Heidegger: Dokumente zu seinem Leben und Denken*, ed. Guido Schneeberger (Bern: Buchdruckerei AG, 1962).