

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN MODERN RUSSIA

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RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN MODERN RUSSIA

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Faith, Freedom, and the Varieties of Russian Religious Experience

RANDALL A. POOLE

In 1917 Sergei Bulgakov (1871–1944), then on his way to becoming one of the century's great theologians, published *Unfading Light: Contemplations and Speculations*. The overarching theme of this classic work of Russian religious philosophy is that the basis of religion is human experience of the divine. Bulgakov emphasizes that religion is essentially experiential and not primarily conceptual or intellectual: "Religious experience assures the human being of the reality of another, divine world, not so as to demonstrate its existence or by various conclusions to convince him of its necessity, but so as to lead him to a living, immediate bond with religious reality, and show it to him."¹ Religious experience, he continues, is distinctive compared to other types of human experience (e.g., scientific, philosophical, aesthetic, or ethical); it "remains the sole path for real, living comprehension of God" (18). It is utterly authoritative, immediately credible, and convincing "by a different higher persuasiveness than the facts of external reality" (17). The immediate credibility of religious experience is called faith, "the assurance of things hoped for, the evidence of things unseen" (Hebrews 11:1). Faith is another way of specifying the distinctiveness or autonomy of religious experience: such experience necessarily comes from within, since it is experience of the transcendent.² Its "object" is not ordinary, immanent sense data, of course, but the divine, which does not reveal itself externally, in the manner of empirical objects. It is the "unseen order," as William James characterized it in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, an order no less real for those who experience it.³

The inward character of faith and religious experience led Bulgakov to identify religion as a core quality or capacity of personhood and to relate both religion and personhood to freedom. "Faith," he writes, "is a function of human freedom; it does not compel the way the laws of nature compel us. To impose the truths of faith from the outside would not meet the fundamental requirements of religious consciousness; to coerce our person, whether by logical constraint or force of knowledge, would not correspond to the dignity of the Divinity who respects our freedom" (29–30). To say that God respects human freedom is to defend it in the strongest possible terms. Not only is the "dignity of the Divinity" at stake but so too is human dignity. Freedom is the very condition of the "truths of faith" and of the whole inner

world of ideals. By their very nature such truths and ideals can be only freely posited, recognized, and pursued.⁴ To coerce them is to destroy them and to strike at the heart of what it is to be a person.

Bulgakov says that faith involves “the whole person in its entirety” and that in this sense “religion is a *personal* work in the highest degree and thus it is a continual, creative work” (30). Clearly he thought religion was a highly distinctive type of human experience, perhaps even the most human type of experience. It should be noted, however, that persons are the only possible subjects of any type of experience, not just of religion. Groups are not subjects and do not have experiences; only the individual persons who constitute them do. (Bulgakov did not suggest otherwise, but the difference is worth mentioning because it is not always well appreciated, and because it is relevant to the distinction between toleration, which pertains to groups, and freedom of conscience, which pertains to persons.) It is true that humans are social beings and that a person’s consciousness forms in interaction with others (especially through language). Our communities enable and enrich our experiences, but still only individual persons have experiences. In empirical experience the external object limits (or is correlated with) the personal or subjective element. In religious experience the personal quality is much deeper because such experience is inner or spiritual, even when evoked by an external object or event (e.g., an icon or prayer service). As Bulgakov affirms, God “‘knocks on the door’ of the human heart” but “in all his omnipotence he cannot force it open, for this would mean the annihilation of freedom, i.e., of the human being itself” (30). The content of religious experience is transcendent reality, which is not given as an object but posed as an ideal. “It is identified not by the coercion of external senses, not violently, but by the free, creative aspiration of the spirit, *by the quest* for God, by the intense actuality of the soul in this direction. In other words the element of freedom and personhood, i.e., creativity, is irremovable from religious faith” (35). The quest for God in religious experience is also a quest for human personhood.

Since 2000 scholars of Russian history and culture have returned to the insights of Bulgakov, James, and other thinkers (e.g., Émile Durkheim and Rudolf Otto) of a century ago.⁵ They have produced a remarkable body of scholarship exploring the experiential aspects of religion. “Lived Orthodoxy” designates a thriving area of research about the ways people (laity, clergy, peasants, workers, women, intellectuals) experienced, practiced, and understood their religion.⁶ Beyond Russian Orthodoxy, to give just one example, Heather Coleman has studied the Russian Baptists by focusing on their individual spiritual experience, as described in their conversion nar-

ratives.⁷ This scholarly attention to lived religious experience proceeds from the recognition that such experience is a window onto believers' faith and thus onto their understanding of themselves and their world. (Collingwood said that the historian's main task is the reenactment of past experience.)⁸ Through this window we can discern, to an extent, inner processes of human spiritual development and how people value themselves in relation to God. In their seminal edited volume on Russian religious experience Coleman and Mark Steinberg found that such experience, narrated and preserved in "sacred stories," reveals how spiritual seekers and believers discovered "self-knowledge, personal dignity and will, and self-realization"—in short, personhood.⁹ Their approach, like Bulgakov's, informs my effort in this introductory study to make a case for the experiential basis of Russian religious freedom.

IDEAL SELF-DETERMINATION, FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE, AND LIBERALISM

The subject of this volume is religious freedom, both in its internal and external meanings. That freedom, if we accept Bulgakov's argument, is essential to religion because it is the very condition of faith and religious experience. The premise of the argument is that human beings, in their innermost nature, are free. Inner freedom is free will, or the capacity for self-determination by one's own ideals. As the power to override external determination by sensible-empirical causes, free will refutes "determinism" in the usual naturalistic sense of the term. (It is thus a good argument for theism, as Bulgakov very well understood.) This core human capacity, which might be called "ideal self-determination," also describes morality (in which case the self-determining ideal is the good).¹⁰ It is what Bulgakov had in mind in relating faith, freedom, and personhood so integrally. Religious experience, because it comes from within, depends on freedom. At the same time, it reveals (or clarifies) the ideals that drive self-determination—as do other types of human experience, although moral-religious experience is paradigmatic.

Bulgakov was following a long tradition in Western intellectual history that identified the capacity for ideal self-determination as central to human dignity, called it *freedom of conscience*, and recognized it as the first and most fundamental natural or human right. That tradition is liberalism. It maintains that inner freedom is the source of external freedom (secured through natural rights), and that the very purpose of the state is to guarantee natural rights by the rule of law. Freedom of conscience is the core of the tradition because of its dual meaning as inner freedom (the capacity for ideal self-determination) and as external freedom (the right to seek, express, and

live according to one's ideals or beliefs). Generally liberalism relates the two dimensions of freedom of conscience in another way as well, contending that the ever fuller realization of the inner capacity depends on the free exercise of the external right.

The ideals that make self-determination possible must, by their very nature as ideals, be freely recognized. It bears emphasizing that the *concept* of freedom of conscience does not imply (though the *term* might seem to suggest) that the ideals themselves are "free," in the sense of being merely subjective or lacking objective truth or value. To the contrary: it is the free recognition of the ideals as true or valid that gives them (or rather persons) the power of self-determination. Truth, in short, must be made one's own, which can happen only through free recognition and "*personal work*," as Bulgakov put it. Proceeding from this understanding of freedom of conscience and of its centrality to human dignity and personhood (*lichnost'*), Bulgakov and other Russian neo-idealist philosophers made an important contribution to the liberal tradition (see the penultimate section below, "Russian neo-idealism"). For them philosophical idealism was, in part, a theoretical articulation of the ideals that were lived and felt in religious experience (or in moral-religious experience).

Russian idealism was closely related to another key intellectual development, which Paul Valliere has identified as Russian theological liberalism—an approach to the problems of church and society that, he says, affirms two axioms with respect to religious life: freedom of conscience and the relative autonomy of the secular spheres of life, such as science, politics, economics and art. "As a liberal axiom," Valliere writes, "freedom of conscience means not just inner, spiritual freedom, which is conscience by another name, but outward freedom as well."¹¹ In another place he distinguishes between two methods that shaped theology in nineteenth-century Russia. The first was the historical method, the foundations of which were laid by the century's most influential hierarch, Metropolitan Filaret (Drozdov) (1782–1867), with his call to "return to the sources." The second was "the experiential or anthropological method, which appealed to religious experience and the data of conscience to elucidate, support or confirm theological beliefs." Its aim "was to give voice to the believing conscience, to articulate the *living Word*." The experiential method, with the primacy it gave to conscience, was, according to Valliere, the indispensable one for liberalism.¹²

TOLERATION AS RUSSIAN RELIGIOUS POLICY

This volume explores the complex contours and contested meanings of religious freedom in Russia. The first essential distinction to be made is be-

tween toleration and freedom of conscience. In European thought toleration developed in the early modern period from the negative, expedient sense of the idea (“mere toleration,” or forbearance from religious persecution) into the positive concept of freedom of conscience. This intellectual development was essentially complete by 1700.¹³ By then, “toleration” could be used synonymously for freedom of conscience.¹⁴

In the context of imperial Russia, however, the two concepts must be carefully distinguished, because the first did not imply the second. By the end of the nineteenth century “toleration” could mean freedom of conscience, but even then that was not its primary meaning. The ambiguity could be exploited for tendentious purposes, as K. K. Arsen’ev (1837–1919), the editor of the liberal historical journal *Vestnik Evropy*, complained. In the introduction to his important collection of articles, *Freedom of Conscience and Toleration*, he wrote, “words are more elastic than concepts, and never, it seems, has this elasticity been clearer than in the interpretations that the word ‘toleration’ has among us.” As an example he points to the conservative paper *Moskovskie vedomosti*. In a lead article on toleration in 1896 it asserted that existing Russian laws on toleration granted the right of freedom of conscience, but also that the “principle of toleration” was “completely inapplicable” if it contradicted state laws. According to Arsen’ev, the first assertion was disingenuous, and the second misunderstood the idea of right. His critique is an admirable formulation of the liberal concept of freedom of conscience as a natural right: “‘The principle of toleration,’ if made dependent on changeable ‘state laws,’ ceases to be a *principle*—that is, a criterion by which the worth [*dostoinstvo*] of positive law is measured. . . . It is not the principle of toleration that must be sacrificed to state laws, but state laws that must be brought into accord with the principle of toleration,” in the sense of freedom of conscience.¹⁵

The tsarist regime used a number of terms to describe its religious policy. They included religious toleration and freedom of faith, religion, and confession. These terms meant something very different from freedom of conscience as an inalienable individual right.¹⁶ Toleration in imperial Russia was a revocable privilege or concession granted by the state to recognized religious groups or communities. It is worth emphasizing that tsarist toleration, far from being a right limiting autocratic power, was rather an instrument of that power. As Peter Waldron wrote in an influential essay in 1989, “religious policy was only one part of the regime’s general strategy” to keep “the strength and authority of the autocracy as intact as possible.” Waldron argues that freedom of conscience was inimical to the idea of autocracy (especially in the mind of the last two tsars), was granted only as a political

necessity in the 1905 revolution, and was thwarted after 1905 as the regime recouped and reneged on its promises.¹⁷

Laura Engelstein clarified the picture further with an essay published a decade after Waldron's. In it she labeled tsarist toleration or "freedom of religion" (*svoboda very*) a "peculiar grant." "In the first place," she writes, "the freedom to worship consisted of the right to persist in the faith of one's ancestors, that is, to continue to belong to the religious community into which one had been born. It did not endow individual believers with the right to change religious affiliation," unless it was to Orthodoxy. "In the second place," she continues, "the price of recognition was subordination to administrative authority. And third, recognition did not mean equality."¹⁸ The Russian Orthodox Church was defined by law as the empire's "preeminent and predominant faith," and it alone had the right to proselytize. To help make the distinction between the state's policy of tolerating certain religious communities for its own purposes and liberal recognition of the individual's right to freedom of conscience, Engelstein draws on the work of the Russian legal scholar Mikhail Reisner (1868–1928). In 1900 he wrote that Russian law "does not observe the division between the state and the religious communities. It acknowledges neither their freedom, nor the freedom of personal belief and conscience." Tsarist law, according to Reisner, treats religion from the instrumental perspective of state interests, "not as one or another form of a person's relation to God." "Our law," he continues, "supposes that religion is not practiced by individual persons but by national-spiritual entities—peoples, nations, tribes. But in fact religion will always be religion, and its true receptacle is not the nation but the individual human heart."¹⁹

Robert Crews has likewise offered incisive insights into the autocracy's "peculiar regime of religious toleration," which policy he regards as anything but noninterference. Rather, the tsarist state attempted to maintain religious conformity and to suppress dissent within the recognized confessions in the empire. "Heresy in any community constituted a political issue in tsarist Russia: to the police, religious dissent and heterodoxy almost invariably involved a broader challenge to the existing order," Crews writes.²⁰ His case study is Islam, which, he argues, came to rely on or "capture" state institutions in the policing and disciplining of its own communities. The result was that the tsarist state and the Muslim authorities whom it backed were drawn together, as Crews puts it, "in the common enterprise of curtailing liberty of conscience."²¹

Russian scholarship is well represented by Aleksandr Safonov. An article he published in 2012–2013 provides a succinct overview of imperial Russia's religious policy of toleration, which he contrasts clearly to freedom of con-

science.²² He indicates that the semantic field of the concept “freedom of conscience,” as used in late imperial Russian public discourse, included elements of freedom of confession, religious freedom, and religious toleration, terms that were often equated in prerevolutionary Russian jurisprudence.²³ The title of his article refers to “freedom of conscience and of confession,” which itself might seem to conflate them. Compared to full freedom of conscience (freedom of thought and belief), freedom of confession implied something more limited: freedom of choice, equality, and nondiscrimination among religious confessions, usually with the intention of excluding nonconfessional options. In a commendable account Safonov reconstructs the liberal and conservative contours of Russian public debate over freedom of conscience and identifies the positions of the main political parties on the issue after 1905. Despite significant support for freedom of conscience in Russian civil society by the early twentieth century, the autocracy and its monarchist supporters impeded its implementation (after the Manifesto of 17 October 1905 conceded it) because, according to Safonov, it was sharply at odds with their allegiance to the traditional confessional state in which non-Orthodox religions were merely tolerated.²⁴ They resisted a liberal order based on freedom of conscience because, most fundamentally, “the radical overhaul of religious law necessarily entailed a thorough modernization of the entire edifice of Russian statehood.”²⁵

The appearance of Paul Werth’s *The Tsar’s Foreign Faiths* in 2014 marked the culmination of this stage of scholarship on religious policy in imperial Russia. It is a comprehensive, extensively researched history of the Russian Empire as “a multiconfessional Orthodox state—that is, a polity that established several religions while constituting only one of them as dominant.”²⁶ Establishment in the tsarist context meant that the empire’s recognized religions were under state control, including (and in many ways especially) the Russian Orthodox Church. The multiconfessional establishment was the institutional structure of toleration. Although Werth is mainly concerned with the policy and practice of toleration, he also analyzes its “rhetoric and content”—that is, its intellectual history. He gives detailed consideration to the movement toward expanded religious freedom, especially in the form of freedom of conscience—to its sources, prospects, and the reasons for its failure. His book has fundamentally deepened our understanding of tsarist religious policy and the fate of religious freedom in imperial Russia.

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN MODERN RUSSIA: AN OVERVIEW

The focus of the present volume is not religious policy (although it is by no means absent) but rather the various meanings that religious freedom,

toleration, and indeed freedom of conscience had in Russia among nonstate actors—meanings that to various degrees bore the state’s deep imprint. Two chapters (those by G. M. Hamburg and Victoria Frede) are reprinted from a 2012 forum on freedom of conscience in the journal *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*, which forum served as the foundation for the present volume. The remaining five are published here for the first time. The book’s focus is imperial Russia, with one chapter (by Eugene Clay) that reveals the striking continuities in religious policy between the imperial and post-Soviet periods. The chapter by G. M. Hamburg won the Distinguished Scholar Prize of the Association for the Study of Eastern Christian History and Culture (ASEC) when it was first published. It is a remarkable history of religious toleration in the political thought of the Muscovite and early imperial periods, one that gives us a richer understanding of the subsequent history of religious toleration in Russian thought and practice.²⁷

In the book’s third chapter Patrick Lally Michelson demonstrates that not just the broad category of religious freedom but “freedom of conscience” itself had contested meanings in Russia. According to him, “Freedom of conscience could be expressed in a variety of discrete, even antagonistic idioms that were almost exclusively intelligible to the ideological, sociocultural, and interpretive frameworks in which they originated and operated.” There was a state administrative discourse on freedom of conscience, a radical intelligentsia discourse, a liberal discourse, and an Orthodox ecclesiastical discourse. His chapter expertly reconstructs the emergence of a specifically ecclesiastical discourse about freedom of conscience, concentrating on Archimandrite Ioann (Sokolov). Michelson makes it abundantly clear that Sokolov’s ecclesiastical conception of freedom of conscience had very little in common with the liberal conception. Rather, Ioann largely understood it to be freedom from error and sin, as externally determined and proscribed by the Church. Michelson writes that his broader purpose “is to decenter all normative claims made by historical actors in Russia that they alone possessed the correct interpretation of freedom of conscience.”

The state administrative discourse of freedom of conscience, which intersected with the liberal discourse, has been closely examined by Paul Werth. Victoria Frede takes up the radical intelligentsia discourse in her chapter, and Heather Coleman explores the (international) liberal discourse in chapter 5. In a fascinating account Frede shows how radicals in Russia’s first revolutionary group, Land and Freedom, deployed the promise of religious freedom in propaganda directed at Old Believer and sectarian peasants. They thereby hoped to recruit dissident peasants for the revolutionary movement, which was actually hostile to religion. That fact discloses some-

thing about the revolutionaries' demand for religious freedom—namely, that it was instrumental, much like the tsarist policy of toleration.²⁸

Coleman focuses on another set of the regime's critics: international evangelicals and liberals. But they, too, looked to peasant sectarians (in this case the stundists)—and found in them “martyrs for . . . the liberal value of freedom of conscience.” She deftly turns the international campaign for the stundists into a highly revealing historical source for understanding Western attitudes and beliefs about religious freedom, liberalism, and Russia and for analyzing how Western evangelicals and liberals saw themselves and their societies. Coleman quotes the English investigative journalist W. T. Stead's striking statement of his belief in the normativity of liberalism: “As water boils at 212° and freezes at the freezing-point in St. Petersburg as well as in London, so the general principles of religious toleration and the right of man to full religious liberty are truths which do not depend for their application upon parallels of latitude, and which therefore must ultimately prove fatal to the system now in vogue in Russia.”²⁹ Of course, these truths did not prove fatal to the Russian autocracy, or not in the way Stead expected—the development of liberal democracy. Coleman's essay nicely illustrates that there was an international context to matters that might otherwise seem to have been entirely internal to Russia itself.

In *The Tsar's Foreign Faiths* Werth expressed the hope that scholars will explore “the social history of religious freedom in Russia.”³⁰ In chapter 6 Daniel Scarborough sets an example for scholarship in that direction. He argues that ordinary Russian Orthodox parishioners were not predisposed toward religious intolerance; in fact they seemed to resist the highly intolerant official diocesan missionaries in their midst. After the position was created in 1886, the diocesan missionaries were the new agents of state intervention into religious life. They usurped the task of interacting with other religious groups, a role that should have belonged to ordinary parish clergy and parishioners. Scarborough sees evidence for the possibility of tolerant and respectful Orthodox Christian attitudes and practices toward other religions, but the opportunity was thwarted by the diocesan missionaries, who often employed the police in enforcing their ideology of “Orthodox patriotism” (as John Strickland calls it).³¹ These agents perpetuated religious intolerance in late imperial Russia. “Thus,” Scarborough writes, “a comparatively small minority within the Orthodox Church inhibited processes that otherwise boded well for the emergence of a civil society with a multiconfessional religious component.” That is a bold and provocative thesis.

In chapter 7, Norihiro Naganawa pursues what might be called the Muslim discourse on freedom of conscience (*hurriyat-i dīnīya*). It, too, was dif-

ferent from the liberal discourse. This is clear in Naganawa's argument that the most prominent issue that Muslim Tatar intellectuals addressed in the name of "freedom of conscience" was preserving and even expanding the particularistic collective rights that the state assigned to the Muslim community under the Orenburg Mohammedan Spiritual Assembly. Something like that goal might have been expected under the tsarist policy of toleration. But after the October Manifesto of 1905 Muslims in the Volga-Urals region sought to modify the degree of state control over Islam and to expand their autonomy. In doing so, Naganawa contends, they "created a new public sphere between themselves and the state." His chapter, as he puts it, "seeks to understand the meanings of religious freedom for Muslims as they were elaborated in this burgeoning public sphere by analyzing reform plans for the Orenburg Mohammedan Spiritual Assembly." It is a most impressive undertaking.

Eugene Clay concludes our volume by examining the religious situation in the Russian Federation today in the aftermath of the 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations (and the new laws, policies, and legal interpretations that followed it).³² To place the 1997 law in its historical context, Clay provides an excellent, succinct overview of religious policy in imperial Russia and the Soviet Union (in a section titled "From 'Confessional State' to Official Atheism and Back"). He shows that the religious order in the Russian Federation bears striking similarities to that of imperial Russia. It favors the traditional religions of Russia, it establishes a hierarchy among religions, it tends to value religions according to their perceived contributions to national and ethnic communities, and it regards religious freedom more as a collective right than an individual one. To ascertain how minority religions have fared in this environment, Clay examines four groups: two Buddhist denominations, the growing Presbyterian movement, and a new religion called the Orthodox Church of the Sovereign Mother of God. He finds that the worst fears of critics of the 1997 law have not been realized. The religious groups forming his case studies have been able to adapt to the new regulatory environment through creative and entrepreneurial strategies, in particular by portraying themselves as "traditional," as having historical ties to Russia, and as being loyal.

In what follows, I offer a broad historical-philosophical conceptualization of the problem of religious freedom in Russia. It seeks to provide the historical context and detail necessary for a comprehensive introduction to the general topic, while also advancing a distinctive interpretation specifically relevant to this volume's main theme: the multiple contested meanings of Russian religious freedom, including freedom of conscience.

I argue that while the autocracy imposed tight constraints, nonetheless there was enough external religious freedom for “the varieties of religious experience.” In fact the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed a long religious revival, which I reconstruct through presenting a synthesis of the rich historical scholarship on lived Orthodoxy (together with work on Russian religious history more generally). This scholarship shows how believers, through their faithful experience, became highly conscious of their ideals, freedom, and dignity as persons—how their faithful experience was simultaneously a process of self-discovery. By the twentieth century many believers recognized that autocratic government was incompatible with their freedom and dignity. Their demand for religious freedom, together with demands for other basic freedoms, led to the 1905 revolution. At the same time, Russian philosophers like Bulgakov theoretically formulated the experiential basis of religious freedom in their neo-idealist defense of liberalism. As a defense of human rights, freedom of conscience first of all, they held that their liberal theory was indeed normative. How could they not?

I focus here on Russian Orthodoxy for four reasons: first, that is where the religious-philosophical nexus was most evident and important; second, the basic model for the empire’s multiconfessional establishment was state control of the Russian Orthodox Church through the Holy Synod; third, the fate of religious freedom in Russia was most closely tied to the status of the Russian Orthodox Church; and fourth, the co-editor of this volume has written an entire book on the regime’s policy of toleration of non-Orthodox religions in the Russian Empire.

REPRESSION AND REVIVAL

Russian religious life unfolded in the inhospitable political environment of Russian autocracy. In 1721 Peter the Great abolished the patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church and replaced it with a collegiate board of bishops called the Holy Synod, which would govern the Church until 1917.³³ The Synod was supervised by a lay official, the chief procurator, whose power greatly increased in the nineteenth century. The Fundamental Laws of the Russian Empire (first codified in 1832) made it clear that “in the administration [*upravlenie*] of the Church, the Autocratic Power acts through the Most Holy Governing Synod, established by this Power.”³⁴ The aptly named *Spiritual Regulation* (Dukhovnyi reglament, 1721), which established the Petrine system of church-state relations, regulated Russian religious life in numerous ways. For example, it condemned “whatever may be called by the term ‘superstition,’” such as “false miracles” and officially suspect shrines and holy places, icons, saints, and relics.³⁵ At issue, according to Vera Shevzov,

was “religious authority and the prerogative to discern what events or experiences were authentically revelatory and therefore ‘of the community.’”³⁶

Peter’s reforms also regulated the clergy—first of all by turning it into a closed estate. Parish priests lost many of their rights and privileges, suffered from poverty and low status, and were subject to tight control by both state and episcopate.³⁷ Notoriously, the supplement to the *Spiritual Regulation* required that priests “expeditiously report” any criminal intentions heard in confession, especially those directed against the sovereign or state.³⁸ Catherine II continued Peter’s policies. In 1764 she decreed the secularization of ecclesiastical lands. Monasteries suffered a catastrophic decline; more than half were closed.³⁹ In the nineteenth century the state increased its control of the Church through powerful chief procurators, notably N. A. Protasov (1836–1855) and K. P. Pobedonostsev (1880–1905).⁴⁰ They were assisted by other lay officials who staffed the synodal and diocesan chancelleries (bureaucracies). As the Synod’s lay archivist wrote in the 1890s, “it is not the hierarchs who govern the Church, but Synod officials.”⁴¹

The Church’s subordination to the autocratic state produced two very different responses in Orthodox religious society. One was irreligion or indifference, doubt, and full-blown atheism, though the latter did not clearly emerge until the mid-nineteenth century. Atheism represented the culmination of people’s alienation from the autocratic order and a reaction to the state’s instrumental use of religion for its own purposes.⁴² The other type of response was, ironically, religious revival, which became possible because the Synodal Church could not monopolize Russian Orthodoxy altogether; room for robust religious development and expression remained despite the external constraints and controls. Believers found diverse ways to encounter the divine, to cultivate their religious consciousness, and to deepen their faith. Their determination and persistence sustained the nineteenth-century religious revival, which culminated in the Russian religious-philosophical renaissance at the end of the century.⁴³ By then many religious believers and seekers were beginning to demand constitutional recognition of the spiritual freedom they had discovered within themselves. Through “independent religious innovation” they had become “religious agents,” as Paul Werth characterizes the process.⁴⁴ An inner dynamic of the long religious revival drove many people toward recognition of freedom of conscience as a human right and, therefore, toward liberalism and constitutionalism. Russian neo-idealist philosophers like Bulgakov sought to make the logic of this dynamic explicit and inescapable. But there were powerful obstacles—the autocracy first of all—that impeded and ultimately thwarted the dynamic.

PHILOKALIC FOUNDATIONS

The long religious revival began with hesychastic spirituality and contemplative monasticism.⁴⁵ Hesychasm (from the Greek word *hesychia*, “stillness”) is a mystical tradition of contemplative prayer going back to the fourth-century Cappadocians. It achieved prominence in Eastern Orthodoxy through the work of the fourteenth-century Byzantine theologian St. Gregory Palamas (1296–1359). In the “hesychast controversy” St. Gregory defended the position (against Barlaam the Calabrian) that through strict ascetic discipline and prayer (especially the Jesus Prayer) the hesychast could experience God (in his divine energies or grace) and aspire toward *theosis* or deification—Orthodoxy’s supreme ideal.⁴⁶ Hesychasm was revived in the late eighteenth century by the *Philokalia*, a collection of patristic and medieval mystical-ascetic texts prepared by Greek monks on Mount Athos and published in Venice in 1782.⁴⁷ A Church Slavonic edition of the *Philokalia*, known as the *Dobrotoliubie*, was published in Moscow in 1793. It was prepared under the direction of the Ukrainian monk Paisii Velichkovskii (1722–1794).⁴⁸ St. Paisii spent seventeen years on the Holy Mountain before moving in 1763 to Moldavia, where he and his disciples at the Neamt Monastery revived the hesychastic tradition of spiritual eldership (*starchestvo*).⁴⁹

Thus it happened that “neo-hesychasm” came to Russia from Moldavia. Optina Pustyn’ emerged as the main center of spiritual eldership in Russia. A hermitage or skete was built near the main monastery in 1821; until then the Petrine *Spiritual Regulation* had banned them.⁵⁰ The Optina Pustyn’ hermitage was home to three famous elders (*starsy*): Leonid (Nagolkin) (1768–1841), Makarii (Ivanov) (1788–1860), and Amvrosii (Grenkov) (1812–1891).⁵¹ Their illustrious predecessor was St. Serafim of Sarov (1754–1833).⁵² Serafim and the Optina elders modified, even transformed, certain traditional aspects of *starchestvo*. First, they “advocated the interiorization of spiritual life,” in contrast to an emphasis on strict physical asceticism and meticulous observance of church canons and rituals. Second, they expanded the audience for elders’ spiritual guidance from primarily other monks to all those who sought it. Such guidance was offered in person and by letter; when collected and published, the letters formed a distinctive type of Russian spiritual literature.⁵³ More and more people, from cultural elites to large numbers of lay believers and pilgrims, came to revere elders as models of spiritual perfection. Gradually *starchestvo* came to be regarded as the “quintessence of Orthodox spirituality.”⁵⁴ One need only think of Dostoevskii: Zosima in *The Brothers Karamazov* was modeled on Amvrosii (St. Ambrose of Optina) after Dostoevskii’s pilgrimage to the hermitage in June 1878.⁵⁵

SLAVOPHILISM

Before Dostoevskii the Slavophiles eagerly promoted spiritual elders and the philokalic tradition more generally. This was one way they played such an important role in Russia's long religious revival. The key figures were Ivan Kireevskii (1806–1856) and Aleksei Khomiakov (1804–1860). The first experienced a “conversion,” as his pious wife Natalia Petrovna née Arbeneva (1809–1900) called it, which was completed by 1842 under her influence and that of her spiritual adviser, the monk Filaret (1758–1842) of the Novospasskii Monastery. Kireevskii immersed himself in the religious world of Optina Pustyn', located near his family estate.⁵⁶ According to V. V. Zenkovsky, “his whole personality and spiritual world were shot through with the rays of religious consciousness. His was a genuine and profound religious *experience*, and in giving it meaning he drew very close to the immense spiritual wealth that was opened to him in the Optina Cloister.”⁵⁷ The Optina elder Makarii was the most important spiritual and intellectual influence on Kireevskii's life from 1845 on.⁵⁸ They collaborated on an important project: translating and publishing Greek patristic texts, in effect continuing Velichkovskii's work. Their publication program resulted in sixteen volumes by 1860.⁵⁹

Through Orthodox spiritual experience and faith Kireevskii arrived at his landmark concept of “believing reason” or faithful reason, which would have a formative role in the future development of Russian religious thought.⁶⁰ By integrating faith and reason, it strives to achieve “the inner wholeness of the mind essential for the comprehension of the integral truth.”⁶¹ Kireevskii insisted that spiritual wholeness—the preeminent Slavophile principle—was an ideal and aspiration; as a moral task it depended on human freedom. Referring to both Kireevskii and Khomiakov, Nikolai Berdiaev called Slavophile philosophy “the philosophy of the integral life of the spirit,” which was impossible without freedom.⁶² While integral reason must be faithful, so too should faith be reasonable. Khomiakov wrote of “intelligent faith,” and Kireevsky asked, “What kind of faith is it that is incompatible with reason?”⁶³ Both thinkers deplored blind faith and religious fanaticism. They firmly defended freedom of conscience as the very condition of genuine faith, which can only come freely from within, not from coercion by external authority. Berdiaev remarked that the Slavophiles' “love of freedom was astonishing.”⁶⁴

Religious experience was no less formative for Khomiakov than for Kireevskii.⁶⁵ Their fellow Slavophile Iurii Samarin (1819–1876) was the first to emphasize the experiential character of his theology, especially for his ecclesiology or theory of the Church.⁶⁶ For him the Church was an expe-

riential reality, a “living organism of truth and love” (as Samarin put it). The true Church is one through its free communal experience and embodiment of the Holy Spirit.⁶⁷ The idea of *sobornost’* (conciliarity)—a neologism coined later, by others, to express Khomiakov’s vision—was premised on inner freedom. S. S. Khoruzhii defined it as “*the freedom of self-realization in truth*.”⁶⁸ Samarin celebrated Khomiakov’s ideas as a ringing defense of freedom of conscience, writing that he “represented an original *manifestation of total freedom in religious consciousness*, one nearly unprecedented in our land.” According to Samarin, his legacy affirms that the Church and faith are perfectly compatible with civil freedom, “in the sense of the absence of external compulsion in matters of conscience,” and with freedom of thought, “the most precious, most sacred, most necessary of all the freedoms.”⁶⁹ While the Slavophiles’ teaching on conscience as inner truth and freedom was not yet the liberal concept of freedom of conscience as an individual right guaranteed by law, nonetheless it helped promote the rise of such a concept.⁷⁰

MONASTIC ENCOUNTERS WITH THE DIVINE

Having discovered the ideal Orthodox Church through the Optina elders and patristic writings, the Slavophiles despaired at the reality of the Petrine state church. Yet they could find hope in the new Russian monasteries. The spiritual authority of elders was a major factor in the growth of Russian monasticism after the disaster of secularization in the eighteenth century. Their authority came not primarily from the institutional Church but from their own spiritual experience and charisma. Elders helped make monasteries holy places, as did saints’ relics and miracle-working icons. As Scott Kenworthy remarks in his masterful history of the Trinity–St. Sergius Lavra, monasteries became “the destination for the massive upsurge of pilgrimage in the nineteenth century, as millions of believers from all social backgrounds were annually drawn to the relics of famous saints, the solemn liturgies, and the living holy men who were the real-life Zosimas.” They were, he says, places “par excellence of encounter with the divine.”⁷¹

The nineteenth century saw a dramatic increase in the number of monasteries and in the number of monks, nuns, and novices, with female monastics substantially outnumbering their male counterparts by the early twentieth century.⁷² Women monastics were inspired by the ideal of ascetic life and by the example of spiritual elders, but they were also devoted to educational, charitable, and otherwise philanthropic service.⁷³ Russian monasticism became a “mass phenomenon,” in Kenworthy’s characterization, not only because monks and nuns were now largely commoners by social origin

but also (which is more important) because of its success in communicating its contemplative ideals (hesychasm and *starchestvo*) and in meeting the spiritual needs of lay believers.⁷⁴ The main reason for their success was that Russian monasteries were places of meaningful religious experience, both for their tens of thousands of community members and for millions of pilgrims and visitors.⁷⁵

Elders exemplified the essential role of spiritual experience in the pursuit of holiness and *theosis*. Among ordinary believers, religious experience could take a variety of forms and have diverse meanings. (Following James, I use “religious experience” to mean an awareness, feeling, or sense of the presence of the divine or of the holy. Merely viewing an icon is not a religious experience; venerating one is, if it evokes a feeling of the presence of the divine.) It could be inspired by contact with elders, priests, and other revered figures.⁷⁶ It could flow from conventional religious practices such as prayer, liturgy and other forms of worship, the sacraments (including confession), pilgrimage, and veneration of saints, icons, and holy relics. It could accompany wonder at being and creation, or it could be evoked by beauty, perhaps especially by music. It could be elicited by compassion and love for human persons and in reverence for their dignity. One path to religious experience was through education and learning—from the saints’ lives and popular religious literature to theological scholarship but also secular learning and self-improvement. Another path was through “good works,” from dutiful action to philanthropic service, charity, and, ultimately, building the kingdom of God on earth.

For a person of faith a wide range of human activities could elicit or become religious experience, thereby clarifying and empowering the ideals that drive self-determination. Ultimately for such a person life as a whole could be approached prayerfully, lived in accordance with higher spiritual ideals, and filled with a living awareness of the presence of the divine—*Shekhinah*, to use the beautiful and evocative Hebrew word. What is essential to this conception of religious experience is human agency and initiative, or faith in Bulgakov’s sense of the term. For him faith involves human will, first to open oneself to religious experience and then to deepen one’s faith and ideals through cultivating such experience. In short, Bulgakov understood faith as spiritual work—asceticism (*podvizhnichestvo*), as he put it in the title of his famous *Vekhi* essay.⁷⁷ In nineteenth-century Russia monastic life, with its ascetic discipline (especially in the hermitages), was a powerful demonstration of spiritual work and religious experience. Surely it is striking, as Kenworthy notes, that “massive numbers of individuals—from a variety of classes and social backgrounds—sought to pursue the most rigor-

ous path of spiritual life” by joining monastic communities.⁷⁸ Their example inspired still larger numbers of people.

Each year, especially after 1861, millions of Russian pilgrims traveled to monasteries and other holy sites. Pilgrimage was one of the main forms of religious devotion in nineteenth-century Russia.⁷⁹ For many who embarked on a journey, pilgrimage was both its own type of religious experience and a pathway to other types.⁸⁰ Pilgrims went to holy places for different reasons, including spiritual guidance, to experience the holiness of the sacred site, or to venerate a miracle-working icon or a saint’s relics. In the case of the Trinity–St. Sergius Lavra, Kenworthy writes: “Thus the monastery drew pilgrims because it represented heaven on earth. It was holy because of all the prayers that had been said and all the people in it who had engaged in spiritual struggles and worked out their salvation for centuries, many of them saints.”⁸¹ If prayers and spiritual struggles made monasteries holy, then faith—the human act of veneration—activated the miracle-working power of icons and saints’ relics.

ICONS AND WOMEN’S RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

Icon stories tell us something about the religious experiences that generated the stories in the first place. These sacred stories recount the life of famous icons, from the circumstances of their discovery to the healings and other miraculous or heroic events associated with their veneration. Typically the stories begin with the experience of individual believers, with their prayers and dreams, then show how the icon became central to a particular faith community (such as a monastery). Interestingly, *startsy* frequently appeared in icon stories, usually as part of a dream or a vision. Vera Shevzov explains why this is significant: “Icon stories in this respect often pulled the dynamics of religious experience back to the inner world of the individual and demanded an independent exercise of will and discernment.”⁸² In these stories the *startsy* was internalized as a type of second conscience, as if to ensure that no one would mistake his role for an external preacher of the truth. Part of the message was that faith was the inner core of religious experience. It could even work miracles.

The veneration of miracle-working icons and saints’ relics (in and outside of monasteries) has attracted special interest among scholars of religion in Russia.⁸³ There are two related reasons for this interest. The first, as I have just suggested, is what the veneration of icons and holy relics reveals about faith and its relation to religious experience. Shevzov has done fundamental work exploring this relationship. She emphasizes that for everyone who experienced a miracle-working icon, faith was the enabling condition of the

experience. The faithful came “to a specially revered icon as a locus of divine presence, as a possibility of immediate personal encounter with the holy that was itself beyond history.” Together with the individual experience, it was believed that the collective and historical faith of the community that venerated the icon could increase its miracle-working power. Thus veneration was also an act of remembering all the faithful who had come before to experience God’s grace. “Remembering was integral to an icon’s efficacy,” Shevzov writes.⁸⁴

The Slavophile Ivan Kireevskii seems to have understood the veneration of icons in just the way Shevzov indicates. There is a remarkable passage in Alexander Herzen’s memoirs in which he is quoted as follows:

I once stood at a shrine, gazed upon a miracle-working icon of the Mother of God, and thought of the childlike faith of the people praying before it; some women, infirm people, and old men knelt and, crossing themselves, bowed down to the earth. With ardent hope I beheld the holy features, and little by little the secret of their miraculous power began to become clear for me. Yes, this was not simply a board with an image—for ages it had absorbed these streams of passionate hopes, the prayers of afflicted and unfortunate people; it must have become filled with the power pouring from it and reflected upon believers. It had become a living organism, a meeting place between the Creator and people. Thinking about this, I looked again at the old men, at the women with children prostrate in the dust, and at the holy icon—then I myself saw the animated features of the Mother of God; she looked with mercy and love at these simple people . . . and I fell to my knees and meekly prayed to her.⁸⁵

For Kireevskii, “the secret of their miraculous power” was that icons were conduits for divine-human encounter. The faithful were not merely passive recipients of supernatural agency; they were themselves agents in the divine-human process.

Pursuing a research interest closely related to the veneration of icons, Shevzov has analyzed Russian Orthodox thought about miracles, selecting a group of academic theologians (generally those who were graduates of, or professors in, the theological academies). In a subtle distinction she found that while these thinkers did not maintain that faith was necessary for miracles to occur, faith “did matter in the process of *identifying* a phenomenon or event as miraculous”—that is, in the process of discernment and perception. In this sense miracles were dependent on faith, as Pavel Florenskii (1882–1937) in particular concluded.⁸⁶ If inner spiritual effort (faith) could help someone to “see” or apprehend the miraculous, then the exercise of

faith could deepen the individual's sense of personal agency and self-worth. It could be empowering and liberating. This emphasis on the inner role of faith helped counter the fear that miracles, if taken as external coercive events, could be enslaving because they paralyzed the will. According to Shevzov: "In contrast to modern enlightened rationalists and Deists who denied miracles and revelatory acts of God in the name of freedom of spirit and independence of thought, Orthodox thinkers argued that those who embrace the notion of divine revelation 'know that they do not lose freedom but discover it.'"⁸⁷

The second reason for scholarly interest in the veneration of icons and holy relics is that such veneration demonstrated that believers could take the initiative, assert their independence, and challenge the official Church. Shevzov shows how the Synodal Church's efforts to regulate piety and suppress "superstition" were resisted by the laity, who wanted to maintain control of their own religious experiences.⁸⁸ In one striking case from 1887 "believers from the Kursk diocese criticized church officials for conducting a scientific analysis of the spring water in which a particular icon had been found and that was now being credited with healing powers. They claimed that they would never attribute the power of healing to the water. That power was to be found in 'the deep faith in the miracle-working nature of the icon which drew [believers] from hundreds and thousands of miles for prayer and repentance before it.'" In the next decade there appeared to be a growing crisis of episcopal authority as the laity defended the veneration of icons that they held to be miracle-working. Shevzov refers to a stark comment made in 1900 by residents of the town of Mozdok (Vladikavkaz Diocese) and filed with the Holy Synod: "the bishop is subordinate to the icon, and not the icon to him."⁸⁹

Russia's religious culture was Marian-centered, and Shevzov has been rightly credited with undertaking "the first systematic examination of Marianism in 19th-century Russia."⁹⁰ In Russia believers have experienced Mary not primarily through visions and apparitions (as in the Christian West) but rather through Marian icons. A rich tradition of icon stories grew from these experiences. In the nineteenth century many of these stories, at least half, related the religious experiences of women. Through them "the experiences of women entered into the annals of Russian Church history," Shevzov writes. Here are some of her conclusions from Marian icon stories immortalizing these experiences:

She [Mary] was the face of hope to which believers would turn to find their own "faces" when their identity was critically threatened by the

ravages of physical or emotional ailments. The believers described in such stories did not simply blend into a faceless mass. . . . While they assembled around a Marian icon, believers did so as distinct persons, and they remained as unique persons before the image, each with his or her own unrepeatable fate. The corporate prayer into which their cries may have blended still preserved the distinct voice of every person present. The power of healing, as the lives of Marian icons testify, consequently remained rooted in the faith and hope of the person.

Like icon stories telling of dreams or visions of *startsy*, Mary's image "often accompanied stories that related the exercise of independent will and discernment by lay men and women."⁹¹ Or, we might say, the exercise of freedom of conscience.

The experiences depicted in Marian icon stories were not, of course, the only type of women's religious experience in Russia. As noted above, in the nineteenth century there was a great increase in the number of women's monasteries and other religious communities (*zhenskie obshchiny*).⁹² Women's asceticism had a very strong service ideal, and women religious were deeply engaged in social welfare, educational, and charitable activities.⁹³ Their social engagement was held up as a model for (male) monastic reform in this direction. Apart from monastic communities, women found more and more opportunities in society (especially from the 1860s) for education, work outside the home, cultural engagement, social and civic activity, public service and involvement, and, in general, for greater autonomy and self-realization. The Russian Orthodox Church itself was increasingly a source of some of these opportunities. For many women their work and service held deep religious meaning. Such a sensibility was highly consequential, as William Wagner has shown in an incisive essay. For one thing, it led in the early twentieth century to a movement for the restoration of the office of deaconess in the Church. The Church Council of 1917–1918 heard petitions to this effect and was generally supportive.⁹⁴

Women's religiosity helped shape and reshape images of womanhood that were articulated and debated by Orthodox writers (almost exclusively male). Although a conservative, domestic image remained dominant, there was also a more liberal variant of this "Orthodox ideal of domesticity." One of Wagner's liberal Orthodox writers is Aleksei Govorov, who wrote a treatise on the "woman question" (1907).⁹⁵ In it Govorov argued that Christianity established the principles of "equality of rights for men and women" and "the moral dignity of the individual personality." Historical progress consisted in the realization of these principles.⁹⁶ Wagner also calls to our

attention one E. Liuleva, a Christian woman writer whose ideas were even more progressive and far-reaching. In her 1906 pamphlet *The Free Woman and Christianity* she wrote, “Christ posited the principle of the liberation of women and gave them access to the only work necessary for humanity, the seeking of the Kingdom of God.” With its historical growth in power the Church betrayed Christ’s message of full equality and participation, but in the modern era “women slowly have conquered for themselves the rights given them by Christ and have struggled ceaselessly for their human dignity, independence, and freedom.” Women, she concluded, “not only can but must insist on their independence and freedom, and their obligation before God and humanity, to throw off the chains placed on them.”⁹⁷ It is difficult to determine to what extent Govorov and Liuleva appreciated that freedom of conscience was intrinsic to the concept of human dignity to which they appealed, but Liuleva in particular seems to have spoken from the depths of religious experience.

SEEKING SPIRITUAL FREEDOM IN THE THEOLOGICAL ACADEMIES

Russia’s theological academies were integral to the country’s religious revival and thus to the problem of spiritual freedom.⁹⁸ The four academies—in Kiev, Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Kazan—were established in their modern form by Alexander I’s reform of the whole system of ecclesiastical education, which also included the diocesan seminaries and lower-level schools (parish and district).⁹⁹ Filaret (Drozdov), first as rector of the St. Petersburg Theological Academy (1812–1819) and then as metropolitan of Moscow (1821–1867), sought to give the academies and thus the Church a new intellectual direction. He opposed the dominance of Latin scholasticism in the church schools (and the use of Latin instead of Russian) and turned to rediscovery of the church fathers and the Eastern patristic tradition, through which he wanted to bring about a reawakening of Orthodoxy. According to Robert Nichols, “Filaret’s ascendancy among the school reformers marks the beginnings of a Russian Orthodox theology.” Yet he did not neglect philosophy and made both theology and philosophy central to the curriculum of the new ecclesiastical schools, thus laying the foundations for the rich Russian tradition of philosophical idealism and religious philosophy.¹⁰⁰

Georges Florovsky devoted a chapter section of his classic *Ways of Russian Theology* to “theology in the reformed ecclesiastical schools.” Several of his observations are worth remembering in the present context, beginning with his first sentence: “Filaret was one of the most influential and prominent representatives of the new ‘theology of the heart’ taught in the reformed ecclesiastical schools.” Quoting from the reform statute (30 Au-

gust 1814), he continues: “The aim of this instruction was ‘the education of the inner man,’ by imparting a living and well-founded personal conviction in the saving truths of faith. ‘The inner education of youths for an active Christianity will be the sole aim of these schools.’”¹⁰¹ This “theology of the heart” in the church schools corresponded to the broader experiential nature of the Russian religious revival. Florovsky indicates that Kirill Bogoslavskii-Platonov (1780–1844), rector of the Moscow Theological Academy, was close to the disciples of the Moldavian *startsy* and that the academy itself became a “semi-hermitage,” a kind of learned monastery of the heart.¹⁰² By the early twentieth century this milieu produced, in Paul Valliere’s words, “perhaps the most thorough-going theological liberal of his time” in the person of Mikhail Tareev (1866–1934), professor of moral theology at the Moscow academy. Freedom of conscience was at the center of his “theory of Christian freedom.”¹⁰³

Florovsky opposed the “theology of the heart” to another current (which he disliked), the “moral-rationalistic school,” but it too was experiential. According to him, its best representative was Father Gerasim Pavskii (1787–1863), chair of Hebrew at St. Petersburg Theological Academy and professor of theology at St. Petersburg University. Florovsky says that Pavskii professed a highly personal religious-moralistic idealism and quotes him as follows: “Religion is the feeling by which man’s spirit inwardly embraces and is blessed by the Invisible, Eternal, and Holy. The study of religion is designed only to awaken, enliven, and nourish this holy feeling, so that it might strengthen, enlighten, and enflame the inner man.” Clearly spiritual freedom was integral to Pavskii’s understanding of religion as human experience of the holy.¹⁰⁴

The theological academies undertook a remarkable research program that involved extensive translations of patristic texts and a large body of historical and theological scholarship. Initiated in the 1820s and continuing for the rest of the century, this massive project focused on the fourth-century Cappadocian fathers (Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Gregory of Nyssa) and on Maximus the Confessor in the seventh century.¹⁰⁵ These and other church fathers, especially in the Byzantine East, developed a theological anthropology (or conception of human nature) based on Genesis 1:26, “Let us make man in our image, according to our likeness.” They interpreted the verse to mean that while human beings are graciously created in God’s image, they must assimilate to God’s likeness by their own free will and spiritual effort—in short, by self-determination. The transcendent culmination of this divine-human process is *theosis*. This “similitude anthropology” closely related human dignity to the capacity

for self-determination, perfectibility, and free assimilation to the divine likeness.¹⁰⁶

What Michelson calls “the sacred tradition of theocentric humanism” entered into Russia’s public sphere when the theological academies began to translate the patristic writings into Russian. The most extensive effort was the Moscow Theological Academy’s *Works of the Holy Fathers in Russian Translation*, which began publication in 1843 and eventually ran to forty-eight volumes. In addition, there was a series of supplemental volumes containing a wide range of biographical, historical, and scholarly materials.¹⁰⁷ By the 1860s Russian academic theologians were promoting a moral (rather than strictly mystical or ascetic) understanding of *theosis*, according to which salvation follows from human striving for moral perfection.¹⁰⁸ Among the studies that Michelson highlights is Pavel Soliarskii’s *Orthodox Moral Theology*, which was commonly used as a seminary handbook in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Soliarskii wrote that the human soul possesses “free will, according to which it can determine its actions based on the idea of what is good and holy; based not on external coercion but on the law of its own reason and conscience.”¹⁰⁹ Only through reason, conscience, and free will could human beings approximate to the divine likeness and make progress toward *theosis*. This was “an entirely new anthropology of moral perfectibility, human dignity, and theocentric freedom.” By the end of the nineteenth century this neo-patristic anthropology, Michelson concludes, offered theological support for the defense of freedom of conscience and for Russian liberalism more generally.¹¹⁰

THE “CLERICAL QUESTION” AND AN ADMINISTRATIVE DISCOURSE OF FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE

In the second half of the nineteenth century the parish clergy formed another vital element in Russia’s religious revival. Their newfound role was a consequence of their education in the reformed ecclesiastical schools. Gregory Freeze refers to the “radical improvement in clergy’s educational standards.” He reports that by 1860, 83 percent of all priests in the empire held a seminary degree. Twenty years later the figure had increased to 97 percent (though by 1904 it dropped to 64 percent). Educated clergy were painfully aware of the discrepancy between their sense of self-worth and aspirations, on the one hand, and their status, income, and opportunities, on the other. Further, they increasingly resented their ecclesiastical superiors, “whose high station—at least in part—derived from their once superior education, not their spiritual superiority as monastic ascetics.” The result, Freeze concludes, “was rising dissatisfaction among parish clergy—over their meagre

incomes, humiliating dependence upon parishioners and total subordination to the whims of 'tyrannical' bishops."¹¹¹ In 1858 a famous statement of the emerging new clerical consciousness was published abroad and smuggled back into Russia. It was written by Father Ioann Belliustin (1819–1890), who saw priests as the natural moral and religious leaders of their communities but thought their role was thwarted by the privileged and powerful episcopate. "Altogether, Belliustin's essay offered a devastating portrait of the Church," in Freeze's summation.¹¹²

Belliustin's sensational essay prompted public discussion for the first time of "the clerical question" and raised expectations that the Church might participate in and benefit from the unfolding era of Great Reforms. The new minister of internal affairs, Petr Valuev (appointed in 1861), was a champion of clerical reform—and beyond that of freedom of conscience. In September 1861 he submitted a lengthy report, "On the Present Condition of the Orthodox Church and Clergy." In it he wrote that the Church "resorts to the display of force and relies primarily upon its ties with civil authorities" to combat non-Orthodox religions. Its reliance on the state deprived the Church of spiritual independence and energy. He deplored the clergy's low social status, demoralization, and "feeling of profound, bitter abasement." Diocesan hierarchs reign over priests, Valuev wrote, "with the most cruel despotism, and that despotism is all the more oppressive because it is exerted mainly through the avarice of diocesan chancelleries and consistories."¹¹³ His analysis of the condition of the Russian Orthodox Church, together with his efforts to deal with problems confronting non-Orthodox religions in Russia (such as forced conversions and laws on mixed marriage in the Baltic region), led Valuev to advocate a broad policy of freedom of conscience for the empire. He was the first senior government official to do so, and his efforts abetted the emergence of "freedom of conscience" as an administrative discourse in the 1860s.¹¹⁴ Several years earlier, in 1857, Boris Chicherin called freedom of conscience "the first and most sacred right of a citizen."¹¹⁵ It was the first of the seven core principles that Chicherin identified—on the eve of the Great Reforms—as constituting Russian liberalism as a political program.¹¹⁶

Dmitrii Tolstoi, chief procurator of the Holy Synod from 1865 to 1880, also wanted priests to have more authority, autonomy, and influence. His reform program was designed to achieve those ends. "The overarching goal," according to Freeze, "was to reconstitute the clergy into a more dynamic, more effective, more committed class of pastors—a change intended to serve primarily the interests of the Church." The aim was to transform the clergy "from a moribund hereditary estate into a more dynamic pro-

fession of zealous, dedicated pastors.¹¹⁷ The prospect of reform, set against the background of the clergy's higher educational achievements and professional ambitions, led to the emergence of what Freeze has called "clerical liberalism" among younger priests. Initially it concentrated on estate (*soslovie*) concerns but later developed in the direction of broader social issues, "suggesting that a true pastor must be concerned with temporal issues as well as spiritual ones."¹¹⁸ This evolution followed naturally from the new conception of priest as pastor, which gave more attention to moral-spiritual development and social ministry, in contrast to the previous primary emphasis on liturgical and sacramental functions.

ORTHODOX PASTORAL SERVICE: FROM PARISH CHARITIES TO THE ORRP

The development of a pastoral sensibility, even a sense of mission, among Orthodox clergy was a significant aspect of church life in the postreform period.¹¹⁹ Pastoral service, compared to traditional conceptions of the priestly role, was more experiential and "lived." It involved preaching, charity, popular religious enlightenment and education more generally, various other forms of social engagement and outreach, and even, by the early twentieth century, politics. It was premised on (and helped deepen) respect for lay persons as responsible religious agents and as active participants, moved by faith and conscience, in the Church's work of building a more Christian society. (Of course, lay participation in pastoral work, and more generally the laity's increasing engagement with Orthodoxy and parish life—the way they lived and experienced Orthodoxy—deepened their own faith, conscience, and self-respect.) Beginning in the 1860s, especially in St. Petersburg and Moscow, pastors worked to revitalize their parishes and turn them into faithful and socially committed communities.¹²⁰ They organized educational and charitable associations in the hope that the revival of parish life would reverberate throughout Russian society and base it more firmly on Christian moral and social principles.¹²¹ Indeed, as Jennifer Hedda has written of Russian pastors, "they were motivated in large part by their shared ideal of bringing the Kingdom of God into reality through preaching and acting on an ethic of Christ-like love and service to others."¹²² Charitable work was especially important to this mission and in creating a sense of Christian community. In the 1860s and 1870s most Moscow and St. Petersburg parishes established charities, involving clergy and laity in a common endeavor that fostered mutual respect.¹²³ In Hedda's words, "ideally, Christian charity respected the dignity and humanity of those who received it and ennobled the souls of those who gave it."¹²⁴

Two parish priests stand out as pioneers of the pastoral movement. The

first was Father A. V. Gumilevskii (1830–1869), whose parish, the Sands, was one of the poorest in St. Petersburg. There, in the early 1860s, he founded a Sunday school for workers, a regular day school, and the capital's first confraternity (*bratstvo*)—the latter hailed as “the first open experiment in Christian social work in Russia.”¹²⁵ He disseminated his ideas about church and society in the journal he helped found and edit, *Spirit of a Christian*. The second pioneer was Ioann Sergiev (1829–1908). This was Father John of Kronstadt, perhaps the most famous Russian priest of the postreform period.¹²⁶ He combined charismatic, even ecstatic fulfillment of his priestly duties (prayer, liturgical services, performing the sacraments) with selfless devotion to Christian social work, poor relief, and charity. In both of these aspects of his pastoral calling Fr. John proceeded from lived experience of the divine, just as he wanted to help others achieve, in Kizenko's words, “a personal, intellectual, and emotional internalization of Orthodoxy,” but in his political views he was no liberal.¹²⁷ He rejected freedom of conscience on the Augustinian grounds that human beings are fallen and corrupt, creatures of passion whose sinful conscience cannot guide them to the good. This conservative theological approach, while hardly rare, was not typical of the Russian pastoral movement (see below).¹²⁸

The St. Petersburg Theological Academy, beginning with the academy statute of 1869, played an important role in training clergy for pastoral work and in promoting a social mission for the Church.¹²⁹ The 1884 statute, a product of the era of counterreforms, increased administrative control over students and faculty but also improved academic standards. The statute specified that the academies were “to provide higher theological education in the spirit of Orthodoxy for the enlightened service of the Church in the pastoral, educational and other fields of activity.”¹³⁰ The St. Petersburg academy admirably met this goal. Its graduates were well educated and prepared for leadership roles in church and society. Many students at the academy came to understand their vocation as Christian service to others. They served in the Sunday school movement, in parish charities, and in the Society for the Dissemination of Moral-Religious Enlightenment in the Spirit of the Orthodox Church (ORRP). The academy thrived under the direction of Bishop Antonii (Vadkovskii, 1846–1912), who served it as inspector (1885–1887) and rector (1887–1892) before becoming metropolitan of St. Petersburg in 1898.¹³¹ According to Hedda, “Bishop Antonii had a decisive influence in affirming and articulating the importance of the school as a center of the church's public religious mission.” He saw that Russian society was experiencing a “strong upsurge of religious feeling,” which he thought should be met by an effective pastoral response. For him this involved not

only teaching but also charity or “preaching by deeds.” In Hedda’s estimation, “Bishop Antonii’s pastoral leadership had an electrifying effect on the students of the St. Petersburg academy.”¹³²

Under Bishop Antonii the St. Petersburg Theological Academy became closely connected with the ORRP.¹³³ The ORRP was another vehicle of the Russian religious revival and indication of its experiential quality.¹³⁴ Founded in 1880–1881 by local clergy, its original mission was to counter the influence of the English evangelist Lord Radstock (Granville Waldegrade) and his Russian disciple Colonel Vasilii A. Pashkov.¹³⁵ Soon, however, the ORRP began to take a less defensive and more positive role in responding to the educated public’s growing interest in religious and philosophical questions. The society organized lectures and meetings outside of church services for the purpose specified in its name, broadly interpreted to include more philosophical topics such as the relation between faith and reason. The lectures drew large audiences, primarily from St. Petersburg *obshchestvo* (educated society), the ORRP’s main target in its first five years. But within a few years of the government’s suppression of Pashkovism in 1884, the ORRP broadened its pastoral mission. In the 1890–1906 period ORRP lectures (often in the form of *besedy* or colloquia) dramatically expanded their reach to include the whole urban population. In 1904, for example, six thousand lectures were presented at eighty-one locations throughout the city to a total audience of about 2.2 million. At the same time, the ORRP sponsored a range of other activities and institutions such as charities, amateur choirs, public libraries, schools, publications, church construction, and church-based temperance societies. By 1904 the ORRP and one of its offshoots, the Aleksandr Nevskii Temperance Society, had become, according to Hedda, “the capital’s largest and most successful public organizations.”¹³⁶

In the course of the 1880s a central aspect of the ORRP’s work became its mission to the working class.¹³⁷ Students from the St. Petersburg Theological Academy, who made up a large percentage of the society’s active membership, established ORRP outreach centers in the city’s factories and working-class neighborhoods. Bishop Antonii strongly encouraged this mission. In his address to the graduating class of 1889, he described it as part of the human work of building the Kingdom of God.¹³⁸ Many workers welcomed the Church’s mission of “moral-religious enlightenment.”¹³⁹ This reception was one aspect of the broader phenomenon of workers’ religious life, which historians such as Mark Steinberg and Page Herrlinger have explored most fruitfully as another variety of Russian religious experience. The experience of workers (of being wounded and humiliated, of suffering and exploitation) lent itself to a religious type of interpretation, and some of them (the

worker-poets) expressed their experience in sacred and poetic language. “Preoccupied with the self (the individual, the inward person, *lichnost*) and with the soul (*dusha, dukhovnost*), workers wrote constantly about the natural dignity of each human being and the suffering of the self,” as Steinberg evocatively puts it. Their wounds, and the spiritual “wandering” that ensued, “can be seen as analogous to one of the central narratives and functions of religion: the promise and the journey of suffering and healing, but also the search to know God.”¹⁴⁰ This wandering and searching, within and beyond Orthodoxy, led more and more people to recognize freedom of conscience from within and to demand it as a right for themselves and others. Thus Page Herrlinger, referring mainly to working-class attitudes in the post-1905 period, writes, “the laity exhibited a more critical attitude toward religious issues, marked by a greater desire for knowledge and a higher expectation of self-determination in religious matters, both on an individual and parish level.”¹⁴¹

PASTORAL WORK AND LIBERAL THEOLOGY

To return to the broader pastoral movement: its ultimate ideal, as Hedda has emphasized in *His Kingdom Come*, was the Kingdom of God. For both clergy and laity, pastoral service was primarily experiential: it was the experience of working in community with one’s fellow human beings to build the Kingdom of God on earth (or at least to make the earth ready for its advent). Scott Kenworthy is right to characterize it as a moral endeavor.¹⁴² Pastoral experience fostered respect for freedom of conscience as pastors, parishioners, students, and other participants in the movement came to appreciate that they were all capable of freely recognizing the ideal of the Kingdom of God (i.e., the supreme good through love and justice), of freely determining their will by that ideal, and of freely working to realize the ideal. Freedom of conscience, as the human capacity for “ideal self-determination” (which is the anthropological basis for freedom of conscience as a human right), is the very precondition of the Kingdom of God as a moral endeavor, although, of course, not everyone involved in pastoral work recognized it as such. To become more conscious of it, they could turn to the nascent Russian liberal theological tradition, which supported pastoral experience and gave it intellectual articulation.

Liberal theology, which had its origins in German idealism, was an international trend emphasizing that “the goal of Christianity was the moral integration of humanity into the Kingdom of God,” as Kenworthy succinctly puts it.¹⁴³ It acquired an explicit social justice dimension with the American Social Gospel movement, to which Russian pastoral and theological devel-

opments have been compared.¹⁴⁴ In Russia Archimandrite Fedor (Bukharev, 1824–1871) helped establish the new “this-worldly” direction in theology. He taught theology at Moscow Theological Academy (1846–1854) and Kazan Theological Academy (1854–1858), then worked as an ecclesiastical censor in St. Petersburg (1858–1862). The central theme of his work was that the Church should enter into the modern world and fully engage it, using all its resources for the purpose of Christianizing it and ultimately bringing about the Kingdom of God. Conservatives denounced his ideas (expounded in his 1860 book, *On Orthodoxy in Relation to the Modern World*) as a dangerous innovation. The controversy, which became known as the “Bukharev affair,” led to the archimandrite’s laicization in 1863.¹⁴⁵ By the turn of the twentieth century there was a revival of interest in him.¹⁴⁶ Significantly, the first chapter of the 1906 collection *The Free Conscience* was devoted to him as an example of someone who refused to compromise his conscience, although he paid dearly for it.¹⁴⁷

Following Bukharev, the new direction in theology was pursued by Vladimir Solov’ev (1853–1900), Sergei Bulgakov, and other Russian religious-philosophical thinkers, who gave it profound development. In general, the liberal theological approach, in Russia and elsewhere, repudiated the Augustinian emphasis on human depravity and original sin, instead recognizing the possibility of human progress toward the ideal of the Kingdom of God and presupposing freedom of conscience as a condition of such progress. Salvation depended on moral effort, not on unmerited grace alone. The liberal theological approach, again in Russia and elsewhere, was (and is) opposed by conservatives who adhered to the Augustinian view that the human will was so corrupted by sin that any capacity for self-determination by the good was radically impaired. Therefore the conservatives rejected freedom of conscience and the possibility of human progress. For them, salvation was possible only by God’s grace, channeled through the Church, the sacraments, and prescribed dogma (departure from which was heresy and threatened salvation). There was little or no place for human agency in the coming of the Kingdom of God.

Pastoral theology was one branch of theology that developed the new liberal approach. It did so in response to and as part of the pastoral movement, and thus was experiential in its foundations. Hedda indicates that one notable change in the pastoral literature was that by the 1880s the term *pastyr’* (pastor) was increasingly used in preference to *sviashchennik* (priest) in order to convey the “good shepherd” ideal of a parish priest who lovingly serves his flock instead of presiding over it as an authority figure uniquely invested with the power to perform the sacraments necessary for salvation.

She provides several examples of theological writers who expounded this pastoral ideal. One figure, Sergei Sollertinskii, professor of pastoral theology at St. Petersburg Theological Academy (and an early ORRP member), stressed that the essence of pastoral service was moral guidance through personal example (rather than doctrinal instruction). He thought the pastor's greatest responsibility was to cultivate the development of the individual's moral consciousness so that, as Hedda puts it, "the individual living in the world could strive consciously toward the good, working toward his own salvation and contributing to the salvation of others as well."¹⁴⁸

These developments in pastoral theology coincided with further theological-philosophical expositions of the meaning of the idea of the Kingdom of God.¹⁴⁹ In the nineteenth century the most powerful exposition in the liberal direction was advanced by Russia's greatest religious philosopher Vladimir Solov'ev. He conceived the Kingdom of God as a divine-human project. He called it *bogochelovechestvo* (Godmanhood, theanthropy, divine humanity, or the humanity of God)—the central concept of his philosophy. He held that Godmanhood could not be achieved, salvation could not happen, and the Kingdom of God could not arrive without human aspiration and perfectibility toward the divine ideal, a process dependent on freedom of conscience. He was a principal figure in the Russian neo-idealist defense of freedom of conscience, as we will see in more detail below. The liberal theological approach did not necessarily entail political liberalism (constitutionalism and the rule of law) for everyone who took such an approach, but it did for Solov'ev.¹⁵⁰ It did, too, for a priest influenced by him, Father Grigorii Petrov (1867–1925), a graduate of the St. Petersburg Theological Academy and leading member of the ORRP.¹⁵¹ His pastoral work, lectures, and writings brought him great popularity at the beginning of the twentieth century. His main theme was the Kingdom of God and human responsibility for building it. Very much like Solov'ev, he declared the full realization of the kingdom to be the "universal ideal of all humanity" and the purpose of history. God would fulfill that purpose once human beings learned to live in the spirit of truth, love, and justice and internalized "the Gospel as the foundation of life" (the title of his first book).¹⁵²

By the Kingdom of God, Petrov understood "perfect life on earth—life based not on the dominion of force, of crude egoism, but on the principles of universal love, full justice, the recognition of all the legitimate rights of persons."¹⁵³ This conception led to his liberal political commitments. He has been called "the most prominent clerical figure" in the liberation movement that led to the revolution of 1905.¹⁵⁴ He joined the Constitutional Democratic (Kadet) Party and was elected on its ticket to the Second Duma in 1906.

He saw no incompatibility between political liberalism and what Solov'ev called "Christian politics," which held that social and political life should be guided by the ideal of the Kingdom of God.¹⁵⁵ Petrov deplored Peter the Great's subordination of the Church to state interests, all the more so in that such interests had nothing to do with creating the type of society conducive to the coming of the Kingdom of God. By the time of the 1905 revolution he came to support disestablishment of the Church. He believed that an independent church, no longer compromised by involvement with state power, could more effectively fulfill its primary purpose of building the Kingdom of God on earth. He wrote that the parish clergy had developed their own distinctive "pastoral sensibility" oriented to that very purpose and that it was precisely they who should lead the Church along the path of reform and renewal.¹⁵⁶

THE RUSSIAN RELIGIOUS-PHILOSOPHICAL RENAISSANCE

By the beginning of the twentieth century the pastoral movement, as well as the emerging movement for church reform (i.e., for ending the Synodal system), converged with the Russian religious renaissance, or rather with the Russian religious-philosophical renaissance. That it was a religious-philosophical renaissance indicates the involvement of cultural elites and educated society. In certain respects this distinguished it from the more popularly based long nineteenth-century religious revival. The religious renaissance contributed mightily to the vibrant cultural movement known as the Russian Silver Age, usually dated from about 1890 to the 1920s.¹⁵⁷ Intellectually the whole period was a "revolt against positivism," and therefore a revolt against the ideology that had formed the worldview of the Russian intelligentsia since the mid-nineteenth century.¹⁵⁸ In its religious-philosophical forms the revolt constituted another variety of Russian religious experience: it was experienced as an inner moral reaction against the positivist reduction of reality to the external empirical world, and for many that moral experience (the realization that "ought," and the freedom to act on it, cannot be explained away) precipitated religious searching and conversion. The revolt against positivism resulted in the intelligentsia's "God-seeking" (*bogoiskatel'stvo*), the very premise of which was freedom of conscience.¹⁵⁹ This was among the more visible aspects of the Russian religious renaissance.

The renaissance found recurrent inspiration in a constellation of sources and events that appeared around 1880. The publication that year of Dostoevskii's *The Brothers Karamazov* revealed to his readership the depths of Russian Orthodox spirituality. Dostoevskii's lifelong exploration of what he

called the “mystery of man” was taken up by his young philosopher friend, Vladimir Solov’ev, who delivered his famous *Lectures on Godmanhood* in 1878 to audiences of nearly a thousand. Two years later he defended his brilliant doctoral dissertation, *Critique of Abstract Principles*. In these and subsequent works he advanced a philosophically sophisticated, ecumenical vision of Christianity that had great spiritual and intellectual appeal. As noted above, Solov’ev made the realization of Godmanhood (*theosis*) dependent on freedom of conscience. From the early 1880s he sharply criticized the subordination of church to state in Russian history and religious intolerance in the Russian Empire.¹⁶⁰ Another source of God-seeking was Lev Tolstoi (1828–1910), whose experience of religious conversion forms the subject of *A Confession*, written in the late 1870s and published in Switzerland in 1884. An earlier set of proofs was copied, circulated, “and debated nationwide in private conversations and correspondence,” according to Inessa Medzhibovskaya. She writes that Tolstoi “drew the attention of the whole nation to the precedent he set for wrestling with the oppressive state and its ideology for freedom of conscience.”¹⁶¹ The struggle for freedom of conscience occupied him in many subsequent works and was dramatically epitomized by his excommunication in 1901.

The ORRP, founded in 1880, also deserves to be seen as an integral part of the Russian religious renaissance or as a conduit for the merging of the century-long revival with the fin-de-siècle renaissance. Recall that in its first five years the ORRP drew audiences primarily from the St. Petersburg educated public, which showed a keen interest in religious and philosophical questions. After that, its reach extended to the whole urban population. In 1887, according to Hedda, “the annual report of the society stated it had adopted religious life in America as the model to imitate.” This remarkable moment came in response to a lecture delivered the previous year by Aleksandr Lopukhin, a professor at the St. Petersburg Theological Academy and a specialist on comparative religion. In his lecture before the ORRP membership Lopukhin described religious life in the United States as free, flourishing, and deeply involved in society.¹⁶² There was an obvious contrast to the state church in Russia. Following Lopukhin, Russian scholars often referred to the example of North American religious history in support of their arguments for religious freedom and beyond that for liberalism. Some argued quite specifically that liberalism developed from the demand for freedom of conscience and that its continued growth and vitality depended on a free and flourishing religious life.¹⁶³

By the turn of the century the time was ripe for dialogue between the God-seeking intelligentsia and Orthodox clergy. In 1899 and 1900 the

ORRP held a series of meetings for clergy eager to respond to the intelligentsia's new religious-philosophical interests. No doubt many priests perceived a possible challenge to the Church. "The situation," Hedda writes, "was reminiscent of the atmosphere at the end of the 1870s, which had originally led to the founding of the ORRP," in response to the challenge posed by Radstock and Pashkov.¹⁶⁴ But the intervening two decades of pastoral experience meant that liberal clergy by and large welcomed a "mission to the intelligentsia," discerning a Christian ethos in the intelligentsia's aspiration for social justice.¹⁶⁵ Metropolitan Antonii (Vadkovskii) was deeply troubled by the alienation of the intelligentsia and sought its reconciliation with the Church. He supported the efforts of a group of prominent lay intellectuals and artists led by Dmitrii Merezhkovskii and Zinaida Gippius to begin a series of discussions with church figures. The result was the St. Petersburg Religious-Philosophical Assemblies, one of the most visible features of the Russian religious renaissance.¹⁶⁶ There were twenty-two sessions between November 1901 and April 1903, before Pobedonostsev suspended them. With Antonii's support, the Religious-Philosophical Assemblies were chaired by Bishop Sergei (Stragorodskii, 1867–1944), rector of the St. Petersburg Theological Academy and future patriarch. They were attended by academy faculty and students, clergy from the capital, and educated society. The meetings abetted the development of a "new religious consciousness" and the formation of a full-fledged religious intelligentsia, with subsequent religious-philosophical societies, journals, and publishing houses.¹⁶⁷

John Basil refers to the St. Petersburg Religious-Philosophical Assemblies as a "semi-official platform" for public discussion of religious freedom.¹⁶⁸ Three sessions were devoted to the problem of freedom of conscience. Prince S. M. Volkonskii opened the discussion with a paper strongly defending the principle of freedom of conscience.¹⁶⁹ Coercion, he said, had no place in matters of faith. Coercion exercised over the non-Orthodox on behalf of the Orthodox majority was also coercion over the majority itself; it violated the conscience of everyone. In Russia, he continued, freedom of conscience depended on liberating the Church from state interference and on restoring its autonomy and spiritual authority (that is, on ending the Synodal system).¹⁷⁰ The Synod official V. M. Skvortsov replied that Russia was, as it should be, an "Orthodox autocratic state," which sharply limited the application of freedom of conscience.¹⁷¹ (Skvortsov's position was held by the regime until it collapsed in 1917, dooming the prospects of freedom of conscience in Russia.) Other participants were also wary or critical of the concept of freedom of conscience, fearing in particular that rural areas of the empire would oppose or simply not understand it.¹⁷² Bishop Sergei (Stragorodskii)

agreed with Volkonskii on one essential point: the state must stop using the Church as a means for its own purposes. “Then the question of freedom of conscience can be raised.” He meant “then and only then,” for in Russia the fate of freedom of conscience rested on freeing the Orthodox Church from state control. Without basic church reform, the introduction of freedom of conscience would keep the Church’s hands tied while unbinding those of its competitors, as Sergei put it.¹⁷³ Yet the tsarist regime, while raising the hope of such reform in 1905, ultimately proved unwilling to proceed with it, fearing that an autonomous church posed a threat to autocracy—the very reason Peter the Great created the Holy Synod.

<H1>RUSSIAN NEO-IDEALISM

<TX>At the St. Petersburg Religious-Philosophical Assemblies Prince Volkonskii was replying in part to a speech given two months earlier by Mikhail A. Stakhovich (1861–1923), marshal of the nobility in Orel Province. Stakhovich, speaking before a diocesan missionary conference in Orel, had dramatically called for the Church to defend freedom of conscience against intrusion by the state—in sharp contrast to Tolstoi’s excommunication the preceding February. Stakhovich’s speech, which was widely reported in the domestic and even the foreign press, created a sensation.¹⁷⁴ When Petr Struve, who had not long since converted from Marxism to idealism and liberalism, read about it, he sent the Moscow University legal philosopher Pavel Novgorodtsev a plan for a collection of essays devoted to liberty of conscience and its importance in liberalism. The result was *Problems of Idealism*, published in November 1902.¹⁷⁵ It was a milestone in the Russian religious-philosophical renaissance and marked the ascendancy of Russian neo-idealism—a revival both of the Russian idealist tradition founded by the Slavophiles and Westernizers in the 1840s and of classic German idealism, especially Kant.

Problems of Idealism was published by the Moscow Psychological Society (1885–1922), which, despite its name, was the first and main center of the growth of Russian philosophy in this period.¹⁷⁶ For the preceding fifteen years the Psychological Society had advanced neo-idealism as a trenchant critique of positivism and an innovative theory of liberalism. In both respects Russian neo-idealism was a powerful defense of personhood (*lichnost’*)—that is, the quality of being a person and therefore of having intrinsic and insuperable value (human dignity). As Novgorodtsev wrote in his foreword to *Problems of Idealism*, the contemporary idealist movement gave “primary importance to the principle of the absolute significance of personhood.”¹⁷⁷ Here he pointed to the legacy of Boris Chicherin and Vlad-

imir Solov'ev, nineteenth-century Russia's greatest idealist philosophers. Both closely related personhood to freedom of conscience, in its dual meaning of inner self-determination and external right.

Recall that in 1857 Chicherin proclaimed freedom of conscience to be "the first and most sacred right of a citizen." Initially he qualified this right in important ways, but over the next two decades of his long career he moved from conservative to "classical" liberalism.¹⁷⁸ His 1879 book *Science and Religion* was a threshold. In it he adopted a liberal, Kantian interpretation of Hegelianism, writing that "the significance of the human person is not limited by the fact that he is an organ of the world-historical process. As a bearer of the absolute principle, a human being has absolute significance in himself."¹⁷⁹ Human beings have the capacity to freely recognize the absolute (experienced or conceived in moral or religious terms) and to determine themselves according to this recognition: this capacity is conscience, and it is the source of personhood and human dignity.¹⁸⁰ That is why freedom of conscience is the "first and most sacred right." Chicherin now declared, more resolutely than ever before: "freedom of conscience is the inviolable sanctuary of the human soul, which the state has no right to infringe, and freedom of thought, even with all its errors, constitutes the necessary condition of development."¹⁸¹

Thus by 1880 Chicherin had come to conceptualize freedom of conscience as inner liberty or self-determination by freely recognized absolute ideals (Kantian autonomy). He called this its "supreme meaning."¹⁸² Directly following Kant, Chicherin regarded moral autonomy as the essential property of personhood and the basis of human dignity.¹⁸³ In his masterpiece *Philosophy of Right* (1900), written on the eve of the formation of the Russian liberation movement, he wrote: "The great moral significance of the secular enlightenment was never expressed so clearly as in the modern recognition of freedom of conscience as the most sacred and inviolable of human rights. It is the cornerstone of the inner freedom of man, and therefore of human dignity as well."¹⁸⁴ A year later *Science and Religion* was reissued in a second edition. In the circumstances the classic text no doubt resonated. In it Chicherin understood freedom of conscience both in the core sense of moral autonomy and, as Paul Valliere has nicely demonstrated, as the relative autonomy of the various distinct spheres of human need, experience, and aspiration: not only church and state, or religion and politics, but also morality, philosophy, science, economy, and art. The autonomous development of each sphere, Chicherin held, is necessary for the integrity of the whole (whether self or society).¹⁸⁵ This broader conception of freedom of conscience was an important theme in *Problems of Idealism*.



Freedom of conscience was a no less important principle for Solov'ev. In *Lectures on Godmanhood* (1878–1880), *Critique of Abstract Principles* (1880), and elsewhere, Solov'ev stipulates that human beings combine in themselves three principles: the absolute or divine principle, the material principle, and (between them) the distinctively human principle, which is rational autonomy or the capacity for self-determination.¹⁸⁶ He derived the middle, human principle of autonomy almost entirely from Kant.¹⁸⁷ (Earlier Chicherin had specified that human beings are both rational and sensible, that they combine in themselves infinite and finite principles, and that freedom consists in our capacity to choose between the two principles.)¹⁸⁸ Godmanhood is the free human realization of the divine idea in ourselves and in the world. Solov'ev always maintained that it cannot be achieved without human autonomy: “The divine content must be appropriated by a human being *from within himself*, consciously and freely.”¹⁸⁹ Otherwise human dignity would be deprived of its basis. Salvation apart from human free will would violate human dignity, or at any rate be accomplished past it.

For Solov'ev Godmanhood was necessarily a social and cultural project, since human perfectibility, the ever fuller realization and development of human potential, was inconceivable apart from society and history. He called his social ideal “free theocracy”—“free” precisely because it purported to respect human autonomy, not only in the form of freedom of conscience but also as the rule of law.¹⁹⁰ In the 1880s he devoted himself to practical aspects of his project, working for the reunification of the Christian churches and for religious freedom in the Russian Empire. In the second half of the decade, following his break with Slavophilism, Solov'ev started to collaborate with the editors of the liberal “thick journal” *Vestnik Evropy*, which consistently defended freedom of conscience.¹⁹¹ Beginning in 1888, the journal ran a series of his articles defending the empire's ethnic and religious minorities against nationalism and Russification. These articles, among others, were published in two volumes as *The National Question in Russia*.¹⁹²

In the last decade of his life Solov'ev returned to his earlier philosophical work. His magnum opus, *Justification of the Good*, appeared in 1897.¹⁹³ In it Solov'ev insists that the Kingdom of God is a human project. “Universal history is the realization of this possibility for everyone,” he writes. “This perfection attained by ourselves, this full, conscious, and free union with the Divine, is precisely what God ultimately wants—the unconditional good.”¹⁹⁴ It is clear that freedom of conscience must be an intrinsic element of this unconditional good, since the process of perfectibility depends on the subject of progress freely choosing the good and realizing it in him or herself.

Therefore Solov'ev is adamant that the inner or spiritual world of man be free from the coercive power of state and society. What he calls spiritual goods cannot be compulsory but must be freely accepted. Ultimately there are two such spiritual goods, virtue and truth:

All compulsory external action in this sphere is, in the first place, *a fraud*. The end of *externally* compelling or forcing a man to have an inner, i.e. an *inwardly* determined, disposition for the good, or an inner receptivity for the true, cannot possibly be achieved, and is indeed a logical contradiction or absurdity; and to use compulsion to no purpose is obviously an evil. Hence, all compulsory measures with regard to spiritual things in the supposed interests of truth and virtue are nothing other than the use of evil means for a false purpose—an abuse in the fullest sense.

Indeed Solov'ev calls society's or the state's intrusion into one's spiritual life, "with the false purpose of safeguarding the inner goods," a type of violence that is wholly false and evil, "and may therefore justly be called *diabolical*." It would be hard to find a stronger condemnation of the violation of freedom of conscience.¹⁹⁵

By the turn of the century Chicherin, Solov'ev, and other Psychological Society philosophers such as Sergei Trubetskoi (1862–1905) had elaborated a rich neo-idealist conception of human nature. They held that human beings are conscious of the absolute (or the infinite or divine) through their ideals (e.g., the good, truth, and beauty) or through more immediate religious experience. They understood freedom of conscience as the capacity for self-determination according to human consciousness of the absolute, which consciousness, in order to have the power of self-determination, must itself be freely formed. In *Philosophy of Right* Chicherin wrote that consciousness of the absolute is the source of the "supreme dignity of the human being" and that this idea is captured in the biblical verse that we are created in the image and likeness of God.¹⁹⁶ Solov'ev put it more precisely in *Justification of the Good*. He wrote that our consciousness of absolute or divine perfection is the *image* of God in us, while our *likeness* to God is our capacity for self-determination or perfectibility according to the image.¹⁹⁷ This "double infinity" of the image and likeness belongs to every person. "It is in this that the absolute significance, dignity, and worth of human personhood consist, and this is the basis of its inalienable rights."¹⁹⁸

The neo-idealist defense of personhood and freedom of conscience made quite an impression on Struve, at just the time he was organizing the Russian liberation movement that would culminate in the 1905 revolution. In 1901, in the Psychological Society's journal, he published (pseudony-

mously) a famous essay, “What Is True Nationalism?”¹⁹⁹ He dedicated it to Solov’ev, presumably to associate his own conception of “true nationalism” with Solov’ev’s ideas in *The National Question in Russia*. In his essay Struve lays out his theory of liberalism, which he conceives as the defense of personhood and human rights. He extols the Kantian principle of individual self-determination, stating that it ought to be the moral foundation of any just social or political order.²⁰⁰ True liberalism demands “recognition of the inalienable rights of the person,” which rights cannot be trumped by any higher national or state values. Thus it is “also the only form of true nationalism.”²⁰¹ Struve traces the historical origins of liberalism to the post-Reformation growth of religious toleration. He points in particular to the English Independents and to Roger Williams, who for the first time established a government—in Providence, Rhode Island (1636)—on the principle of unlimited religious liberty. He calls Williams the first apostle of the idea of inalienable rights, beginning with freedom of conscience—the “first word of liberalism.”²⁰²

Struve arrived at his neo-idealist theory of liberalism not only by learning from the Psychological Society’s senior philosophers but also through personal experience. He was the first of the four “legal Marxists” to convert to idealism. Bulgakov, Nikolai Berdiaev, and Semen Frank followed, sooner or later. Their journey “from Marxism to idealism,” as Bulgakov put it in the title of his 1903 collection of articles, was one of the more dramatic developments in the Russian religious renaissance.²⁰³ All four thinkers contributed to *Problems of Idealism*, which publicly marked their conversion (although Frank still stood aside from the metaphysical idealism of the others).²⁰⁴ Their turn toward idealism took place through moral experience, by which they recognized the authenticity of ideals and the freedom to act on them. The philosophical formulation of such experience was called “ethical idealism,” which was the common ground of *Problems of Idealism*. On that ground Russian neo-idealists typically drew the metaphysical, theistic conclusion that our ideals are a form of human consciousness of the absolute. There was a fairly direct path from ethical to metaphysical idealism.

The spiritual trajectory of the four former Marxists was an experiential one. The moral experience that took them from positivism to idealism deepened into religious experience, whereby their metaphysical idealism took the form of Christian faith. According to Nicolas Zernov, “Their primary similarity lay in the intensity and vitality of their faith; they all passed through genuine conversion, which gave them an overwhelming sense of the living God who acts in history and hears and speaks to individuals as well as to the whole body of mankind.” He adds an important remark: “They firmly

defended the dignity and significance of the individual, and the importance of social justice, so often disregarded by conventional Christians.”²⁰⁵ By this Zernov suggests that, at least for them, conversion was an experience that carried with it liberal convictions. Bulgakov was the most explicit about his religious experiences, which he movingly described in his *Autobiographical Notes*. The experience which brought him back to the Orthodox Church itself took place in 1908 at the Zosimova Hermitage, through the intercession of its abbot German (Gomzin).²⁰⁶

Their experiential path to religious idealism made the former Marxists resolute defenders of freedom of conscience in the Russian liberation movement. In 1902–1903 Bulgakov and Berdiaev contributed a series of short articles on religious freedom to Struve’s famous émigré newspaper, *Osvobozhdenie* (Liberation). In his articles Bulgakov deplored the multifarious disastrous consequences of the autocracy’s subjugation of the Russian Orthodox Church. He called on the Church to fight for freedom of conscience—which, as he made clear, necessarily meant fighting for political freedom against the autocracy. Berdiaev emphasized the connection among freedom of conscience, human personhood, and liberalism as the defense of natural rights.²⁰⁷

Struve founded the liberation movement on his neo-idealist conception of liberal principles, freedom of conscience first among them, and some historians (such as John Basil and Patrick Michelson) have seen the demand for religious liberty as indeed central to the whole movement.²⁰⁸ According to Basil, “the desire for religious freedom in the empire had . . . accomplished what seemed beyond the capacity of all other public issues,” by uniting “for one purpose all but a handful of Russians.”²⁰⁹ The liberation movement culminated in the 1905 revolution, which began on 9 January, henceforth known as “Bloody Sunday,” when troops massacred a massive but peaceful procession of workers led by a Russian Orthodox priest, Father Georgii Gapon.²¹⁰ Among the people’s demands was religious freedom, the point being given special emphasis: “*Separation of the church from the state.*”²¹¹ One member of Fr. Gapon’s Assembly of Russian Mill and Factory Workers gave a speech that morning in which he reportedly said: “Our Church has been enslaved by the government. The Church needs to be free, so that each can pray according to his or her own conscience.”²¹² Religious freedom was clearly an integral part of the assembly’s commitment to social justice, which reflected the broader Russian Orthodox pastoral movement from which it came. Thus the liberation movement and ensuing revolution drew not only on the “moral-idealist” type of religious experience among intellectuals in the Russian religious renaissance but also on more popular

types of religious experience in the pastoral movement and elsewhere in the long Russian religious revival.

THE FAILURE OF REFORM

The demand for religious freedom in Russia seemed to be achieved when Nicholas II issued the Manifesto of 17 October 1905. However, as historians have shown, the October Manifesto granted freedom of conscience as a promise that was to be implemented through future legislation—legislation that was in fact never enacted. Strikingly, the empire's new Fundamental Laws, enacted on 23 April 1906, made no reference to "freedom of conscience."²¹³

Ultimately, recognition of freedom of conscience as a right depended on the fate of church reform (and thus on the autocracy), since such recognition was scarcely feasible until the Russian Orthodox Church was free of state control.²¹⁴ Church reform gathered momentum with the onset of the 1905 revolution. The immediate catalyst for reform was an imperial decree on 12 December 1904, which reaffirmed the autocracy's commitment to the principle of "religious toleration" and instructed the government to initiate a comprehensive review of existing legislation pertaining to the toleration of non-Orthodox groups.²¹⁵ The review was undertaken by the Committee of Ministers and its chairman, Sergei Witte, from January to March 1905. Its purview immediately came to include the Orthodox Church, since expanded freedom for other confessions would disadvantage the Church relative to them, assuming it remained under state control. Accordingly, Metropolitan Antonii (Vadkovskii) participated in the committee's deliberations. Since 1903 he had served as a consulting member of the committee. In that role he firmly defended religious toleration, arguing, for example, that laws against mixed marriages "violated every principle of respect for individual conscience," as Cunningham characterizes his position.²¹⁶ In February 1905 Antonii submitted a memorandum to the committee in which he posed a series of seven fundamental questions about church-state relations in Russia. In the second of them he asked "whether now is not the proper time to abolish (or at least moderate) the constant tutelage and all too vigilant control exercised by secular authorities over the life of the Church and its administrative activities, which deprives the Church of its independence and initiative, and which also, by limiting the Church's sphere of authority almost wholly to worship and the performance of rites, virtually silences its voice in both private and public life?"²¹⁷

Witte consulted also with Bishop Sergei (Stragorodskii), rector of the St. Petersburg Theological Academy, and with several theology professors

and canon lawyers from St. Petersburg and Moscow. Their combined efforts resulted in his memorandum, “On the Present Situation of the Orthodox Church.”²¹⁸ It was a searing indictment of the Petrine Synodal system and called for its abolition, for the restoration of church autonomy and canonical order, *sobornost’* in church life, and the convening of a Russian church council (*sobor*). There was broad consensus on these goals among advocates of church reform, whether liberal or conservative. The goals did not necessarily imply freedom of conscience (certainly they did not for episcopal and theological conservatives), but they were made more urgent by the imperial decree of 17 April 1905, “On the Strengthening of the Principles of Religious Toleration,” which was the result of the Committee of Ministers’ work to implement the December 1904 decree.²¹⁹ For the first time, it legalized transfer from Orthodoxy to other Christian confessions.

Meanwhile, on 13 March, discussion of church reform was moved at Pobedonostsev’s behest from the Committee of Ministers to the Holy Synod, where the chief procurator hoped to exercise more control over it. Instead, the Holy Synod promptly requested that the emperor authorize a church council. Nicholas II deferred it to a more suitable time but approved the idea in principle. Public discussion of church reform had begun in earnest following the publication on 17 March in *Tserkovnyi vestnik*, the Church’s newspaper, of a liberal manifesto by the “Group of Thirty-Two St. Petersburg Priests.” The manifesto was addressed to Metropolitan Antonii, who approved its publication after presenting it to the Holy Synod. The priests declared that all true members of the Russian Orthodox Church could not but joyously welcome “the forthcoming liberation of religious conscience” for the non-Orthodox peoples of the empire and for Old Believers, but they warned that the Church also had to be liberated from state control if it were to fulfill its proper mission of providing religious and moral leadership to Russian society and of building the Kingdom of God. This mission, they said, required the reestablishment of canonical order and freedom, realized through convening a Russian church council.²²⁰

The Group of Thirty-Two St. Petersburg Priests represented the position of “clerical liberalism” on church reform. Clerical liberalism, which had developed together with the pastoral movement, understood church reform within the context of its commitment to social justice. Father Grigorii Petrov was a prominent member of the group. Their outlook was shaped by common experience in the St. Petersburg Theological Academy, the ORRP, and (to an extent) the St. Petersburg Religious-Philosophical Assemblies.

Following the October Manifesto, the group expanded to become the Union of Church Renovation—the “renovationists” (*obnovlentsy*). Accord-

ing to Hedda, the union had 102 active members, 52 from the clergy. About one in seven priests in St. Petersburg joined, among them some of the capital's most prominent pastors. In addition, there were at least forty-three laymen, including the neo-idealists Bulgakov, Berdiaev, and Evgenii Trubetskoi.²²¹ The renovationists remained committed to the (Solov'evian) ideal of Christian politics. In general, they recognized that church reform was highly unlikely without the liberal transformation of the regime, which recognition allied them with the political opposition to autocracy—the Kadets and parties further to the left.²²² The restoration of tsarist power in the aftermath of the revolution led to the closing of the Union of Church Renovation in 1907.²²³

Clerical liberals were not the only advocates of church reform. Episcopal conservatives were also firm supporters.²²⁴ In the summer of 1905 the Holy Synod conducted a survey of the views of diocesan bishops on a wide range of questions pertaining to a prospective church council. The bishops expressed their views at length.²²⁵ They were virtually unanimous in condemning the Synodal system as uncanonical and in demanding church autonomy, restoration of the patriarchate, and other basic reforms. However, their motivations in supporting church reform were very different from those of the clerical liberals. Few of them supported freedom of conscience; indeed that may be a good criterion for defining “episcopal conservative.” For example, Archbishop Antonii (Khrapovitskii), a fierce critic of the Synodal system and a staunch advocate of restoring the patriarchate, dismissed “freedom of conscience” as an “absurd expression.”²²⁶ For the hierarchy, autonomy was not a path to freedom of conscience; rather it was a way to keep the state from imposing even toleration on the Church (as in the matter of mixed marriages).²²⁷

In 1906 Nicholas II permitted the establishment of a pre-council commission (*predsobornoe prisutstvie*), which met for several months to prepare for the anticipated church council. In 1912 a similar commission (*predsobornoe soveshchanie*) was held. But the emperor never convened a council, for two basic reasons. First, the council's very purpose was to establish an autonomous church under a restored patriarchate, which by its very nature could challenge the power of autocracy. Second, Nicholas II saw the Russian Orthodox Church as a vital source of legitimacy for the monarchy; it was integral to his “scenario of power.”²²⁸ It seems likely that he feared that an autonomous church, separate from his imperial person, might not serve that legitimizing function. Similar reasons explain why the regime did not enact freedom of conscience into law. First, recognition of freedom of conscience as a right was incompatible with autocracy as unlimited state power. In Oc-

tober 1905 Nicholas apparently granted that right, but he did so to quell the revolutionary threat; he reneged once the regime was able to reconsolidate power. Second, for the emperor, the episcopate, and other conservatives and servitors freedom of conscience “demeaned” their understanding of the Church, an understanding that was essential to their identity, prestige, and power.²²⁹ There were, of course, other understandings of Russian Orthodoxy that emphasized spiritual values directly opposed to autocracy. In using Orthodoxy to bolster its legitimacy, the regime inadvertently risked invoking those values and thus undermining itself.²³⁰

The Russian religious revival, culminating in the religious-philosophical renaissance, is a history of rich and diverse religious experience. Through that experience believers became highly conscious of their freedom and dignity as persons. By the twentieth century many of them were demanding that their inner freedom and dignity be externally recognized and guaranteed through freedom of conscience and other basic rights. Of course, not everyone drew liberal conclusions from their religious experience. Russian neo-idealists sought to convince them that they should. Philosophers like Bulgakov believed that the depths of human dignity and personhood (freedom of conscience in its inner meaning as ideal self-determination) were most transparent to the type of moral-religious consciousness formed from faithful experience. Therefore they concluded that the faithful should be the first to recognize and defend freedom of conscience as everyone’s right. The number of people who recognized this right and were willing to defend it is an important measure of the strength of civil society. Historians have long debated the strength of Russian civil society, but in the first years of the twentieth century it was strong enough to bring about the 1905 revolution. Russia’s long religious revival had provided the experiential basis and then the philosophical articulation of freedom of conscience. But that right was inimical to the autocracy, which continued to resist it.

2. RELIGIOUS TOLERATION IN RUSSIAN THOUGHT, 1520–1825

G. M. HAMBURG

In his landmark essay *On Liberty* (1859) John Stuart Mill described religious freedom as the foundation of liberty of thought, opinion, and sentiment and as “practically inseparable” from freedom of speech and freedom of the press. He asserted, “No society in which these liberties are not, on the whole, respected is free, whatever may be its form of government.”¹ Like so many other nineteenth-century thinkers, Mill regarded religious freedom as the virtually exclusive product of Western civilization, even though he had the honesty to admit that intolerance “is so natural to mankind . . . that religious freedom has hardly anywhere been practically realized, except where religious indifference, which dislikes to have its peace disturbed by theological quarrels, has added its weight to the scale. In the minds of almost all religious persons, even in the most tolerant countries, the duty of toleration is admitted with tacit reserves.”²

Mill’s position on the foundational importance of religious toleration to the wider practice of civil liberties deserves careful consideration, as does his caveat about the “tacit reserves” often attached to toleration. But Mill’s assumption that religious toleration should be associated primarily with Western societies is almost certainly a major historical blunder. As Amartya Sen has contended in *The Argumentative Indian*, religious toleration in South Asia has roots in the third century BCE and took modern form in the sixteenth century under Emperor Akbar.³ Thus the South Asian record of tolerating, even celebrating, religious and intellectual diversity rivals or exceeds that of the West. Moreover, no historian can be insensible to the fact that in twentieth-century Europe, the supposed “home” of religious toleration, powerful political regimes committed themselves to the destruction of religious pluralism. Clearly, given the stakes for human liberty posed by religious toleration and the elementary misunderstandings surrounding the history of the phenomenon, it is urgent for scholars to analyze the development of toleration in Europe and elsewhere.

This chapter analyzes Russian thinking about religious toleration from the first quarter of the sixteenth century to 1825. The chapter offers a brief survey of the historiography on religious toleration in early modern Europe; a short analysis of Russian terms connoting toleration; a multipart analysis of tolerationist thinking from the early sixteenth century to 1825; and an

examination of the patterns of Russian tolerationist thinking with special reference to the European Enlightenment. The chief goal of the chapter is to juxtapose Russian toleration, in theory and practice, with the early modern and modern record in Western Europe: in this context, the impact of the European Enlightenment on Russian toleration will receive special attention. Since this chapter is a speculative piece designed to provoke informed discussion and further research, the reader should not expect monographic depth or strict proportionality in the treatment of subjects under scrutiny.

At the outset the reader should note that, in both Western Europe and Russia, the concept of religious toleration applied chiefly to groups rather than to individuals. It usually connoted freedom of religious practice for a religious minority or set of minorities but not necessarily for all minorities in a polity. Toleration did not generally entail freedom of preaching to members of other denominations, particularly to members of the established church, nor did it generally imply freedom of the press for the tolerated group. By definition, freedom of conscience denoted an individual right of religious belief and practice: it was therefore a more sweeping right than anything connected with toleration.

In historical literature religious toleration has sometimes been associated with the phenomenon of secularism, itself a multivalent concept. In certain contexts the adjective *secular* has been used by historians to distinguish any political measures not directly bearing on religion: the trouble with this usage, especially for pre-Petrine Russia, is that the Russian worldview was thoroughly religious, so for a Muscovite to imagine an act of state devoid of religious significance was difficult. Sometimes it has been said that Peter the Great secularized Russia, this description usually meaning that Peter bureaucratically subordinated the Church to the state or that he confiscated monastic lands, thereby breaking the economic power of the Church. Such usages have their appropriate contexts, but they should not be read more broadly as implying that Peter created a polity free of religious influence or that the Petrine elite itself was irreligious. These broader claims are deeply problematic—indeed, falsifiable. The term *secularism* has sometimes been employed to connote an irreligious ideological movement or a commitment to the proposition that reason refutes and crowds out religious belief. However, as Charles Taylor has argued in his magisterial book, *A Secular Age*, it probably makes more sense to think of toleration and modern secularism as connected elements in a centuries-long historical process whereby human beings “moved from a society in which it was virtually impossible not to believe in God, to one in which faith, even for the staunchest believer, is one human possibility among many.” This kind of society, rather than its early

modern predecessors, can truly be called secular.⁴ This chapter, therefore, is not about the making of Russian secularity in Taylor's sense, nor is it about the emergence of a secularist sensibility. Rather it is about the emergence of tolerationist thought in a religiously divided part of Eastern Europe.

TOLERATION AND THE WESTERN ENLIGHTENMENT

Although in Western Europe the term "toleration" has had a long history, many modern historians of Europe have connected the concept with the Enlightenment.⁵ A vigorous assertion of the case for linking toleration with the Enlightenment and, in turn, with the making of modern secularism can be found in Jonathan Israel's synthesis, *Enlightenment Contested*.⁶ There Israel has pointed to the influence of three tolerationist doctrines: Baruch de Spinoza's defense of freedom of conscience in *Theological-Philosophical Treatise* (1670) and *Political Treatise* (1677); Pierre Bayle's fideistic notion of toleration in *Diverse Thoughts* (1683) and *Philosophical Commentary* (1686); and John Locke's cautious defense of freedom of worship in his three letters concerning toleration (1689–1692).⁷ Israel claims that in the short term Locke's "defective" and moderate theory of toleration had great appeal in those countries where the goal of thinkers was to prod monarchs toward incremental limitations of church authority; however, in the long term Spinoza's more radical theory, grounded in freedom of thought, "cleared a greater space for liberty and human rights than Locke and . . . cuts a historically more direct and, arguably, more important path toward modern Western individualism."⁸

Israel's synthesis is useful as a taxonomy of the early Enlightenment, but it understates the philosophes' own awareness of their debt to earlier thinkers. For example, Voltaire, writing in *Treatise on Tolerance* (1763), insisted that toleration had been the established practice of all ancient peoples. Of the Romans, whom he called "our legislators," he observed, "The Romans did not recognize all [religious] cults, nor did they grant them all public sanction; but they permitted all of them to exist."⁹ Edward Gibbon made a similar point in the first volume of *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (1776), where he contrasted early Roman imperial toleration with Christian "fanaticism."¹⁰ To make explicit the link between classical and Enlightenment toleration (while avoiding any positive reference to the Middle Ages), Peter Gay, in his own synthesis of the Enlightenment, referred to it as "the rise of modern paganism."¹¹

Indeed, *pace* Israel, the term *tolerantia* was used not only in classical Rome but also in medieval scholastic dialogues and in medieval defenses of prudential religious concord.¹² The word and concept therefore had a

continuous life for more than a millennium of West European history—a fact that should alert historians of Russian toleration to the possibility that Russian thinking about toleration might have roots elsewhere than in the Western Enlightenment.

A different order of criticism to the proposition that modern notions of toleration originated with the Enlightenment has come from social historians, who have argued that actual toleration in Europe emerged not from Enlightenment doctrines but from the determination of religious communities to bridge their differences in daily life. In Iberia from the seventh to the late fifteenth centuries Muslim–Christian *convivencia* thus had nothing to do with enlightened sensibilities and much to do with a mutual desire for harmony and prosperity in a common place of residence.¹³ Studies of the Dutch republic, the fabled “home of toleration” in early modern Europe, have shown that toleration was the result of arrangements made by numerous confessional groups to demarcate their own territories while granting to other confessions the right to worship—all in the interests of civil order.¹⁴ The most thoroughgoing case for understanding religious toleration not as intellectual process but as social practice can be found in Benjamin Kaplan’s *Divided by Faith*.¹⁵ There Kaplan sagely observed that in the early modern era toleration “was a pragmatic move, a grudging acceptance of unpleasant realities, not a positive virtue.” In his view, tolerance and intolerance “were not, in the ordinary sense, opposites” but were “dialectically and symbolically linked.”¹⁶ Kaplan also pointed out that toleration *among Christians* developed in inverse relationship to confessionalism: that is, toleration fell as confessionalism rose and rose again as confessionalism declined.¹⁷ The literature on the social history of toleration in Europe should alert historians of Russia to the possibilities that tolerationist ideas might appear not at moments of religious peace but at moments of social peril, and that tolerance as a practice might not be sustained in times of intense confessional self-assertion.

A final point to emerge in the historiography about toleration in Western Europe is the importance of state policy in shaping the scope of toleration. For example, although most Reformation-era states embraced one side or another in the religious disputes between Rome and Protestants, there was a strong irenic current at the late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century Austrian court, which for a time created in Habsburg lands a tolerationist alternative to religious strife.¹⁸ When the atmosphere changed in Vienna, the prospects for toleration quickly collapsed. Conversely, in the late eighteenth century toleration was reinstated in the Habsburg lands by Emperor Joseph II.¹⁹ The French crown also vacillated in its attitude toward

Protestants: the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 has even been seen as the event that gave rise to the French Enlightenment, because the decree aligned the French state with the established church and with its “superstitious” outlook in a fashion that many philosophes found objectionable.²⁰ Although state policy in Austria and France reflected changes in public mood and responded to social pressures from below, the state was also to some degree an independent agent. By the eighteenth century policies of toleration strongly appealed to those rulers who wished to advertise their polities as *bien policé*.

TOLERATION IN THE RUSSIAN LEXICON

The word *tolerantnost'*—the Russian cognate to the Latin *tolerantia*—has never been widely used in the literary language, perhaps because of its foreign sound to the Russian ear.²¹ The term most closely equivalent in meaning to West European cognates of *tolerantia* is *veroterpimost'*—a compound of *vera* (faith) and *terpimost'* (the abstract noun meaning “patience” or “tolerance” derived from the verb *terpet'*, whose basic meaning is “to endure”).²² According to the Academy of Sciences' dictionary of contemporary Russian, the word *veroterpimost'* entered the Russian language in the late eighteenth or early nineteenth century.²³ However, the verbal root *terpet'* derives from the Old Russian verb *t'rpēt'*, first attested in the *Sbornik* (Compendium) of 1076. Its abstract nominal form *t'rpenie* (basic meaning: “patience,” “endurance,” “forbearance”) was used in the fifteenth century to translate the Latin *tolerantia*.²⁴ By the fifteenth century a rough linguistic equivalent of the Latin *tolerantia* had thus appeared in Russia, and by the late eighteenth or early nineteenth century the word *veroterpimost'* had become an established term in Russian literary discourse. As shown below, the concept of religious toleration of “foreign” confessions was understood and discussed by Russian thinkers from the sixteenth century on.

Historically, the terms *terpimost'* and *veroterpimost'* have connoted toleration of heterodox groups—that is, members of the non-Orthodox confessions (*inovertsy*) and members of Orthodox “sects” such as the Old Believers. The terms have also usually connoted the celebration of religious rites without state interference but not necessarily freedom of conscience. Thus the dictionary compiled by Vladimir Dal' defined *veroterpimost'* as “freedom for the heterodox [*inovertsy*] to confess their faith.” His definition of the related construct *veroterpimoe gosudarstvo* (tolerant state) was “a state or government not restricting the heterodox in the conduct of their religious rites” (*ne stesniaiushchee inovertsev v otpravlenii obriadov*).²⁵ These definitions mirrored political circumstances in late imperial Russia, where Or-

thodox subjects enjoyed the legal privileges of belonging to an established church but where their heterodox counterparts could generally conduct their religious rites without interference. Dal' was careful not to mention in his definition either freedom of preaching or freedom of conscience, neither of which was fully protected under Russian law; indeed, for *inovertsy* freedom of preaching was positively prohibited. Very occasionally, however, *terpimost'* and *veroterpimost'* have been applied both to groups and individuals, with the broader implication that toleration entails freedom of conscience.²⁶

TOLERATION AND TOLERANTISM IN MUSCOVY

In a famous passage at the end of volume 10 of his *History of the Russian State* Nikolai Karamzin argued that religious toleration (*terpimost'*) had been characteristic of Russians “from the time of Oleg’s children to the time of Fedor’s children.” He maintained that this toleration could not unconditionally be ascribed to enlightenment, “of which we had none”; nor to a true knowledge of faith, for the theologians quarreled about that; nor to the natural reason of the ancient princes. Whatever the source of toleration, Karamzin declared it “an advantage for Russia that had facilitated our conquests and our successes in domestic politics, for it required us to entice the non-Orthodox [*inovertsy*] to join us and to assist our great cause.”²⁷ The immediate context for these remarks was the state-encouraged *convivencia* between the Orthodox and Muslims in Kazan and Astrakhan after the conquest of those territories and the agreement of Ivan IV to permit Westerners in the city of Moscow to practice their faith, albeit without the construction of “foreign” churches. In 1582, in discussion with the Jesuit Antonio Possevino, Ivan asserted: “Every man praises his own faith, and no one loves to be contradicted. Argument leads to quarreling, but I desire tranquillity and love.”²⁸ He went on, “Catholics are free in Russia to observe their own faith, without reproach or disgrace.”²⁹ Karamzin was also mindful of Boris Godunov’s policy that “every faith is tolerated” in Russia, but that neither Catholics nor Lutherans nor any other non-Orthodox confessional community should be permitted to build churches there.³⁰ Boris broadened Russia’s connection with foreign confessions by sending eighteen young boyars to study in Europe, by taking preliminary steps toward the establishment of a university in Moscow, by meeting routinely with foreign doctors, and by inviting them to pray for him in their sacred services.³¹

Toleration in Muscovy in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries was the practical toleration necessitated by the conquest of Muslim territories and by the imperatives of diplomatic relations with Western powers—

that is, it was linked neither to European-style confessional struggles nor to the organic emergence from below of socially sanctioned toleration but was rather the result of conscious political calculation. As we would expect, practical toleration in Muscovy was circumstantial, varied according to the needs of the crown, and was limited in scope and subject to sudden reversal. In the sixteenth century the spirit of toleration did not extend to those Orthodox people suspected of heresy, as the trials of Maksim Grek (1525, 1531) and Matvei Bashkin (1553) illustrated. In the seventeenth century Orthodox toleration for the heterodox suddenly evaporated when the First False Dmitrii and his Polish allies provocatively insisted on permitting celebration of the Catholic mass in Kremlin churches. In the mid- and late seventeenth century, official toleration protected foreigners in the German settlement of Moscow, and Muslims in the Kazan and Astrakhan regions, but neither Muslims on the militarily active southern periphery nor sectarian Old Believers suspected of conspiracy against the Nikonian Church.³² Karamzin had hinted that toleration in Muscovy was a “political virtue,” and if this description is accurate, it was a virtue honored as often in the breach as in the observance.³³

Perhaps because the issue of religious toleration was so politically sensitive, few sixteenth-century writers addressed the issue at all. The early parameters of what discussion there was were indicated by the polemic between Maksim Grek and Nikolai Nemchin (also called Nikolai Bulev) over the Orthodox attitude toward the Latin Church.³⁴ Maksim defended Orthodox teaching on the Trinity against Nemchin’s “Latin” argument that the Eastern and Latin faiths were “one and the same” in so far as both faiths saw Christ as God’s son and as truly God, both recognized the same baptism, and both were inherited from the apostles and church fathers. In this polemic Maksim accused Nemchin of grave theological errors. Maksim asserted that “disunion [of the two faiths] is better than a union apart from God.”³⁵ For his part, Nemchin advocated an ecumenical solution to the church schism that would have bridged differences over ritual by pointing to commonly held dogmas, rather than differences over Trinitarian theology. It may be that Nemchin wrote under the inspiration of Nicolas of Cusa’s *On the Peace of Faith* (1453), which explored the main dogmatic agreements between Eastern and Western Christianity.³⁶

Yet in another context Maksim himself pleaded for a certain measure of understanding between the Latin and Orthodox faiths, as he demonstrated in his “Terrible and Portentous Tale” about the virtues of Western monasticism.³⁷ The centerpiece of Maksim’s story was an account of the martyrdom of the Italian moralist Girolamo Savonarola at the hands of Roman church

authorities. Maksim credited Savonarola with “steadfast and salutary teaching”: Savonarola’s sermons, beloved by many Florentines, led “each of them to desist from long-established evil habits and deception, and, in the place of gluttony, greed, and fleshly impurity, to adhere to wisdom and purity.”³⁸ According to Maksim, official accusations of heresy filled the Florentine preacher “with still greater godly fervor,” and he called the Roman church council’s decision against Savonarola “unrighteous and unpleasing to God.”³⁹ Maksim told his readers, “I do not write this to show that the Latin faith is pure, perfect and in all respects correct—may such insanity never affect me!—but to demonstrate to the Orthodox that even the incorrectly reasoning Latins manifest care and zeal in their faith in Christ.”⁴⁰

Maksim’s tale pointed toward the possibility not of ecclesiastical union but of a wary *détente* between Latins and Orthodox. Without surrendering their theological beliefs, he thought, the Orthodox could profit from pondering aspects of Latin practice. Maksim also hinted that the Orthodox should learn a negative lesson from the Savonarola affair—not to resort to accusations of heresy against critics of the Church’s worldliness and corruption. Maksim’s position cannot be understood without reference to his own circumstances: he was a foreign-born monk who for a time had adhered to the Latin faith and was therefore suspected by the Russian monastic elite of spiritual impurity; he was also a powerful critic of Orthodox monastic practice in Russia and of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Both his plea for co-existence between the churches and his Orthodox rigorism reflected these circumstances.

According to Aleksandr Sergeevich Lappo-Danilevskii, the first sweeping defenses of religious toleration in the Russian language surfaced not in Muscovy but in the Polish-Lithuanian state in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. One very assertive Orthodox advocate of toleration was Chrystophor Philaleth [also known as Christopher Philalethes], whose tract *Apokrisis* (1597) appeared after the Brest Convocation.⁴¹ Philaleth argued that violence done in religion’s name is a “violation of the law of God and of natural law.” He claimed that the unity of the Polish-Lithuanian state depended on a legal contract, the declaration of the 1569 Lublin Diet that spelled out the “fundamental rights” of the nobility and of citizens. He saw any infringement of these political rights as a threat to the unity of the realm. He took the violation of the freedom of religious practice to be the most harmful of all rights violations: “In general, the worst form of coercion is coercion over faith; and its results are the most destructive. Nor can this species of coercion achieve the desired results, for it is pointless to use coercion against a free people: and even if other forms of coercion can succeed,

how can it be effective in matters of religion, which is a subject of the heart and the mind?⁴²

In 1633 an anonymous treatise discussed the papacy's influence on religious rights in Lithuania. The author, who identified himself as "a Russian," argued that the Polish crown should be independent of Rome in political matters, and that this independence should extend to the right to protect Orthodox subjects from papal religious coercion. Indeed, the treatise claimed that maintaining the integrity of the Polish state required protection of the Orthodox.⁴³

These defenses of religious toleration by Russian Orthodox thinkers outside Muscovy were prompted by the contest for religious mastery in Lithuania, a contest in which the Orthodox could best secure protection by appealing to Polish statutory law, to customary religious freedoms, or to an abstractly desirable division between the powers of the Church and the state. Most of these arguments made in seventeenth-century Lithuania by representatives of the Russian Orthodox minority were not applicable to Muscovy, where Orthodoxy was the established religion and where members of other confessions found themselves petitioning the crown for protection of their rituals. However, it is worth noting that Philaleth's plea for toleration rested in part on natural law and on the principled conviction that religious coercion can never be effective since faith is "a subject of the heart and the mind." This argument for toleration was not historically contingent, and since it was framed in terms of human nature, it *would* have applied in Muscovy as well as in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Yet at this juncture the natural law tradition of thinking about religious rights was little developed in Muscovy. Exploring just how Philaleth's ideas were regarded by Muscovite church circles is a question that merits future investigation.

In Muscovy the mid- and late seventeenth-century religious climate was marked by the schism between Nikonians and Old Believers. In 1666 monks at the Solovetskii Monastery resisted the imposition of the Nikonian reforms, deposed their abbot, and in 1667 declared themselves willing to die rather than to accept the "new rituals." In 1682 the regent Sophia ordered the arrest of a leading opponent of the church reforms, Nikita Pustosviat, and decreed his beheading. In 1684 she commanded government agents to hunt down all opponents of the new rituals.⁴⁴ Meanwhile, many Old Believers accepted martyrdom rather than live in the world of the Antichrist. In 1688 as many as fifteen hundred Old Believers died in the raid on the Paleostrovskii Monastery in the White Sea region.⁴⁵ As Nikolai Pokrovskii has shown, among Old Believers apocalyptic thinking persisted through the eighteenth into the nineteenth century, alongside the conviction that

the state Church had committed apostasy in implementing the liturgical reforms.⁴⁶

The antagonism between the Nikonian Church and the Old Believers left little room for a spirit of toleration between them, yet even so there were some possibilities for a tentative accord. In 1655 the Greek Patriarch Paisii had advised Nikon that a schism in Muscovy could be averted if Moscow's ecclesiastical authorities would only avoid classifying their critics as schismatics. "If one Church happens to differ from another in a few unimportant and inessential rites," Paisii had written, "that does not indicate any division [between them] so long as the faith has been immutably preserved."⁴⁷ In the event, this observation did not prevent Nikon from carrying through the liturgical reforms or from demanding their adoption by all Orthodox communities. However, the distinguished church historian Nikolai Kapterev has argued that Paisii's letter "should have restrained Nikon from a too swift, categorical, and relatively minor change in church ritual that, at the same time, was dangerous to church unity." Kapterev speculated that if Nikon had been less proud and determined, a peaceful way forward might have been discovered for the two church factions.⁴⁸

That a tolerationist or accommodationist policy on the part of the Nikonians might at one point have elicited a positive reception from the Old Believers is suggested by a passage in Archpriest Avvakum's *Life*, where he exclaimed: "It is amazing that they [the Nikonians] do not want to embrace this wisdom. They want to affirm the faith by fire, the knout, and the hangman's rope! Who among the apostles taught them this?—I don't know. My Christ did not command the apostles to instruct their followers to impose the faith by fire, the knout, and the noose." Avvakum maintained, "Those teachers are openly minions of the Antichrist who preach the faith but subject [others] to punishments and death."⁴⁹ Of course, Avvakum's strictures against religious violence from the state Church did not prevent Avvakum himself in other writings from comparing Nikon to the early Christian theologian Arius (250/256–336 CE), whose Christology was deemed heretical at the First Council of Nicea, nor from demanding that Aleksei Mikhailovich "draw and quarter Nikon, the dog, and then all the Nikonians."⁵⁰

Avvakum's vacillation between conciliatory and unconciliatory impulses was uncommon neither in Muscovy nor in Orthodox church history: in fact, these impulses represented the warring inclusivist and exclusivist tendencies that had marked Christianity from the second century onward. What is interesting from our perspective is that in seventeenth-century Muscovy, at a moment of confessional divergence within Orthodoxy, both rigorist and tolerationist possibilities simultaneously surfaced. This devel-

opment, however paradoxical at first blush, was precisely what should have been expected in view of the West European historical record, in which confessional divergence sometimes sparked efforts to build toleration but also made those efforts unlikely to succeed.

A key figure in laying out the official response to the Old Belief and in thinking through the prospects for religious toleration in the last third of the seventeenth century was Simeon Polotskii.⁵¹ In 1666, acting on instructions of the church council, he wrote an attack on the Old Belief under the title *Scepter of Governance*.⁵² The book combined unyielding hostility to the Old Believers' position with an attempt to persuade them of their folly. Simeon took as his premise the two functions of church leadership: first, guiding the "good sheep" who upheld the virtues of steadfastness, long-suffering, honesty, hope, and piety; and second, correcting the "bad sheep" who refused to submit to Christ's words. Simeon fully supported punishment of errant Christians ("evil and cruelly mistaken sheep") and of their leaders ("the wolves who prey on these sheep") by the rod of correction.⁵³ Simeon did not envision the possibility that the state Church would make concessions to the Old Believers; instead, any movement to bridge the incipient schism would have to come from the Old Believers and their leaders—that is, from the "bad sheep" and "preying wolves" who led them. In effect, Simeon's exhortation was both an invitation to Old Believers to engage the state Church in dialogue and a declaration that any genuine dialogue, short of capitulation, was impossible.

It is difficult to read through Simeon's text to his intentions. He may privately have preferred a dialogue with the Old Believers before the Church wielded the "rod of correction" against them. Yet there are also good reasons to suppose that he believed a solution of the incipient schism to be urgent for reasons of state. His 1673 play *On King Nebuchadnezzar*, inspired by fear of a Turkish invasion, preached popular resistance to "godless" magistrates—a message aimed at mobilizing Russians, especially in the south, to mobilize themselves to fight the "heathen Turks."⁵⁴ Simeon did not relish facing a Muslim invasion at a moment of religious division in Muscovy. Wanting to heal the church schism before the wound had time to fester, he probably did not wish to risk tolerating the Old Belief.

Before the reign of Peter the Great the concept of religious toleration was thus known to the Russian Orthodox, was occasionally discussed by them, and from time to time was made an element of state policy. But the practice of toleration remained fitful. After the schism between the Old Belief and the established church, leaders of the two rival tendencies piously wished for a climate of toleration, but only on terms favoring their own group.

TOLERATION IN PETRINE AND POST-PETRINE POLICY AND THOUGHT

In his *History of the Russian Empire under Peter the Great* (1763), Voltaire depicted early eighteenth-century Russia as a multiconfessional state where relations among religions were largely pacific. He described the five churches for foreigners in eighteenth-century Petersburg as “five temples raised to tolerance and as examples given to other nations.”⁵⁵ He characterized Russia as “the only large Christian state where religion had not provoked civil wars but only minor tumults.”⁵⁶ Voltaire claimed that Peter regarded the various Christian rites—Greek, Latin, Lutheran, Calvinist—with indifference: “He [Peter] let [his subjects] each serve God according to conscience, so long as they served the state well.”⁵⁷ Voltaire’s benign picture of the Russian Empire and of Peter as its “great lawgiver” was presented as an effort to counteract the tendency of competing historians “to traffic insolently in falsehood” concerning Russia’s alleged despotism, but Voltaire’s interpretation of Russia’s religious climate was so simplistic as to verge on deliberate mendacity.⁵⁸

In fact, Peter’s religious policies mixed limited toleration of major Christian denominations with impatience at church rituals and with contempt toward ecclesiastical hierarchy, as his carnivalesque ridicule of the pope and of bishops in the All-Drunken Assembly demonstrated.⁵⁹ Peter was distrustful of the Jesuit order, which he expelled from Russia in 1689 and again in 1718 (after readmitting it in 1701). He politely but firmly rejected the Catholic initiative for church reunification in 1717–1718. Peter’s ban on beards at court (1698) and his tax on beards (1705) aimed to penalize the “superstitious” elements in Orthodoxy but also his presumed opponents among Old Believers. In 1716 Peter imposed a double tax on Old Believers, and in 1718 he issued a decree demanding that Orthodox priests identify Old Believers in their parishes, on pain of defrocking and criminal prosecution. The church reforms of 1721–1722 reinforced these anti-Old Believer policies by instituting the office of inquisitors, whose purpose was to oversee enforcement of church discipline and to impose on Old Believers the requirement to wear identifying clothing. Some historians have described these discriminatory policies as a form of “grudging tolerance” toward the Old Belief, a label that makes sense only if we think of militant persecution as the only alternative.⁶⁰ Alongside these circumscribed elements of “toleration,” Peter showed “no love for Jews or Muslims.” His foreign policy aimed at subduing and converting Russia’s Muslim enemies, and within the empire he strove to destroy “pagan” temples and to convert his “heathen” subjects.⁶¹ As far as Orthodoxy itself was concerned, Peter was a self-styled modernizer, impatient with the Church’s insularity, hostile to its “supersti-

tious” practices, and determined to eliminate the social “parasitism” of contemplative monasticism. Thus the religious climate of Petrine Russia did not resemble the happy pluralism described by Voltaire: instead, it was marked by tension or open struggle between Peter’s band of statist modernizers and religious traditionalists of every sort.

In Russian political thought of the Petrine era, there were very few concessions to the desirability of religious toleration. For example, the choleric Ivan Pososhkov’s three letters to Stefan Iavorskyi between 1703 and 1710 were vitriolic attacks on the Old Believers, whom Pososhkov described as “schismatics corrupting Christ’s body.”⁶² Pososhkov warned Iavorskyi that Russian schismatics, if left unchecked, would grow in number as Lutheranism and Calvinism had grown in the German lands, so that eventually “there will not be a single person holding to [true] piety [in Russia].”⁶³ To prevent this result, Pososhkov called on Orthodox priests to enter data in seven books on births, baptisms, confessions, communions, marriages, burials, and household residences. These books, held in each parish, would be used to monitor the religious observances of Orthodox parishioners and to ensure that no schismatics could live unnoticed in a rural village.⁶⁴ If, for example, the child of a schismatic couple should be baptized but avoid participation in communion services and that child should die, then, according to Pososhkov, Orthodox priests “should absolutely refuse to bury the body.”⁶⁵ If a Christian, on taking ill, should avoid the last rites, then priests should, according to Pososhkov, “not take the body to the local cemetery but should expose it to the birds and to the wild dogs.”⁶⁶ Such tactics, Pososhkov thought, would place schismatics under “great pressure” to conform to Orthodoxy: “Little by little, moved either by persuasion or by the force of prohibition, or by fear, they will join the Holy Church, and whether they like it or not, they will be saved.”⁶⁷ One cannot help but note that Pososhkov’s logic directly negated the position of Philaleth, who argued that religious coercion “can never achieve the desired results.” However, even Pososhkov had to make a minor concession to non-Orthodox Christians. He realized that the key to creating a religiously disciplined Orthodox community was the training of literate, theologically competent priests. He also understood that there did not yet exist in Russia a sufficient cadre of seminary teachers to provide this training. Therefore, in his second letter to Iavorskyi he conceded that “teachers of the Lutheran faith should be hired [in seminaries], if needed,” although he cautioned they should be “supervised carefully so that no heresy insinuate itself in their teaching.”⁶⁸

The addressee of Pososhkov’s letters, Metropolitan Stefan Iavorskyi, was another uncompromising opponent of “heresy.” In his 1713 manuscript

Rock of Faith Iavorskyi endorsed the energetic suppression of heresy as a necessity of Orthodox policy.⁶⁹ According to Iavorskyi, heretics “rightly and justly are subject to anathema; they deserve to be put to death. Once in the power of evil and loyal to Satan, they may endure any physical torment.” Iavorskyi claimed: “For heretics there is no cure but death. Heretics laugh at the prospect of damnation and to speak to them is ‘thunder without lightning’; they do not fear deprivation of their property . . . so the only cure for them is death.” Furthermore, he wrote: “For heretics themselves to die is useful, and they sometimes regard death as a blessing. If they remain alive, they will induce others to sin, they will tempt others, they will corrupt others; by this means others will fall under condemnation and will suffer eternal punishment. All this their death, imposed righteously, will avert.”⁷⁰ After the promulgation of the Spiritual Regulation in 1721, Iavorskyi wrote an attack on the newly created synodal church, *Apology or Verbal Defense*, in which he suggested that the Synod be placed under the jurisdiction of the ecumenical patriarch. He believed that the defenders of an autonomous synodal Church were “heretics, like the schismatics.”⁷¹

However, even the rigorist Iavorskyi made a small concession to the fact that Petrine Russia was a multireligious polity. In *Rock of Faith* he noted that “tsars in Christian states rule over Christians not as Christians but as individuals, and in this way they may also rule over Jews, Muslims, and others.”⁷² This view implied that even in Russia there had to be a clearer delineation between faith and secular authority. Iavorskyi admitted, “The power of tsars extends to their subjects’ bodies rather than to their souls; the spiritual power applies to souls rather than to the bodies they inhabit.”⁷³ If this concession to Russian reality had been made the main principle of Iavorskyi’s religious system, he might have built on it a pluralist rather than a monolithic understanding of religious politics and would almost certainly have been logically compelled to endorse religious toleration in the empire. But Iavorskyi was more committed to the logic of the inquisitor than to that of religious pluralism.

In the work of Feofan Prokopovich there is also little evidence of an interest in religious toleration. Although Feofan had the benefit of an education in Jesuit schools in Poland and of theological training in Rome at the College of St. Athanasius, he bitterly repudiated Roman Catholicism. In his course on rhetoric taught at the Kievan Academy in 1706, Feofan apparently went out of his way to describe Jesuits and Catholic monks as “asses” and “Epicurean swine,” respectively.⁷⁴ In courses on sacred theology, taught from 1712 to 1716, he attacked the Catholic theologians Aquinas and Robert Bellarmine as “asses,” “dunces,” and “witchdoctors.” He dismissed them as

blind worshippers of authority—ironically, a charge that would one day be leveled against him—and called their scholastic method of inquiry “charlatanry” and “superciliousness,” nothing but terminological “pettifoggery” (*scholarum quisquiliae*).⁷⁵ In Feofan’s theory, non-Orthodox Christians and non-Christians existed to test true believers or to punish them for clerical corruption, impiety, superstitious credulity, or pride. He thought of Western nations as legitimate targets of Russian arms, since those nations had surrendered to false, diabolical faiths. In his panegyric to Peter after the Russian victory over the Lutheran Swedes at Poltava, Feofan called Peter’s triumph a victory for the “adamantine shields of the fatherland and for Orthodoxy.” He predicted future victories over the Uniate Church in Ukraine and over the Ottoman Turks, who had intervened in favor of Charles XII: “The damnable Uniate Church that has intruded itself into our country will be extirpated from its nest, and the universal-Orthodox faith will expel from Ukraine these diabolical slaves [i.e., Muslims] and will extend [Orthodoxy’s] sway into other lands.”⁷⁶

Feofan was clearly no friend of pluralism or toleration, yet he was also a loyal supporter of Peter the Great and was therefore committed to restraining overzealous Orthodox bishops from arresting “heretics” in their diocese. In the Spiritual Regulation he directed bishops not to excommunicate Christians except in extreme cases, “for it is not suitable to pronounce anathema simply for sin, but [only] for open contempt toward God’s judgment and toward church authority.” Even then a bishop was obliged to seek written permission from the Holy Synod before pronouncing anathema.⁷⁷ That said, Feofan called on Russian priests to enforce the Orthodox belief system by fighting superstition and “wailing women” (*klikushki*), by suppressing news of “false miracles [supposedly] worked by icons” and so on.⁷⁸ Essentially, Feofan’s plan was to do battle against “heresy” by educating priests and the public against “superstition”: he was a religious modernizer, but his modernizing did not extend as far as principled religious toleration.

Between 1730 and 1740 Russian thinkers produced two important defenses of religious toleration: Vasilii Tatishchev’s “Dialogue of Two Friends on the Utility of Science and Schools” (1730–1733), and Artemii Volynskoi’s *General Project* (1734–1739). Tatishchev’s “Dialogue” was a Platonic conversation focusing on the question of whether Russian noble families should send their children abroad to be educated but expanding to include ruminations on justice, human nature, true religion, natural and biblical law, heresy, the proper organization of the state, the Russian language, and the defects of the Russian school system. For our purposes, four points in Tatishchev’s “Dialogue” deserve special attention. First, he argued, human

beings have an innate sense of virtue. We possess intelligence and will; we understand the difference between right and wrong; the concepts of virtue and vice “have been implanted in our hearts since the creation of Adam.” This innate sense of virtue Tatishchev called the “natural law.” He said it was “inculcated in us by God,” and since it came from God, it was perfectly consistent with religious law as recorded in the Bible.⁷⁹ Although Tatishchev did not say so explicitly, this same natural law must govern the consciences of all human beings, including non-Orthodox people of every sort, even if the sacred books of those non-Orthodox communities differed in fundamental respects from the Christian scriptures.

Second, Tatishchev asserted, it is the duty of all people to train themselves in the ways of virtue. This duty meant that educated people must study philosophy written by both pagan and non-Orthodox authors. To the objection that the study of non-Orthodox texts might open the way to agnosticism or atheism, Tatishchev replied that “necessary philosophy is not sinful; only philosophy that repels us from God is harmful and destructive to the soul.”⁸⁰ To stop studying philosophy for fear of its consequences was to put oneself in the power of “malicious churchmen,” who will force the ignorant “to submit blindly and slavishly to their orders and commands.” Among such malicious churchmen Tatishchev numbered not only the popes but also Patriarch Nikon, who tried to subordinate Tsar Aleksei to the Church’s dictates. Furthermore, Tatishchev warned, the failure to study non-Orthodox texts would actually leave Russia exposed to inroads from papism and from heresy. In Tatishchev’s opinion, the correct policy for a secular state was to do as Peter the Great had done: vigorously to promote learning of all sorts, including philosophical inquiry. The failure to advance true learning would lead only to heresy’s triumph.⁸¹ In so many words Tatishchev called for an educational curriculum that would incorporate pagan and non-Orthodox texts as key elements: this was an unmistakable step toward toleration of the faith systems that had generated those heretofore forbidden texts.

Third, Tatishchev described Russia as a religiously pluralistic society in which pluralism served as a check against rebellion based on popular superstition. According to the “Dialogue,” rebellion often stems from groundless religious fanaticism. In sixteenth-century Central Europe, the Anabaptists at Münster had used rumors and false reports of miracles to incite the “stupid mob” to revolt. In seventeenth-century England the “famous thief and rebel leader Cromwell had by hypocritical piety and prayer, sophistry, and spurious interpretation [of the Bible] led the simple people to believe literally that he was Lord and Protector of English liberty.” Not infrequently, in the

Ottoman Empire, “where the people have no access to education at all and are sunk in superstition,” clever leaders had used the pretext of defending the faith to fan rebellions. Even Russia had not escaped this phenomenon, as Stenka Razin’s success in fanning popular superstition had demonstrated.⁸² However, according to Tatishchev, the danger of schism and rebellion is most acute in those states where two faiths are of equal strength. “But where there are three or more faiths, then that danger does not exist, and this is particularly true in a state with good laws which do not permit religious disputes to become inflamed. . . . Among monarchies we see several, including our Russia, which have harbored not only different Christian confessions but also a large number of Muslims and pagans and where, thanks to several hundred years of good and careful government, the differences among these faiths have done no harm.”⁸³ Tatishchev added that during the Razin uprising Russia’s tradition of religious toleration had kept the rebellion from getting out of hand.

Fourth, Tatishchev proposed a theory of the Russian language according to which this Slavic tongue had from the first incorporated non-Slavic words, thus changing and enriching itself in response to external influences. Tatishchev pointed out that the openness of the Russian language to outside words gave the lie to “irrational and contemptuous, sanctimonious hypocrites” who regarded Russian as a sacred language of faith and who believed it justified to burn books written in other tongues. According to Tatishchev, to “study and speak foreign languages is not offensive but pleasing to God.”⁸⁴ He recommended that every priest be compelled to study Hebrew, Greek, and Latin as well as Church Slavonic. He called on civil officials to learn the foreign language appropriate to their station. All Russian nobles should learn German; officials living in the southern periphery should study Turkish, Farsi, or Chinese; those on the northern border should learn Finnish. In general, Tatishchev argued, the Russian language had always been a crazily complex, dynamic instrument of communication. It should in future be recognized as the key medium in a pluralistic empire. The multiple borrowings from foreign tongues could now be reclassified as evidence of Russia’s polyglot nature and of its openness to or toleration of other peoples.

Thus in the “Dialogue” Tatishchev formulated a theory of cultural toleration based on natural law, openness to pagan and non-Orthodox learning, religious pluralism as a safeguard against domestic rebellion, and the openness of the Russian language to external influences. Yet he remained in some respects a typical practitioner of Orthodoxy and a patriot willing to shed blood for the sake of the empire. As we know, he was involved in the Orenburg military expedition from 1737 to 1739 and the Kalmyk expedition

in 1741. From 1741 to 1746 he served as governor of Astrakhan, a position that required him to take an active role in the suppression of indigenous dissent to Russian power, including religious dissent. In practice Tatishchev did not allow his support for toleration and linguistic pluralism to interfere with the sanguinary work of expanding imperial borders and subjugating unruly peoples.⁸⁵ During the five years from 1735 to 1740 government estimates placed the number of Bashkir casualties at over 28,500—nearly 17,000 of these killed by regular army units.⁸⁶ If Tatishchev was a pioneer in developing a broad theory of Russian religious toleration, he was from the actual perspective of the conquered peoples a tormentor and an executioner (*muchitel' i palach*).

Between 1727 and 1739 Tatishchev used his spare time to write a long version of his *Russian History*. In March 1739, during a visit to Petersburg, he read passages from this book to the circle of Artemii Volynskoi. Although Volynskoi was a high official in Anna Ioannovna's government and a protégé of Ernst Johann von Bühren, he enjoyed a reputation as a man of broad political discernment. His main work, the book-length *General Project*, was burned in Easter Week of 1740, when Volynskoi learned he would probably be arrested on suspicion of political crimes. What we know of the memorandum or book has been reconstructed by Dmitrii Korsakov from the transcripts of Volynskoi's interrogation by Anna's Secret Chancellery.⁸⁷

Intellectually, Volynskoi was an admirer of the Roman aristocratic historian Tacitus and of the late sixteenth-century European commentator on Tacitus, Iustus Lipsius. He rejected political despotism, as Tacitus had famously done in the *Annals*, and he may also have accepted Lipsius's teaching on the proper role of religion in government: that only one Church be established by a given state but that nonconformists be tolerated so long as they practice their faith quietly. Lipsius believed that a prince should exercise no authority over doctrinal matters but should take care to preserve church unity. Volynskoi's interest in religious toleration, however limited, and his advocacy of a circumscribed role for the prince in religious affairs may explain his reputation for being a freethinker.⁸⁸ From what we know of his theory of toleration itself, Volynskoi's contribution to Russian thought must be described as modest: after all, the writ of Roman toleration was such as to have accommodated the religious persecution of Christians—a fact that could not have escaped Volynskoi's attention.⁸⁹

Although Mikhail Lomonosov was the most learned Russian of the eighteenth century, he was neither a systematic political thinker nor an engaged advocate of religious toleration. As an adolescent he may have fallen briefly under the influence of the priestless Old Believers in the Russian north, but

as a mature intellectual he was nevertheless inclined to call the Old Believers “schismatics” and to associate them with rebellion against the crown. Thus in his *Short Russian Chronicle* (1760) Lomonosov mentioned “the obstacles, disappointments, and dangers” encountered by Peter the Great “from the *streltsy*, *raskol’niki*, and other detractors.”⁹⁰ In general, as a historian Lomonosov favored a strong autocratic state and national unity. He treated Russian Christianity as a contribution to national unity and was therefore little disposed to sympathize with religious minorities.

However, Lomonosov strongly opposed efforts by Orthodox traditionalists to institute heresy trials of religious dissenters. In the early 1740s Bishop Amvrosii (Iuskevich) proposed to root out foreign “superstition” and to put an end to foreigners’ “diabolical cleverness” in Russia by acting on the basis of Iavorskyi’s *Rock of Faith*. Lomonosov challenged this religious zealotry by recalling the tale of Job. In his “Ode Drawn from Job” (1751) he demanded that human beings patiently accept their lot and recognize God’s sovereign power “to punish and reward whom He pleases.”⁹¹ Iurii Lotman has interpreted the “Ode Drawn from Job” as a programmatic break from Orthodox clerics who wished to use coercion to extirpate evil from the world. In Lotman’s accounting, Lomonosov was a quietist and rationalist who stood against the arbitrariness of traditionalist religion, with its view of a broken world subject to “demonic insanity.”⁹² It is not improbable that Lomonosov’s patient quietism was linked to his acceptance of Leibniz’s theory of evil, which posited that evil lacks substantial reality.

We should also mention that, as a scientist, Lomonosov was a Copernican who accepted the possibility of multiple worlds in the cosmos.⁹³ From the pluralism of worlds he did not draw the conclusion that many true religions may exist, but he did reach the more limited conclusion that present theology had yet to assimilate the “grandeur and power” of God’s creation. Thus, while not a principled champion of religious toleration, Lomonosov preached a modern version of Christian humility and patience insisting on the relaxation of religious exclusivism. Lomonosov apparently did not see any contradiction between his outlook as a scientist and his perspective as a historian, which emphasized the need to suppress religious schismatics and other rebels against the crown.

Religious thinkers under Peter generally opposed broad-based religious toleration, although here and there they conceded its practical necessity within tight limits. Only in the post-Petrine period, in unpublished works by Tatishchev and Volynskoi, do we encounter principled defenses of toleration, but these tolerationist works did not attain wide circulation among the reading public. Although one might have expected Lomonosov to advocate

toleration, he did not do so in spite of his dislike of heresy trials and his distrust of the traditionalist bishops in the Orthodox hierarchy.

TOLERATION IN CATHERINIAN RUSSIA

The notion that the Russian imperial government in the late eighteenth century was committed to religious toleration has a genuine plausibility. After all, Catherine was an admiring correspondent of Voltaire who prided herself on being “neither a persecutor nor a fanatic.”⁹⁴ One of her earliest domestic policies was the secularization of the land held by the Orthodox Church, a move that she advertised as helpfully “freeing” the Church from earthly cares but which actually increased its material dependence on the state, thus making it difficult for the Church forcefully to oppose state toleration of other churches and religions.⁹⁵ Early in her reign Catherine tried to find a *modus vivendi* with the Old Believers.⁹⁶ By the early 1770s the priestless Old Believers had managed to found a new hospital and cemetery in Moscow, the so-called Preobrazhenskoe kladbishche.⁹⁷ Furthermore, in the first decades of her reign Catherine created a civil framework in which Jews were recognized as subjects of the crown meriting the protection of Russian laws. Isabel de Madariaga has described the decree of 7 May 1786 as “the first official statement of the civil equality of Jews in Europe.”⁹⁸ Also among Catherine’s most significant decrees on religion was the law of 23 June 1794 authorizing Jewish residence in the so-called Pale of Settlement. Finally, Catherine tried hard to purchase civil peace with Russia’s Muslims, especially those in the Orenburg territory. She invited Muslim delegates to participate in the 1767 Legislative Commission, and in 1773 she abandoned active persecution of Muslims in favor of a policy of “passive toleration,” leading by 1788–1789 to a government-authorized Muslim Spiritual Assembly in Orenburg.⁹⁹

Each of these steps was historically significant, but Catherinian toleration was in certain respects short-lived and in others hedged about with restrictions. Although the empress decreed in 1782 that Old Believers were no longer to be called schismatics (*raskol’niki*), and although she refused to enforce Peter the Great’s prohibition on the wearing of beards (which remained part of the legal code), she did not approve the Old Believers’ petition to be placed under the jurisdiction of a sympathetic bishop. In 1764 she sent twenty thousand Old Believers to Siberia for failing to comply with her “voluntary” resettlement plan of 1762. After the Pugachev rebellion in 1773–1774 she tended to regard the Old Believers with grave suspicion as potential political subversives.

Catherine’s policy toward Catholics was contradictory. While permitting the free practice of Catholic rites in Moscow and elsewhere and allow-

ing the Jesuit order to operate in Russia even though it had been suppressed elsewhere in Europe, Catherine strictly regulated the ecclesiastical hierarchy in Belorussia and the western periphery by ordering the election of Catholic bishops to proceed under government supervision, by demanding that Catholic monks swear oaths of allegiance to the Russian crown, and by refusing to promulgate papal bulls unless they had received prior approval from the Imperial Senate. De Madariaga has noted that so-called toleration of Catholics came at the price to Russian Catholics of government control over priests, bishops, and church property.¹⁰⁰

Imperial toleration of Jews was, of course, notoriously two-sided, since the Pale of Settlement was simultaneously a protected settlement zone and a legally mandated reservation for Jews. Moreover, by the law of 23 June 1794 Jews in a given social estate (*soslovie*) were required to pay double the taxes paid by Christians in the same social stratum.¹⁰¹ Toleration toward Muslims was more extensive, as Robert Crews has argued, but it entailed indirect state control over Islamic jurisprudence and cooptation of the Muslim elites; moreover, state toleration of Muslims did not preclude the government from suppressing popular forms of Islam, such as the preaching manifested in the Sheikh Mansur rebellion.¹⁰² Not every influential Muslim accepted the Faustian bargain of “toleration” by St. Petersburg: as Crews himself admits, dozens of itinerant Sufi preachers and Muslim holy women, for example, taught their versions of Islam outside the oversight of officially sanctioned Russian institutions. It therefore seems more accurate to describe Catherinian toleration not as the heart of imperial domestic policy but rather as one among many tactics adopted by the government to regulate and control the religious lives of its subjects.

Catherine’s theoretical views on religious toleration were first articulated in her Instruction to the Commission for Composition of a New Law Code (1767). Since the Academy of Sciences edition of the Instruction (1907), historians have known that Catherine borrowed from other sources, often verbatim, no fewer than 469 of the 655 articles in the document.¹⁰³ The differences among her sources and her own inconsistent impulses help explain the lack of clarity in her views on religious toleration as articulated in the Instruction. From the beginning of the text, Catherine presented herself as a faithful Christian. The Instruction commenced with a prayer for wisdom, “so that I may judge Your people according to Your law in a spirit of true justice.” Its first article declared, “Christian law teaches us to do good to one another insofar as possible.”¹⁰⁴ Articles 348–55 dealt with the education of the populace. According to Catherine, moral instruction by heads of household was to be grounded on the principles of Orthodox Christianity: “Each

[head of household] is obliged to teach his children the fear of God as the source of all wisdom, and to inculcate in them all the duties that God demands of us in the Ten Commandments, and through our Orthodox Greek faith in its institutions and traditions.”¹⁰⁵

If one were to read no further in the Instruction, one might think that the empress had forgotten Russia’s multiconfessional religious composition, but in chapter 20 she recognized that fact by describing Russia as a vast empire of diverse peoples. She warned against the “vice of forbidding or hindering their different religions” and noted that granting non-Orthodox communities permission to follow their creeds “softens even the cruelest hearts, draws them out of inveterate obstinacy, and quiets their disputes, which are antipathetic to the state’s tranquillity and to the unity of citizens.” Yet Catherine did not propose to permit diverse religious practices to continue indefinitely. She claimed, “There is no truer means than wise toleration, permitted by our Orthodox faith and polity, through which one can lead all these lost sheep into the true flock.”¹⁰⁶ Hence Catherine treated religious toleration as a politically expedient measure necessary to pacify the empire’s religiously diverse peoples until such time as the Orthodox faithful had succeeded in converting the “lost sheep” to the “true flock.” Implicit in her views was the willingness to abolish measures of toleration if they did not mitigate her subjects’ “cruelty of heart,” “inveterate obstinacy,” or disputatiousness.

Also relevant to Catherine’s idea of toleration was her discussion of punishments for crime in articles 61–96. In article 74, she asserted that “crimes against faith,” including blasphemy, should be dealt with by the Church through excommunication or shunning. She mentioned in the article neither the multiconfessional status of the empire nor the principle of religious toleration—significant evasions. In discussing so-called crimes against mores, Catherine prescribed punishments mostly of a moral sort: the exclusion of deviants from the community they had offended, shunning, shame, and dishonor. The only material punishment she mentioned was the imposition of monetary fines, but she did not specify whether the fines were to be imposed by the state or by private associations. Her general rule was to regard crimes against mores as minor violations from the state’s perspective.¹⁰⁷ It may well be that Catherine hoped to make a *de facto* distinction between state and church, in which religious and customary breaches of confessional rules would be punished by religious communities without state involvement.

According to the empress, the government’s interest in prosecuting crimes begins at the point where social tranquillity is violated. In such cases

the government may punish violators by imposing on them “exile, [penal] correction, and other punishments capable of returning restive spirits onto the right path and restoring them to their places in the established order.”¹⁰⁸ The trouble with Catherine’s approach to punishing violations of public law was that the distinction between religious crimes and dangerous statutory offenses was clearer in theory than in practice. Under Russian law, blasphemy remained a serious criminal offense, whatever Catherine’s sentiments in the Instruction.

Later in her reign Catherine seemed intent on further circumscribing the application of the idea of toleration she had defended in 1767. For example, her *Notes concerning Russian History* (written in the 1780s, unfinished) seemed to link Orthodox piety with political wisdom in the chapter on Prince Vladimir’s conversion to Christianity.¹⁰⁹ In her discussion of the Tatar Yoke, Catherine complained that the invaders had done “much evil to Christians [and] to the Russian land.”¹¹⁰ She praised Russian opponents of the Tatars in religious terms, citing, for example, the “Christian stoutness” of Mikhail of Chernigov.¹¹¹ The religious-political synthesis in Catherine’s *Notes concerning Russian History* fit her traditionalist patriotic mood in the 1780s—a moment when Russian foreign policy was characterized by zealous defense of the realm against its long-standing religious adversaries.

Finally, we must note that starting in 1780 Catherine launched a public relations offensive against Freemasonry. The offensive initially took the form of a pamphlet ridiculing Masonic initiation rites and Masonic secrecy.¹¹² Catherine surely felt that ridicule of Freemasonry did not violate her commitment to religious toleration, since she thought it permissible simultaneously to tolerate an “absurd” religion while criticizing it as superstition. Indeed, that peculiar notion of “freedom of criticism” resembled Voltaire’s attitude toward those religious groups he wished to discourage through satire. Note that Catherine published her satire against Freemasonry anonymously, so that she could preserve the fiction that it did not come freighted with the weight of imperial sanction. However, as we know from the history of Catherine’s subsequent policies toward Freemasonry, her satiric disapproval turned by 1785 into harassment of Russia’s leading Mason, Nikolai Novikov, and led to his arrest in 1792.

Catherine’s attempt in 1767 to make a *de facto* distinction between church and state had been abandoned by the mid-1780s with respect to those religions she considered to be “absurd,” “superstitious,” and dangerous to the state. Her idea of toleration, from the outset riddled with contradictions, was meant either as temporary political window dressing or as an aspiration toward which benighted Russians might strive over decades.

In either case, it was not a consistent, principled foundation for Russian domestic policy.

Catherine's target, Nikolai Novikov, had used satirical journals early in his career to attack vice in court circles and to criticize the excesses of the serf system. His polemics against social injustice rested on the premises of human perfectibility and human spiritual dignity, premises that would also have supported advocacy of religious toleration. However, Novikov seemed loath to declare himself vigorously in favor of religious toleration until after becoming a Freemason in 1775. His Masonic journals—*Utrennii svet*, *Moskovskoe ezhelesiachnoe izdanie*, and *Pokoiashchiiasia trudoliubets*—all defended a rationalist conception of virtue and of human dignity that Novikov advertised as consistent with Russian Orthodoxy and the welfare of the state but also with other religious creeds. In his signature essay “On Human Dignity in Relation to God and the World” (1777) he celebrated the creation of human beings in God's image and likeness as the foundation of human dignity and equality. On this assumption he built a case for human interdependence and mutual respect as the foundations for social conduct.¹¹³ In “On Virtue” (1780) Novikov ruled out the use of coercion in matters of ethics and morals. He contended that virtue is connected with the inclination to do good rather than with the ability to force one's adversaries into submission. He compared those statesmen resorting to force against the religiously heterodox to parasitic insects.¹¹⁴ The Italian expert on Masonry Raffaella Faggionato has suggested that after 1779 Novikov became increasingly interested in the Rosicrucian variant of Masonry, which sought to institute religious toleration in European states, among other goals.¹¹⁵ Thus Novikov's tolerationism arose both from his reading of Scripture and from the Rosicrucian Enlightenment. From the perspective of Russian thought it is an oddity that Novikov seemed to grow more interested in religious toleration just as the empress energetically distanced herself from it.

Unlike Novikov, Aleksandr Radishchev—whose passionate denunciations of serfdom, autocracy, and censorship were the most radical to appear during the Russian Enlightenment—wrote little about the problem of religious toleration. Radishchev's long poem “Liberty,” composed in the 1780s, argued for a state based on a social contract specifying the government's purposes as follows: “To uphold equality in society, to give alms to widows and orphans, to keep the innocent from misfortune; to be a loving father to the innocent but an irreconcilable foe to vice, to falsehood, and to slander; to bestow honor for good service, to give warning of evil, to preserve moral standards in all their purity.”¹¹⁶ In the poem Radishchev criticized estab-

lished religious groups for preaching “blind belief.” In stanza 10 he evoked the specter of Petrine Russia, a country “where stands the dark throne of slavery. There the secular powers tranquilly see in the tsar the image of God. The tsar’s power preserves the faith, and the faith confirms the tsar’s power; together they corrupt society.”¹¹⁷ In *Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow* (1789) Radishchev attacked religious censorship as an enterprise instituted by Christian monks to shore up their own control over society by keeping learning out of laymen’s hands.¹¹⁸ His fictional traveler implored readers not to worry about the dangers of irreligious books: “If a fool not only thinks but says aloud ‘there is no God,’ in the ears there will resound the echo: ‘there is no God, there is no God.’ But so what? The echo is a sound; it strikes the air, lingers for a moment, then it dissipates. It will only rarely affect the reason, and then but weakly; it will never affect the heart. God will always be God, whose presence is felt even by unbelievers.” The traveler claimed that empty words were impotent: “Words are not always acts, thinking is not a crime.”¹¹⁹

Radishchev’s advocacy of untrammelled free religious speech was important for two reasons: first, it criticized the established church from the perspective of a social contract theory borrowed from Locke and Rousseau; and second, it linked religious toleration firmly to freedom of the press and freedom of conscience. Radishchev’s idea of religious toleration went beyond Spinoza (who was willing to countenance an established church so long as the code of public laws provided dissenters freedom to worship) and Locke (whose case for toleration did not extend to Catholics or atheists). Radishchev probably found his inspiration in Voltaire’s many defenses of toleration, especially *Philosophical Letters* (1734) and *Treatise on Tolerance*, in the latitudinarian tendencies of the English, and in American law. Unfortunately, because of Russian censorship, Radishchev’s major works remained almost unknown until Herzen published them in London in the 1850s.

Mikhail Shcherbatov and Nikolai Karamzin have usually been classified as conservative thinkers, defenders of the Russian monarchy and of Orthodoxy as the established church. Yet both men were also cosmopolitans strongly influenced by the Enlightenment. Shcherbatov, for example, was a lifelong student of Voltaire, a close reader and critic of Rousseau, and an admirer of David Hume. The early Karamzin respected Voltaire and idolized Rousseau. His *History of the Russian State* showed the influence of Voltaire’s *Essay on Morals and Customs* (1745–1746) and of Hume’s *History of Great Britain* (1754–1762). In spite of their political conservatism, both Shcherbatov and Karamzin strongly defended religious toleration.

Shcherbatov's early views on religious toleration can be found in private commentaries he recorded on Catherine's Instruction in 1767. In them he accepted the validity of Catherine's description of Christian moral teaching as "perfect." In his opinion, other religions "provide rules of virtuous moral conduct, but only Christian law teaches us to love our enemies."¹²⁰ Although in principle Shcherbatov granted that moral laws should be the same everywhere, he conceded that statutory laws must differ according to popular customs, climatic differences, and local political circumstances. He evidently thought that laws written for the European parts of Russia should not necessarily be extended to the "Asiatic" parts, especially the Muslim regions of Astrakhan and Orenburg.¹²¹ Shcherbatov thought it possible for the Russian monarchy to rule the empire in harmony with the Orthodox Church, but only if the Church adopted an enlightened view of religion. He was very skeptical concerning the capacity of Islam to adopt an enlightened outlook.¹²² At the same time, he declared himself firmly opposed to inquisitorial attempts to use the Christian religion to eliminate moral corruption in Russia. He asked: "Five years after the publication of this Instruction, will the government really manage to eliminate vice and uphold virtue? Will our morals really be improved?"¹²³ Thus early in his career Shcherbatov accepted the necessity of practical toleration, especially given the presence of "backward" Muslims in "Asiatic" Russia, yet he still accepted the notion of the perfection of Christian moral teaching and of the theoretical compatibility of Christianity and enlightenment.

Shcherbatov's *Russian History* (written 1768–1790) treated Orthodoxy as the "true Christian faith" but also criticized its proponents for encouraging superstition and a "monkish spirit" among princes.¹²⁴ Shcherbatov's ideal seemed to be a rationalistic or virtue-oriented Christianity quite alien to Orthodox practice. In his unpublished essay "Reflections on Legislation in General" (1785) he spelled out a method for transforming Catherinian despotism into a constitutional regime. Key planks of his program were the retention of Orthodoxy as the state religion and the granting to other confessions of formal legal recognition and toleration.¹²⁵ In his utopian tract "Journey to the Land of Ophir" Shcherbatov imagined a regime in which a network of priests supported by the state supervises morals and conducts religious rites devoted to worship of the Supreme Being. Shcherbatov seemed to have in mind a belief system similar to French deism, and simple rituals patterned on Rousseau's system of civic religion in *The Social Contract*.¹²⁶ Shcherbatov's mature religious ideal uneasily combined Russian traditionalism (Orthodoxy as the established church), enlightened toleration, and deism. It should be noted that Shcherbatov's scheme of

toleration and of civic religion was not published until the late 1890s, a century after his death.

Karamzin's thinking about toleration can be found in the forceful passages of his *Letters of a Russian Traveler* (written 1789–1791, published as a volume in 1797), where his unnamed traveler praises the advocates of toleration, criticizes its enemies, and points to the baneful consequences of intolerance. In letter 75, reporting a visit to Voltaire's estate at Ferney, the traveler lauded Voltaire for exposing "scandalous superstition" and for disseminating the "mutual tolerance in religious matters that became the disposition of our age."¹²⁷ In letter 15 he pilloried the German rationalist Friedrich Nicolai for suggesting that a cabal of "secret Jesuits" was trying to control Europe. Apropos Nicolai's theory, the traveler observed: "My heart could not condone the tone in which the men of Berlin are writing. Where can we seek tolerance if the very philosophers—the very enlighteners, as they call themselves—demonstrate such hatred toward all those who do not think as they do?"¹²⁸ In letter 42 he reproved the municipality of Frankfurt for banning Protestants from civic life. He also attacked Frankfurt for confining seven thousand Jews to a filthy ghetto. The traveler's picture of Sabbath services at the local synagogue was heartrending, for there "despondency, sadness, terror were etched on the faces of the supplicants."¹²⁹

In letter 139 about England the traveler listened to the boast of a local citizen who claimed, "Here [in England] we tolerate every image of faith." The traveler asked rhetorically, "Is there in Europe even one Christian sect which has not been in England?"¹³⁰ In letter 145 the traveler described the electoral process in Winchester, noting that local voters approved of sensible candidates over those who were selfish and religiously intolerant.¹³¹ Perhaps the boldest moment in the entire oeuvre came in letter 127, where the traveler alluded to a session of the French National Assembly in which Mirabeau passionately defended religious toleration against members of the clergy who wanted to codify Catholicism as the single religion in France.¹³²

Although we must remember that Karamzin's traveler was a fictional character whose views did not necessarily represent those of the author, there is no reason to suppose that the traveler's opinion of religious toleration diverged from Karamzin's own. The passages on toleration in Karamzin's *History of the Russian State*, quoted above, showed that Karamzin regarded toleration as an appealing feature of the Russian character and as a singular political virtue. *Letters of a Russian Traveler* suggested that one source of Karamzin's tolerantism was Voltaire, who was praised by name in letter 75, but also invoked indirectly in letter 140—the traveler's description of the London stock exchange. (Karamzin was referring to Voltaire's

description of toleration as the key to commerce in *Philosophical Letters*.) *Letters of a Russian Traveler* implicitly criticized Catherine II for continuing to uphold Orthodoxy as a state religion: this was the political point behind the reference to Mirabeau's speech. The critique of Nicolai in letter 15 was an original contribution to Russian thinking about toleration in that it underlined the intolerant spirit driving certain advocates of tolerance. Karamzin reserved his approval for political moderation, or rather for a certain intellectual equipoise in matters of faith. Letter 8, which recounted a conversation between the traveler and Immanuel Kant, underlined the difficulty of achieving certitude about faith. In this exchange, according to Karamzin, Kant mentioned the satisfaction he had always felt after acting in accordance with the moral law, his hope for the afterlife, his postulate of a Universal Creative Reason, but also his realization that in matters such as the afterlife we necessarily operate "in dark ignorance." Karamzin accepted Kant's lack of certitude as his own.

TOLERANTISM FROM SPERANSKII TO THE DECEMBRISTS

The surfacing of religious tolerance as a matter for public discussion early in Catherine II's reign and its importance in the work of Karamzin, the best Russian writer of the Catherinian era, might lead one to expect that in the reign of her grandson Alexander I toleration would be regarded as a central political objective. Yet this proved not to be the case, largely because neither high officials nor most Russian social thinkers willingly accepted the practical effects of universal toleration.

Mikhail Speranskii's draft memorandum "Introduction to a Code of State Laws" (1809) argued that Russia "is headed toward liberty."¹³³ He maintained that Russia's future laws would have to recognize the existence of civil and political rights, among which he included freedom from punishment without a trial, freedom from personal servitude, and freedom from "material service" (payment of taxes) except as specified by law. Speranskii did not mention freedom of conscience as a civil right. His draft did recognize that Russia was a multiconfessional state, and it called for a department of government where "spiritual affairs of the various confessions should be administered."¹³⁴ This was at best a backhanded acknowledgment of the need for an even-handed religious policy: in fact, the memorandum did not advance the cause of toleration one iota. We know from Speranskii's subsequent tenure as an administrator in Siberia that he sought to regularize the legal status of non-Russian peoples and to guarantee them freedom of religious practice consistent with existing positive law. He opposed forced conversions of Siberian peoples to Christianity.¹³⁵ However, Speranskii's

long-term goal was the Christianization of the Russian Empire and of politics generally. He hoped each Russian citizen would identify himself with God, the source of reason and order in the universe. His plan for the empire involved the promotion of the Christian conception of human dignity through educational institutions and thus the *voluntary* conversion of the heterodox to Orthodoxy. Speranskii therefore saw no contradiction between short-term toleration of the non-Orthodox and the long-term process of their absorption into the established church.¹³⁶ The intellectual roots of Speranskii's idea of "toleration" probably extended back to his seminary days, when he read Locke, Montesquieu, and Diderot, but his mature views represented a compromise between the political necessity of toleration and his fervent Orthodox religious outlook.

Whereas Speranskii's 1809 memorandum was one of the most important monuments of Alexander's early reign, Nikolai Novosil'tsov's State Charter of the Russian Empire (written 1818–1819) represented the tsar's post-1815 "constitutionalist" thinking. It sought to protect civil liberty defined as freedom of the press, immunity from arbitrary arrest, and the rule of habeus corpus. Article 78 of the State Charter insisted, "The Orthodox Greek–Russian faith shall always be the dominant faith of the empire, as well as of the emperor and of the whole imperial family." It specified that the government should manifest "special solicitude" toward Orthodoxy, but it added that this solicitude should be demonstrated "without the other creeds being suppressed." The article specified that "membership in different Christian denominations should not entail any distinctions in civil and political rights" of subjects. Yet article 167 declared, "Jews, even those who are enrolled in guilds and who own real estate, may not participate in municipal assemblies." At the regional level the charter's operation would likely have been weighted in favor of ethnic Russians and thus in favor of members of the Orthodox Church, in spite of Novosil'tsov's declared intention to avoid "distinctions in civil and political rights."¹³⁷

Novosil'tsov may have developed his brand of toleration during his years in France and England (before 1801), from which he emerged as an admirer of English liberty. However, his views were moderated by experience in the Unofficial Committee early in Alexander's reign and by Russia's wars with Napoleon. Novosil'tsov's mature political posture combined willingness to experiment with political instrumentalities like a state charter with a dirigiste approach to government.

In the event, Alexander decided to reject both Speranskii's and Novosil'tsov's solutions to Russian problems, perhaps out of the fear that even a limited guarantee of civil rights and religious toleration would prove

troublesome to administer. Thus even their selective visions of toleration remained a dead letter.

Among the government's post-1815 critics leaders of the Decembrist movement gave the most serious attention to toleration. In the first draft of the so-called constitution that Nikita Murav'ev wrote for the Northern Society between the fall of 1821 and mid-1822 he spelled out the "rights of citizens" under a proposed constitutional monarch.¹³⁸ These rights included, in article 3, freedom from servile bondage, freedom of thought and of the press, freedom of travel, freedom from arbitrary arrest and from detention without legal writ, the rights to post bail and to have a jury trial in criminal cases. Under article 5 Murav'ev proposed to give citizens the right to participate in elections through various social mechanisms. Article 12 guaranteed that the national legislature could not infringe on book publication or religious belief—a provision that seemed to promise disestablishment of the Orthodox Church and to underwrite individual freedom of conscience. However, Murav'ev's idea of liberty was actually not so robust. He held under article 2 that citizenship in the empire should require mastery of the Russian language—a proviso that would have ruled out citizen status for many non-Russians. Article 3 ruled out citizenship for nomadic peoples (on the ground that they did not possess fixed property). Article 8 restricted the right of Jews to move from one region to another and gave regional governments (*derzhavy*) the prerogative to deny citizenship to Jews who had so moved. It appears that Murav'ev was conflicted over religious toleration: in theory he favored toleration and even freedom of conscience, but he subjected those preferences to caveats that would have excluded many heterodox people from full citizenship and would have perpetuated legal segregation of the Jews. Murav'ev's doubts about universal toleration probably sprang from his own commitment to Russian Orthodoxy, which he characterized in the constitution as "our holy faith" and, ironically in view of these caveats, as the "Christian faith, according to which all persons are *brothers*."¹³⁹

The second variant of Murav'ev's constitution (probably written 1823–1824, first published 1906) promised, "No one may be hindered in the exercise of his religion according to conscience and convictions unless he has violated the laws of nature and of morality."¹⁴⁰ This apparently sweeping declaration of freedom of conscience was qualified as follows: "The *veche* [Murav'ev's proposed legislative assembly] has no authority to establish or prohibit any confession or schismatic group. The faith, conscience, and opinions of citizens, so long as they do not manifest themselves in illegal acts, are outside the *veche*'s purview. But a schismatic group based on morally corrupt principles [*na razvrate*] or on unnatural acts, may be prohibit-

ed by judicial authorities on the basis of general regulations.”¹⁴¹ Murav’ev’s guarantee of toleration seemed to go beyond anything contemplated by eighteenth-century Russians—indeed, beyond the limits on toleration set by Locke and Montesquieu—except that, in practice, Murav’ev’s grant of toleration would have turned on juridical interpretations of the phrases “illegal acts” and “unnatural acts.”

Murav’ev’s thinking on constitutional matters was influenced by his reading of leading philosophes (Montesquieu), of constitutionalist literature (John Adams and Thomas Jefferson on the US Constitution, Christian Julius Steltzer on universalist jurisprudence), French liberal tracts (especially Benjamin Constant’s essays), and Russian reformist projects (he saw manuscript versions of Speranskii’s 1809 memorandum and of Novosil’tsov’s State Charter).¹⁴²

The most influential figure in the Southern Society, Pavel Pestel’, adopted a complicated, perhaps even self-contradictory perspective on religious toleration. His “Note concerning National Government” (written 1816–1819, published 1958) assumed that natural law and divine law are identical in supporting civil rights. At the same time, the note called for the creation of secret police operatives to investigate citizens suspected of disseminating ideas opposing the laws or the common faith.¹⁴³ In January 1823 at a meeting of the Southern Society, its leaders, including Pestel’, unanimously adopted a resolution supporting Orthodoxy as the empire’s established religion rather than an alternative resolution identically protecting all faiths.¹⁴⁴ The second variant of *Russian Justice*, the programmatic document produced by Pestel’, proposed a centralized Russian state in which Roman Catholicism, the Uniate confession, and Islam would all be tolerated. However, he demanded that among the Tatars Russians use “every occasion by friendliness and persuasion to incline them to accept Holy Baptism.” He also called for a ban on polygamy among Muslims and a ban on forced seclusion of Muslim women. He was willing to grant Muslims civil rights but not full political rights. In the Caucasus he advocated conquest of rebellious Muslims and their “resettlement to the interior of Russia, breaking them up into small groups”; meanwhile, ethnic Russians would be transported to the Caucasus to take the Muslims’ places.¹⁴⁵ Pestel’ regarded the Jews as a backward, unenlightened people who “must always live under the power of superstitions.” He accused Jews of dishonest commerce with their Christian neighbors and of constituting a “state within the state . . . with greater rights than Christians [possess].” His solution to the Jewish problem was to warn rabbis “not to put themselves in inimical relations with Christians.” He did not rule out “helping the Jews

to establish a special state somewhere in Asia Minor” outside the Russian Empire. He anticipated the government would have to set up a collection point (*sbornyi punkt*) for Jews; he then supposed the army would escort them to the border. He was aware the latter proposal would entail moving two million Russian and Polish Jews and would require “special conditions and true ingenuity.” He wrote of the undertaking “only as a hint of what might be accomplished.”¹⁴⁶

Meanwhile, Pestel’ proposed the sedentarization of nomadic peoples and casting on them the “light of the Orthodox faith and the rays of true enlightenment.”¹⁴⁷ His ultimate ambition was “for all tribes in Russia to be Russified” (*vse razlichnye plemena v Rossii . . . obruseiut*).¹⁴⁸

The Southern Society under Pestel’ therefore combined a very circumscribed toleration, probably inspired by historical precedents as well as by his reading of enlightened philosophers (Locke, Montesquieu, Mably, Smith, and Filangieri among them), with a truly frightening program of military conquest in the Caucasus, religious proscriptions (against “unnatural” practices by Muslims), and religious discrimination (against Jews). The Caucasus resettlement plan proposed a form of ethnic cleansing later practiced in the region toward the end of the Caucasus War. The policy of collecting and expelling Jews, though it purported to be a voluntary program, anticipated elements of the Armenian genocide (escorting populations with troops) and Nazi-era Jewish resettlements (witness the plans developed by Adolf Eichmann and others before 1941). Post-Soviet Russian scholarship on Pestel’ has emphasized certain disagreeable sides of his political persona: for example, his involvement in espionage against the Greek independence movement, his hypocritical support for republicanism and for regicide.¹⁴⁹ However, neither Soviet nor post-Soviet scholars have fully confronted the menace of his intolerant tolerantism.

THE HEAVENLY CITY AND ITS SPECTRAL SHADOWS

If we review Russian thinking about religious toleration from the sixteenth century to 1825, we discover the following patterns. First, before the mid-eighteenth century Russian thinking about toleration owed little or nothing to the West European Enlightenment. The early sixteenth-century dispute between Maksim Grek and Nikolai Nemchin focused on the advisability of church unity and confessional coexistence. Late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century Russian Orthodox pleas for toleration hinged on conditions in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth that did not obtain in Muscovy. The tolerationist moments in the Muscovite religious schism of the seventeenth century were grounded in political calculations about reli-

gious peace (Paisii's letter of advice to Patriarch Nikon) and on the Gospel (Avvakum's assertion that faith cannot be spread by "fire, the knout, and the noose"). From the late seventeenth century to the Petrine church reform there were few concessions to toleration: Simeon Polotskii's call for dialogue with the Old Believers was really a demand that they capitulate to the established church; Pososhkov's letters to Stefan Iavorskyi admitted the temporary necessity of permitting Lutherans to teach Orthodox seminarians, but the context of his religious thinking was otherwise strictly monoconfessional; Iavorskyi's admission that the Orthodox tsar may rule non-Orthodox subjects neither led Iavorskyi toward religious pluralism nor diminished his zealous confessional spirit; Feofan Prokopovich's willingness to restrain diocesan heresy trials and to review diocesan excommunications sprang not from a plan for religious toleration but from a determination to control religious practice from the Synod. Even the tolerationist thinkers of the mid-eighteenth century owed little to the European Enlightenment: Tatischev's remarkable dialogue on education and toleration drew on Grotius's doctrine of natural rights but not on Locke, Bayle, or Spinoza; Volynskoi's *General Project* was inspired by Tacitus and Lipsius (and perhaps by Tatischev) but not by the philosophes. Lomonosov's opposition to heresy trials was underpinned by his scientific outlook and by Leibniz's moral theory, so he can be said to have operated under the influence of the Western Enlightenment; however, his religious views did not otherwise depart from Orthodox traditionalism.

From Catherine II to the Decembrists all major Russian thinkers who addressed religious toleration were influenced by enlightened Westerners. Usually, Russian tolerationists were stimulated not by Spinoza or Bayle but rather by Locke, Voltaire, and/or Montesquieu—that is, by the moderate variant of European tolerationism. Thus Catherine, Shcherbatov, Karamzin, Speranskii, Murav'ev, and Pestel' had all read the moderate European philosophes and, in Murav'ev's case, their North American successors (Adams and Jefferson). Certain Russian thinkers were aware of more radical approaches to the problem of toleration: Novikov drew on the German Rosicrucians' general tolerationism; Shcherbatov on Rousseau's doctrine of civic religion; Karamzin was aware of Rousseau's teaching and cited Rousseau's "pupil" Mirabeau with approval. Pestel' read the moderate philosophes (Locke, Montesquieu, and company) and some of their liberal followers (Constant) but seemed not to have shared their moderate spirit.

Still, most Russians influenced by European tolerationists focused not on the abstract, theoretical justifications for toleration but on its practical advantages. This was true in spades of Catherine but also true of Shcherba-

tov, Karamzin, Speranskii, Novosil'tsov, Murav'ev, and Pestel': all saw toleration as a morally desirable goal that had to be reconciled with Russian historical realities—first and foremost, with the existence of the established church but also with the circumstances of the heterodox. For Karamzin, Novosil'tsov, and Pestel' relations between the Orthodox state and the Muslims were a stumbling block to the mandating of universal toleration. For Speranskii, Novosil'tsov, and Pestel' the nomadic tribes of Siberia could not be accommodated under a decree of blanket toleration. For Catherine and Pestel' the Jews constituted a challenge that could be met only by legalized segregation from Christian populations (in the Pale of Settlement), by limitations on Jewish movement within the empire, or, as Pestel' supposed, by “voluntary” resettlement of the Jews outside the empire. Only Novikov, Radishchev, Shcherbatov, and Murav'ev defended something like a general writ of toleration. Novikov, Radishchev, and Shcherbatov thought toleration was both a political and a moral virtue, but two of them (Novikov and Shcherbatov) still advertised its consistency with the established church. Radishchev and Murav'ev linked toleration with freedom of conscience and individual rights—Radishchev being more logically consistent in this respect than was Murav'ev.

Second, as the entire discussion has demonstrated, Russian thinking on religious toleration was, from beginning to end, hedged with qualifications about the desirable limits of toleration. There was in this respect continuity across the Muscovite and early imperial periods. True, Enlightenment influences tended to widen the parameters of discourse about toleration in Russia by facilitating broader claims about its desirability or applicability, yet substantively speaking none of the imperial theorists of toleration advanced much beyond Philaleth's pre-Enlightenment advocacy of toleration based on freedom of conscience and natural rights. Rather, the effect of Enlightenment tolerationism was to encourage Russian thinkers to root toleration in theories about civil and political rights or to ground it in natural virtue—that is, to do what Radishchev, Speranskii, Novosil'tsov, and Murav'ev accomplished in their theories. But except in Radishchev's case, the theory of toleration was always subordinated to practice.

Third, Russian thinking on toleration constituted a response to local religious and political circumstances and, after 1740, to the West European Enlightenment, but it did not constitute a national discourse or sustained, diachronic dialogue on the subject. In the pre-Petrine period writing on toleration had little resonance: Maksim Grek's polemics with Nikolai Nemchin were known only in high clerical and court circles; Philaleth and the Russian tolerationists in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth may not

have been known in Muscovy; Avvakum's autobiography containing his tolerationist plea circulated in manuscript among Old Believers, not among Nikonians. The best eighteenth-century works on toleration—Tatishchev's dialogue, Radishchev's poetry and his *Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow*, Shcherbatov's utopian "Journey to the Land of Ophir"—were either written "for the drawer" or were suppressed shortly after publication. None of the early nineteenth-century thinkers on toleration (Karamzin being the exception) were published. Novosil'tsov must have known of Speranskii's 1809 memorandum, Murav'ev knew of Speranskii's memorandum and Novosil'tsov's State Charter, but tolerationist writings of the period did not reach the public at large until decades later. The great exceptions to this pattern of limited circulation were Catherine's Instruction (printed in French, in a large edition), Novikov's essays (published in subscription-based Masonic journals), and Karamzin's *Letters of a Russian Traveler* and *History of the Russian State*. Paradoxically, although Karamzin was not the most radical tolerationist to appear in Russia before 1825, his views on the subject probably had the largest long-term readership and the biggest influence. His teaching treated toleration as a national virtue and as the wise result of political calculation about the need to accommodate the heterodox in a growing empire. His flattery of the educated public and of the crown was conducive to his idea's favorable reception.

Fourth, Russian thinking about toleration, with all its limitations and peculiarities, illuminates certain elements in the broader historiography of the Enlightenment. The Russian case shows that tolerationist thinking predated the West European Enlightenment; that for most thinkers social imperatives (the need for ethnic Russians to come to terms with their Tartar neighbors and with other Muslim groups, for example) and state interests in domestic tranquillity outweighed moral justifications for toleration; and that in certain respects moderate Enlightenment-era tolerantism did not represent a fundamental break with pre-Enlightenment thinking on the subject. Nor can it be said that most Russian advocates of toleration were pure secularists, the Russian pattern after 1740 being to combine secularist and religious impulses. Usually, the secular component of tolerationist thinking was presented as consistent with the established church, but secularist arrangements were not infrequently accompanied by open avowals of religious belief. Thus it is a serious mistake to treat the Russian Enlightenment (or Petrine-Catherinian "modernization" of the empire, for that matter) as a purely secularist enterprise. In this respect the Russian Enlightenment resembled more the German-Austrian model, not the French or British Enlightenment. It is a cliché among historians of the eighteenth

century that there was not one but many enlightenments. The Russian case confirms this proposition clearly.

The thorniest theoretical problem raised by Russian thinking on toleration bears on the proposition that the so-called enlightenment project was repressive rather than emancipatory. This proposition has been defended by various scholars: notably by the founders of the Frankfurt school of critical theory Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1944–1947); by their epigone Herbert Marcuse in *Repressive Tolerance* (1965); by Michel Foucault in *The Order of Things* (1966) and *Discipline and Punish* (1975); and by Barrington Moore in *Moral Purity and Persecution in History* (2000).¹⁵⁰ It must be said that very little of the theoretical criticism of the West European Enlightenment is helpful in understanding Russian tolerantism. Horkheimer and Adorno were mostly interested in explaining social conformism of industrial capitalist societies, the destructive myth of rationalism, and the deceptiveness of capitalist art; their discussion of the link between the Enlightenment and antisemitism aimed to explain Nazi racial antisemitism, not antisemitism generally. Marcuse sought to expose nineteenth- and twentieth-century liberalism's repressiveness. Foucault postulated a sharp epistemic break in Europe between classical modes of understanding the world and the modern social-scientific understanding of it, especially the social-scientific mania for objectification of reality and social control. Moore's idiosyncratic book was a philippic against Western monotheism that touched only briefly on the dangers of Enlightenment-revolutionary purism. For eighteenth-century Russia, where industrial capitalism had a mere toehold, where liberalism had not yet developed, where the social sciences had not taken root (and, it should be noted, the classical worldview described by Foucault also had little purchase), where Western-inspired Enlightenment ideas were not universally embraced even by the educated elite, and where the French Revolution found almost no would-be emulators, the twentieth-century critique of the Enlightenment seems misdirected.

However, two aspects of Russian tolerantism are illuminated by the critics of the Enlightenment. First, the selective religious toleration advocated in Russia logically entailed selective intolerance as the other side of the medal and therefore opened the door to schemes of surveillance and control of the state's purported religious enemies. Thus Russian tolerantism was simultaneously emancipatory and repressive. This dialectic was perhaps clearest in Catherine's Instruction, but it operated in the work of other thinkers too, except for Novikov and Radishchev. Second, in the Decembrists Murav'ev and Pestel' we see elements of a certain epistemic shift in discourse concern-

ing toleration. Murav'ev called for freedom of conscience to be extended to all groups except those engaging in unnatural acts or whose practices were based on unnatural principles. We can only guess what he meant, but here the proscription of Muslim polygamy and forced segregation of women advocated by Pestel' may be examples of what Murav'ev had in mind; so might an aversion to Russian castrati (*skoptsy*). Evidently, Murav'ev sought to ban religious practices that were, from an Western enlightened perspective, "irrational." The rationalist prejudices expressed by Pestel' against traditionalist Islam, against nomadism, and especially against "unenlightenable" Jews also instantiated an epistemic shift connected with Enlightenment intolerance. His surveillance scheme involving clandestine secret policemen in "Note concerning National Government" eerily evoked the unseen but all-seeing eye of Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon.

The fifth pattern in Russian thinking about toleration was that certain aspects of tolerantism—its selectivity and enlightened rationality—had worrying implications for those standing outside toleration's emancipatory writ. The negative features of Russia's Enlightenment project should not be absolutized, as articles by Robert Wokler and Elise Wirtschafter rightly insist.¹⁵¹ But to pretend that bright lights throw no shadows or that promises of a radiant future are necessarily salubrious would be unworthy of the Enlightenment and of us.¹⁵²

3. FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE IN THE CLERICAL IMAGINATION OF RUSSIAN ORTHODOX THOUGHT, 1801–1865

PATRICK LALLY MICHELSON

Orthodox priests and theologians in Russia's late imperial period (ca. 1861–1917) made for unlikely theorists and proponents of “freedom of conscience” (*svoboda sovesti*). Orthodoxy enjoyed an array of legal privileges as the “leading and dominant faith” in Russia's multiconfessional empire, privileges that many ranking members of the Church were reluctant to give up until the very end of the old regime.¹ Much of the conceptual edifice of Russian autocracy and nationality (*narodnost'*) at that time was premised on the centrality of Orthodoxy to the “monarchical nation,” as evidenced in part by representations of the last two tsars (1881–1917) as Russian Orthodox rulers.² Similarly, ideologies of Russian ethnic identity and the “invention” of that ethnicity's nation-state on the historical remnants of Kievan Rus' were increasingly associated with Orthodox confessional identity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.³

In doctrinal terms the Russian Church broadly conceived of itself as the sole guardian of “right belief” (*pravoverie*), which it protected from heterodoxy, paganism, and atheism in preparation for Christ's triumphant return and the establishment of the Kingdom of God. This self-perception was framed by an array of concrete experiences, including protracted, at times violent struggles against schism and sectarianism that were woven into the historical narrative, institutional memory, and administrative prerogatives of the Church.⁴ The ecclesiology of Russian Orthodoxy was similarly organized around the idea that salvation could occur only within the confines of the one, holy, catholic, and apostolic Church, which precluded the notion that personal conviction could lead one to God.⁵ And Protestantism, the Christian confession most commonly associated with the idea of freedom of conscience in genealogies of political, civil, and human rights, was widely believed by lay and clerical theologians to express an irreligious, ultimately atheistic attitude that directly threatened the cosmology of Russian Orthodox culture.⁶ For these reasons alone, it seems improbable that the Russian Church would have developed an argument for freedom of conscience, with its implied liberation of personal convictions from the institutional and epistemological restraints of positive religion. Yet throughout Russia's late imperial period Orthodox churchmen did just that. They appealed to freedom of conscience as a central tenet of their faith, even as something

unique to Orthodox Christianity, which necessitated actualization in social reality.⁷

Even more improbable to the claim that Russia's Synodal Church (1721–1917) generated a theory of freedom of conscience is the fact that it was these same issues and experiences—the privileges of establishment, Orthodoxy's place in ideologies of autocracy and nationalism, concern about confessional deviation and competition, the imperative to defend God's Word against its enemies—that structured the Church's articulation of freedom of conscience. To critics of the Russian Church the incongruity between what they recognized to be freedom of conscience and the ways in which Orthodox clergy interpreted that term reflected little more than the cynical opportunism of a religious elite struggling to maintain institutional and cultural dominance in an age increasingly shaped by the politics and epistemologies of secular modernity. However valid this critique may have been, it raises two important historical questions: what did Orthodox churchmen mean when they uttered the phrase *svoboda sovesti*; and how could apologists of the Russian Church, most of whom were committed to a scientific (*nauchnyi*) defense of their faith, coherently hold together the seemingly self-evident contradictions embedded in ecclesiastical articulations of freedom of conscience, especially ones that did not conform to conventional interpretations of what was meant by that term?⁸

Part of the answer to these questions resides in one of the central findings of this volume and the special issue of *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* from which this volume is partly derived. Freedom of conscience could be expressed in a variety of discrete, even antagonistic idioms that were almost exclusively intelligible to the ideological, sociocultural, and interpretive frameworks in which they originated and operated. We now know, for example, that there existed a state administrative discourse about freedom of conscience oriented toward the management of Russia's imperial order; a radical intelligentsia discourse organized around a revolutionary narrative that sought to liberate the Russian people (*narod*) from the psychological and institutional tyranny of religion; and a philosophy of history discourse that interpreted freedom of conscience as a cognitive necessity by which humans gained access to a transcendental moral order that manifested itself in legal and political reality as a rights-based society.⁹ This scholarly awareness of the diversity of interpretations in Russian public opinion and officialdom raises the possibility that the term “freedom of conscience,” despite its commonly assumed secularist and statist orientations, could viably exist within the linguistic and conceptual parameters of ecclesiastical Orthodoxy.

If this part of the answer to questions about how freedom of conscience could be meaningfully endorsed in the Russian Church is derived from historiographical developments, then the other part of the answer comes from history. The idiosyncrasies of Russian Orthodoxy's ecclesiastical discourse about freedom of conscience—its particular syntax and illocutionary intent—were largely shaped by church lexicon, clerical modes of exegesis, and an imperative to renew the Church. Well into the first half of the nineteenth century it was nearly impossible for an Orthodox priest to put together the words “freedom” (*svoboda*) and “conscience” (*sovest'*) in a way that would have been doctrinally or linguistically comprehensible to his confreres. During that time the individual words *svoboda* and *sovest'* found no correlation with each other in the language or self-conceptualization of the Church, much less with any of the discourses about freedom of conscience then in circulation in European philosophy and political science or, later, in Russian state and society. Yet certain historical events during the reign of Nicholas I (1825–1855) and the first decade of Alexander II's reign (ca. 1855–1864) helped reconfigure the meaning of those words, eventually making it possible, even necessary, for Orthodox priests and theologians to utter the phrase “freedom of conscience” in a way that expressed the hermeneutic traditions, theological norms, and practical concerns of the Russian Church. This is exactly what happened in the mid-1860s, when Archimandrite Ioann (Sokolov) (1818–1869), a former theology student at the Moscow Theological Academy (1838–1842) and an instructor and administrator at the clerical academies in St. Petersburg and Kazan (ca. 1844–1866), offered the first account of what freedom of conscience could mean from the perspective of ecclesiastical Orthodoxy.¹⁰ It is this history—a history of linguistic provenance, contextual formation, and ideological articulation—that the present chapter seeks to recover and examine.

In many ways, the historical process by which an ecclesiastical understanding of freedom of conscience emerged in the Russian Church can be read as a reaction to the advent of similarly worded but conceptually divergent interpretations in Russian officialdom, the nascent intelligentsia, and so-called liberal society. These conceptualizations predated the one that arose in the Church by a few years, which clearly suggests a chronological explanation as to why Orthodox churchmen felt compelled to offer an interpretation of freedom of conscience at the moment they did. More broadly, the appearance of those secular and statist interpretations of freedom of conscience posed a direct challenge to the prerogatives of the Church as Russia's dominant religious institution, as well as to the Church's pastoral

mission to cultivate Orthodox religiosity among parishioners and convert the non-Orthodox to right belief.

While not denying the validity of these explanations as to why the Church might have offered its own reading of freedom of conscience during Russia's Great Reform era (ca. 1861–1874), this chapter assumes a different orientation in its valuation of that particular utterance. The emphasis here is less on why the Church responded to theoretical and practical challenges to its authority and more on the content and structure of the interpretation itself. The intent in this approach is to discern the imagination of the Church's academically trained apologists as they responded to debates in state and society. In particular, we discover that Archimandrite Ioann's interpretation of freedom of conscience was informed by a wider renovationist consciousness that in its frustration with the present order of things sought to reform existing church-state relations, whereby the renovated Church, not the imperial office of the chief procurator (established in 1722), would have the final say in ecclesiastical affairs. The anticipation among churchmen was that such a reform would restore Russia's authentic Orthodox community, which many of them believed had been corrupted with the promulgation of Peter I's Spiritual Regulation and the establishment of the Holy Synod (1721). If conscience constituted the location at which the Orthodox faithful encountered God's judgment, as well as the God-given faculty by which human behavior was emotionally experienced as good or evil, then the Church must be free to minister this encounter and experience according to standards derived from scripture, doctrine, and canon. It was here that Orthodox priests and theologians began to argue that the Church, not the state, understood the real meaning of the terms "freedom," "conscience," and "freedom of conscience," and that it was the ecclesiastical interpretation of those concepts, as opposed to some ministerial gloss, that facilitated the creation of an integral community in Russia. In this sense, the ecclesiastical interpretation of freedom of conscience that developed during the reform era can be understood as a critique of the existing Synodal system of church governance; a vision of what would come after it; and a claim that in matters of faith, to which freedom and conscience belonged, the Church superseded the state.

The recovery and examination of this ecclesiastical interpretation also illuminates one of the pivotal moments in the history of the Russian Church: the emergence of its anti-intelligentsia polemics. Here, as in similar events in the Church's burgeoning critique of the intelligentsia, the dispute over what freedom of conscience meant was framed as a struggle between Orthodox and atheistic consciousness, between theocentric and anthropocentric an-

swers to questions about anthropology, psychology, history, and sociology.¹¹ The Church clustered its theological articulation of freedom of conscience around an array of categories particular to those areas of study—such as guilt, tranquillity, free will, necessity, morality, order and progress, the formation of cultural mores and the types of society that emanated from them—and then juxtaposed its understanding of freedom of conscience to what the Church considered to be the intelligentsia’s erroneous interpretation of that concept. The ideological contest between clergy and intelligentsia in this regard was over who best comprehended the content of human nature and thus was capable of regulating and directing human behavior so that it might achieve its imagined end. In this sense, the emergence of an ecclesiastical interpretation of freedom of conscience expressed an anxiety in Russia’s late imperial Church that some satanic force had been let loose in the world in the figure of the radical *intelligent* and his progenitor in the “West.”

This is not all that can be derived from a contextual analysis of how freedom of conscience assumed an ecclesiastical inflection in reform-era Russia. Although the present chapter devotes considerable effort to explaining what an Orthodox churchman like Archimandrite Ioann could have meant when he uttered the phrase *svoboda sovesti*, its other, if less obvious, intent is to decenter all normative claims made by historical actors in Russia that they alone possessed the correct interpretation of freedom of conscience. The ecclesiastical interpretation examined here was just one of several interpretations competing for linguistic and conceptual dominance at that time, each of which, despite claims to universality, was framed by the lexical field from which it emerged and in which it was made meaningful. When an Orthodox priest, state agent, radical *intelligent*, or liberal thinker argued for freedom of conscience, it is very likely that they did so in terms that were acceptable only to like-minded audiences, as partly evidenced at the turn of the century by debates over the meaning of freedom of conscience at the St. Petersburg Religious-Philosophical Gathering (1901–1903).¹² In that setting—which brought together prelates, priests, theologians, and Silver Age proponents of a “new religious consciousness” under the auspices of reconciling church and society—apologists for ecclesiastical Orthodoxy were concerned that the intelligentsia’s call to freedom of conscience would lead to sectarianism, atheism, and thus the dissolution of Orthodox Russia, while members of the intelligentsia were convinced that the Church’s notion of freedom of conscience constituted a form of institutional violence against personal conviction. Each thought the other was seeking to destroy the promise of Russia, however imagined. Herein resides one of the para-

doxes of freedom of conscience in late imperial Russia. A concept that was intended to generate unity—religious, imperial, revolutionary, or rights-based—actually contained within it many of the ideological and discursive antagonisms that were to sweep away the very world that freedom of conscience was expected to create.

The combined phrase *svoboda sovesti* had little if any salience in Russian Orthodox thought prior to the mid-nineteenth century. Instead, the word “conscience” was a discrete, largely uncontested term in the church lexicon of eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Russia. In homilies, manuals, and church dictionaries, *sovest'* was mainly understood to be a God-given moral faculty that helped humans distinguish good from evil, generated countervailing sensations of serenity (*sovest' tvorit bezmiatezhnu*) or remorse (*ugryzienie sovesti*), and provided the best means to regulate private and public behavior as well as guarantee loyalty to the throne.¹³ According to one churchman writing in 1829 Christian practice largely entailed cleansing and enlightening one's polluted conscience (*ochistit' i prosvetit' svoiu sovest', pomrachennuiu grekhami*) and then maintaining “its purity and integrity” through acts of renunciation and penance.¹⁴ By turning away from evil and choosing to do good, as well as by repenting for past sins, the Orthodox faithful would be rewarded with a “tranquil conscience” in this world and eternal salvation in the next, as the believer would be walking along “a peaceful path [*put' zhe miren*]” in accordance with God's will.¹⁵

What was not an element in these clerical interpretations of conscience was the idea that the individual must be free to follow his own convictions—that there was a right (*pravo*) to free conscience. Such an argument at that time would have been nearly impossible for Orthodox clergy to conceptualize or articulate due to the dominant discursive habitus in which they lived. The institutional and devotional language of the Russian Church was not grounded in the notion of rights. Rather, standards of ecclesiastical governance, worship, and Orthodox domesticity were derived from Holy Scripture, the Apostolic Canons, the *Great Menaion Reader*, lives of saints, monastic instructions, and various Slavonic exegeses of canon law. In these sources and in the way in which they were contemporaneously interpreted, the emphasis was on hierarchy, humility, veneration, tradition, and obligation, with specific prescriptions for liturgical and doctrinal deviation.¹⁶ Even when the term “right” entered ecclesiastical discourse, it usually denoted the institutional concept of vertical authority or the increasingly popular notion among Orthodox clergy that church and state had jurisdiction over different realms of human existence.¹⁷ The only notion of freedom related

to conscience in this context was freedom from being enslaved to one's passions.¹⁸ A believer could even have a strong conscience or a weak conscience (*nemoshchna sovest'*), understood here as proper or improper love for or knowledge about God, but not a free conscience.¹⁹ Indeed, from the perspective of contemporary Russian Orthodox theology, a well-functioning conscience necessitated submission to a higher authority.

Such a conceptualization of conscience and the specificity of its meaning was reflected during this period in the satirical, sentimental, and academic literature of educated society. Playwrights, poets, philologists, and literary critics commonly conceived of *sovest'* as a natural faculty by which humans achieved personal and social harmony or as a device of the mind that psychologically punished people for their misdeeds.²⁰ This general understanding of conscience as both an inner "moral force" that used judgment and punishment (*vozmezdnie*) to temper one's will (*volia*) and an "administrative principle" that directed individuals toward ethical behavior similarly informed Mikhail Speranskii's writings on the formation of law-based communities.²¹ Although the *Complete French and Russian Lexicon* (1798) included an entry for *liberté de conscience*, which was translated as "*svoboda sovesti*, liberty, the permission to confess a different faith from the one that dominates," a definition that mirrored the one given for *Gewissensfreiheit* in the *Complete German-Russian Lexicon* (1798), there was no such run-on entry for the words *svoboda* or *sovest'* in either the *Dictionary of the Russian Academy* (1822) or the Academy's *Dictionary of Church-Slavonic and Russian Language* (1847).²² The Russian Academy of Sciences defined "conscience" as "a force innate to the soul [*vrozhdennaia dushi sila*], the capacity to judge the moral good and ill of our actions," and later as "the inner consciousness [*vnutrennee soznanie*] of the moral quality of our actions." These definitions relied almost exclusively on citations from Jewish and Christian scriptures to elucidate their meaning.²³

More comprehensively, the concept of "rights" was not operative in the interventionist discourse and practices of Russian autocracy. Instead, the sociopolitical order of post-Petrine Russia was based on the prerogatives of the absolutist state to mobilize and direct the empire's legally ascribed social estates, including the clerical estate (*dukhovnoe soslovie*), for *raisons d'état*.²⁴ This is not to suggest that there was no language of freedom at the time. There was, even in regard to religion. But that language was largely informed by the principles of absolutism and empire. The "freedom of faith" (*svoboda very*) granted to the emperor's non-Orthodox subjects in the Digest of Laws (1832), for example, did not guarantee the individual some kind of unconditional freedom so that he might practice religion according to the

dictates of personal conviction. Rather, it allowed “all peoples” (*vse narody*) to practice the normative rituals and traditions of their officially recognized faith on the assumption that such blessings and prayers were beneficial to the empire’s welfare and vitality (*umnozhenie blagodenstviia i ukreplenie sily Imperii*).²⁵ The imperial regime was also deeply, if paradoxically, committed to maintaining Orthodoxy’s dominant position in the multiconfessional empire, which it did through the enforcement of civil laws that, among other things, privileged Russian Orthodoxy over other faiths, circumscribed the devotional behavior of Orthodox parishioners, and criminalized a variety of religious practices and sects.²⁶

In commentary about Orthodox doctrine from the late 1840s, the word *svoboda*, as well as the phrase “human freedom,” generally conveyed a sense of licentiousness, the “arbitrary, wanton actions” of postlapsarian humanity, which manifested and perpetuated spiritual distance from God.²⁷ Complete autonomy in this sense was a satanic problem to be overcome, as it stood opposed to God’s providential theonomy and led to psychological and social disorder. Juxtaposed to this type of freedom was what Metropolitan Stefan (Iavorskyi) (1658–1722) and Metropolitan Filaret (Drozdov) (1782–1867) called “Christian freedom” or “true evangelical freedom,” terms that expressed both a goal and a condition. In Stefan’s *The Rock of Faith*, which was republished for the first time in nearly a century in 1841–1842, authentic freedom entailed liberation from “the works of the devil and sin,” emancipation from Jewish laws and rituals, and the ability to fulfill God’s “moral law” without recourse to divine compensation or coercion—that is, the capacity to realize the demands of the Decalogue out of love for God. Those who promoted “false [*prityvornyi*] evangelical freedom” were opponents of the Lord seeking to confuse the faithful.²⁸ Similar terminology was used by Tikhon of Zadonsk (1724–1783) and Bishop Innokentii (Smirnov) (1784–1819), who rendered “true freedom” as slavery to Christ (*rab Khristov*), understood here as an ascetic reconfiguration of mind and body toward the characteristics of God.²⁹ Around 1850 the term “Christian freedom” would even come to designate the psychological state of being liberated “from the fear of death” through salvation in Christ.³⁰ What these various ecclesiastical interpretations of the word “freedom” suggest is that well into the nineteenth century most Orthodox priests and theologians would not have been able to join together the contextually antinomic terms *svoboda* and *sovest’* in a meaningful linguistic or conceptual cluster.

The absence of freedom of conscience as an intelligible utterance in the Russian Church at this time was also partly the result of the polemical and confessional hermeneutics that shaped the way in which clerical and lay his-

torians could think about Orthodoxy's relationship to other denominations and religions. Accounts of concrete historical events such as the baptism of Grand Prince Vladimir of Kiev (988), the Great Schism between Rome and Constantinople (1054), the Mongol invasion and domination of Rus' (ca. 1237–1480), the Union of Brest (1596), the Time of Troubles (1598–1613), and Russia's Schism between the established church and Old Belief (beginning in the 1660s) were organized around a historiographical narrative of ecclesiastical struggle and triumph in which the Russian Church preserved the sanctity of right belief against the forces of idolatry, heresy, and ungodliness.³¹ The truth of God's eternal Word was thought to reside exclusively in the traditions and sacraments of the Orthodox Church. It could not be found elsewhere.³²

Such an understanding also shaped the ecclesiastical language of religious toleration (*veroterpimost'*). Like the binary categories of orthodoxy and heterodoxy, as well as the clerical differentiation between genuine and false freedom, a distinction was made in the Russian Church between two types of toleration: a mendacious one premised on atheistic indifference toward religious belief that sought to eradicate faith in God; and an authentic one grounded in Christian love for one's neighbor (*liubov' k blizhnemu*) that sought to bring the wayward back to God through persuasion and forgiveness. Toleration was thus a missionary attitude and practice premised on the idea that conversion to right belief could not be coerced.³³ From this perspective advocating religious freedom as some kind of political or civil right that guaranteed the unconditional exercise of one's convictions would have been tantamount to abrogating the Church's evangelical responsibility to convert those living outside the Body of Christ.

What became linguistically possible by the mid-nineteenth century was an interpretation of freedom of conscience partly structured by the semantic antinomy of *svoboda* and *sovest'*. Freedom to an Orthodox churchman almost exclusively meant submission to God's will, and conscience was rendered as the God-given site where human behavior was emotionally experienced as good or evil. As such, the clergy's emerging notion of freedom of conscience could not help but denote something akin to subordination to God within the confines of the Orthodox Church. Yet these terms and narratives, as well as the meanings embedded in them, were not static. The ecclesiastical interpretations of freedom and conscience did not exist in a closed linguistic or ideological system, regardless of how circumscribed clerical hermeneutics might have been in the first half of the nineteenth century.³⁴ By the time Archimandrite Ioann published his study about the "religious foundations" and "historical origins" of freedom of conscience

in the mid-1860s, the thought world of Russian Orthodoxy had begun to function in a much wider milieu, one that was informed and provoked by new intellectual currents in educated society and the Church.

The rhetorical space in which an ecclesiastical interpretation of freedom of conscience could emerge from the Russian Church and the state's censorship regime was partly generated by a variety of events that transpired several years before the publication of Ioann's study. The Crimean War (1853–1856), which was commonly experienced and interpreted by the Orthodox faithful as a holy war, is likely to have constituted one of the first times that a Russian priest uttered the phrase *svoboda sovesti*, in this case the call to defend “freedom of conscience . . . and human rights [*prava chelovechestva*] for Eastern Christians” living under Ottoman rule.³⁵ Russia's defeat in that war, followed by a period of glasnost and reform during the first decade of Alexander II's reign, created an opening in public opinion whereby the existing imperial order, including church affairs, could be thought anew.³⁶ Several lay Orthodox thinkers, for example, interpreted Russia's failure to defend the Crimean Peninsula against Orthodoxy's confessional opponents to be symptomatic of a spiritual malaise brought about by bureaucratic absolutism, a diagnosis premised on the idea that authentic Orthodoxy, however imagined, could only flourish and invigorate Russia once the state was removed from matters of faith.³⁷

This critique was coupled with a development in Russian historiography initiated in the late 1850s by Afanasii Shchapov (1830–1876), who interpreted Russia's Old Belief Schism as a popular democratic revolt against the political culture of autocracy, an interpretation that Shchapov formulated at the Kazan Theological Academy during Ioann's tenure there as rector (1857–1864).³⁸ Subsequently, members of educated society, as well as radical émigrés like Alexander Herzen, were increasingly drawn toward secular notions of religious liberty as a means both to ameliorate the plight of Old Believers and to bring about a new sociopolitical regime in Russia.³⁹ Appeals to freedom of conscience soon became commonplace among religious minorities and members of the Russian Church seeking redress from civil laws that criminalized dissent. Even Petr Valuev, minister of internal affairs (1861–1868), invoked the language of freedom of conscience in his attempts to manage religious conflicts among Christian denominations in the imperial borderlands, sometimes to the detriment of Russia's established religion.⁴⁰

Yet it was not just these extraecclesial episodes that helped elicit a freedom of conscience discourse in the Church. Other developments particular

to the intellectual and institutional history of Russian Orthodoxy played equally important roles in the formation of that new utterance. Arguably the most significant development in this regard was the advent of what might best be called a restorationist consciousness among educated clergy, as well as among lay Orthodox thinkers like Aleksei Khomiakov, Ivan Kireevskii, and other early Slavophiles, whose theological and confessional writings were to influence not only Archimandrite Ioann but successive generations of Orthodox priests and theologians.⁴¹ This consciousness, the structural lineaments of which can be traced back to a complex of historical episodes and personal experiences that occurred during the first half of the nineteenth century, was organized around concerns that the present Church in Russia had deviated from the evangelical mission, textual foundation, and canonical tradition of true Orthodoxy.⁴² The principal cause of Orthodoxy's deviation was state intervention in ecclesiastical affairs and religious consciousness.

This part of the argument mainly derived from an essentialist claim that the Orthodox Church constituted a divine sanctuary, as opposed to an earthly regime, into which members voluntarily entered so that they could freely subordinate their wills to the will of God. The true Church had to operate in the world independently of institutions that relied on human-made laws and the threat of physical violence. With the advent of absolutism in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Russia and the criminalization of dissent by the state, that aspect of Orthodox ecclesiology had been violated. According to this narrative religious faith was coerced in Russia, a legal practice that contradicted the restorationist idea that right belief was something that could not be compelled, as compulsion was anathema to the characteristics of God and the example of Christ. Central to this postulation was a historiographical formula that traced the rise of religious indifference and atheism among educated Russians, as well as the material and "spiritual" poverty of parish priests, back to Peter I's Spiritual Regulation, whereby a secular office, not a clerical one, oversaw ecclesiastical affairs.⁴³ What was required to overcome these challenges to Orthodoxy and the social and psychological traumas that they were imagined to induce was the restoration of the Russian Church to its authentic, pre-Petrine ecclesiology.⁴⁴ It was this restorationist mindset with its emphasis on the dilemmas of church-state relations that shaped Ioann's theory of freedom of conscience.

One aspect of this restorationist program that enabled the emergence of a freedom of conscience discourse in the Church was the establishment of new ecclesiastical institutions and periodicals intended to facilitate the return to true Orthodoxy. A particularly important episode here was the

founding of clerical academies in the dioceses of St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Kiev during the middle part of Alexander I's reign (ca. 1809–1819), followed several decades later by the founding of the Kazan Academy (1842). It was in this institutional setting, where Ioann studied and worked for most of his adult life, that restorationist consciousness in the Church came to the fore, mainly through a massive research project spearheaded by Metropolitan Filaret (Drozdov) to translate the writings of the church fathers into the vernacular and to support those translations with a scholarly apparatus of exegesis, history, and biography. With the completion of the first installment of these translations and studies at the Moscow Academy (ca. 1843–1865), an array of anthropological and ecclesiological categories drawn from the corpora of Athanasius and the Cappadocian fathers systematically entered Russian Orthodox thought.⁴⁵ One practical result of this research project was the recovery and reconfiguration of patristic language about Christian freedom, vocation, and dignity among educated clergy—a result that is apparent in the textual citations, conceptual formulations, and appeals to Orthodox tradition that make up Ioann's interpretation of freedom of conscience.

The conceptual innovations initiated by the imperative to restore the Russian Church to its ideal state were not without their challenges to Orthodox doctrine and ecclesiastical order. In many ways Ioann's articulation of freedom of conscience, uttered from a position of institutional authority and from the perspective of apologetics, was just as much a response to these innovations as it was shaped by them. The principal intellectual challenge to Orthodoxy during Ioann's long tenure in seminary and academy (ca. 1832–1866) arose from an influx of German philosophical and theological categories, most of which found their way into the Russian Church via the clergy's appropriation of Slavophile religious thought and the Church's own philosophical turn during the first half of the nineteenth century. The 1814 charter that founded the Church's clerical academies, for example, grounded what its authors called "evangelical truth" in the tenets of moral philosophy, ancient philosophy, and the history of philosophy. It likewise sought to conform the study of church history to the philosophy of history.⁴⁶ Driven by a pedagogical obligation to adapt their faith to contemporary standards of scholarship, instructors at the Church's academies translated works of German philosophers and theologians into Russian, which in turn were discussed in informal reading groups and incorporated into the curriculum and research agendas of academic Orthodoxy. One of the largest venues in which German philosophy and theology entered the Moscow Academy was the lecture hall of Archpriest Fedor Golubinskii (1797–1854), who not only helped translate the church fathers into Russian as part of

Metropolitan Filaret's restorationist project but also taught metaphysics and the history of philosophy to several generations of clerical students (ca. 1818–1854), including Ioann. Although Golubinskii's lectures were framed by the counter-Enlightenment writings of Franz Xaver von Baader and Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi and his own conservative ecclesiastical reading of Immanuel Kant, the breadth and novelty of their content meant that students were introduced to an array of provocative concepts that had the potential to destabilize church doctrine, which in turn precipitated a clerical reaction to what Metropolitan Filaret later called the “dogmatic terrorism” (*dogmaticheskii terrorizm*) of German Protestantism.⁴⁷

One such source for this doctrinal instability and its corresponding reaction, especially in regards to Orthodox conceptualizations of freedom and conscience, came from the writings of Friedrich Schelling, whose work was critically engaged around this time by Golubinskii, the early Slavophiles, and other members of educated society and clergy.⁴⁸ The problem of freedom (*Freiheit*) was one of the central concerns of early German Romantics like Schelling, who recoiled from the mechanical determinism associated with Spinoza's ideas about God and nature and from the emphasis on spontaneity and self-positing in Kantian and Fichtean notions of freedom. Dissatisfied with these philosophical constructs, which from the Romantic perspective either obliterated free will in the inexorable laws of natural causality or divorced it from any determinative cause, Schelling put forward the idea that the self was truly free only when it knowingly and willingly participated in providence.⁴⁹ Such an interpretation of freedom, in which each rational act was perceived to be an expression of God's will, meant that the individual shared some kind of identity with God. Where this freedom was performed was in the mind's capacity to choose good or evil. Here the struggle took place within and against the self, which had the darkness of evil in it but could overcome that darkness by acting in accordance with the “inner voice of [its] own better nature.” Schelling labeled this voluntary, self-conscious commitment to the divine necessity of doing good “religiosity” and “conscientiousness” (*Gewissenhaftigkeit*).⁵⁰ In Schelling's scheme freedom became operative in the discernment of God-given conscience; conscience was manifested in the free choice to do what God ordained; and religion entailed private and public behavior that conformed to the divine dictates of good conscience.

As these aspects of Schelling's philosophy found their way into Russian Orthodox thought—mainly through studies about anthropology, psychology, jurisprudence, and history written by former clerical students who went on to teach at imperial universities and/or the Church's institutions

of higher education—the ecclesiastical understanding of the terms *svoboda* and *sovest'* was invigorated. Schelling was imagined by several of his Russian Orthodox readers to offer both a philosophical justification of faith in the Christian God and a philosophy of history and religion that privileged the Christian Church as the providential embodiment of authentic community.⁵¹ Similarly, Schelling's conceptualization of freedom was familiarly rendered in the lexicon of Russian Orthodox theology as a psychological disposition generated by God (*rozhdena ot Boga*), whereby the "free human" (*svobodnyi chelovek*), who shared conditional identity with God (*Bogopodobnyi chelovek*), acted morally not out of fear but because he had been liberated from all "coercion" and as such was self-consciously living "under grace."⁵² Schelling's notion of conscience was explained in terms that partly corresponded to clerical notions of *sovest'*, understood in this context as a cognitive and emotional faculty that could not be derived from experience; that by its very nature was "good"; and that could make a person feel tranquil, awe-struck (*oglushennyi*), remorseful, or anxious depending on whether one's behavior conformed to or deviated from God's will.⁵³

Yet embedded in these Schellingian categories were tendencies that could threaten the authority and cosmology of the restorationist Church. The ecclesiastical problem with Schelling's religious philosophy and its Russian appropriation revolved around the standard by which freedom and conscience were determined to be authentic. Instead of relying on Christian scripture, church doctrine, and the normative hermeneutics derived from them, some of Schelling's proponents in Russia, like Aleksandr Galich (1783–1848), appealed to the "pure spirit of religion" to make that determination, arguing that the "positive form of confession" embodied in historical religions constituted a barrier to actual freedom and genuine conscience. What was required to overcome this obstacle was emancipation from the epistemological and institutional constraints of organized religion. Only after "man clearly recognizes that he is higher than the law [*vyshe zakona*], that through his own efforts he has acquired that priceless treasure, freedom," Galich declared, could *sovest'* merge with blessedness, virtue, worldly wisdom (*mudrost' zhiteiskaia*), and love, rendered here as "reconciliation with God."⁵⁴ Some of the philosophical and theological categories just then beginning to circulate in church schools and imperial universities were thus organized around the decidedly anticlerical notion that freedom, conscience, and religion must be grounded in and directed toward a nonconfessional, extraecclesial understanding of God.

The implication of this reading of Schelling—and by extension the many provocations generated in Russia at that time by German philosophy and

theology—was that as the Russian Church learned new ways to talk about Orthodoxy, its institutional and doctrinal authority came under threat from those very innovations. The Church’s normative understanding of what was meant by *svoboda* and *sovest’* was simultaneously reinforced and challenged by the practical and conceptual results of ecclesiastical restorationism, as well as by contemporary events and historiographical developments. As the phrase “freedom of conscience” began to be uttered in state and society in the early part of Alexander II’s reign, the Russian Church found itself compelled to respond in a way that would be meaningful to its audience, coherent to its hermeneutics and teachings, and protective of its prerogatives. It was in this context that an ecclesiastical interpretation of freedom of conscience emerged in Russia in the figure of Archimandrite Ioann (Sokolov), the Church’s first theorist of freedom of conscience.

As Paul Werth noted in one of the *Kritika* articles that prompted this volume, Archimandrite Ioann’s “On Freedom of Conscience: The Religious Foundations and Historical Origins of this Freedom” can be read as a “critical analysis” of freedom of conscience.⁵⁵ Serially published between September 1864 and November 1865 in *Khristianskoe chtenie* (Christian Reading), the scholarly journal of the St. Petersburg Theological Academy and a leading organ in Metropolitan Filaret’s restorationist project, Ioann’s study begins with a condemnation of freedom of conscience as articulated by “liberal minds [*liberal’nye umy*].”⁵⁶ The principal problem for Ioann was that “freethinking people” incorrectly interpreted religion (*religiia*) as “a matter of conscience” that must enjoy unconditional freedom in its personal exercise. This erroneous postulation was the result of “modern enlightenment and civilization,” which had infiltrated not only educated society but also the imperial state and the Orthodox Church. What was required to recover the positive meaning and practice of freedom of conscience, Ioann insisted, was a correct interpretation of religion, since religion constituted the sole criterion of what freedom of conscience could possibly signify.⁵⁷

The fact that Ioann indicated that *svoboda sovesti* could be accurately defined suggests that his study was much more than a critique. It was also an exegetical, apologetic, and historical argument for an Orthodox interpretation of freedom of conscience, one that was meant to counter the intelligentsia’s atheistic reading of human nature and progress, challenge the existing imperial system of church governance, and elucidate the Church’s practical contribution to the creation of psychological and social harmony in Russia. As such, an examination of Ioann’s text that is sensitive to both the linguistic provenance of the terms *svoboda* and *sovest’* and to the intellectual and

institutional history of Russian Orthodox thought helps reveal the clerical imagination of churchmen who, like Ioann, experienced their era as one of innovation, transformation, and anticipated restoration. It is with this text that we can identify and unpack what terms like church, state, religion, and, of course, freedom of conscience might have meant in their ecclesiastical inflection. More broadly, a textual analysis of Ioann's study contributes to a historical understanding of those ideological and discursive fissures particular to Russia's late imperial period.

Making religion the center of his argument about freedom of conscience required Ioann to explain what was meant by that word, as its meaning was contested at that time.⁵⁸ Deploying the same binary categories that informed the historiography of right belief and the doctrine of Christian freedom examined earlier in this chapter, Ioann demarcated two different understandings of religion: an erroneous one and an authentic one. Premised on the notion that "a person's relationship to God" did not require "external authority [*vneshnii avtoritet*]" to direct (*upravliat*) humans back to their Creator, the false interpretation of religion made "two important mistakes." First, it subordinated religion to *zeitgeist* (*dukh vremeni*)—that is, it understood religion as a construct that changed, and by necessity had to change, in accordance with the dialectics of history and culture. Second, such an interpretation did not judge the content of religion according to "positive foundations," by which Ioann meant "the revealed teachings of God disclosed in the Church." Rather, it evaluated religion's content according to some "spirit of religion," the same Schellingian terminology used thirty years earlier by Aleksandr Galich. For Ioann, this immanentist interpretation of religion had a devastating effect on psychology and society. Now oriented toward the dictates of empiricism and personal autonomy, humans were becoming more interested in enriching their social life than in fostering an ascetic life, understood here as the key to safeguarding Orthodox Russia and realizing the Kingdom of God.⁵⁹ Concern about the teachings of Christ had been displaced by politics, a displacement exemplified by the fact that church rights (*pravo tserkovnoe*) were now secondary to state rights. Instead of trying to direct human "thoughts and enlightenment" toward divine truth, the false priority of the day was to emancipate the individual from all constraints, regardless of the outcome.⁶⁰

To counter this interpretation, Ioann appealed to what he called the "one, true religion." In Ioann's formulation genuine religion constituted a divine-human relationship initiated by God (*proiskhodiashchii ot samogo Boga*) and "independent of the person" (*nezavisimyi ot cheloveka*) through which revealed truth entered the world. The other aspect of religion was that

it presupposed “a positive doctrine, definable expectations, and real judgment [*deistvitel’nyi sud*] over humanity.”⁶¹ According to Ioann, the confessional expression of authentic religion was Christianity, a faith grounded in divine revelation, articulated in Holy Scripture, illuminated by dogma, and preserved in the Church. The Christian religion offered the exclusive path to revealed truth, which alone determined whether or not conscience could be free. Because freedom ostensibly was about establishing and cultivating the correct relationship between God and man, it necessarily had to be evaluated, as well as formulated, from the standards and traditions of the religion that most fully embodied that relationship: Orthodox Christianity.⁶²

Ioann’s reading of the Gospels left no doubt in his mind that the Savior did not countenance the type of religious freedom envisioned by secular thinkers in state or society. Christ radically distinguished between the Christian faithful and “people not disposed to faith.” Those who accepted Christ gained eternal salvation. Those who denied him were to suffer God’s wrath. The choice was exclusive: either the way of the Lord or “the way of people.” This was a God who did not “bring peace but a sword,” and who asked that his followers turn against their families and their own material and physical well-being by taking up the cross (Matthew 10:32–39), declarations that in Ioann’s estimation could not be more “powerful and decisive” in demonstrating Christ’s opposition to “freedom of opinions and conscience.” The freedom offered by Christ was “not a right or the property of a person [*sobstvennost’ cheloveka*] but a gift of grace [*dar blagodati*]” from God.⁶³ Similarly, the mission bequeathed to the apostles at the Last Supper (John 17) was to bring about “the perfect unity of faith and spirit among Christians,” a duty that could be achieved only by establishing the salvific truth of the Lord. Christian unity necessitated the “subordination of all” to the teachings of Christ. From this reading of John, as well as from a critical interpretation of a speech by Lord Palmerston (August 1864) and an assessment of the “extreme disintegration of opinions about religious matters in [contemporary] Germany,” Ioann deduced an ecumenical argument against religious freedom. If the Christian mission was to establish a universal community in the Body of Christ, then Christianity as a confession could not be organized around personal convictions. That would generate cacophony and disorder. Instead, Christians were expected to “separate themselves from the world—that is, from a society of people who think differently,” so as to “preserve the Word of salvation in all of its purity and in the integrity of divine revelation.”⁶⁴

According to Ioann, the institution that exclusively embodied and sustained this mission was the Orthodox Church, which by its very existence

constituted a repudiation of the claim that religious freedom was countenanced by the tenets of Christianity. The Church was the “fullest expression” of “unity of faith and spirit . . . on earth,” a phrase that Ioann often repeated in his article. Yet the Church did not originate in this world. As the divinity of Christ was revealed to Peter not by “flesh and blood . . . but [by] my Father in heaven” (Matthew 16:17), so too was the sanctity of the Church. This contention led Ioann to elucidate an essence of the Church and to distinguish it from human-made organizations and human imperatives. The Church was not just some “gathering [*sobranie*] of believers in Christ.” It was instead “a society [*obshchestvo*] of Christians, united by the unity of faith and spirit, which was affirmed in the precise, defined confession of God’s teachings.” Membership in this community, which was closed to those who “did not consider themselves obliged” to adhere to ecclesiastical standards (*pravila*), necessitated practical, emotional, and intellectual commitment to the divine truths revealed to and preserved in the Church.⁶⁵

Based on this teaching, the Church could not be a place in which Christians enjoyed “independent freedom of opinions or conscience.” Its commission was to spread the Gospel, affirm the Kingdom of God, and actualize the “highest spiritual-moral perfection of people.” The authority to realize these goals had been given to Peter and his successors by Christ so that they could guide the Christian flock back to God. Here Ioann quoted from Matthew 16:19: “I will give you [Peter] the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and whatever you bind on earth will be bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth will be loosed in heaven.” In his exegesis of this passage Ioann oriented the semantic content of the terms “to bind” and “to loose” toward a normative understanding of *svoboda* and *sovest’*. The authority that Christ conferred on the apostles included the “right . . . to bind human conscience,” as evidenced by the scriptural and doctrinal stipulation that there is but one path to God. And “to loose,” which in colloquial Russian could be read as “to permit” or “to allow,” meant only one thing: the conscience of those who stood before God was liberated “from the bonds [*uzy*] of sin and the imputation of guilt by the gracious power of Christ.” The Church was not commissioned by Christ to grant freedom to conscience, but rather “to forgive . . . matters of conscience.”⁶⁶

It was at this point that Ioann began to direct his argument about freedom of conscience toward a distinctly ecclesiastical interpretation of *svoboda sovesti*, which he believed existed in the original Church but had been forgotten in the present Church and thus was in need of restoration. Hints of this shift appeared in the first few pages of the study. For Ioann the ex-

pression “true freedom of conscience in Christianity” meant Christ’s exhortation that whoever “acknowledges me before others, I will also acknowledge before my Father in heaven; but whoever denies me before others, I will also deny before my Father in heaven” (Matthew 10:32–33).⁶⁷ Most of Ioann’s explication of *svoboda sovesti*, however, did not derive from an exegesis of Jesus’s sayings in the Gospels. Relying on the epistles, the Apostolic Canons, and the church fathers—especially Irenaeus, Tertullian, Cyprian, and Lactantius—Ioann situated the development of the Church’s freedom of conscience discourse in the early Christian context of mission, conversion, heresy, persecution, and worship. The concept of “freedom of conscience” delineated in the Gospels was not unmediated as it entered Christian institutions and became formalized in doctrine. Rather, it was formulated in response to the concrete problems, social realities, and intellectual challenges confronted by the Church at that time, which eventually necessitated the subordination of reason and “individual conscience” to the “higher authority of the Church.”⁶⁸ In Ioann’s mind, it was this history that the Russian Church had inherited, a history that should inform ecclesiastical interpretations of freedom of conscience.

The central aspect of Ioann’s theory of freedom of conscience was in the practical expression and institutional orientation of Christian conscience. Ioann countered the argument that the Church was little more than a “society of unthinking people” or a “mechanistic organism” in which there was no place for the “rational and moral rights of man,” as contemporary critics of the Church contended.⁶⁹ Ioann located his rebuttal to this critique in an interpretation of Christian martyrdom. The Christian faithful expressed commitment to the teachings of Christ in their willful acceptance of torture and execution. Such devotion to Christianity could not have been sustained, Ioann deduced, if the Church had been organized around coercion and deceit. The Church’s only bind on its members was salvific truth. For Ioann this devotion to Christ and his Body was an “act of complete freedom.” It was a decision and achievement of the “moral will—that is, of freedom,” which repudiated compulsion in matters of faith for the sake of the Lord and his truth. As a result of this martyrdom experience the early Church developed “spiritual disciplines” (*dukhovnye nakazaniia*) that did not denigrate human dignity, “the moral significance of the person,” or the social position of those outside the Church. The “cleansing of conscience” specific to Christianity was achieved exclusively through confession and contrition. As such, Ioann argued, the goal of “free repentance” in the Church was “not flagellation of the free . . . spirit” (*ne bichevanie svobodnogo dukha*). Its intent was to heal the soul (*vrachevanie dushi*) corrupted by sin.⁷⁰

Until this point in the text Ioann's interpretation of *svoboda sovesti* largely stayed within the linguistic and conceptual confines of church lexicon. Freedom was generally rendered as liberation from sin in imitation of Christ and in subordination to church doctrine; and conscience was understood to be a form of moral consciousness or type of moral cognition that, although perverted by sin, could be cleansed and thus reoriented toward God through acts of contrition and renunciation. Yet Ioann did not limit his explication of freedom of conscience to these conventions. Rather, most of his analysis focused on how Orthodox freedom of conscience had been corrupted over time and how it could be restored in the present day.

In Ioann's account of church history—which took the shape of a philosophy of history that identified recurring patterns in church-state relations—the “true freedom of conscience” taught by Christ came under threat the very moment that the Roman Empire made Christianity its established religion. The principal dilemma initiated by Constantine the Great's appointment as “bishop of the Church's external affairs” was the subordination of “doctrine, liturgy, hierarchy [*sviashchennonachalie*], and pastoral work in the realm of Christian conscience and morality” to secular authority. This event introduced an antinomy into the structure of church history. Although Christianity materially benefited from its alliance with the imperial regime, such a relationship meant that ecclesiastical administration—which should be based on “spiritual methods, doctrine, sacraments, and clerical courts”—was now organized around “governmental, civil methods.” As a result, the Church lost its independence and vitality, which in turn made it incapable of combating false doctrines and heresy. The Church's evangelical mission to expand “true freedom of religion in the world, the freedom of good conscience among people,” had been subordinated to *raisons d'état* and partisan politics.⁷¹

Ioann identified a single cause to explain how empire came to violate the Orthodox Church and distort its mission. “There were no other reasons” for this perversion, the archimandrite declared, “than the crude, undeveloped, irreligious consciousness of [the state's] own power in the Church. . . . In a word, it was despotism, which emanated in a degenerative form from the state's unlimited, insatiable intervention in church affairs.” This “despotism of civil authority in spiritual matters” was not just detrimental to the Church. It also generated the “greatest disorder and distress in society and the state,” as Christianity was now enforced through violence.⁷² These results were replicated throughout church history as the problem remained the same: state intervention in ecclesiastical affairs and Christian

consciousness. Having brought the Church under its tutelage, the state “suf-focated it.” No longer were “matters of faith and conscience” the exclusive domain of the Church as proscribed by scripture and positive religion. In the age of empire Christianity had become entangled in civil concerns and turned into a matter of state. Despite efforts by Athanasius and the Cap-padocian fathers to keep conscience under the jurisdiction of the Church, Christian freedom of conscience had been forfeited to the prerogatives of empire, which led to individual and collective discord as divine truth was sacrificed to human falsehood.⁷³ Left unchecked by Christian principles and mores, the state drew on its own imperatives to determine the reach of its authority. The historical result was the rise of an anti-Christian state, albeit one that deployed Christian signs and symbols.⁷⁴

In this version of church history Ioann analogically shifted the de-bate about freedom of conscience to his own time. The state’s promotion of “complete freedom of religion,” Ioann declared with reference to the pre-Christian Roman Empire, was nothing more than an expression of pa-gan irreligiosity and polytheism. The state’s intervention in ecclesiastical affairs, this time corresponding to the political “despotism” of Byzantium, violated the jurisdiction that had been bequeathed to the Church by Christ. Juxtaposed to these images were those of evangelical Christianity and the early Church, which together had transformed religious consciousness and practice by creating an entirely new way to talk about and act on con-science. If made autonomous, a person’s conscience would remain polluted by sin, leaving the individual isolated from God and his coming kingdom. If coerced, conscience would be distorted, leading to anomie and damna-tion. The purification (*ochishchenie*) of conscience could be actualized only in sacramental forgiveness and clerical guidance. Because of its evangelical mission and its historical experience, the Christian Church alone knew this formula. It had received the means to acquire good conscience from Christ and had internalized the challenges of heterodoxy and persecution.⁷⁵ The Orthodox Church, both in its earliest manifestation and in its future res-toration, constituted the exclusive site in which true freedom of conscience was understood, practiced, and realized. In this way Ioann made the ren-ovated Church, not the imperial state or civil law, the means by which an integral community would be actualized in Russia. This was what the phrase *svoboda sovesti* meant when uttered in an Orthodox idiom shaped by the apologetics and hermeneutics of clerical education and framed by the Church’s growing restorationist project. It was a freedom invested with ecclesiastical authority, a conscience directed toward the dictates of posi-

tive religion, and more broadly an illiberal discourse that was simultaneously antiabsolutist and anti-intelligentsia. The concept of *svoboda sovesti* to emerge from the Orthodox Church in the mid-1860s was thus almost exclusive to its own linguistic and experiential frame.

The emergence of a freedom of conscience discourse in the Russian Church in the 1860s represents a significant development in the intellectual history of Russian Orthodox thought. The previously antinomic words *svoboda* and *sovest'* had been put together in an innovative way that reveals the Church's capacity to respond to questions of the day, in this instance whether or not citizens of the Russian Empire should enjoy freedom of conscience. For Archimandrite Ioann (Sokolov), the answer to that question was yes. But it was not the type of freedom of conscience then being articulated in imperial ministries, legal philosophies, or intelligentsia circles. It was, rather, a freedom of conscience derived from normative readings of scripture, doctrine, and church history that sought to bring Christian believers closer to God through acts of contrition and renunciation. Freedom of conscience in this context meant freedom from sin and the bad conscience it generated.

With Ioann's focus on questions related to human nature, psychology, politics, historiography, and society, the emergence of this discourse among clergy also demonstrates the Church's growing engagement with the social, behavioral, and, later, medical sciences.⁷⁶ Here we can start to see what was historically significant about Ioann's interpretation of freedom of conscience. It constituted a linguistic and conceptual construct in which the Church began to frame its polemics against secular and statist challenges to ecclesiastical authority and Orthodox doctrine. Ioann's criticism that "liberal minds" and "freethinking people" misunderstood what freedom of conscience really meant was premised on his claim that their worldview was anti-Christian, a reproach that conservative churchmen were to level against the intelligentsia and progressive theologians until the end of the old regime. Likewise, Ioann's condemnation of state intervention in ecclesiastical affairs became one of the central motifs in the Church's imperative to reestablish the patriarchate, a reform that was thought to be key to restoring authentic Orthodoxy in Russia. Freedom of conscience was imagined by Orthodox churchmen such as Ioann to be a theological answer to a host of epistemological, political, and cultural dilemmas. But this answer generated its own problem. Each articulation of freedom of conscience and the imagination that informed it—whether imperial, revolutionary, philosophical, or in this case ecclesiastical—operated within its

own interpretive tradition and was oriented toward its own goal. There was no consensus in Russia's late imperial period as to what was meant by freedom, conscience, or freedom of conscience. Instead, there was competition and disagreement. What in the 1860s was expected to bring unity to Russia instead helped exacerbate the ideological divisions that framed the last decades of the old regime.

4. FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE, FREEDOM OF CONFESSION, AND "LAND AND FREEDOM" IN THE 1860S

VICTORIA FREDE

In *On Liberty* (1859) John Stuart Mill vigorously promoted freedom of conscience as an "indefeasible right." All citizens should be treated as equal under the law, regardless of their religious affiliation or lack of religious affiliation. Under no circumstance should state and society set about determining what constitutes religious truth or what kind of behavior is appropriate for religious believers. Debating religion and ethics in the press was healthy, but individuals should not be forced to make their beliefs known to the public, nor should they feel compelled to identify themselves with any church. No human being should ever be "accountable to others for his religious belief."¹ In Russia radicals and liberals were inclined to agree with Mill. All objected to the regime of censorship in imperial Russia that stifled the expression of heterodox views, to the state's denial of a right to privacy, and to the prosecution of dissenters.

When the revolutionary movement coalesced early in the reign of Alexander II, participants hoped to take advantage of discontent among peasant sectarians and Old Believers. By making religious freedom one of their demands, they sought to unite with dissenters against the imperial state. Yet as their activities shifted from London to St. Petersburg, then to the Russian provinces, revolutionaries came to fear that their conception of freedom was fundamentally different from that of peasant dissenters. Not only did the complex of ideas that Mill packaged as an "indefeasible right" have to be separated into two principles, but these principles began to seem incompatible. One was freedom of confession—the right of all religious believers to fulfill the ritual demands of their faith. The other was freedom of conscience—the right to speak and think as they wished, the right to decide which religious or ethical systems to assent to, the right not to identify with any religion at all, and most critically, the right not to be compelled to make their religious beliefs known if they did not want to. This chapter seeks to explain why freedom of conscience and confession posed such problems for radicals by concentrating on the experiences of Russia's first revolutionary group, Land and Freedom (*Zemlia i volia*), in the early 1860s.

As is well known, freedom of confession, the right of individuals to practice whatever religion they choose, was conspicuous largely for its absence in imperial Russia. The state practiced religious tolerance to an ex-

tent, recognizing several major religions alongside Orthodox Christianity, most notably Catholicism, Lutheranism, Judaism, and Islam. State policies toward these religions remained inconsistent, however, and dissent within them was forbidden: the state prosecuted heterodoxy, targeting Old Believers and sectarians with special vigor. Converting from one denomination to another was made difficult, and conversion from Orthodoxy was strictly forbidden. Adherence to *some* religion was obligatory.² The situation did not change in any fundamental way when Alexander II ascended the throne in 1855, although some Old Believers hoped that policies of greater tolerance would be part of the package of reforms he introduced.³

Figures who played a key role in the foundation of Land and Freedom—Nikolai Ogarev, Vasilii Kel'siev, and Nikolai Serno-Solov'evich—looked specifically to sectarians and Old Believers as the segments of peasant society most likely to rebel, an idea they adopted from Alexander Herzen. They would promote freedom of confession in broadsheets that targeted these groups. The first Land and Freedom was an umbrella organization called together between late 1861 and early 1862 by activists in St. Petersburg. Its purpose was to coordinate revolutionaries throughout Russia in anticipation of a major peasant uprising, which was expected in the spring of 1863, when the emancipation of the serfs was scheduled to take effect. It dissolved in 1864.⁴ In its revolutionary proclamations Land and Freedom pursued two key goals: the immediate redistribution of land to the peasants and the creation of representative government at all levels, from the capital to the regions to the villages.⁵

Although the group was short-lived, it was important as the first revolutionary organization in 1860s Russia—one that, as Abbott Gleason commented, “provided many Russian radicals with their first organizational experience.” It was also important as a “transitional organization,” operating at a time when liberal and radical opponents of autocracy were just beginning to part ways.⁶ As such, participants in this organization first confronted many of the core problems that revolutionary populists would continue to face in and after the 1870s. One such problem was that revolutionaries did not share the religious beliefs of peasants and workers, whom they sought to draw into their movement. Radicals were critical of organized religion; indeed, many were atheists. This raised the question of when or whether to communicate their lack of faith as they conducted propaganda.⁷ The dilemma faced by figures in Land and Freedom thus posed an important precedent. Studies of Land and Freedom have not commented on this problem and have tended to pass over the demands for freedom of conscience and confession in silence, most likely because they were confusing and inconve-

nient: they did not fit the ideological profile of a revolutionary organization, which was supposed to be antiliberal.⁸

Participants in Land and Freedom regarded dissenting faiths as the true forms of popular religiosity; hence they believed that all ordinary Russians, from peasants and soldiers to merchants and *raznochintsy*, wished for freedom of confession. By defending the rights of Old Believers and sectarians, members of Land and Freedom hoped to gain their trust and support, as well as to draw them into a revolutionary alliance with their organization. As they began composing propagandistic works targeted at dissenters, they found they could promote only freedom of confession, not freedom of conscience, worrying that they would alienate potential supporters. Peasant dissenters would not, they feared, agree to cooperate with members of Russia's educated elites who did not share their religious beliefs. If Old Believers and sectarians were to join a representative government, they would support only causes they thought would be pleasing to God. They would not be prepared to extend religious toleration to people who did not share their beliefs in a postrevolutionary order. Russian revolutionaries of the 1860s were unable to imagine a future for Russia in which religious faith, or lack thereof, could remain a private matter. Mill had declared that he would not be held to account for his religious beliefs in public.⁹ Ogarev, Serno-Solov'evich, and Kel'siev were unable to insist on such privacy. They did not feel at liberty to express their own views, yet they could not remain silent on religious questions either.

LONDON: HERZEN, FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE, AND POPULAR REVOLUTION

The potential conflict between freedom of conscience and confession was not yet clear to Alexander Herzen in 1853, when he founded the Free Russian Press in London, some six years after having left Russia. In publications of the Free Press—*Poliarnaia zvezda*, *Golosa iz Rossii*, and *Kolokol*—he repeatedly emphasized that their function was to give voice to all opinions indiscriminately, to offer all Russians an uncensored platform from which to express their views, and to spread a “free manner of thought” in Russia.¹⁰ Herzen's decision to dedicate his considerable energy and finances to the Free Press must also have been inspired by the British press, including the recently founded radical newspaper *The Leader*, which promised “every opinion,” including religious opinion, “its own free utterance.”¹¹

The pairing of freedom of conscience and confession also appears to have been standard among Russian liberals. Among the many people who sent Herzen their writings was the Russian liberal Boris Chicherin, whose essay “The Contemporary Tasks of Russian Life” appeared in an 1857 edition of

Golosa iz Rossii. “Freedom of conscience” came first in the list of demands that Chicherin made in this piece, and he added that such freedom must include the right to privacy. “A person’s religious convictions are a sanctuary into which no one has the right to intrude. They constitute the soul’s inner world and do not fall under the jurisdiction of civil law, for such law regulates only the public relations of citizens.” Chicherin added that freedom of confession must also be recognized: he noted the plight of Russian sectarians and Old Believers and called for an end to the persecution of Jews.¹² Although Herzen and Chicherin disagreed in many regards, this would certainly have been one point of consensus.

The events Herzen witnessed in France and Italy during the late 1840s and early 1850s, before he settled in London, can only have served to reinforce his commitment to freedom of conscience. In the wake of the 1848 revolutions Herzen and his new friends and acquaintances were exiled from France, Germany, and Italy to the enclaves of Nice, Switzerland, Brussels, and England. Muzzled by new censorship regimes—for example, in France, where the regime of Napoleon III entered into a close alliance with the Catholic Church—they also found themselves intimidated by the conservative backlash in public opinion.¹³ Under these circumstances those intellectuals who had promoted atheism prior to the revolutions felt considerable pressure to refrain from expressing their views.¹⁴ The difficulty of defending atheist views was made clear to Herzen by his close friend Carl Vogt. A natural scientist and atheist, Vogt took refuge in Geneva, Switzerland, after having been expelled from Germany for his active participation in the Frankfurt Parliament, and he frequently complained in letters to Herzen about efforts by his colleagues in the scientific community who demanded that he silence himself.¹⁵ Herzen, therefore, would have understood freedom of conscience as a pan-European cause.

Herzen’s commitment to freedom of confession seems to have arisen from considerations on the possibility of revolution in Russia. As Martin Malia has shown, Herzen’s experience of the failure of the 1848 revolutions made a nationalist of him, and he came to regard the Russian peasant commune as the basis of a future socialist order. “Each village and commune would elect all its own officials, its courts, militia and police; all would be subject to popular recall. The central government, insofar as there would be one, would be the creature of the communes, and not their master.”¹⁶ Already in 1850 Herzen remarked to Mazzini that discontent among peasants, especially Old Believers, was great enough to make revolution a real possibility. Only by uniting with Old Believers and sectarians would it become possible to deal a mortal blow to the regime in St. Petersburg.¹⁷ Herzen

was not entirely original in thinking that peasant dissenters could be mobilized to support a revolution—opponents of the state had mentioned this possibility before.¹⁸ In 1854, however, he published the first pamphlets that targeted Old Believers, encouraging them to rebel against the state.¹⁹ The view that Russian revolutionaries should draw on peasant dissent became an ingrained feature of the revolutionary movement into the early twentieth century.²⁰

Herzen remained ambivalent about the necessity or even desirability of a peasant uprising, however. According to Malia, he viewed this as a “last, desperate resort.”²¹ Yet his friend Nikolai Ogarev and associate Ivan Kel’siev took up the idea with great enthusiasm. Both would make freedom of confession a core demand in the books, pamphlets, and articles they published in Herzen’s Free Press. Kel’siev began to explore the issues raised by freedom of confession with regard to the Old Believers in considerable detail, while Ogarev’s articles for *Kolokol* played a central role in the formation of Land and Freedom.

LONDON: KEL’SIEV AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF COLLECTIVE FREEDOM

Born in 1835, Kel’siev had been drawn to radicalism in St. Petersburg in his early twenties. Highly critical of the Russian state, he resolved to leave Russia. When he traveled abroad in 1859, he quickly sought out Herzen and Ogarev, and Herzen employed the impoverished émigré at the Free Russian Press. To Kel’siev freedom of confession was the most important of revolutionary demands; he was less concerned about state policies toward the intelligentsia than about its repression of religious minorities.

At the time he settled in London, Kel’siev was, according to Herzen, so full of doubt that he “approached belief and unbelief with equal suspicion”; he was a “nihilist” given to “mystical fantasies.”²² Kel’siev’s first project in London was to translate the Bible into Russian, a project he abandoned after completing only the Pentateuch.²³ His next project, undertaken with Herzen’s encouragement, was the publication of materials that the Ministry of Internal Affairs had gathered on Russia’s Old Believers and sectarians.²⁴ The *Collection of Government Materials on Old Believers* was published in four volumes from 1860 to 1864, and it made Kel’siev famous in radical circles.

Kel’siev prefaced the first volume of the *Collection* with a commentary on the history, current state, and revolutionary potential of Russia’s dissenters. He also made three distinct claims about the desirability of promoting freedom of confession, each one of which is striking in its own way. The first, perhaps most important to him, was that freedom of confession would ultimately undermine religion. Fanaticism was a product of perse-

cution and would wane only if Old Believers and sectarians were left alone. Laura Engelstein has noted that Kel'siev found sectarians repulsive, and his lurid description of some of their practices was indeed calculated to shock a Westernized audience.²⁵ He emphasized, however, that sectarians' rituals and beliefs were no more ridiculous and harmful than those of other Christians, notably Catholics and Protestants (Orthodox Christians were included only by implication).²⁶ By bringing all Christian beliefs and practices out into the open on an equal footing, he argued, everyone could observe their absurdity in comparative perspective.²⁷ Pluralism begot relativism. Kel'siev hoped that complete religious freedom would lead to the decline of religion across the board.

A second point, albeit not one that Kel'siev emphasized strongly, was that people should have the "unconditional freedom to do to themselves whatsoever they might please." The practices of Old Believers and sectarians did not constitute an "attack on anyone, an encroachment on any other person, a violation of any sort" that would justify intervention by the state. He argued, rather provocatively, that "it is silly to forbid people to burn, cut, or castrate themselves, if that is their wish."²⁸ Were it not for their disparaging tone, these words would differ little from the liberal claim that society and state have no right to forbid religious beliefs and practices. Indeed, Mill himself argued in *On Liberty* that even distasteful religious minorities such as the Mormons in the United States should not be interfered with: "I am not aware that any community has a right to force another to be civilized."²⁹ The points are similar enough to suggest that Kel'siev had drawn from *On Liberty*, which appeared the year before he began to publish his *Collection*.

Kel'siev's third argument in support of freedom of confession was the most basic. Old Believers wanted "svobodu ispovedan'ia vsem tolkam": freedom of confession not only for themselves but for people of all sects and persuasions.³⁰ To Kel'siev the persecution that Old Believers and sectarians endured had transformed them into determined opponents of the state. They were, he claimed, of a much less passive disposition than their Orthodox Christian brethren and hence constituted much more promising material from which to launch a revolution.

Kel'siev elaborated freedom of confession as a concept that applied to certain Russian communities and to communities rather than individuals. His *Collection* was addressed, first and foremost, to other members of the intelligentsia, to make them see how Old Believers and sectarians could be prevailed **on** to participate in a revolution. Kel'siev did not express an interest in principles pertaining to freedom of conscience more generally:



he was less interested in the rights of Russian subjects under the existing regime than he was in fomenting revolution among peasant dissenters.

In March 1862 Kel'siev paid a brief visit to Russia disguised as a Turkish merchant to establish contacts with Old Believers and fellow radicals. In St. Petersburg he stayed for several days or weeks in the apartment of Nikolai Serno-Solov'evich, the owner of a radical bookstore on Nevskii Prospekt, apparently to discuss the conspiratorial activities of Land and Freedom. His main interest, however, was in establishing contact with Old Believers. After returning to London for a brief time, he traveled to the Ottoman Empire, settling in the Old Believer community at Tulchin with his brother, wife, and child. There Kel'siev sought to create a smuggling network to import illegal publications into Russia as well as to agitate for revolution among the Old Believers. After suffering repeated failure (the Old Believers refused contact with him) and tremendous privation (his brother, wife, and child all died), Kel'siev grew disillusioned and eventually allowed himself to be arrested by the Russian authorities.

In 1867, when he was in prison, Kel'siev would look back on the period in which he compiled his *Collection* and note that he had been motivated by quite another consideration in defending Old Believers and sectarians: nationalism. These dissenters were Russian; their beliefs had been formulated in Russia and in the Russian language. The same, he said, did not apply to those who worshipped "foreign faiths": Catholics and Protestants were based in and emerged from alien lands and thus did not merit his defense.³¹ Kel'siev added, however, that he had always feared Russia's peasantry. The Russian people were not well disposed toward the educated elites and might, in the absence of state control, slaughter them. In the peasant tongue, the revolutionary demand "A Republic!" (*Respubliku!*) would be transformed into "Knife the Public!" (*Rezh' publiku!*). Anyone who was not of the common people would be killed.³² A year later he claimed to have abandoned his earlier view that Old Believers actively recognized a right to freedom of confession that would apply to people other than themselves. On the contrary, he claimed that they actively repudiated the principle, because they did not want faiths other than their own to flourish in the Russian Empire.³³

Clearly, Kel'siev's words must be taken with a grain of salt: they were, after all, written for the benefit of the police. They do, however, draw one's attention to the dilemma that had already been evident in his introduction to the *Collection*—namely, that there was a disjuncture between dissenters' aims in achieving freedom of confession and the aims of Russian revolutionaries. By 1867 he had come to think that this gap was unbridgeable.

**ST. PETERSBURG: SERNO-SOLOV'EVICH AND THE DEFENSE
OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS**

Kel'siev was not the only radical to be inspired by a visit to Herzen and Ogarev in London. In 1860 they received another important guest: Nikolai Serno-Solov'evich. Born in 1834, Serno-Solov'evich was a government official who had just retired from service in 1859, disillusioned by the state's conservatism, especially as manifested in the terms it outlined for the emancipation of the serfs. Unlike Kel'siev, he did not wish to remain abroad and quickly returned to St. Petersburg, where he opened a radical bookstore.³⁴ In 1861 or 1862 Serno-Solov'evich played a central role in founding Land and Freedom. The organization was partly inspired by an article Nikolai Ogarev published in *Kolokol* in July 1861. It was Ogarev's slogan "Land and Freedom!" that lent the organization its name.³⁵ A few months later Serno-Solov'evich published his own highly influential article in *Kolokol*, calling on all educated Russians to form secret societies and to establish contacts with peasants, especially Old Believers, to organize the overthrow of the Russian government.³⁶

In his writings Serno-Solov'evich would advocate both freedom of confession and freedom of conscience. His commitment to the latter principle may be attributable to his early interest in liberalism: he had published articles in Russian liberal journals such as *Zhurnal dlia aktsionerov* in the mid-1850s. Having joined the radical community in the early 1860s, he would continue to underscore the importance of freedom of confession. Experiences in the radical movement, including persecution by the state, would increase his commitment to defending freedom of conscience. Attempting to foment revolution, however, also prompted him to reflect on the precariousness of this principle in a postrevolutionary society.

Between 1858 and 1865 Serno-Solov'evich drafted no fewer than four petitions to Alexander II.³⁷ One of them, written early in 1862, included an outline for a constitution that called for representative government while preserving a weakened monarchy. The constitutional project is of interest here chiefly for its last section, in which Serno-Solov'evich outlined the rights that citizens of Russia were to enjoy under the new order. Paragraph 54 guarantees that "every person living in Russia has the right to maintain his religious beliefs without interference and to practice the liturgy in accordance with the doctrines of his church." Paragraph 55 grants every person the "right to express his opinions in print without interference."³⁸ Serno-Solov'evich never had a chance to present his petition to the tsar, for he was arrested in July 1862 and held in prison for three years.

At the time Serno-Solov'evich was arrested, the state knew nothing of Land and Freedom but convicted him for corresponding with Herzen and Ogarev. Because he was not informed of the charges against him, Serno-Solov'evich became convinced that he was being prosecuted solely on the basis of opinions he had expressed in letters and manuscripts that were used as evidence against him. After one and a half years of detention, he would complain bitterly about this in three missives, or "pleas" (*prosheniia*), he addressed to Alexander II in 1864. In them Serno-Solov'evich articulated demands that amounted to freedom of conscience. The state had seized private documents—letters—and was using them to prosecute him. Moreover, he was being prosecuted for his "opinions" or "convictions" (*mneniia, ubezhdeniia*) for the sole reason that state officials disapproved of them: "I do not renounce my convictions." He added, "I say that my convictions were and remain pure and honest," suggesting that the interrogations he had been subjected to could have polluted them. Serno-Solov'evich further warned that state efforts to regulate personal opinion and expression were certain to provoke, rather than to hinder, the outbreak of a revolution in Russia.³⁹ "Freedom," by contrast, was the "best guarantee of social well-being and peace [*spokoistviia*]." Such freedom should apply not only to Russia's educated elite but also to persecuted religious minorities, specifically the Old Believers. "Whoever holds freedom as a principle wishes it upon everybody."⁴⁰ Here Serno-Solov'evich went beyond demanding freedom of conscience, advocating freedom of confession as well, a rare blend in writings by members of Land and Freedom.

At the same time, Serno-Solov'evich expressed profound ambivalence about the revolution he had hoped to bring about, especially about the role of Old Believers in it. Old Believers wished for nothing but the freedom to continue practicing their religion as they always had: they "blindly adhered to the past." Serno-Solov'evich, by contrast, was a "lover of freedom," who cultivated independent views on religion (*osmyslivaiushchim svoiu religiiu*). His "level of development" meant that his "religious feelings [were] too lofty to be understood by the ignorant masses."⁴¹ There could, he said, never be any real sympathy between the two groups. If Old Believers were ever to come to power, they would surely set out to destroy people like Serno-Solov'evich. For this reason, he said, he himself had never thought it was a good idea to conduct revolutionary agitation among Old Believers.⁴²

Serno-Solov'evich's statements about the Old Believers call to mind the comments that Vasiliĭ Kel'siev made in prison in 1867—namely, that Old Believers would never recognize the rights of people who did not share

their beliefs and would remain hostile to the educated public in particular. Serno-Solov'evich, by contrast, *both* argued that Old Believers recognized a universal right to freedom *and* expressed the fear that they would prove violently intolerant.

In 1865 Serno-Solov'evich was released from prison and exiled to Siberia. He immediately joined a conspiracy to organize an uprising among Polish exiles and Old Believers settled there.⁴³ He was not, apparently, dissuaded by the fears he had expressed in prison of potential excesses of Old Believer violence, but he did display concern about the incompatibility between Old Believers' religious beliefs and those of revolutionary activists. In a letter to a fellow radical written around December 1865, he urged his associate to seek out Old Believers and to communicate his political views to them. "But don't say a word about your religious views; on the contrary, you must, as far as possible, adopt the vocabulary [*voiti v ton*] of your interlocutors." The activist must pretend to share the Old Believers' religious beliefs.⁴⁴ Serno-Solov'evich practiced what he preached, as can be seen in a revolutionary proclamation he drafted in late 1865 or early 1866, addressed primarily to semiliterate peasants and soldiers. There he made heavy use of New Testament imagery, calling on the people to rebel against the state, directing his audience to read the Gospels, and claiming that submission to the authorities was sinful.⁴⁵ The uprising never took place, and Serno-Solov'evich died under mysterious circumstances in 1866.

Serno-Solov'evich was a complicated figure, to say the least. He had little difficulty adopting different vocabularies and switching between them: the secular vocabulary of liberalism, which he inserted into his 1864 petition to Alexander II, and the religious vocabulary of Russian peasant dissenters. In addressing both the emperor and Siberian peasants, he felt compelled to account for his religious beliefs, or at least to go through the motions of doing so. Silence does not seem to have been an option.

MARIENHAUSEN: CONSCIENCE VERSUS CONFESSION IN REVOLUTIONARY PROCLAMATIONS

Land and Freedom continued to function for roughly two years after Nikolai Serno-Solov'evich's arrest in July 1862. Its most important activity was the composition, printing, and distribution of revolutionary broadsheets. Not all the proclamations issued by Land and Freedom addressed matters of faith. Three out of seven broadsheets I surveyed for this article did not discuss them at all. The four that did, however, show that the authors were highly selective in articulating demands for freedom of conscience and free-

dom of confession. The former was addressed in a broadsheet directed at an intelligentsia readership, while the latter was featured in three propagandistic works directed at peasants.

The group had been slow to announce its existence in print, most likely hoping to remain beneath the radar screen of the Third Section for as long as possible.⁴⁶ External events forced the hand of Land and Freedom's Central Committee: in January 1863 an uprising broke out in Poland, and Polish revolutionaries called on members of Land and Freedom to support them. The Central Committee responded by endorsing the publication of a broadsheet titled "Land and Freedom: Journal of the Society 'Land and Freedom.'" Its authors remain unknown. The broadsheet was to be printed with the help of Polish revolutionaries in Marienhausen, Vitebsk Province (present-day Viļaka, Latvia), and it clearly targeted an educated audience: its sentences were long, requiring a relatively high level of literacy. The text itself was long—so long, in fact, that printing was interrupted for fear of arrest.⁴⁷

The broadsheet called on Russian officers in the imperial army not to fight to suppress the Polish uprising and urged its audience to spread the rebellion to Russia. "Thinking people" must give up their support of the autocracy. The state had "stripped us of the essential right of the human individual—the right to personal freedom." Abuses included entering people's homes, arresting them irrespective of age and gender, and the attempt to control their thoughts, feelings, and religious beliefs. Here the authors invoked freedom of thought and expression as a natural right: "The natural freedom of thought and expression does not exist among us: we must think, feel, and speak the way our supreme despot [*verkhovnyi despot*] commands us."⁴⁸

Essentially, the proclamation was delineating a private sphere into which the state had no right to make incursions. Domestic space belonged to this zone: the authors claimed that the authorities had "insolently desecrated the sacred inviolability of homes" by arresting people in their houses and apartments. Personal correspondence also belonged to the private sphere: the authors noted that letters written to friends and family members, "to a mother or a wife," were being used as evidence against them in trial. Most notably, the individual's mind belonged to it: "Even secret thoughts and personal feelings are placed under the eternal surveillance of the autocracy." State incursions went so far that priests of the Russian Orthodox Church who heard antigovernmental sentiments in confession were expected to report to the authorities: "that which the naïve soul has entrusted in confession to the priest—that 'mediator between the soul and God.'"⁴⁹

The authors refrained from addressing the issue of Russia's oppressed religious minorities.

Three areas, then, had been outlined as belonging to something like a private sphere that ought to be free from state intervention. Significantly, the authors did not defend the private sphere against the interference of public opinion, society at large, or the Church, which to them was merely a pawn of the autocratic state. For example, they complained that the state was using the teachings of the Russian Orthodox Church, which they referred to as "religious prejudice and superstition," to pacify the people and keep them in a state of ignorance.⁵⁰

Such comments did not appear in broadsheets that Land and Freedom produced for mass audiences, which rather emphasized freedom of confession. One such document was a fake imperial manifesto, purportedly by Alexander II, which the group also printed in Marienhausen in December 1862 or January 1863 with the help of Polish revolutionaries, and which was planned for distribution around Easter (the time when the emancipation of the serfs was to take effect, and when the revolutionaries expected a massive peasant uprising). The manifesto extended "complete freedom" to all Russian subjects, and the first type of freedom listed was "freedom of faith": "From now on, freedom of faith and religious practice will be the inalienable right of every person."⁵¹

Two other proclamations by Land and Freedom addressed a mass audience (the second opens with the appellation: "Brothers!"). Both bore the title "Land and Freedom: Freedom of Confession," although they were written and produced by different people. The first, subtitled "Provisional People's Government," was printed in Fredrickshamn, Vyborg Province (now Hamina, Finland), in March 1863. The other was produced in Kazan in April 1863.

Significantly, neither proclamation criticized the Russian Orthodox Church. The first claimed to represent the wishes of the "emperor" as well as of the Russian people. It not only placed "freedom of confession" on its masthead but promised such freedom in the text: "Every man is free, without constraint, to confess [*ispovedat'*] his faith and to practice the rituals of his church."⁵² The second broadsheet criticized the tsar for failing to act on the wishes of the people but proclaimed that God was on their side. No reference to freedom of confession was made in the body of the text, although the large print of the words on the masthead may have been sufficient to convey that message, especially given the limited literacy of the target audience.⁵³ Placing "freedom of confession" on the masthead was intended to attract the attention of peasant readers.

The decision not to criticize religion in proclamations directed at peasants must have been the result of a conscious choice. Other revolutionary propagandists who composed propaganda addressing peasants in 1863 did criticize the Russian Orthodox Church; they showed little interest in freedom of confession and even denied the existence of God. Those activists came from clerical families in provincial villages and considered themselves to be culturally and socially close to the people.⁵⁴ Members of Land and Freedom's Central Committee, by contrast, were highly educated people who came from elite families.⁵⁵ They would have been keenly aware of their distance from the people and worried about alienating peasant readers by making antireligious statements. They also seem to have genuinely believed that religious dissent among peasants constituted a legitimate form of free-thinking that ought to be encouraged. As I show in the next section, both considerations influenced the journalistic activities of Nikolai Ogarev in London.

LONDON: OGAREV'S FEARS COME TRUE

While members of Land and Freedom were busy trying to spark a revolution in the west and south of the Russian Empire, Ogarev was in London printing and writing articles for his own journal, *Obshchee veche*, directed at a more popular audience than *Kolokol*. Harbored in London, he was closer to the home of European liberalism (he addressed an admiring letter to Mill in 1862) and slower than radical associates in Russia to confront the difficulties posed by promoting freedom of both conscience and confession.⁵⁶

Ogarev had played a central role in the foundation of Land and Freedom through his personal connection with Kel'siev and Serno-Solov'evich, as well as through articles he had published in *Kolokol* in 1861. When Kel'siev returned from St. Petersburg in May 1862, he and Ogarev opened *Obshchee veche* as a supplement to *Kolokol*. The new journal appeared from July 1862 until July 1864. From the very beginning, Kel'siev and Ogarev had different ambitions for the publication. Kel'siev wanted to dedicate it entirely to religious questions, making it a forum where Old Believers and sectarians could express their theological views, while Ogarev insisted it must focus on social and political concerns.⁵⁷ Ogarev prevailed, and Kel'siev abandoned the project to travel to the Ottoman Empire.

In the editorial statement for *Obshchee veche*'s first edition Ogarev explained that its purpose was to give voice to Russia's "lower estates," including peasants, soldiers, *raznochintsy*, and low-ranking clergymen oppressed by the prelates of the Russian Orthodox Church.⁵⁸ Old Believers and sectarians, however, were explicitly invited to contribute, and they were welcome

to express the “convictions of their faith.”⁵⁹ In the two years of its existence the journal featured twenty articles by Old Believers, although one scholar, Michel Mervaud, implies that Ogarev may have written most of them himself.⁶⁰

Ogarev tirelessly argued in his articles for *Obshchee veche* that political freedom and freedom of confession (he referred to it as *svoboda very*) were integrally connected: one could not be achieved without the other. Freedom of confession was the cornerstone of emancipation in all its forms, he claimed, but Alexander II would never grant complete religious tolerance voluntarily.⁶¹ In July 1863 Ogarev proposed that Old Believers organize a council, or *sobor*, to which they would send representatives, and which would present a coherent set of demands to the government. This *sobor*, Ogarev hoped, would become the embryo of a larger representative institution for peasants, the *Zemskii sobor*.⁶² He returned to the idea of a *Zemskii sobor* in November 1863 in a series of articles titled “Letters to a Monk.”⁶³ Yet Ogarev now proposed other, more radical measures in addition: peasants must drive the nobility and rural officials out of the countryside and set up what he called *zemstvo* governments. Only then would religious freedom be attained.⁶⁴ Freedom of confession served Ogarev as a slogan to draw an Old Believer and sectarian readership into participating in a wider revolutionary movement.

Notably, Ogarev did not expect that Old Believers would show much sympathy or understanding for his views. Ogarev had by this time rejected religious belief; at least he suggested as much in a letter to a former lover dated 1862: “I shall not argue about God; I profess toleration [*veroterpimost*]. I see no poetry in vague self-reassurances but merely faintness of heart.”⁶⁵ In this letter Ogarev refused to be drawn out on the question of his personal faith. In public, however, Ogarev was even more guarded. The following section of an article he published in the November 1863 edition of *Obshchee veche* is particularly poignant:

I am not an Old Believer. I will not express my inner conviction until there is freedom for any religious faith in Rus'. A person can be wrong. He needs to talk his way through to the truth together with other people. And when he is not permitted to speak freely but is compelled to believe by force, then there is no point in talking about his conviction. One must first achieve freedom of belief and [freedom of] the human word, oral and in print, [achieve] freedom of assembly and freedom of the book.⁶⁶

In the last sentence Ogarev was articulating liberal principles: freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly. These would safeguard the inter-

ests of Old Believers, allowing them to practice their faith freely in Russia. Yet Ogarev also hinted that they would extend to people like him. While making it clear that he was not an Old Believer, Ogarev did not state what his views were, insisting only that he would keep these to himself for the time being. He was operating according to a double standard: Old Believers might express their views in print; *Obshchee veche* explicitly invited them to do so. When it came to Ogarev's views, however, "there is no point in talking about his convictions." Only by implication did he demand tolerance of Old Believers when he explained that a "person cannot be compelled to believe by force." This was a point that dissenting readers might easily miss, assuming that his words applied to the autocratic state, rather than to themselves.

Developments in the spring of 1864 proved that Ogarev had good reason to worry about the tolerance of his sectarian allies. In March–April 1864, Cyril, metropolitan of priestist Old Believers in Belokrinitza (then in Austria-Hungary), pronounced an anathema against the "insidious atheists who nestle in London," by which he clearly meant the editors of *Kolokol* and *Obshchee veche*. Not only were they "sowing the weedy teachings of the thrice-cursed Voltaire," but these "freethinkers' were the apostles of Satan, for the sum of the word *vol'nodum*, he claimed, was the apocalyptic, beastly figure 666." Cyril's followers were forbidden to have anything to do with them. These denunciations must have come as a grave disappointment, especially since they were most likely drafted by the metropolitan's assistant, Archdeacon Filaret Zakharovich, who had been in direct contact with the Londoners for almost two years.⁶⁷ Another blow came in May 1864 when the Old Believer Osip Gonchar, or Goncharov, who stayed in Herzen's house for a week in 1863, handed the letters they had sent him over to the Third Section in Constantinople.⁶⁸ Ogarev gave up publishing *Obshchee veche* soon thereafter.

Still, Ogarev remained committed to freedom of confession. He defended it in *Kolokol* in September 1864 but expanded this demand into a uniquely Russian argument about the overall place of religious dissent in the intellectual life of the Russian nation. Western-style education had not yet reached Russia's peasant masses. The only form of intellectual debate they engaged in was over religion. Sectarianism was important as a form of nonconformist thought, and all nonconformist thought was to be welcomed. This was true not only in Russia but in the world at large: "given the level of education of the majority of the human species, only freedom of faith, freedom of persuasion, [and] the absence of any state-sponsored religion can serve as the cornerstone of further intellectual development." Without religious sectarians, humanity would fall into utter mental stag-

nation (*umstvennyi zastoi*). He went on to explain that permitting sectarianism to flourish should not cripple the vibrancy of society as a whole. The experience of the United States proved that the existence of large numbers of religious sects did not detract from civic life.⁶⁹

Ogarev was clearly building on earlier speculation about the impact that freedom of confession would have on the Russian masses. Kel'siev, in the introduction to his *Collection*, had suggested that the freedom to express religious beliefs in all their diversity would lead to relativism and the overall decline of religion. In the November 1863 edition of *Obshchee veche* Ogarev had suggested obliquely that a "person can be wrong" and "needs to talk his way through to the truth." We may surmise that for Ogarev, the truth was that faith in God was nothing but a "vague self-reassurance" and resulted from "faintness of heart." The masses, however, must come to this conclusion by themselves. They would only do so after they had been permitted freely to practice their own religions. In the meantime, circumstances in the United States might reassure nonsectarians that coexistence was possible.

Of all the figures associated with Land and Freedom, Ogarev had offered the most coherent defense of freedom of confession and was the most firmly committed to it. This commitment had withstood some significant trials. Inspired by Alexander Herzen, Kel'siev explained how the promotion of freedom of confession could be used to draw Old Believers and sectarians into the revolutionary movement. Kel'siev then influenced members of Land and Freedom, who heavily emphasized freedom of confession in some of their revolutionary proclamations, anticipating a massive uprising in the spring of 1863. Yet the peasant revolt never materialized, the uprising in Poland failed, and Old Believers steadfastly refused to cooperate with the group. Kel'siev, as mentioned above, grew so disillusioned as to declare that Old Believers, far from supporting freedom of confession, actually rejected it on the grounds that it would allow other religious minorities in Russia, including sectarians, to flourish. By the end of 1864 Land and Freedom had ceased to function, partly as a result of arrests, partly due to disagreements over the Polish uprising, and partly due to loss of faith that the peasants would revolt.⁷⁰

Participants in Land and Freedom were committed to freedom of confession and saw it as a demand that could strengthen their ties with potential peasant revolutionaries. However benighted the religious beliefs of Old Believers and sectarians may have seemed to Kel'siev, Ogarev, and Serno-Solov'evich, they did not dismiss them. Rather, they were willing to recognize those beliefs as authentically popular and therefore worthy of defense.

Members of Land and Freedom also supported freedom of conscience: freedom of thought and of speech, the freedom not to believe in any religion if one did not care to, the right not to be accountable to others for one's beliefs. These were liberal principles, and when the circumstances were right, when called on to defend them against the autocratic state, they could expound them. The circumstances, however, all too often seemed wrong. It is an old truism that Russia made poor soil for the growth of liberalism. Ogarrev, Kel'siev, and Serno-Solov'evich were dedicated to bringing about radical political change; the need to appeal to a mass audience compelled them to jettison some of their principles—or as Russians liked to say, *sreda zaela*.

Russia was a country in which the vast majority of the population firmly believed that salvation depended on the defense of a single set of religious truths, while disagreeing on what those truths were. It was unfortunate for members of Land and Freedom that this attitude was held not only by the emperor but ostensibly by rebellious peasants as well.⁷¹ Religious beliefs were not, and could not be, regarded as a private affair, the concern of the individual, in imperial Russia.

This observation implies a criticism of the limitations of liberalism itself, and that criticism is by no means new. Raymond Geuss, in commenting on nineteenth-century liberal attempts to establish religious belief as a private matter, has argued that liberals deluded themselves in dismissing a core belief of “religiously minded persons”: “that God will hold *all* responsible for the heresies of any one member of the society.”⁷² Geuss based these observations, at least in part, on arguments that were advanced by Robert Paul Wolff that “Christianity is a dogmatic, exclusive religion. It claims to have *the* truth about God, to offer through the savior, Jesus Christ, the *true* path to salvation. Faith, the precondition of salvation, is an unswerving trust in the promise of God.” Even within the utilitarian logic that Mill advanced in *On Liberty*, Wolff observed, no Christian was likely to exercise tolerance.⁷³ Wolff and Geuss no doubt addressed these problems because they found them pertinent in the contemporary world, largely secular though it may now be. The same problems were even more pressing in nineteenth-century Western Europe, which was only in the process of secularization. In imperial Russia, where religion still pervaded state and politics, parts of the package of rights Mill advocated as “indefeasible” struck those with the greatest interest in defending them—the radicals—as indefensible.

International Interest in Evangelical Christians
and Religious Freedom in Late Imperial Russia

HEATHER J. COLEMAN

In the preface to her 1895 novel about the Russian religious movement of stundists, the bestselling English evangelical author Hesba Stretton wrote: “It seems to me that this poor and persecuted sect approaches more nearly to the Christians of the Apostolic age than any other existing church. . . . It is for the purpose of making their sorrows and martyrdom more widely known that the facts of their history have been woven into this story.” Over the next 430 pages Stretton vividly described the vibrant religious life of these Ukrainian Protestants, their alleged social and gender egalitarianism, the religious alternative they offered to revolutionary activity, persecution by their fellow villagers and the Russian authorities, and their travails in Siberian exile—all held together by a love story, as the courageous Halya conquers her inner turmoil and turns her back on Orthodoxy to follow the stundist of her dreams to a tragic fate in Siberia. The book was immediately translated into French and German.¹ Two years later, Stretton penned a second novel devoted to the stundists.² It too reflected what Elaine Lomax describes as Stretton’s characteristic “blend of popular fiction, historical fact, melodrama, evangelical message and social polemic.”³

Stretton’s novels joined an outpouring of popular interest in and writing about the problem of religious freedom in Russia in Western Europe and North America in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.⁴ The woes of a range of religious groups in Russia such as the Jews, Greek Catholics (Uniates), and Dukhobors drew the attention of governments, journalists, liberals, and assorted philanthropists.⁵ But the stundists—a catch-all term used to designate peasants who had left the Russian Orthodox Church and adopted a Baptist-like form of Christianity—played a special role in the international discourse on religious liberty in Russia. As an 1896 article in the London magazine *The Academy* noted, “We are a Protestant people, and the martyrdom of the Uniat Church appealed but slightly to British sympathies. It is otherwise with the martyrdom of the Reforming bodies.”⁶ Similar sympathies were in play among Protestant communities in Germany, Switzerland, France, the United States, and Canada.

Certainly, Russian revolutionaries and liberals seeking to garner consideration for their causes in the West banked on the evangelical tenor of public

opinion in the English-speaking world. Thus in his famous Crane lectures at the University of Chicago in 1903, the liberal Pavel Miliukov discussed the fate of Russian religious sectarianism, including stundism, at some length.⁷ The revolutionary Sergei Stepniak-Kravchinskii devoted half of the pages of his widely read 1888 book, *The Russian Peasantry*, to religious questions; his influential final work, *King Stork and King Log: A Study of Modern Russia*, dedicated its one chapter on religion entirely to “the important and very promising sect” of stundists.⁸ Through the efforts of their promoters it is notable that by the late 1890s the stundists usually needed no introduction in articles about Russian affairs—it was general knowledge that in the tsar’s empire there lived thousands of evangelical peasants who were the object of persecution.⁹

The fact that those peasants themselves generally rejected the name “stundist” was unimportant. From members of the Russian intelligentsia—liberals and socialists and Silver Age writers—to Ukrainian nationalists in Galicia and Protestant evangelicals in Western countries, the term served as a suitably vague vessel into which they could pour their worries, hopes, and aspirations regarding the Russian or Ukrainian people.¹⁰ Much ink was certainly spilled trying to define stundist beliefs; in the foreign evangelical press, for instance, it was usual to propose that the stundists were in some way like Baptists, Methodists, Moravians, Pietists, Quakers, or “evangelical Protestants” more generally. What mattered more than precise nomenclature was the proposition that they were martyrs.

The importance of religion as a lens for Western perceptions of imperial Russia has been little explored. Religion simply does not feature as an interest of the scholars and intellectuals whom Martin Malia studied in his classic *Russia under Western Eyes*. Works taking a broader view of foreign popular perceptions have likewise long neglected the topic.¹¹ Recently, however, David S. Foglesong has pointed to the fundamentally religious character of US engagement with Russia.¹² Indeed, the most widely read books on Russia in English and French of the period, such as those by Donald Mackenzie Wallace and Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, made religious conditions in the empire and the fate of religious minorities a central focus.¹³ In Britain in particular, leading popular journalists such as W. T. Stead and E. J. Dillon, influential among the public as well as the policymaking elite, championed these issues.¹⁴ For all contemporaries’ fears of religious decline and later scholars’ characterizations of secularizing trends in Western societies in this period, religious participation and cultural identification remained high. In Great Britain and the United States, in particular, public life retained a strongly Protestant and evangelical character right up to the First World War.¹⁵ For

the general British adult and youth public, for instance, popular religious magazines and tract tales like Stretton's made up a considerable proportion of reading matter.¹⁶ More broadly, religious preoccupations fueled interest in and shaped perceptions of the wider world. Missionary movements, for instance, "created a public awareness of a larger world beyond Britain and of an imperial duty towards the rest of the world."¹⁷

This chapter explores the discourse about stundists in Western Europe and North America from the 1880s to 1917 and attempts there to influence public perception and Western governments' policies vis-à-vis Russia in that period. It focuses especially on Great Britain in the 1890s, where the stundist issue developed particular resonance. There, but elsewhere as well, two overlapping but not identical groups—liberals and evangelical Protestants—drove this discourse. In Britain the liberal and Nonconformist traditions were closely intertwined, and freedom was widely understood as "England's special gift to the world." At the same time, awareness that the battle to eliminate the privileges of the Church of England had yet to be won also animated interest in religious freedom in Russia.¹⁸ The useful ambiguity of the term "stundist" allowed Western observers to overlook denominational differences and to focus on a perceived shared affinity with suffering Russian religious dissidents.¹⁹ The stundists served as martyrs for both a revived Christianity in an era when faith had become too comfortable and for the liberal values that seemed destined to spread across the world. Concern about persecution of evangelicals in Russia played a significant role in early attempts at interdenominational Protestant cooperation in Europe and North America, even if that activity was ineffective in influencing governments, whether Western or Russian.

The international campaign in aid of the stundists thus highlights the role of evangelical religion in the elaboration and international transmission of liberal ideas about the individual conscience, the individual's relationship to the state, and the state's relationship to religion. Furthermore, it demonstrates how transnational religious encounters not only affected new converts but also shaped organization and values in the societies in which the religious ideas originated.

IN SEARCH OF THE STUNDIST: EVANGELICALISM, THE RUSSIAN STATE, AND TRANSNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FORCES

The phenomenon of stundism brought into sharp relief the character of the Russian policy of religious toleration by presenting a new challenge: Russian (and Ukrainian) peasants affected by transnational religious forces. Although the imperial government did worry about the influence of (Polish)

Roman Catholicism on “Russian” (Ukrainian and Belorussian) peasants in its western borderlands, the basic perception of the state and the Russian Orthodox Church remained that earlier forms of religious sectarianism among the peasantry had been native in origin and character, whereas stundism was a sign of foreign influence. To a certain extent they were right. Stundism first emerged among Ukrainian peasants through contact with German-speaking subjects of the Russian Empire who had been influenced by Pietist and Baptist ideas circulating in the German lands in the first half of the nineteenth century. Teachings about the Bible as the only guide in all matters of life and faith, the priesthood of all believers, the need for a personal conversion experience, and living a vigorous Christian life spread through the German-speaking communities scattered across Central and Eastern Europe by the mid-1850s. These ethnic German converts to evangelicalism played a crucial role in spreading the faith to their Orthodox neighbors.²⁰ Thus Ukrainian and Russian peasants who worked for German colonists in southern Ukraine began to attend revivalist Bible “hours” (*Stunde* in German) in their employers’ communities and acquired the nickname of *shtundisty* when they started to organize their own such meetings. In the 1870s evangelicalism spread across the Ukrainian provinces but also in the Caucasus, up the Volga River, and, through the activity of high-society men and women influenced by English evangelicals, in the St. Petersburg region (the Pashkovites).²¹ Very quickly the converts came up against the religious governance structure of the Russian Empire, which had no place for them.

The Russian Empire was what Paul Werth terms a “multiconfessional Orthodox state—that is, a polity that established several religions while constituting only one of them as dominant.”²² Orthodoxy was the dominant faith of the state and its monarchs, and the state assumed that confession to be the religion of all ethnic Russians (Great Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians) within its borders. But Russia was also a multinational empire, and it accommodated the concomitant religious diversity through a system of multiple “established” faiths whose activities were regulated and supervised by a branch of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Department of Foreign Confessions. Thus German Lutherans or Polish Roman Catholics or Tatar Muslims practiced their faith legally. This structure embodied a fundamentally static vision of religious identity, one where faith was an ascribed group characteristic rather than an individual choice. The structure also implicitly acknowledged religions’ transnational character and sought to limit outside influence, whether of the pope or of Muslims across the border in Persia and the Ottoman Empire, by creating a Russian-based and state-administered authority structure.²³ Even as Russia’s confessional

order proved capable of accommodating religious innovation within certain parameters—in 1879, for example, the Russian state established a legal Baptist church for converts from Lutheranism—a key principle of the multiconfessional Orthodox state was that only the Orthodox Church had the right to make converts.²⁴ Indeed, in 1881, in response to ethnic Russian and Ukrainian evangelicals' efforts to gain legal recognition under the provisions of the 1879 law, Konstantin Pobedonostsev, the chief procurator of the Holy Synod and influential adviser to Alexander III, famously declared that “there are and can be no Russian Baptists.” The term “stundist” thereafter became the official one for Slavic evangelicals. In 1894 the Committee of Ministers declared the stundist sect to be “one of the most dangerous and harmful sects for the church and the state” and prohibited its meetings. An accompanying circular of the minister of internal affairs asserted that stundist teachings “undermine[d] the fundamental bases of the Orthodox faith and Russian national character [*narodnost'*].” Although believers rejected the name, with its foreign ring, the term remained in government and church use right up to the revolution.²⁵

Paradoxically, the Russian state and the Orthodox Church themselves contributed to the porosity of the religious borders of the empire in two ways. First, they allowed foreign missionaries to work among non-Orthodox Christians.²⁶ Second, they permitted a major international evangelical organization, the British and Foreign Bible Society (BFBS), to operate as the main agency for the internal distribution of scripture. Founded in 1804 and devoted to providing bibles “to all people in their own language,” the BFBS had initially made inroads in Russia in 1812, when it was permitted to form a Russian Bible Society for the purpose of the “circulation of the Scripture among the members of the foreign religions in the empire.” With the encouragement of some Orthodox clergy, the distribution of the Slavonic Bible was also added to its goals in 1813.²⁷ The Russian Bible Society was closed down in 1826, but the BFBS retained an agent in St. Petersburg right up to the revolution—even during the Crimean War. When the Russian Orthodox Church returned to its project of translating scripture into Russian and published its own translations of the New Testament in 1862 and the Old Testament in 1876, the BFBS added agencies in Odessa, Ekaterinburg, and Tiflis that coordinated a network of several hundred locally engaged bible colporteurs and hawkers. State authorities granted free rail passage for these peddlers of scripture and their wares.²⁸ In the face of accusations, especially in the 1880s and 1890s, that the colporteurs flogged evangelical Protestant piety along with bibles, the St. Petersburg office worked forcefully to dissociate the BFBS and its employees from proselytizing.²⁹ The Holy Synod and



state officials anxiously tracked the behavior of peddlers throughout the late imperial period, seeking to ensure that they were all faithful Orthodox believers; however, the commitment to putting scripture in the hands of the laity remained primary: for example, a 1904 conference of state and church representatives on the issue of the BFBS concluded that the importance of bible distribution outweighed the risks presented by this great BFBS network working outside official Russian Orthodox channels.³⁰

Yet these fears certainly did have some foundation. It is clear that English BFBS agents, who spoke Russian and lived for long periods in the country, served both as important sources of information about the stundist movement for the Evangelical Alliance and other interested groups abroad and as conduits into evangelical networks among Russians and Ukrainians.³¹ For example, although the Evangelical Alliance took care not to mention details of its contacts in Russia, Friedrich W. Baedeker, an Anglo-German evangelical who for thirty years, with government permission, visited the prisons of the empire and distributed bibles to convicts, also delivered aid from the Evangelical Alliance to stundists and regularly preached to local evangelical meetings.³² Meanwhile, the BFBS agent in Odessa from 1877 to the turn of the century, Michael Andrews Morrison, maintained close links with sectarian communities and used his prolific and versatile pen to play a crucial role as a source of information about the movement abroad. During the 1890s Morrison authored, under a variety of pseudonyms, not only a carefully researched and widely cited 1893 book on the stundists (originally a series in the influential Nonconformist newspaper, *The Christian World*) but also a book of sketches, *Queer Stories from Russia* (1892), and a well-received novel, *Nadya: A Tale of the Steppes* (1895), devoted to their plight.³³

For the late imperial Russian state, the stundists exemplified the challenges of governance in a modern era where the identity and loyalties of the population were increasingly perceived as a crucial component of state strength. Guided by Pobedonostsev, Alexander III and Nicholas II aimed to use Orthodox religion and, increasingly, Russian national identity as tools to unify the population around the autocracy. Yet stundism integrated the common people into transnational networks that conveyed foreign ideas and money deep into the Russian countryside. Pobedonostsev rightly sensed that evangelical religion bore with it notions of the individual, the community, and internationalism that embodied a view of human nature antithetical to his own.³⁴ The tension between individual conscience and official ascription in religious life, between bureaucratic tutelage and civil society, came into the open and continued after Nicholas II promised freedom of conscience during the revolution of 1905.

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND EVANGELICAL COOPERATION

Certainly, evangelical Christians of the late nineteenth century regarded themselves as the vanguard in the fight for religious liberty in the world. The stundist issue played a significant role in the elaboration of this self-identity and in providing a rallying point for collective action.

One of the great problems being worked out in nineteenth-century Europe was the connection between religion and citizenship: the legitimacy of pluralism, the question of religious minority rights, and the relationship between church and state. In 1800 most European states had established churches whose adherents enjoyed superior or exclusive access to religious and political rights. By the early 1890s, when foreigners became especially interested in the plight of the stundists, state churches remained the rule, but freedom of religion, though not universal, had become widespread, and Russia was increasingly perceived as out of step with broader European trends. This transformation over the nineteenth century was the product of both a liberal struggle and a religious one, and the rapid spread of what has been termed “revivalist” or “voluntary” or “evangelical” Christianity played an important role in pushing open the doors of religious liberty across Europe. For example, in Britain, the dramatic increase in numbers of activist non-Anglican Protestants (the Nonconformists such as the Methodists, Baptists, and Quakers) led to the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts, which in 1828 had excluded Dissenters from holding civil office, and to the 1846 Religious Disabilities Act, which removed remaining limitations; restrictions on Roman Catholics and Jews were done away with between 1829 and 1858. Similarly, in the 1840s in Norway and Denmark, writes Dag Thorkildsen, “the development of revival movements implied an end to the religious unity of the state, and opened society to modern pluralism.”³⁵ For evangelical believers across Europe, who had in recent memory fought for their own rights, a commitment to promoting religious liberty at home and abroad was intimately tied up with their understanding of their mission. Although pluralism ultimately had secularizing implications, the evangelical campaign for separation of church and state stands as a key example of how, more often than not, it arose from *religious* individualization and competition.³⁶

A shared interest in religious liberty in the Russian Empire in general, and more specifically the travails of the stundists, provided a common cause for early international Protestant cooperation. In particular, it formed a central component of the work of the Evangelical Alliance. Founded in 1845, the Evangelical Alliance brought together individual Christians from

Great Britain, continental Europe, and North America from many Protestant traditions. They united on the basis of shared evangelical values to work across denominational lines to advance the cause of mission at home and abroad and to promote the religious freedom that would make evangelism possible.³⁷ From the founding of the Evangelical Alliance's monthly journal, *Evangelical Christendom*, in January 1847, pages of foreign news focused on oppression of believers around the world became regular fare. Although initially hesitant about political activism, the alliance adopted "common action" on religious liberty as its hallmark in the second half of the nineteenth century. It monitored and intervened in cases where independent evangelicals suffered at the hands of state churches, in defense of Christian converts in the Ottoman Empire and Persia, in support of the rights of Roman Catholics in Japan, and against the maltreatment of Jews.³⁸

The Evangelical Alliance launched its work on behalf of persecuted subjects of the tsar in 1863 with a formal complaint to the Russian ambassador in London about alleged oppression of German-speaking Baptists in Russian Poland.³⁹ Soon thereafter, it became concerned about Russification policies in the Baltic provinces, including efforts to convert Lutheran peasants to Orthodoxy and the refusal to allow apostates to return to the Lutheran faith. In 1871 an international delegation presented a memorandum to Emperor Alexander II (via his foreign minister, Aleksandr Gorchakov) objecting to these policies. The US branch similarly tried to appeal to the Russian ambassador in Washington in 1874.⁴⁰ When the tsar visited London the same year, the British branch called publicly for "further progress in religious liberty." Such progress was not forthcoming, and a new letter signed by the presidents of all the alliance's international branches and complaining about religious persecution, especially the fate of Baltic Protestants, was delivered personally to Emperor Alexander III when he visited Copenhagen in 1887.⁴¹ The next year Pobedonostsev responded with a letter that reiterated and defended the model of a "multiconfessional Orthodox state": "You ask for all sects an equal and full liberty," he wrote. "Russia is convinced that nowhere in Europe do heterodox faiths, and even those which are not Christian, enjoy so full a liberty as in the bosom of the Russian people. But Europe does not know this. And why? Only because among you religious liberty comprises also an absolute right to unlimited propagandism, and so you exclaim against our laws against those who pervert the faithful from orthodoxy."⁴² As Alexander Polunov points out, Pobedonostsev attempted to appropriate the language of "religious liberty" to describe the tradition of tolerance of non-"Russian" religions in the empire.⁴³ But the alliance would have none of it. It widely publicized both Pobedonostsev's reply and a series

of open letters that responded by reiterating the principle of freedom of the individual conscience.⁴⁴ Pobedonostsev's letter served as a statement of official Russian policy to which foreign observers would refer with opprobrium for years to come.⁴⁵

In the 1880s and 1890s Slavic evangelicals, almost always described as stundists, emerged as the principal object of interest in Evangelical Alliance reporting on and activity in Russia. The alliance's crusade in support of the stundists included several components. First, it undertook an active international publicity drive. It published brochures and regular reports in its periodicals, reports that often served as source material for other commentators. Activists wrote letters to newspapers and made presentations to religious congresses.⁴⁶ An accompanying campaign sought prayers and donations. Beginning in 1895, the alliance appealed for special prayers to bring an end to stundist suffering during its annual international Week of Prayer.⁴⁷ Between 1892 and 1896 alone alliance members in Britain, Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland raised £1500 in support of the wives and children of arrested and exiled stundist preachers. The Swiss activist Georges Godet wrote a sixty-three-page booklet, the proceeds of which were destined for persecuted Russians; it went to four editions and was translated from French into German.⁴⁸ Indeed, donors' enthusiasm for the cause of the stundists (and of Armenians forced to convert to Islam in Turkey, the other major Evangelical Alliance preoccupation of the 1890s) led to concern among leaders of the British branch by 1899 that funding for general operations was suffering.⁴⁹ Finally, alliance leaders continued to seek means of influencing the Russian emperor through his highest officials.⁵⁰ In 1893 they sponsored a joint letter to the Russian Orthodox Church signed by 123 church leaders of all the main Protestant denominations in countries where the alliance was active; after the alliance's 1896 jubilee a memorandum was sent to Nicholas II. Neither missive was acknowledged.⁵¹ Indeed, alliance members debated whether their public lobbying helped or hindered their fellow believers in Russia.⁵²

The stundists constituted the ideal object of the alliance's attentions. The Evangelical Alliance deliberately sought to accommodate the intense individualism of evangelical religion and to transcend denominational difference by operating as an association of *individuals* expressing (Protestant) Christian unity in the world.⁵³ In the 1890s alliance-sponsored publications took little interest in defining stundist beliefs, emphasizing their adherence to basic evangelical tenets, their numbers (consistently greatly exaggerated), and their suffering. This practice made them an effective unifying cause for a nondenominational movement.⁵⁴

A similar challenge of transcending religious individualism animated international Baptist organizing in the first years of the twentieth century, and here as well the stundists played a significant rallying role. Baptists were intensely individualistic and congregational in their religious organization, anxious that any supracongregational authority not limit the freedom of believers or dictate the teachings or organization of local communities. Yet this was an era when various Protestant groups were organizing international associations, and Baptists concluded that cooperation nationally and internationally would aid them in promoting their teaching.⁵⁵ In 1905 the Baptist World Alliance was founded at an international congress in London. At that meeting, when the Russian delegate spoke and mentioned the stundists for the first time, he was interrupted by spontaneous applause. Wrote the Rev. J. H. Shakespeare, the secretary of the congress, in his introduction to the published proceedings, “the Russian delegates, . . . who had suffered so much . . . were undoubtedly the heroes of the Congress.” According to Shakespeare, the gathering had revealed that Baptists were playing a crucial role in the religious ferment on the European continent: “Again and again we found that movements, which had begun otherwise, were inevitably tending along Baptist lines. . . . Probably the evangelical and spiritual life of the Continent of Europe will gravitate to Baptist teaching and fellowship.”⁵⁶

Russian believers emerged as the key evidence—and indeed as living exhibits—of this assertion and thus as the hope for an end to evangelical disunity. For instance, in his welcoming address the president of the 1908 European Baptist Congress in Berlin singled out the Russian delegates as “faithful pioneers of our biblical-apostolical principles” and noted that they “have now a great influence over the thousands and thousands of Stundists.”⁵⁷ Baptist writers liked to comment on the obscurity of the Russian evangelical movement’s origins and its native qualities as proof that if one simply studied the Bible carefully, one would come to Baptist conclusions.⁵⁸ Thus Robert Sloan Latimer, the prolific writer on Russian Baptist affairs, declared that the Russian Baptists’ 1906 statement of faith, did “not differ materially from similar documents published in Great Britain and in the United States of America; and it is thus an instance of the unity of the Evangelical Faith, arrived at by the independent study of the Word of God.”⁵⁹ The stundist hosts, sometimes estimated to be in the millions, represented that inevitable movement’s rising generation. It was satisfying, reassuring, and unifying to believe that the stundists naturally gravitated toward Baptist teachings and structures.

Tales of stundist vitality in the face of suffering contributed to a discourse on evangelicals’ historic role in the fight for religious liberty and as

inspiration for further activity. The idea that to contemplate stundist suffering was to relive one's own past served as a common theme among foreign Protestants. For instance, in 1893 a French Christian Reformed magazine noted that reports of stundist suffering were "well made to excite the sympathy of us French Protestants; for little more than a century and a half ago we were treated the same way."⁶⁰ For many Britons those reports summoned up "memories of Primitive Methodism of an early day, rich in the heroics of faith and bright with many a triumph over bigotry."⁶¹ Wrote another, "We in our free island home will pity those harried broken men in Russia, fighting the fight now that *our* fathers fought so grandly in olden time."⁶²

The stundist experience provided an opportunity to reflect on and reanimate evangelicals' glorious history in the fight for freedom. For example, at the Evangelical Alliance's fiftieth anniversary in 1896 there was much talk of the stundists and attention to the "stundist" in attendance, Ivan Prokhanov (a future vice-president of the Baptist World Alliance who was then studying at the Bristol Baptist College). Prokhanov brought greetings from the Russian stundists, spoke about his family's experience of persecution, and called for Alliance aid in what he termed a "holy war" underway in Russia: "Which side will conquer? This is the question. I have pleasure in speaking now to my Christian friends whose forefathers, as I know, carried on a long war and conquered with God's power. The privilege of religious freedom and of liberty to hold meetings for worship, which I am enjoying with you, is a living answer to the question." He went on to argue that the Evangelical Alliance must not lose heart and that despite the apparent failure of the 1887 appeal to the tsar and Pobedonostsev's rebuke, the endeavor had "made a great impression upon the Russian educated classes, and turned their minds to the question of religious liberty."⁶³ Prokhanov thus appealed to Western evangelicals' sense of their heroic history as defenders of religious liberty and offered himself and his people as martyrs for the same cause and worthy of their continuing support.⁶⁴

Sometimes such struggles were not completely over, even in the West, and the glorious example of stundist courage provided stimulation to complete the separation of church and state. Thus the Rev. Henry Smith, writing in *The Wesleyan-Methodist Magazine*, observed, "bitter as is the intolerance experienced by some village Methodists in England in 1892, it is kindness itself as compared with that which our fellow Stundist Methodists experience in Russia."⁶⁵ Even more pointedly, at the Baptist World Alliance's second congress in Philadelphia in 1911 organizers used the ongoing challenges faced by Russian Baptists even after 1905 to send a message to the home country of the president of the Evangelical Alliance, John Clifford,

an Englishman. Since 1903 Clifford had been spearheading a national campaign of passive resistance to the 1902 Education Act, which had extended state support to church schools. At the opening of the congress the chairman dwelled at some length on the contrast between the liberties enjoyed by Americans and the threats faced by Russian Baptists. He then turned, in the next breath, to welcome “brethren from another benighted land”—England. “Now it may be that our brother Clifford, hero of heroes in these modern days, will go back to find that . . . the sheriff has been in and taken the rest of his tea-set to pay the taxes he protests against paying for the support of religious schools in which he does not believe,” he warned.⁶⁶ By strategically juxtaposing the English Baptists’ struggles with those of the young Russian church, he both shamed the British government and summoned his British brethren to recover the energy of their heroic early history in the struggle for religious liberty.

Indeed, the plight of Russian evangelicals served another function in international evangelical discourse: as inspiration against the perceived complacency of evangelicals wherever battles for the freedom to gather and preach had been won. The fin-de-siècle era presents a contradictory picture of the health of evangelical religion. It was a time of vigorous international organizing, when evangelicals rallied to the famous watchword of the Student Volunteer Movement for “the evangelization of the world in this generation.” Yet evangelicals experienced a widespread sense that the highpoint of their movement was past and expressed fears of complacency, of decadence, and of evangelical disunity.⁶⁷

The stundists appeared to present a cure for those ills. Their martyrdom would usher in a great Christian revival that would make real the ambition of evangelizing the world in a generation.⁶⁸ For example, in 1892 an English writer, after reporting a series of testimonies of believers and their experiences of persecution, waxed lyrical about “Stundist trophies to be multiplied by hundreds of thousands.” In an era when revivals in the West were no longer spontaneous but needed fostering, the stundists represented a new “great religious awakening.”⁶⁹ Similarly, at the golden jubilee of the Evangelical Alliance Baedeker bemoaned the stagnation and division in the church in England and compared that “congested” body with the vitality of stundism: “I wish all Christians were as devoted as the Stundists,” he declared. “The Stundists are a people who have received the Word of God—whatever portion they have received they again give forth.” And he bluntly argued against the bureaucratization and professionalization of mission, observing, “They do not form a Missionary Society, such as the one our Chairman is so deeply interested in. They themselves go and do the work,

and the Stundist people are the great hope of Russia.”⁷⁰ This theme of a more vital, spontaneous Christianity was likewise taken up at the 1908 European Baptist Congress when Pastor R. A. Saillens of Paris spoke of the thrill of reading about persecuted brethren in Russia and the effectiveness of exiled believers living in France “to help us in evangelizing our own people.” He opined that “they will give to the world a type of Christianity less effeminate, less mammon-worshipping, than the one we are too much accustomed to see.”⁷¹

The mobilizing potential of Russian evangelical suffering was demonstrated three years later at the Baptist congress in Philadelphia. Members of a large delegation of Russian Baptists, chosen for their past sufferings and specially sponsored to attend, were individually introduced to the congress as apostles and heroes, the only national delegation so honored. Tales of potential and tales of suffering paid off—the following session was devoted to launching a campaign to raise \$100,000 to open a Baptist university in Russia. The congress chairman described this as “the greatest act that the Baptists have done in all the centuries.” Within a few hours \$66,000 had been pledged.⁷² Writing later, one US participant declared, “The touch I have had with these people gives me faith to believe that there will grow in Russia a Protestant force which will send to us across the sea the inspiration which we need in our own lethargy.”⁷³ The stundists served both to unsettle Western evangelical complacency and to provide models for a genuinely apostolic church.

MARTYRS FOR LIBERAL VALUES

Just as stundists provided stimulation among evangelicals for a rejuvenated Christianity, for many Western liberals their appearance likewise seemed to herald a regenerated Russia. There existed a strain of thought, especially among conservative high-church Anglicans, that admired Orthodoxy and idealized the piety of the Russian peasant, allegedly unspoiled by modernity.⁷⁴ Broadly speaking, however, the Western press in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries portrayed Russia as an alien, dirty, unfree, and generally barbarous place, left behind by progress. This was the era of the dreadful famine of 1892, of anti-Jewish pogroms, and of George Kennan’s famous books and speeches in the United States and Britain exposing the horrors of Siberian exile. The benighted Russian peasant, oppressed by brutal officials and in the thrall of a church that preached a dubious Christianity, hardly seemed to belong to European civilization. The story of persecutions of the stundists by both the government and their fellow villagers evoked much comment along these lines. As one author wrote in

The National Review in 1890, the sectarians' fate revealed a "state of society which the casual reader little dreams still exists in a civilized kingdom in this enlightened nineteenth century."⁷⁵ However, a second, not entirely unrelated strain of thinking held that Russia could in fact be understood within a liberal narrative of progress and was ultimately destined to develop along West European lines.⁷⁶ Thus in Britain Keith Neilson points to important elements within the Liberal Party, including the Radicals and much of the rank and file, "who attributed the positive aspects of Russia to a new, emerging group of Russians—people undoubtedly much like themselves—who rejected traditional Russian government."⁷⁷ Similarly, in her study of the development of the category of the "refugee" in British thinking in the nineteenth century Caroline Emily Shaw notes that the persecuted individual's capacity to exemplify British ideals emerged as the critical criterion for the worthy refugee. "Refugee narratives," she contends, "implicitly recognized *liberal subjects* among the oppressed."⁷⁸ The inclination among British liberals of the 1880s and 1890s to regard the Russian nihilists and anarchists as political reformers rather than terrorists illustrates the tendency.⁷⁹ But perhaps more significant for the fate of Russia as a whole was evidence that the peasantry, which made up the overwhelming majority of the Russian population, could find its place in this category of the liberal subject. For this the stundists provided the crucial proof.

The notion that the existence of religious dissent among the peasantry held significance for Russia's future was not new when the stundists emerged as a subject of widespread interest in the 1890s. Mackenzie Wallace, in his much translated and reprinted 1877 study of Russia, devoted two of four chapters on religion to dissenters. He concluded that the existence of significant religious sectarianism "proves that the Russian people is by no means so docile and pliable as is commonly supposed. . . . The dogged energy which it has displayed in asserting for centuries its religious liberty may perhaps some day be employed in the arena of secular politics."⁸⁰ The great French liberal and expert on Russia Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu shared the view that an understanding of religious matters was crucial to any evaluation of Russia's future, dedicating the entire third volume of his influential *The Empire of the Tsars and the Russians* to the subject. Leroy-Beaulieu's main goal was to reveal how the close connection between religion and the state in Russia was a brake on Russia's future development. Although he too discussed religious dissidence at length, in contrast to Wallace he questioned whether it could serve as the means for changing this state of affairs, opining, "If we clamor for liberty to be given the old Schism and the formless peasant heresies, it is not because we expect from the free development of them anything

like a religious revival or a social renovation.⁸¹ Yet his readers often drew the opposite conclusion. For example, a review in a liberal British magazine contended that “a careful perusal of M. Leroy-Beaulieu’s substantial essay leaves the impression even upon an inveterately political mind that just here [in popular religiosity] may yet lie the chief hope of a free and enlightened Russia.”⁸²

This tradition of seeing the source of a transformed Russia among religious dissenters took on a new life in the discussion of stundism. One of the most widely quoted articles on the topic—published in 1892 in a leading liberal journal, *The Contemporary Review*—represents an excellent example of the discovery of the liberal subject among the stundists. The author was the St. Petersburg-based correspondent for the *Daily Telegraph* and a foremost British authority on Russian affairs, E. J. Dillon (writing under his pen name, E. B. Lanin).⁸³ As he published his first article on the stundists, Dillon was finishing a series about Russia in *The Fortnightly Review* that painted a singularly negative portrait of the Russian national character and the Russian state.⁸⁴ Yet Dillon found in the stundists the hope for Russia’s future. Stundism had the power to transform beasts into humans: “Here then, on the one hand,” he asserted, “was a population sunk in an abyss of foulness . . . ; and, on the other hand, a band of heroic individuals such as form the pith round which great movements grow, humanising these masses, shaping thought and deed in a noble harmony, transforming beasts of the field into men and Christians.”⁸⁵ The stundists lifted themselves up from the morass of Russian peasant life, but their reward was persecution: “flogging, fining, imprisonment, and life-long torture in the Siberian mines can be, and frequently are, meted out . . . to men and women whom practical Englishmen or Americans would be disposed to regard as good citizens.”⁸⁶ The stundists, he suggested, proved the potential of the Russian peasantry and held the key to a reformed and Europeanized Russian future:

a social upheaval, a religious revival . . . would be enough to awaken the dormant qualities of the Russians, and thus resuscitate one of the most gifted, generous, and chivalrous peoples in the world. This is not mere prophecy, but the embodiment of facts which can be verified in the story of the rise and spread of religious sects, especially of that remarkable sect known as “Stundists” . . . [which] now stands forth as a formidable power, engaged in a decisive struggle with autocracy and Orthodoxy, the upshot of which may mean life or death to the Russian Empire.⁸⁷

Dillon thus evoked the potent mixture of Russophobia and liberal hope in the potential for reform that characterized much discourse on the stundists.

The stundist became the embodiment of the Russian peasant's potential as a rational individual and political actor.⁸⁸

The stundists, through their suffering, exposed the irrational and police character of the Russian state, and through their self-improvement—the path to a renewed Russia. “The police-officer is the god of Russia,” declared a commentator in *The Contemporary Review*. “Remember,” he went on, “that this is not one of the effete nations of old Europe, but is a young giant only beginning history. And think of such a young Colossus being fettered in such manacles of despotism.”⁸⁹ Even England's most ardent Russophile, the great investigative journalist W. T. Stead, could only agree with his rival Dillon (Lanin), wondering, “was there ever a more suicidal policy sanctioned by a sincerely religious and good-hearted ruler?”⁹⁰

Stundism revealed that a great civilizational battle was underway in Russia, one that demonstrated that the tsar's empire, though backward, would develop toward enlightenment and freedom along West European lines. Describing the stundists as representing “culture and morality,” a German commentator argued, “It is really more than a religious persecution that we meet with here; it is an attack upon a type of civilization different from that expressed in the ecclesiastical world of Russia.”⁹¹ Authors continually sought to place persecutions in Russia in broader historical perspective and to remind their readers that “civilized” countries, too, had passed through such phases. Opined *The Spectator* in 1891, “To men of our day, such persecution seems incredible; but it is not two centuries since our own ruling classes pursued exactly the same policy towards Nonconformists, while they treated Roman Catholics far worse. There seems to be a stage in the human mind when a dissident in religion appears to the majority a perversely anti-social being who should be cut off even from contact with the community.”⁹² In a book otherwise devoted to advocating close ties between Britain and Russia Stead remained highly critical of Pobedonostsev and his religious policy. He objected to any notion that Russia was not “subject to the same conditions as those which prevail in the West.” Rather, he argued that, “as water boils at 212° and freezes at the freezing-point in St. Petersburg as well as in London, so the general principles of religious toleration and the right of man to full religious liberty are truths which do not depend for their application upon parallels of latitude, and which therefore must ultimately prove fatal to the system now in vogue in Russia.”⁹³ The stundists represented universal principles of human life that applied to Russia as much as to the West and were bound to win out.

In a footnote to “The Tsar Persecutor,” Dillon (himself an Irish Roman Catholic) had made clear that he hoped that his article would “arouse the

attention of English and American Nonconformists” and encourage them to come to the aid of “their Russian brethren.”⁹⁴ In so doing, he was appealing to a dominant strand of public opinion in Britain that had recently been dubbed the “Nonconformist conscience.” During the 1870s and 1880s Nonconformists had moved away from their earlier desire to separate Christian and worldly activity and standards and now sought to remake Britain in their image by breaking down the boundary between religion and politics, by holding politicians to high moral standards, and by advocating the view that the state should promote the moral welfare of its citizens. Politically they were drawn to the Liberals, whom they viewed as advocates of civil and religious liberty who would address Nonconformists’ remaining grievances about civil disabilities based on their faith.⁹⁵ In conjunction with this new attitude toward living their faith in the world, Nonconformists (in particular Stead, the son of a Congregational minister) pioneered a new kind of crusading journalism in this period.⁹⁶ The stundists appealed to English religious dissenters as Christians as well as liberals, thus making them an ideal object for a moral campaign.⁹⁷ Moreover, discussions of the stundists provided opportunities to remind their fellow citizens of the service that Nonconformists had performed to enliven the established Anglican Church and to foster the creation of a society of rights and freedoms. For example, Stead made the importance of free competition for the religious health of a society a central theme, arguing that Stundism “spreads fast . . . for the same reason that Dissent spreads in parishes where the Anglican church is purely formal and there is no real spiritual life or healthy humanitarian activity in connection with the Establishment.”⁹⁸

In Britain the overlapping concerns of Nonconformists and liberals fueled a sustained attempt to arouse public opinion in support of the cause of religious freedom in Russia. Two societies organized around two magazines, each spearheaded by Russian émigrés in cooperation with British liberals, Fabian socialists, evangelicals, and other Nonconformist Christians, were founded in the 1890s and explicitly placed this issue at the center of their activities.⁹⁹

The older of the two associations, the Society of Friends of Russian Freedom (SFRF), constitutes the perfect example of “progressive” British society’s desire to see liberal reformers in the persons of Russian revolutionaries and those revolutionaries’ attempt to harness the political energies of the “Nonconformist conscience.” The society was the product of Stepniak-Kravchinskii’s efforts throughout the 1880s to generate sympathy for the terror campaign of Russian revolutionaries (such as himself, although he was not necessarily clear about his own past) by showing that they were forced into terror

by the Russian government's policies. He argued that Westerners had the duty to "unite in a moral crusade against Russian despotism."¹⁰⁰ One point of contact between the Russian revolutionary tradition and Western liberalism was precisely their shared tradition of seeing in religious dissidents the authentic voice of Russian popular religiosity and in assuming that they yearned for freedom of conscience.¹⁰¹ By 1889 he had attracted the interest of Robert Spence Watson, a Quaker lawyer who in 1890 became president of the National Liberal Federation. Despite his reservations about Kravchinskii's socialism, Spence Watson's disgust with the persecution of the Jews in Russia drew him to the scheme. Together they recruited a General Committee for the society, made up of "predominantly middle-class, middle-aged, liberal or radical dissenters," including eleven members of Parliament (ten of them Liberals or Radicals), the editors of the liberal *Contemporary Review* and the radical *Reynold's Weekly*, four clergymen (only one Anglican), and Stretton, the bestselling evangelical author.¹⁰² The way in which religious sympathies drew members to the SFRF, and the sense that religion remained a sensitive issue in Britain too, can be seen in a letter from one of these founders, the Fabian socialist Edward R. Pease, to Kravchinskii shortly after the publication of *The Russian Peasantry*: "Political freedom we have had for so long a time that people regard it lightly. But the passion for religious freedom has not cooled, and that people must suffer for their religion seems to Englishmen to be a terrible injustice."¹⁰³ From 1890 to 1915 the society published a monthly paper, *Free Russia*, edited by Kravchinskii until his death in 1895. Articles from *Free Russia* often served as sources for the English and continental press; shorter-lived Swiss (German) and US editions further extended its influence.¹⁰⁴ The society also regularly organized public talks about political and religious repression in Russia and gathered funds to aid the oppressed.

From the outset, the fate of the stundists was front and center in the society's activities. Indeed, they were the only group, political or religious, specifically named in the SFRF's mission statement to support "all those who are persecuted on religious or political grounds."¹⁰⁵ As in the case of the Evangelical Alliance, the vagueness of the term "stundist" allowed the society to preserve its nonpartisan and nonsectarian identity. One of its brochures on religious persecution explained, "generally speaking these Dissenters from the Greek Orthodox Church belonged to the type which in this country would be designated by the general term 'evangelicals.'"¹⁰⁶ *Free Russia* in the 1890s included frequent articles about the stundists, portraying them as "one of the most remarkable signs of the intellectual awakening of the Russian masses" and as evidence of the Russian peasant's potential for progressive change.¹⁰⁷

The fact that a Russian nihilist assassin served as editor of the SFRF's magazine encouraged accusations in the Russian and English press that the society supported terrorism. At its annual meeting in 1894 Spence Watson preferred to present such attacks as a sign of the society's effectiveness.¹⁰⁸ However, tensions also existed within the alliance of liberals, Nonconformists, and revolutionaries. In his high-circulation magazine *Stead* mockingly noted in 1894 that "sympathy makes strange bedfellows, and it is curious to find so mild and evangelical a Christian linked arm-in-arm with a political assassin."¹⁰⁹ He was referring to Stretton and Stepiak-Kravchinskii and their cooperation in the context of the SFRF. What he did not know was that Stretton's *Highway of Sorrow* had begun life under their joint authorship until the two writers found themselves unable to agree on the novel's message. Where Stretton saw the pure Christianity of the early church, Kravchinskii sensed revolutionary potential. So Stretton published her evangelical version in English, and Kravchinskii's Russian-language *Shtundist Pavel Rudenko* ended with the hero accepting revolutionary teachings.¹¹⁰ Similarly, as David Saunders has shown, for all their cooperation Spence Watson remained ambivalent about the revolutionaries to whom he referred in letters as his "curious friends."¹¹¹

The question of the extent to which English liberals would support political revolution in Russia contributed to the establishment in 1895 of a competing society and magazine dedicated to promoting awareness of Russia in Britain. Its initiator, Jaakoff Prelooker, had founded a Christianizing Jewish sect called New Israel in Russia and had quickly become a sought-after speaker on the religious circuit on arriving in British exile in 1891. Prelooker's Society for the Promotion of Russian Reformation aimed to promote international peace through Anglo-Russian friendship. While acknowledging that this would not be possible under the autocratic system, Prelooker proposed to focus the society's attention on supporting Russians striving for freedom of conscience, distancing it from the SFRF's devotion to political transformation and, he implied, revolutionary methods.¹¹² The Russian Reformation Society never came to much, but Prelooker's journal, *The Anglo-Russian*, lasted until 1914, seeking to exploit the liberal values of the Nonconformist conscience through constant comment on Russian (and British) religious affairs—in particular tales of the martyrdom of stundists and Dukhobors, who were usually termed "Nonconformists" in the English manner.¹¹³ The magazine criticized the Anglicans who sought closer links with Russian Orthodoxy "at a time when the Russian church is trampling on the name of Christ" and when other British denominations were raising money to aid suffering Russian brethren. When the bishop of London

spoke on the importance of liberty to true Christianity, *The Anglo-Russian* reprinted his words, warning “Russian ecclesiastics and English Ritualists” to take note.¹¹⁴

When Prelooker spoke about the stundists at a London church in the early 1890s, he was amazed to find himself advertised as “A Russian Stundist.” He was told, however, that “in England they do not differentiate between various shades of Russian Non-conformity, but understand under Stundism all kinds of Dissent from the Russian Established Church.”¹¹⁵ The very vagueness of the term made the stundists an ideal object of interest and rallying point, not just for readers of religious magazines and participants in evangelical organizations, but more generally for Western Europeans and North Americans committed to spreading liberal ideals. Liberalism and evangelicalism shared a belief in the universal applicability of their teachings. Moreover, a commitment to religious liberty rooted in their own denominational histories united evangelical—and more broadly Nonconformist—Christians across Europe and linked them, as a rule, to the wider cause of liberalism. The fact that communities of Russian peasants were taking up evangelical beliefs became proof of those beliefs’ universal correctness, and that history was on the side of evangelicalism and liberalism. Liberals and evangelicals could see themselves in the stundists and thus imagine them as harbingers of a new Russia made in their own image. In the meantime, the stundists’ suffering served as an inspiring counterpoint to the seemingly complacent, materialist, and self-satisfied Western culture. The stundists became martyrs for the cause of a revitalized Christianity and the liberal value of freedom of conscience. In Britain, where the affinity between liberalism and evangelicalism was particularly strong, so too was the campaign in aid of the stundists.

The international campaign in defense of the stundists reveals the important role of religion in the elaboration and international communication of liberal ideas about the individual conscience and the individual’s relationship to the state. Transnational religious networks served as conduits conveying information about stundism and its challenges abroad and funneling ideas and money back to the believers in Russia. Moreover, as foreign believers mobilized in support of their persecuted Russian brethren, they also highlighted the ways in which their evangelical and liberal ideals remained not fully realized at home.

Supporters of the stundists failed to persuade their governments to take up their cause. The British government regarded the treatment of religious minorities as an internal problem of Russia, arguing, when questions were

asked in the House of Commons in 1878, 1892, and 1904 that to raise the issue would be to impinge on Russian sovereignty.¹¹⁶ Confidential reports and papers from the Foreign Office dealing with Russia contained little analysis of religious matters.¹¹⁷ In the United States both the Democratic and Republican party platforms in 1892 protested religious persecution in Russia.¹¹⁸ An 1892 commission on the causes of emigration from Europe to the United States noted that religious persecution of the Jews, Lutherans, Roman Catholics, stundists, and other groups was a cause of exodus from Russia. However, there is little evidence of concrete government activity on the matter.¹¹⁹

The impact in Russia itself of foreign campaigns for religious freedom is not easy to determine. Émigré supporters insisted that their efforts were contributing to awareness among educated Russians of issues of freedom of conscience.¹²⁰ Certainly, as Paul Werth notes, international interest in religious minorities in Russia forced the government to make explicit its religious policies. Officials monitored the international discussion about freedom of conscience and debated its applicability to Russian conditions.¹²¹ The well-known publicist Konstantin Arsen'ev praised the Evangelical Alliance's efforts in the pages of the liberal *Vestnik Evropy* in 1888.¹²² However, whether and how the international campaign against religious persecution contributed to the active discussion of religious freedom in Russian intellectual circles in the late imperial period remains a subject for further research.¹²³

The campaign left important traces, however. Observers continue to use religious freedom as a measure of the broader evolution of the relationship between the citizen and the state in Russia.¹²⁴ Especially within evangelical circles, religion remains a crucial lens through which knowledge of the world is acquired and evaluated. In the 1970s, when the defense of human rights entered international relations in the wake of the Helsinki Accords, defenders of the Soviet evangelicals turned to the large literature created in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries about the stundists.¹²⁵ After the Soviet Union collapsed and foreign missionaries flooded in, these works yet again served as sources of knowledge and perceptions about Russia's political and religious history.¹²⁶

Agents of State Religion in Late Imperial Russia

DANIEL SCARBOROUGH

The Orthodox Church encompassed one of the most extensive social and institutional networks in the Russian Empire. By the late nineteenth century Orthodox clergy and laypeople were participating in a variety of voluntary associations that carried out charity, mutual aid, disaster relief, and support for primary education.¹ Yet the Orthodox Church has also been seen as a major obstacle to the development of civil society in late imperial Russia. Social and entrepreneurial networks remained largely confined to coreligionists during Russia's industrial expansion, partly as a result of intolerance toward non-Orthodox communities.² Historians of late imperial Russia have identified interfaith barriers as an important factor behind the inability of the middle classes to collaborate for political self-assertion in the Duma era.³ Some scholars have attributed this environment of religious intolerance to Orthodox Christianity itself, identifying Orthodox chauvinism and exclusivity as the root of the "mass ethnophobias" that arose in the nineteenth century.⁴ Walter Laqueur suggests that the tendency of extreme right-wing groups to demonize minorities was attributable to pervasive superstition and Orthodox preoccupation with the forces of evil.⁵ The present work, by contrast, argues that the majority of Orthodox Christians were not predisposed toward religious intolerance. Rather, the main factor in the perpetuation of intolerance was the protected status of the Orthodox Church under the autocratic state. Orthodox associations had developed extensive local autonomy from the state by the early twentieth century as a result of the relaxation of religious regulations after the Great Reforms of the 1860s. These associations were poised to develop closer ties with other communities and associations in Russia's rapidly changing society. Beginning in the 1880s, however, advocates of maintaining the Church's protected status emerged within the ecclesiastical structure and served as agents of continued state regulation of religious life. These agents of state intervention played a major role in perpetuating confessional barriers, exacerbating interconfessional hostility, and reducing the Church's contribution to Russia's nascent civil society.

During the Great Reforms, as part of the general "invitation to society" to assume responsibility for its own needs, members of the church hierarchy sanctioned the formation of free associations among the Orthodox to

compete with other religious groups at the local level through voluntarism and community building practices.⁶ John Strickland, however, identifies the emergence of another movement among “a small but influential group of Church leaders,” who were skeptical of the reform-era appeal to society. Viewing the tsar as “an apostle-like leader,” they looked, instead, to the autocracy to protect the status of Orthodoxy as the national faith of the Russian people.⁷ This ideology, which Strickland calls “Orthodox patriotism,” was most prevalent among agents of the “internal mission.”⁸ Professional missionaries were created to work within Orthodox communities by a council of bishops in Kazan in 1884. This council called for the establishment and financial support of antischismatic specialists in each diocese to take responsibility from the regular clergy for fighting apostasy as well as atheism.⁹ Much of their missionary work would consist of monitoring rival religious groups and enforcing (with police help) legal restrictions on interfaith contact. In addition to “Orthodox patriotism,” the substantial material benefits of their official position are likely to have motivated the missionaries in their work of promoting state regulation of religious interaction. Even after the decree of 17 April 1905 “On Strengthening the Principles of Religious Toleration,” which expanded religious freedom in Russia, professional missionaries worked to maintain state control (through their own office) over significant aspects of religious life. By usurping the task of interacting with other religious groups, official missionaries, I argue, reduced the freedom of Orthodox communities to establish ties across confessional boundaries and perpetuated religious intolerance in late imperial Russia. Thus a comparatively small minority within the Orthodox Church inhibited processes that otherwise boded well for the emergence of a civil society with a multiconfessional religious component.

The present work draws on archival material from the dioceses of Moscow and Tver’ to examine state intervention in interfaith relations at the local level. The Orthodox associations of these dioceses were uniquely active in their engagement with the society around them. The parish trusteeships of Moscow consistently dedicated more funds to education, charity, and mutual aid than those of any other diocese. After St. Petersburg the far less wealthy parish trusteeships of Tver’ were next in the percentage of their collective resources that they dedicated to social needs.¹⁰ Moreover, both dioceses contained overwhelming Orthodox majorities.¹¹ True, there were well-established communities of Old Believers in both Moscow and Tver’, but they were not among the largest in the empire.¹² Thus the Orthodox communities of Moscow and Tver’ were more sheltered from religious competition than those of many other dioceses. Nevertheless, official mis-

sionaries were deeply entrenched in both. The Synod designated Moscow as the location for their training and for the first “congress of antischismatic missionaries” in the fall of 1886.¹³ Official missionaries obtained positions in the largest brotherhoods of both dioceses and influenced the agendas of those organizations. They established networks of subordinate missionaries that wielded control over the interfaith relations of the robust Orthodox communities of Moscow and Tver’. The Orthodox population of these dioceses thus serves as a useful focus for an examination of the influence of official missionaries on the communities and associations of Orthodox Christians.

Prior to 1905 state protection of “official Orthodoxy” was a draconian form of social control that the regime imposed on all its subjects, including Orthodox Christians. Atheism was illegal for all subjects of the empire. Conversion from Orthodoxy to any other religion was illegal both for those born into the Church and for those baptized into it at a later age. After 1832 children of mixed Orthodox and non-Orthodox marriages were automatically considered Orthodox. Landowning apostates from Orthodoxy could have their property seized if it was populated by Orthodox peasants. In some cases apostates were deprived of their own children.¹⁴ For the Orthodox clergy the protected status of their church came at a price. The state viewed the Orthodox Church as its promoter of loyalty and social support among the Russian population, and it reserved the right to compel the Church to perform this function. This prerogative was expressed in the Law Code of the Russian Empire: “Autocratic power acts in church administration through the Holy Governing Synod, which it established.”¹⁵ As representatives of the official church, Orthodox priests were deprived of the freedom to preach sermons contrary to government policy. Church regulations dictated that the Orthodox priest was to preach “about submission to authority, and especially to the authority of the tsar, and about the obligations of every rank.”¹⁶ To prevent deviation from these guidelines, all priests were required to submit their sermons in written form to their local superintendent (*blagochinnyi*) for approval prior to delivering them.¹⁷ Even proselytism was regulated among the Orthodox clergy, as missionary work among the non-Orthodox required permission from state authorities. Ironically, the clergy of no other religion endured such tight state regulation of their sermons as did the pastors of the official Orthodox Church.

Despite the extensive demands that the regime imposed on them, Orthodox clergymen were often disinclined to call on state power in return. Unlike the clergy of most state churches throughout Europe, the Orthodox pastorate enjoyed neither significant financial support from the government

nor legal enforcement of tithe payments.¹⁸ By the beginning of the twentieth century the Synod was providing state salaries to priests in some urban parishes and supplementary aid to priests in impoverished, rural parishes. Yet most parish clergymen derived the majority of their livelihood from the voluntary tithes of their parishioners. The parish clergy was, therefore, more directly beholden to the Orthodox population in a material sense than to the authorities. Priests did not report incriminating confessions to the police as they were legally required to do.¹⁹ Many clergymen even concealed the number of apostates and religious dissenters residing in their parishes from the authorities to avoid alienating the communities that supported them.²⁰ Thus the privileged status of the Orthodox Church could be more of a burden than a boon to most parish clergymen.

The mid-nineteenth century saw a relaxation of the imperial government's control over religious expression and interaction. As part of the Great Reforms Orthodox Christians of all estates were authorized to participate in voluntary associations known as "brotherhoods." This institution represented a revival of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Orthodox brotherhoods of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. They were originally established by Orthodox laypeople within the Commonwealth to provide mutual aid for the protection of church property and support for religious schools, especially after six of their bishops entered into union with the Roman Catholic Church in 1596.²¹ The brotherhoods were first recreated in 1862 in the western provinces of their origin, without the help of the tsarist regime, for the same goals that their predecessors had pursued: education, charity, and "the preservation of Orthodoxy from the influence of Catholicism."²² The first three brotherhoods were organized in Kiev Diocese with the sponsorship of Metropolitan Arsenii (Moskvin). In 1864 the minister of internal affairs promulgated the "Fundamental Rules" for the establishment of brotherhoods, which granted retroactive state recognition to existing brotherhoods and authorized the establishment of future institutions for the support of religious education, charity, missionary work, and "the defense of the Orthodox Church against the propaganda of other confessions."²³ An empire-wide survey of brotherhoods carried out in 1893 by the church publicist Aleksandr Papkov reported their total number to be 159 with 37,642 members in possession of an estimated 1,629,707 rubles.²⁴ While many of them were concentrated in the western provinces, with twenty-two brotherhoods in Minsk Diocese alone, the report indicates that the movement had spread throughout the empire. Papkov observed the second largest number of brotherhoods in the dioceses of Moscow, Riga, and Podol'sk, each of which contained at least eight. He observed two brother-

hoods in Tver'.²⁵ Archival records of smaller brotherhoods not mentioned in Papkov's report indicate that these numbers must have been higher.²⁶

It was in keeping with the reformist mood of the era that state authorities endorsed the participation of society in an officially sponsored enterprise such as the promotion of Orthodox Christianity. The brotherhood was not the only Orthodox association to receive official sanction in the decades following the Great Reforms. Such organizations gradually multiplied over the empire's final half-century and were often justified by the need to strengthen Orthodox communities to enable them to resist the encroachment of other confessions.²⁷ The parish trusteeship, for example, was also created in 1864 to allow clergy and parishioners to assemble and raise funds for a variety of parish needs such as education, mutual aid, charity, and church renovation.²⁸ A 1901 Synodal report associated these tasks with interfaith competition: "The main tasks of the parish trusteeships have been: cooperation for the dissemination and strengthening of the truth and principles of the Orthodox faith in the parish; care for the defense of the Orthodox population of the parish against the harmful influences of the false teachings of various sects and other confessions."²⁹

This perception of the need to permit free association enabled Orthodox communities to cooperate in addressing confessionally neutral social needs. For example, one brotherhood founded in a rural parish of Tver' in 1901 provided financial support for a local clinic (*fel'dsherskii vrachebnyi punkt*) and for a society of firefighters.³⁰ At the same time that the Orthodox were being invited to engage with the society around them, restrictions on the social activities of religious nonconformists were also being tempered. In 1874 the marriages of Old Believers were officially recognized and their children were accepted into educational institutions.³¹ The modest liberalization of the regime's regulation of religious life facilitated interaction between the Orthodox and other religious communities living in proximity with them, creating the potential for interfaith cooperation. In 1899, for example, a charitable society for needy school children was founded in the town of Rovno, and counted Orthodox priests, one Catholic priest, and one "teacher of the Talmud-Torah," among its members.³²

Primary education provided a particularly rich opportunity for interfaith collaboration. Beginning in the early nineteenth century, Orthodox priests began establishing small schools in their parishes to provide basic education and religious instruction to the children of their parishioners for no obligatory fee. The chief procurator of the Holy Synod, Konstantin Pobedonostsev, expressed his hope in 1898 that these parish schools would serve as a useful tool of conversion for those children of non-Orthodox families

who attended them.³³ Yet education had become a universal concern, especially with the appearance of new employment opportunities for literate peasants that came with industrialization at the end of the nineteenth century.³⁴ Many Catholic families voluntarily sent their children to Orthodox parish schools, although any goodwill generated from this exchange turned to resentment in 1892, when all Catholic schools in the empire were transferred to the Ministry of Education, leaving many Catholics with no other alternative than the parish schools.³⁵ Nevertheless, parish schools provided an entirely new educational opportunity for the children of other non-Orthodox communities. Brotherhoods and other voluntary associations provided the main source of support for these institutions.³⁶ In 1902 one Moscow priest described the process: "The clergy create schools from what? Well, from nothing. We have neither funds nor material. The priest goes from door to door, bows, and asks his parishioners to help him build the school in which their children must learn."³⁷ Brotherhoods published reports on some parish schools in which only a minority of the students adhered to the official Orthodox Church.³⁸ In some cases the "schismatics" themselves provided the voluntary support that sustained these schools. Moscow's parish school inspector published a report in 1903 in which he recounted the visit of one Old Believer to a parish school. The man was reportedly so impressed with the Russian language lesson and the children's singing that he donated twenty kopecks on the spot, before turning around and donating thirty more.³⁹ In such reports the ultimate goal of conversion usually went unmentioned.

Records of simple interaction across confessional boundaries suggest that Orthodox parishioners, the primary financial supporters of both Orthodox associations and clergy, favored coexistence and even cooperation with other confessions in the realm of common social concerns. Heather Coleman has documented the outbreaks of violence within Orthodox villages in reaction to Baptist conversions in the early twentieth century.⁴⁰ Yet these episodes seem exceptional. The large number of petitions and complaints that the increasingly literate parishioners of Moscow and Tver' Dioceses sent to their consistories in the early twentieth century do not reflect the preoccupation of ecclesiastical officialdom with the suppression and conversion of schismatics and sectarians.⁴¹ In letters written in praise of their priest, if parishioners mentioned other religious groups, it was usually to commend their pastor for maintaining amicable relations with them. Parishioners from a church in the Lefortovo District of Moscow, for example, wrote to the consistory requesting that their priest be honored with a pectoral cross. Among his qualities and accomplishments they noted that "sec-

tarians living among us, as well as members of other faiths such as Catholics and Lutherans, with whom he has dealings in connection with the German cemetery, regard him with the same deep respect as do we.”⁴² When parishioners did commend the missionary work of their priest, they described this work as a component of education and community building rather than confrontation. For example, parishioners from the Volokolamsk District of Moscow Province wrote to the consistory: “The kindness and morals of our priest have earned him love and respect even from the Old Believers, from whom five families have left the schism for Orthodoxy thanks to his authoritative and edifying Christian persuasion.”⁴³ It seems unlikely that many parish priests felt pressured by the parishioners who supported them to initiate hostile confrontations with religious dissenters. It is still less likely that many peasant parishioners would have approved of their clergyman bringing police into their communities to enforce religious conformity.

The expansion of local autonomy and free association that followed the Great Reforms led, in some cases, to conflict, anxiety, and calls for tighter regulation of social interaction.⁴⁴ In the case of the Church such calls came from yet another voluntary association that emerged among the clergy. Since the mid-nineteenth century members of the hierarchy had been demanding that local congresses of bishops be convened to discuss issues of concern for the Church outside of the Synod. Like the brotherhoods, these congresses were justified by the need to address the threat posed to the Church by religious competition.⁴⁵ The first bishops’ congresses were held in Kiev and Kazan in 1884. Delegates to the latter argued that the threat posed to the Orthodox fold by sectarianism was too great to be met by the regular parish clergy and proposed that antischismatic specialists should be trained “in measures to weaken sectarian propaganda.” In response to the congress’s proposal, the Synod passed a resolution in 1886 requiring all bishops to establish official missionaries in their dioceses. These missionaries did not have to be ordained clergymen and were to be relieved of any other pastoral obligations not pertaining to the fight against sectarianism. They were to be generously supported, “with the designation of local funds.”⁴⁶ One Father Polianskii, for example, left his position as instructor at the Moscow Theological Academy in 1903 to work as a full-time missionary and was compensated with an apartment with heating and a salary of three thousand rubles a year.⁴⁷ This was quite an improvement over the seven hundred to nine hundred rubles a year that he would have received as a teacher.⁴⁸ In carrying out their work, these missionaries were not materially accountable to the wishes of the Orthodox laity as regular parish clergymen were. Bishops’ congresses were discontinued, partly due to Pobedonostsev’s suspicion

that they would advocate greater independence for the church hierarchy from the state.⁴⁹ Yet the official missionaries established a permanent network within the ecclesiastical administration that gradually assumed legal authority over interfaith relations within the dioceses, brotherhoods, and parishes. This professional network, along with its supporters among the clergy, would ultimately reduce the autonomy of Orthodox communities from the state.

The primary focus of the professional missionaries was the Orthodox population. Their priorities and strategies were expressed in a series of missionary congresses held in 1887, 1891, 1897, and 1908. The first, convened in Moscow and attended by sixty-four professional missionaries, compiled a list of “infectious” threats to Orthodox unity, which placed non-Orthodox confessions in the same category as revolutionaries, referred to as rationalistic sects (*ratsionalisticheskie sekty*).⁵⁰ Strickland points out that this “internal mission” to the Orthodox themselves was strongly influenced by the program of “Orthodox patriotism.”⁵¹ Leaders of the movement believed that only Orthodox Christianity could restore cultural and social unity to the Russian nation. They sought, therefore, to restore cultural predominance to the Orthodox Church. Autocratic authority was a crucial component of this cultural mission. Alexander III, in particular, instilled confidence in Orthodox patriots through his steadfast refusal to relax state control over religious life. Bishop Nikanor (Kamenskii) of Orel wrote in 1899 that Alexander deserved the title of “Equal to the Apostles,” because he had refused to decriminalize apostasy among the Orthodox.⁵² His pious successor would receive similar reverence. The official lay missionary Vasilii Skvortsov established a state-funded journal in 1896, *Missionerskoe obozrenie*, which hailed the coronation of Nicholas II that year as part of the “struggle for a native Orthodoxy.”⁵³

The strategy that official missionaries adopted of consistently appealing to state authority for enforcement of religious norms is likely to have been shaped by this ideology. The congress of 1891, which also took place in Moscow, declared that strengthening religious convictions among the Orthodox was by itself insufficient to prevent the spread of sectarianism and that cooperation with “state power” was also necessary. Local authorities would be asked to enforce tighter regulation of religious life among the Orthodox by, for example, compelling factory workers to attend missionary lectures, preventing the sale of icons in unauthorized locations, and enforcing prohibitions against commercial activity on holy days. The congress also called for increased restrictions on the public activities of sectarian groups to minimize their interaction with the Orthodox population.⁵⁴ In accordance with

these policies, missionaries carried out surveillance on the population under their jurisdiction with the help of the police and brought to trial offenders of antisectionarian laws.⁵⁵

Their official status allowed missionaries to obtain positions of authority in Orthodox associations and communities. Missionaries occupied council seats in the largest brotherhoods of both Moscow and Tver' and ensured that significant sums were dedicated to the surveillance of sectarians and the distribution of antischematic literature.⁵⁶ Significant amounts of the parish clergy's own resources were also diverted to support the missionaries. At the diocesan congress held in Tver' in 1902 the bishop blocked a motion by the clergy's elected representatives to allocate a parish taxation surplus of 12,472.92 rubles from the consistory's savings to local educational expenses on the grounds that the salary of the diocesan missionary was derived from the interest that these invested funds generated.⁵⁷ Missionaries influenced the public activity of Orthodox communities down to the level of the parish. Special licenses ensured that missionaries had greater authority over interfaith relations than did Orthodox pastors. The text of a license issued in 1898 to an assistant missionary of peasant background demonstrates that this authority extended into the very churches of the regular parish clergy.

By order of His Imperial Majesty, Autocrat of all Russia, through the Moscow Consistory, this license is issued to the peasant Afanasii Vasil'ev Kuznetsov, assistant missionary of Luzhitsk Okrug, Moscow Province, to be presented at the appropriate times to the civil authorities in both cities and settlements and asserts that he, Kuznetsov, has been authorized by the diocesan authorities to conduct public and private discussions with schismatic Old Believers and other sectarians in churches, monasteries, public buildings, factories . . . in private homes, and under the open sky.⁵⁸

Although members of the parish clergy were not explicitly forbidden to engage in religious discussions with the non-Orthodox, they were required to obtain permission to hold the kinds of public and private events that the bearer of the above license could organize at will. By discouraging Orthodox associations from engaging the non-Orthodox and encouraging their reliance on surveillance and regulation of interfaith contacts, missionaries strengthened their own influence within the ecclesiastical administration and over diocesan resources.

Despite the influence of official missionaries, many clergymen met the challenges facing the Church through social engagement. The proliferation of voluntary associations among the clergy, largely justified as a means to resist the spread of new religious movements, also allowed pastors to combat

poverty and social dislocation by promoting charity, education, and mutual aid among the laity.⁵⁹ Such pastoral work was also referred to as part of an “internal mission” to strengthen the piety and solidarity of Orthodox communities. An article in Moscow’s diocesan journal from 1902, for example, declared:

In the sphere of social life, the internal mission fights against need of all kinds that oppress the poor classes. . . . The mission thus collaborates in the establishment of various associations, organized for different kinds of mutual aid, loan funds, companies for the organization of inexpensive apartments, and consumers’ societies. The mission also works to instill into the members of these societies the spirit of true Christian self-sacrifice, on which their success depends.⁶⁰

The article claimed that social engagement was needed to counter the growing influence of sectarians and evangelical Protestants in Russia’s cities but also argued that this work should be carried out independently of the “secular authorities.” Urban workers were turning away from the Church, the article claimed, because “it is supported by the state, the agents of which are unpopular among the workers.”⁶¹ Clergymen who engaged in this form of the “internal mission” often succeeded in organizing voluntary associations among the laity.⁶² Yet even in those areas where Orthodox associations were highly active, such as Moscow and Tver’, there is little evidence of their participation in interfaith competition or collaboration. This important limitation on the associational activity of the Orthodox population was largely maintained by the missionary network. Operating alongside the regular pastorate at the parish level, official missionaries effectively perpetuated confessional boundaries even after the 1905 decree that reduced state regulation of religious life.

On 17 April 1905 Emperor Nicholas II’s decree on religious toleration guaranteed all subjects of the Russian Empire “freedom of belief and prayer according to the dictates of [their] conscience.”⁶³ In addition to decriminalizing apostasy, the decree increased freedom of association among non-Orthodox religious communities by, for example, recognizing the freedom of Protestant converts to congregate in prayer houses and private homes. This decree, as well as the October Manifesto, came as a tremendous shock to many Orthodox clergymen. Others, however, perceived potential benefits for the Church in the decree. An article published in Moscow’s diocesan journal in September 1905 declared: “Remember that the time has passed when we could rely on the strength of police enforcement, and thank God for that. Remember instead the words of the Savior: *My grace is sufficient for*

thee, for my strength is made perfect in my weakness (2 Cor. 12:9). We need not fanaticism but toleration.”⁶⁴

In addition to distancing the Church from complicity in police persecution, “toleration” presented opportunities for interfaith collaboration that some churchmen recognized as mutually beneficial. The antireligious intimidation and violence that erupted during the 1905 revolution affected both Orthodox and non-Orthodox communities.⁶⁵ The archpriest-superintendent (*blagochinnyi*) of Rzhev, a town in Tver’ Province dominated by Old Belief, noted in his 1906 report to the consistory that the “schismatics” had served as allies against revolutionary violence over the previous months. “The city is characterized by hostility toward and condemnation of all strikers. The Schism, in my personal opinion, as a source of strict conservatism, has done Rzhev an important service by opposing the harmful trends of recent years.”⁶⁶ Even the stridently anti-Catholic Metropolitan Evlogii (Georgievskii) of Kholm proved capable of recognizing commonality with other religious groups amid Russia’s experiment with popular representation. As a deputy to the Second Duma he described his feelings of sympathy and admiration for Muslim representatives who experienced the same antireligious scorn from liberal and radical politicians as did the Orthodox. “I was able to observe how Muslim deputies, at their appointed times, left the assembly and prayed in the Catherine Hall. They knelt in corners and prayed with rhythmic motions of their bodies. Journalists and deputies laughed at them while they smoked, but I was moved to respect them for bearing witness to their religious convictions.”⁶⁷

The Orthodox were capable of perceiving the potential for collaboration with other religious communities in the Russian Empire of the Duma era. Their ultimate failure to establish ties with other religious groups was not simply the result of Orthodox chauvinism. It stemmed from the Church’s inability to escape its own protected status as the state church of the Russian Empire.

Some church leaders believed that the tsar’s decree had necessitated greater freedom for Orthodox communities to compete with Russia’s newly liberated religious minorities. Metropolitan Antonii (Vadkovskii) of St. Petersburg called for a corresponding relaxation of regulations on the speech and association of the Orthodox clergy. He argued before the Committee of Ministers that state tutelage, “renders the voice of the Church inaudible in both private and public life,” and that the continuation of such tutelage in an openly multiconfessional society would place the Church in an untenable position.⁶⁸ The Synod again invited Orthodox society to organize its own defense. On 18 November 1905 the Synod issued a “decree on the

organization of parish life and pastoral councils.”⁶⁹ The decree proposed that the management of parish funds and property be entrusted to “parish councils” that would be elected by parishioners and chaired by their priest. It also authorized clergymen to organize “pastoral councils” at all levels of the dioceses and to invite laypeople to take part in them. Parish and pastoral councils significantly enhanced freedom of association among the Orthodox clergy and laity in the hope that they would help the Church compete in Russia’s emerging marketplace of confessions and ideas.

“The Church of Christ has only one sword—the sword of spiritual admonition [*vrazumleniia*] and persuasion [*ubezhdeniia*],” the Synod declared in its November decree. It continued that while “our Sovereign has seen fit to announce to His people the immanent reordering of the state on principles of freedom,” many people were taking advantage of the situation and, “having lost their fear of God, have already begun to use that freedom for evil.” Therefore, the Synod urged that “this spiritual sword—Christ’s eternal truth—must rouse its strength through the communication of the pastor with all believers loyal to the Church.”⁷⁰

Yet restrictions remained in place to dull this “spiritual sword.” While the decree transferred unprecedented authority over the management of diocesan resources to elected representatives of the laity, it did not sanction unauthorized or spontaneous assembly among the Orthodox.⁷¹ It did not relax the censorship of sermons or the prohibition against unsupervised interfaith interaction. Thus Metropolitan Antonii’s fears remained well founded. The decree of toleration had also retained many restrictions on non-Orthodox religious groups. Conversion was legal only among different Christian denominations, and proselytism among the Orthodox remained illegal. The failure of a Duma bill in May 1906 to relax these restrictions made it clear that the Church was to retain a reduced version of its protected status.⁷² The retention of restrictions on the parish clergy’s own freedom of speech made recourse to these remaining legal defenses often more appealing than facing the challenges and opportunities of interfaith interaction.

The network of official missionaries played a central role in perpetuating state regulation of religious life after the decree of toleration. Despite a series of articles in *Missionerskoe obozrenie* condemning the tsar’s decree in apocalyptic terms, the editor, Skvortsov, continued to espouse the centrality of autocratic authority to Orthodoxy in Russia, as did many other “Orthodox patriots.” Strickland argues that Orthodox patriots’ “decision to retain an uncompromising faith in autocracy was a sign of the movement’s dislocation from political reality and its inability to offer the Russian public a viable alternative to a secular nationalism in the fateful years before the

war and revolution.”⁷³ At a tactical level, however, the decision of official missionaries to retain legal compulsion as their primary weapon in the fight against apostasy may have been based as much on professional self-interest as on ideological intransigence.⁷⁴ Their lucrative position within the ecclesiastical structure was based on the perception that regular clergymen were unable to address the crisis of apostasy, and their legal mandate to supervise interfaith relations had perpetuated the marginalization of the parish clergy as representatives of the Church to other confessions. Rather than altering their strategy to focus on “responding to the social needs that sectarianism addressed,” as some delegates to the 1908 missionary congress in Kiev suggested, official missionaries continued to act as agents of state control over interfaith relations.⁷⁵ In so doing, they maintained their own control over religious interaction and over diocesan funds.

This missionary network immediately responded to the decree of toleration by educating the parish clergy about the legal protections from religious competition that remained available to them. The Moscow missionary Fr. Polianskii published a series of articles in the diocesan press in which he delineated and clarified the legal restrictions that remained in place against the non-Orthodox. He stated: “It would be completely incorrect to presume that because the edict does not forbid something that it therefore permits it. The edict permits only that which is written in it, and it is not written that members of other religions, Old Believers, and sectarians have the right to conduct propaganda among the Orthodox. . . . In the journal of the Committee of Ministers, it is clearly stated that propagandistic activity by various sects and ideologies, if such should occur, should be investigated and prevented.”⁷⁶

The missionaries successfully encouraged many parish clergymen to appeal to these laws in response to perceived threats to their congregations. It is not surprising that this approach did not check the spread of conversions to other denominations. Delegates to the 1908 congress expressed horror at the success of new religious movements among the Russian population.⁷⁷ Yet the official missionaries were able to expand and intensify their strategy. In May 1908 the Synod approved plans to establish missionary councils in each diocese to oversee a network of district missionaries.⁷⁸ On his appointment as chairman of Moscow’s missionary council in 1917, Bishop Aleksii of Dmitrov expressed his concerns to Metropolitan Makarii of Moscow regarding the possibility of conflicts of interest within the council’s decision-making structure: “Hitherto, missionary concerns and material concerns have both been resolved in the missionary council. Individuals with vested interests in the designation of funds have taken part, as

voting members, in decisions regarding the allocation of those funds.”⁷⁹ By the empire’s final decade official missionaries had become an entrenched interest group with ties to conservative prelates in the Synod and control over resources in the dioceses. Through this position of influence they had become the dominant representatives of Orthodoxy to other confessions throughout much of Russia.

The insecurity of many parish clergymen about their own ability, and that of their communities, to freely compete with other confessions induced many of them to appeal to the official missionary network to intervene in interfaith disputes at the local level. This insecurity may well have been the product of the missionaries’ legal usurpation of that responsibility. Letters between Moscow’s missionaries and parish clergymen illustrate that this relationship continued well after 1905. In 1912 one priest from the town of Mytishch, Father Protopopov, addressed two letters to the diocesan missionary Varzhanskii in which he recounted attempts by local Baptists to win converts from among the Orthodox. “Regarding the Most Holy Mother of God, they claimed that She was a simple woman . . . they said that one should not kiss the Gospels.”⁸⁰ Fr. Protopopov also expressed fear that his parishioners might be won over by Baptist “propaganda.” “One young woman, who is very religious but uneducated, has had her Orthodox beliefs shattered by the shameless arguments of these sectarians. She has been left with no foundation and is suffering from internal strife.”⁸¹ What would seem to have been an important occasion for pastoral action Fr. Protopopov viewed as cause for police intervention. He repeatedly pointed out that these meetings were illegal and asked Varzhanskii to have them shut down: “Because the law on sectarian meetings has obviously been broken, I humbly implore Your Excellency to petition for their immediate closure in Mytishch and for the complete prohibition of local sectarians, of whom there are only seven, to hold any meetings whatsoever in the future, including prayer meetings.”⁸² These letters reveal an acute lack of confidence on the part of this priest in his ability to resist the influence of just seven Baptist evangelists without police support. Such timidity is not entirely surprising considering the fact that the priest himself could not legally have held large, extraliturgical meetings of his own without a permit. The diocesan mission offered the priest an easy alternative to confronting both state restrictions and religious competition.

In response to these letters Varzhanskii dispatched a subordinate missionary to observe the situation in the town. That missionary, Tsvetkov, reported his subsequent confrontation with the Baptists and seemed to think that he had gained the upper hand. He attended their sermon in a private

home along with “fifty to sixty people.” The preacher, about twenty years old, reportedly proclaimed: “of the Church of Christ, that is the Orthodox Church . . . there remain only scraps [*rozhki da nozhki*]. Those who claim to follow the teachings of the Apostles lead dissolute lives. If they carry the keys to the Kingdom of God, they use them neither for themselves nor to admit others.” Several spectators, Tsvetkov reported, were offended and left. After the talk he approached the preacher and asked, “How can there remain only scraps of the Church of Christ when Christ himself promised Her eternal life?” Instead of an answer, they forcibly led him out. He was met on the street by some of the spectators, who thanked him.⁸³ Varzhanskii, however, deemed this apparent victory insufficient and complained to the governor of Moscow. In April of the next year the district police inspector was dispatched to Mytishch to warn all registered Baptists not to hold meetings for Orthodox Christians. The local police were also warned to enforce compliance with laws against proselytism.⁸⁴ Despite their generally high academic qualifications, often from a theological academy, professional missionaries utilized police force as a matter of course, even when peaceful and “rational” debate seemed to have been sufficient to deflect competition from other confessions.⁸⁵

The fact that official missionaries facilitated police enforcement of religious conformity among Orthodox believers as well as among apostates demonstrated their lack of concern over the sympathy or support of Orthodox communities. As missionaries repeatedly pointed out, many spectators at the religious meetings they broke up were merely curious Orthodox Christians. With the help of missionaries some priests censored their parishioners’ access to literature as well. In March 1914, for example, a district missionary wrote to Varzhanskii regarding the illegal circulation of Lev Tolstoi’s religious writings by a local *zemstvo* library.

Respected Nikolai Iur’evich! I present the enclosed report that I wrote at the request of the priest of Borisov, Fr. Vasilii Bogoiavlenskii, who learned from you that the essays of L. Tolstoi, indicated in the report, are forbidden for distribution among the people. . . . Believing that these essays were permitted in public libraries, I was forced to be reconciled with this evil. Now, since I have learned that these essays by Tolstoi are not allowed in such places but circulate among the people anyway, I happily accepted Fr. Vasilii’s assignment to write you this report and ask you to put a stop to this harm inflicted on simple people.⁸⁶

Thus the parish priest seems to have learned of this prohibition against Tolstoi’s work only from the missionary, who encouraged him to request the

seizure of this material from the library. The missionary handled even that chore at the priest's request. While regular parish clergymen did rely on the goodwill of the laity, their fear of religious or even ideological competition could outweigh their concern about retaining the trust of their parishioners.

Official missionaries exacerbated interfaith tensions not only by promoting police enforcement of religious conformity but also by fomenting hostility and xenophobia among the Orthodox toward other communities. An example is provided by a 1912 court case in Moscow involving seventeen teenage boys. According to the testimony of a Lutheran pastor, the boys had attended a prayer meeting for German evangelical Christians and shouted, "Anathema to the sectarians!" That this attack was motivated more by general xenophobia than any specific religious animosity is suggested by the fact that one of the boys was also accused of directing the slur "yid" at one of the congregants.⁸⁷ In his capacity as an attorney, the official missionary Varzhanskii represented the boys. His defense exhibited general xenophobia as well: "the witness-accuser, the German sectarian named Pochkat, a foreign subject and sectarian propagandist from Riga, has merely indicated that an anathema is offensive to sectarians, amounting in his opinion to a curse."⁸⁸ In the boys' defense Varzhanskii employed the standard missionary appeal to laws against proselytizing among the Orthodox. He argued that they could not be accused of breaking the law against "disturbing the religious services of the Orthodox and other faiths [*inovertsy*]," because this law "cannot protect all manner of gatherings of innumerable Russian sects when it remains unclear if the gathering took place for purposes of propaganda, religious service, or prayer." Otherwise, he argued, the Orthodox would be unable to protest against sectarian propaganda.⁸⁹ Thus Varzhanskii essentially argued that the law against proselytism sanctioned the verbal abuse of those deemed to be sectarians. Two of the older boys were sentenced to two weeks' imprisonment, but Varzhanskii was given "personal supervision" over the others so as to influence their future behavior.⁹⁰ Coleman, too, notes that official missionaries encouraged Orthodox Christians to disrupt sectarian meetings.⁹¹ Like their work within the brotherhoods, it is clear that the organizational activity of the missionaries influenced the stance of Orthodox communities and associations toward the non-Orthodox, manufacturing interfaith hostility and perpetuating social divisions within Russian society.

Interfaith interaction was not the only form of social activity that the party of the "apostle-like tsar" and its missionary activists suppressed among the Orthodox clergy. After most of the sixteen priests elected to the First and Second Dumas affiliated themselves with dissident parties, the missionary

Skvortsov began publishing articles in *Kolokol*, a church journal he began editing in 1905, which called for the creation of a separate clerical curia.⁹² Once this curia was established, clerical campaigning and voting could be contained within ecclesiastical organizations, allowing Synodal authorities to monitor and control the process. The chief procurator of the Synod, Petr Izvol'skii, dispatched the official missionary and "Orthodox patriot" Father Ioann Vostorgov on an unofficial mission from May to December 1907 to manipulate clerical elections with the help of diocesan authorities throughout European Russia.⁹³ From Tver' Vostorgov issued a report describing his campaign of coercion and intimidation. The chairmen of the clergy's local congresses were called before the bishops and governor, who instructed them to compile lists of loyal and dissident clergymen in their districts. The latter were to be excluded from the electoral process by confining them to their parishes or excluding them from the city of Tver' during the elections.⁹⁴ This suppression of political expression within the Church effectively prevented the emergence of a "clerical party" in Russia.⁹⁵ Yet the regime's direct intervention into interfaith relations through official missionaries may have restricted the autonomy of the Orthodox community even more severely than did intervention into the Church's participation in politics.

It was the fear of engaging other religious groups in free competition, without the protection of the Church's privileged status, that motivated Orthodox complicity in government regulation of interfaith relations, especially after the decree of toleration. Paradoxically, recognition of the need for the Orthodox community to meet the challenge of religious competition independently of the state had justified the extension of freedom of association within the Church throughout the empire's final half-century. State sanction for the formation of Orthodox brotherhoods was initially justified by their performance of missionary activity. The creation of subsequent organizations that progressively broadened the scope of voluntarism permitted among Orthodox clergy and laity was partially motivated by the perception in the Synod of the need to compete with the successful mutual aid activities of evangelicals, Catholics, Volga-German Lutherans, and Old Believers.⁹⁶ These Orthodox associations allowed the Church to influence Russian society independently of the imperial government. Yet the regulation of contact with non-Orthodox groups circumscribed the scope and scale of public activity in which these associations could engage. It is clear that by acting as agents of such regulation, official missionaries checked the advance of Orthodox associations into the emerging public sphere of late imperial Russia.

The history of the Orthodox Church in late imperial Russia provides a striking example of the oppressive influence of state protection of an official religion on that very religion. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia's leadership pledged to help the Orthodox Church recover from decades of persecution. This policy has resulted in the partial restoration of the Church's privileged status in the form of special tax concessions, influence over public education, and the right to preview and comment on legislation under consideration in the Duma.⁹⁷ Yet the Soviet collapse also permitted the revival of many other forms of religious practice in Russia. Church leaders, including Patriarch Kirill, have criticized the proselytism of other religious associations among Russians as predatory and harmful for the Church's recovery from Soviet oppression. This criticism has resulted in legislation to shield the Orthodox from religious competition. The 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations discourages proselytism by new religious groups in the Russian Federation and allows for the forcible liquidation of associations deemed harmful.⁹⁸ This law was amended in response to the February 2012 demonstration by Pussy Riot in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior to explicitly criminalize insulting the religious feelings of believers.⁹⁹ Yet as the history of the late imperial period shows, state efforts to protect the Church are far more likely to weaken its influence over society and to exacerbate social tensions.



Religious Freedom and the Emergence of a Muslim Public Sphere,
1905–1916

NORIHIRO NAGANAWA

The 1905 revolution radically reshaped the boundaries not merely between the state and its subjects but also among multiethnic subjects and even within one or another collectivity. It opened up an unprecedented possibility for subjects' negotiation with the state and for public discussions in the press, as well as at a vast array of assemblies and congresses. The Muslim population in the Volga-Urals region was no exception. It now had access to a range of newspapers and journals in Tatar—these became possible only after 1905—and to public meetings and political circles.¹ The local Muslims involved in this reconfiguration set as their central concern the full implementation of “freedom of religion” (*hurriyat-i dinîya*). In doing so, they appealed to a series of recent legislative acts: a decree of 12 December 1904 pledging to reappraise rights of non-Orthodox believers and to eliminate restrictions on their religious life; a decree of 18 February 1905 allowing all sectors of society to address the government with their views and proposals; a decree of 17 April 1905 aiming at reinforcing the principle of religious tolerance; and finally the October Manifesto, which declared freedom of conscience, word, assembly, and union.²

Although *hurriyat-i dinîya* can be best understood as a Tatar translation of “freedom of conscience”—*svoboda sovesti*, the Russian expression articulating the broadest possible religious liberty at the time—the Muslim parlance was different from and even contrary to the usage that had developed in Russia since the 1860s to construe religion as individual conviction rather than as bureaucratic ascription.³ According to the latter usage (there was a literal translation of *svoboda sovesti*: *hurriyat-i wijdân*), discussions over the fate of the baptized Tatars should have been paramount after April 1905. Since, however, Muslim Tatar intellectuals took their return to the bosom of Islam for granted and made no allowance for the possibility that their baptized compatriots might have a particular spirituality of their own, apostasy and individual choice of faiths do not seem to have been a persistent topic of debate in the press.⁴ Instead, the most prominent issue that Tatar publications addressed in the name of “freedom of conscience” was to revise and even expand particularistic collective rights for the Muslim community. Specifically, Islamic scholars (*‘ulamâ*) enthusiastically contributed to this

kind of discourse. For example, Ridâ' al-Dîn b. Fakhr al-Dîn (1859–1936) suggested that Muslims, while enjoying with other Russian subjects the freedom expressed in the October Manifesto, act “for our own particular rights” (*kendi khâss haqqlarmiz ichûn*).⁵ In a similar fashion, Mûsâ Bigîyif (1875–1949) regarded the October Manifesto as a declaration of the “principles of neither obstructing nor assaulting the religion, school, mosque, and parish of any community [*millat*].”⁶

As Robert Crews and Jane Burbank forcefully argue, this way of thinking presumably derived from an imperial regime assigning rights and duties to differentiated collectivities, be they confessional groups or estates (*sosloviia*), whose members in their turn activated their pertinent rights to pursue justice with the state’s particularistic sanction.⁷ Yet this does not mean that the Volga-Urals Muslims after 1905 attempted to maintain the long-standing collusion with the state in policing Islamic morality, even by diminishing the possibility of freedom of conscience, as Crews argues.⁸ The state indeed remained pivotal as the supreme regulator of confessional administration, but after the appearance of “freedom of religion” the Tatar public did not so straightforwardly invite the state’s intervention, as Crews contends, but rather sought to change the nature of their interaction with it. Invoking the existing laws of the empire’s administration of Muslims as well as the new ones noted above, until the fall of the tsarist regime the Tatar press and numerous gatherings freely discussed the modification of the state’s control over Islam and the scope of autonomy for its adherents. In doing so, Muslims in the Volga-Urals region created a new public sphere between themselves and the state.

This chapter seeks to understand the meanings of religious freedom for Muslims as they were elaborated in this burgeoning public sphere by analyzing reform plans for the Orenburg Mohammedan Spiritual Assembly.⁹ Since this institution, which opened in Ufa in 1789, served as the main conduit for communication between the state and the Muslims of European Russia and Siberia, all the issues of Muslim collective rights were inseparable from the discussions of its reform. In addition, as the Spiritual Assembly was integral to the empire’s Muslim administration, the public debates I discuss below usually went so far as to propose overhauls of the latter, frequently encompassing the equivalent directorates in Simferopol’ (established in 1831) and Tiflis (with two founded in 1872 for the Shiites and Sunnis), as well as the absence of such institutions in the North Caucasus, the Kazakh steppe, and Turkestan. This chapter divides the agenda of the Spiritual Assembly reform that took shape after 1905 into three clusters. First, I trace a dispute over the qualifications for leadership of the assembly—the mufti as its chair, with



the *qâdîs* as his deputies—which clarifies the kind of relationship with the state that the Muslim public envisaged after 1905. Second, I examine the way in which the Spiritual Assembly was expected to handle the domain of religion: the supervision of schools attached to mosques, the implementation of the Islamic legal tradition in family affairs, and the inspection of printings of the Quran. Third, I address the question of the assembly's territorial jurisdiction, focusing primarily on the Kazakh steppe. This allows an assessment of the proper community to which Tatars believed that the assembly should apply and implications for how Tatars regarded themselves in relation to their co-religionists on the steppe.

Although plans for the reform of the Spiritual Assembly offered by the Muslim public have attracted substantial scholarly attention, that work usually concludes that all these plans turned out to be unfeasible, as they were diametrically opposed to those of the tsarist officials, who did not have any consistent policy toward the Muslim administration and sidestepped any substantial solutions as carefully as possible.¹⁰ This literature has not paid necessary heed to the metamorphosis of Muslim society itself, which now with the invocation of *hurriyat-i dîniya* dynamically exchanged, elaborated, and proposed numerous ideas for the reconstruction of the assembly. It was the new Tatar periodical press—all attempts to obtain the government's permission for the production of newspapers and journals had failed before 1905¹¹—as well as numerous booklets that enabled Muslim readers to learn of multifarious proposals of reform, to disseminate ideas about the possible future structure of the Muslim administration, and thereby to visualize designs of *Dâr al-Islâm*, the House of Islam.¹² Here my emphasis is not so much on the solidification of a Muslim identity in response to tsarist policy, a process Christian Noack meticulously demonstrates, but on the ways in which state-Muslim interactions shaped a competitive discursive space within Muslim society—namely, the emergence of a Muslim public sphere.¹³ Simultaneously, this Muslim public sphere is somewhat similar to the one created by voluntary associations, with their charters as microconstitutions defining a legal relationship with authority and rules for self-management.¹⁴ The Muslim public was also seeking and discussing a new relationship with the state, citing appropriate articles of law to propose alternative regulations for the empire's spiritual assemblies.¹⁵

Of particular significance in this regard was the multiplicity and connectivity of Muslim voices in terms of social groups and geography, in contrast to the period before 1905, when the chair of the Spiritual Assembly (*muftî*) alone had been capable of making general reform plans for this institution among the Muslims.¹⁶ To be sure, in the last three decades of

the nineteenth century Muslims, frequently with the help of Tatar merchant networks and funds, organized petition campaigns against the state's increasing intrusion into communal life. But they tried to communicate directly with tsarist officials by means of a shared language of Sharia, with their petitions produced in each mosque community (*mahalla*) and at marketplaces and often identical to one another based on a common sample.¹⁷ After 1905 the novel terms that gained much wider currency in the Tatar press, as well as in a variety of meetings, were “public opinion” (*afkâr-i 'umûmîya*) and “community” or “nation” (*millat*)—terms that indicate the formation of a distinct sphere between individual mahallas and the state. Sustained by Tatar commercial capital, this public sphere was equally open to State Duma deputies, mullahs, and the growing number of young literati from distant cities and villages, promoting debates among them and creating new connections that local Muslims had never seen before. Several works on Volga-Urals Muslim society underline the oratory of the young intellectuals (“the youth” [*yâshlar*] or “intellectuals” [*diyâlilar*]) after 1905, when they began to find themselves detached from the pious majority of the population and to collide with the conservative ‘ulamâ’ in particular.¹⁸ This chapter integrates youth voices and gives more room to those of the ‘ulamâ’ so as to illustrate the polyphonic nature of the politics of the Spiritual Assembly reform.¹⁹ While the print media gave any literate person access to Islamic or other information and thus subverted an age-old mode of oral transmission of expertise from masters to disciples, the ‘ulamâ’, both conservative and reformist, quickly adapted to the new media and effectively employed it to make their voices heard.²⁰ Thus Tatar printed products, as well as public gatherings that the press rendered as much larger events, became fundamental elements of a Muslim civil society in which the idea of “freedom of religion” increasingly underpinned the free exchange of opinions on Muslim collective rights.

WHO SHOULD PRESIDE AT THE SPIRITUAL ASSEMBLY?

Although Catherine II's initial edict on the foundation of the Spiritual Assembly in Ufa on 22 September 1788 did not mention the election of the mufti or the qadis by the Muslim population, by the middle of the nineteenth century the prevailing practice was for the tsar to appoint the mufti on the minister of internal affairs' recommendation, with three qadis elected from among the “Kazan Tatars” every three years.²¹ Although article 1236 of the Regulations on the Religious Affairs of Foreign Faiths (1857 edition) stipulated that candidates for the post of mufti be elected by the Muslim community (*magometanskoe obshchestvo*), the Ministry of Internal Affairs avoided

implementing that provision by arguing that Muslims had little common interest in the vast space of the Spiritual Assembly's jurisdiction and that elections were likely to spawn intrigues.²² The election of the qadis exclusively from among the Kazan Tatars was also controversial, as they were prone to give preference to petitions from their home province and thereby often fell into conflict with the mufti.²³ In 1880 the fourth mufti, Salim-Girei Tevkelev (in office 1865–1885), proposed to the Ministry of Internal Affairs that two of the three qadis be elected from among the Muslims in other provinces of the eastern half of European Russia in a three-year rotation.²⁴ The 1896 edition of the Regulations on Religious Affairs—the volume of the *Digest of Laws* (Svod zakonov) that regulated the affairs of Russia's non-Orthodox religions—confirmed the practice of installing the mufti without an election and of the minister of internal affairs' appointing the qadis on the mufti's recommendation. The latter practice presumably worked to alleviate tensions between the mufti and the qadis.²⁵

During the 1905 revolution Volga-Urals Muslims demanded the restoration of “our lost rights” (*dâ'i' ûlân huqûqmiz*), which they believed that Catherine II had originally bestowed on them, seeing this deprivation as an example of state intrusion into Muslim life after the Great Reforms.²⁶ For them the imposition of a mufti from above was all the more outrageous because, although the first three muftis had belonged to the ‘ulamâ’ and the qadis had always been religious representatives, the next two muftis were Muslim nobles whose military and secular backgrounds integrated them too closely with the Russian authorities. Salim-Girei Tevkelev was nominated as mufti by Orenburg Governor-General Aleksandr Bezak and appointed by Minister of Internal Affairs Petr Valuev. A veteran of the Russo-Ottoman War in 1828–1829 and pacifier of the Polish uprising from 1830 to 1835, he derived his religious authority solely from the hajj he had undertaken in 1854 after his retirement.²⁷ After Tevkelev's death, the famous Kazan missionary Nikolai Il'minskii proposed to Chief Procurator of the Holy Synod Konstantin Pobedonostsev—both notorious among the Muslim Tatars for violating their religious autonomy—the name of Mukhamed'iar Sultanov, who indeed became mufti in 1886 and served until 1915.²⁸ Having studied briefly at Kazan University and retired as second lieutenant (*podporuchik*), Sultanov made his career in the institutions established during the Great Reforms, working as land arbitrator (*mirovoi posrednik*) and justice of the peace (*mirovoi sud'ia*) in the Menzelinsk and Belebei Districts of Ufa Province.²⁹ Although these positions had perhaps furnished Sultanov with juridical and administrative practices relevant to his management of the Spiritual Assembly, the 1905 revolution encouraged Muslims to ask for

a return to Catherine's alleged tradition and the election of the mufti from among the 'ulamâ' by Muslims themselves.

The electoral system for the mufti and qadis was already on the agenda at a meeting in Ufa held on 10–15 April 1905, when Mufti Sultanov invited thirty-nine famous 'ulamâ' with Sergei Witte's authorization. The active leadership of the Spiritual Assembly was reluctant to accept election with fixed terms: although sympathetic to the idea, Ridâ' al-Dîn b. Fakhr al-Dîn, then qadi, was afraid that it would spread conflict and corruption; Sultanov was openly opposed, arguing that the government would not treat seriously an elected mufti with a limited tenure.³⁰ The discussion continued in Ufa two months later, when 121 delegates from the Bashkir county gatherings (*volostnye skhody*) of Ufa Province, most of them mullahs, assembled to deliberate religious affairs. The meeting was chaired by Shakir Tukaev, a descendant of a great Sufi family of Sterlibash Village and later deputy to the Second and Third State Dumas.³¹ One of the most innovative plans examined at the meeting involved the creation of regional boards (*Mahkama-i shar'îya-i âkhûndîya*) under the direction of âkhûnds.³² Although âkhûnds were in practice, albeit very nominal, holders of a higher clerical position in nearly every district (*uezd*), each of them would be elected from among the Muslim clergy under each regional board covering a hundred mahallas and would facilitate their communication with the Spiritual Assembly. Those present drew on the example of analogous middle-level structures in Transcaucasia.³³ The new institutions could effectively coordinate the election of the Spiritual Assembly leaders. For the election of the mufti each regional board would assemble a meeting of mahalla representatives so as to send two electors (one secular, the other religious) to the final congress in Ufa, which would then designate three candidates, one of whom the tsar would approve as mufti on the minister of internal affairs' recommendation. For the election of qadis, of whom there would now be six rather than three, the vast jurisdiction of the assembly was divided into ten electoral areas, with each including about ten regional boards; with one-year rotation among ten areas, the Muslim clergy in a given area would send their sealed ballots (each naming three colleagues) to Ufa by an assigned date; the assembly was to count them, nominate candidates, then submit the list proposing the mufti for approval by the minister of internal affairs.³⁴ Overall, as the reform plans approved by this Bashkir meeting were based on those of the meeting held by the mufti two months earlier, it became one of the first occasions when the broader Muslim public drew designs for the House of Islam by responding to the state's commitment to religious toleration.³⁵



The zenith of discussions in the period from 1905 to 1907 was the third All-Russian Muslim Congress, which convened in Nizhnii Novgorod in August 1906, where the blueprints for reform were extended to overhaul the existing structure of the empire's spiritual assemblies in general and the qualifications of the muftis in particular. A special commission of the Congress on Muslim Administration chaired by 'Ālimjān Bârûdî (1857–1921), a prominent scholar from Kazan, included a number of key provisions. First, it proposed that the five muftis of Crimea, the Caucasus, Orenburg, Turkestan, and the Kazakh steppe, now with the title of *shaykh al-Islâm*, be elected for five years from among those well versed in religion and current affairs. Second, the Muslim population of each spiritual assembly was to choose three or six qadis from among the 'ulamâ' proficient in Islamic law, as well as one Muslim jurist who would handle administrative aspects of the institution. Last, Muslims were to elect the supreme head of the 'ulamâ' (*ra'is al-'ulamâ'*), who would coordinate the muftis and present all Muslim grievances directly to the tsar. Although those present did not elaborate a concrete electoral process, the discussions enabled a clear articulation of the future leadership of Russia's Muslim communities. Many seemed to agree with Ismail Gasprinsky (1851–1914), who underlined that the muftis should have “two wings” (*iki qanâdli*), one commanding religious expertise like 'Ālimjān Bârûdî and the other secular knowledge like Yusuf Akchura (1876–1935), a politician straddling the Russian and Ottoman Empires.³⁶

Yet some participants, particularly leftists like Ayaz Ishaki (1878–1954) and Mullah Hâdî Âtlâsî (1876–1938), were hostile to any attempt to reform the archaic structure of the spiritual assemblies. They accordingly opposed the creation of a supreme head of the 'ulamâ', arguing that this idea derived from the old autocratic bureaucracy and was contrary to the era of democracy.³⁷ One Kazan mullah, Kashshâf Tarjumânî (1877–1940), a member of the commission, countered that the supreme head was indispensable for religious autonomy (*mukhtâriyat-i dîniya*).³⁸ Attempting to convince others, 'Ālimjān Bârûdî argued that election by the Muslims themselves could save the mufti and qadis from excessive dependence on the central government and the mufti, respectively, with the qadis able to keep a watchful eye on the mufti's behavior. In addition, the supreme head as the linchpin of Russian Muslim unity would be less vulnerable to bribery and corruption and more responsible to the people.³⁹ All the reform plans and debates that took place at this congress would remain a prominent reference point both for Muslim opinion makers and the Russian authorities in the next decade.

Although calls for the Spiritual Assembly reform continued to feature in the Tatar press, the year 1914 saw the second largest upsurge of contentious

views of the empire's Muslim administration in general and the mufti's status in particular. This public excitement arose from expectations surrounding two conferences on Muslim administration: one held by the central government at the turn of April and May and the other at the initiative of the Muslim State Duma deputies in the middle of June.⁴⁰ Mufti Sultanov's serious illness also made the question of his successor pressing. Finding that Qadi 'Inâyat Allâh Kâpqâyif would attend the government conference—where only three Muslim representatives were invited from Ufa, Simferopol', and St. Petersburg and deemed reliable—the Kazan paper *Yûlduz* (Star) raised the possibility of Kâpqâyif's elevation to mufti.⁴¹ Conservative mullahs associated with the Orenburg journal *Dîn wa Ma'îshat* (Religion and Life) supported this idea, while another paper in the same city, *Waqt* (Time), pushed the reformist qadi Hasan 'Atâ Muhammaduf.⁴² Yet given the growth of the Muslim public sphere after 1905, the government's special conference vetoed the idea of the mufti election on the grounds that this was likely to foster activism among nationalistic intellectuals as well as press agitation. The government also noted the practical difficulties of making heard the voice of the Muslim population under the vast jurisdiction of the Spiritual Assembly.⁴³

As vividly reported in *Yûlduz*, a Muslim conference a month later (marshaling thirty-four delegates from the Volga-Urals, the Kazakh steppe, Turkestan, the North and South Caucasus, and Crimea in addition to six State Duma deputies) meticulously scrutinized every aspect of the empire's Muslim administration, including the ideal leadership of the spiritual assemblies. The fruit of the conference was a bill on Muslim religious affairs, according to which the empire's Muslim administration was to consist of four levels: parish mullahs, district qadis, the provincial *majlises* (councils), and the regional spiritual assembly. The head of each level was to be installed through election from the 'ulamâ' (parish mullahs every eight years, the mufti and qadis every five years). One of the district qadis was to chair the provincial majlis; the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly and its newly planned Turkestan counterpart were to have no less than six qadis; the muftis and their deputies were to be elected based on the rules of the State Duma election, the former being approved by the tsar and the latter by the Senate.⁴⁴ One of the most controversial points was the mufti's educational qualifications, particularly the extent to which he needed to know the Russian language. Jihângîr Âbizgildîn, the âkhûnd of Ufa, demanded a higher education, and Âlîkhân Bûkâykhânuv, a former Kazakh State Duma deputy, also proposed that the mufti defend a dissertation on a religious question. Mustafa Mîrzâ Dâvidûvîch, a Polish Muslim from Crimea, said that a sec-

ondary school level of Russian would be enough; others were either reluctant to set a definite qualification or satisfied with a primary school level on the ground of the lack of ‘ulamâ’ with a mastery of Russian.⁴⁵ The Ufa paper *Türmush* (Life) later criticized the educational requirement discussed at the conference as inadequate to defend Muslim interests before the government and to guide Islam in the new century.⁴⁶ Although this conference was clearly distinguished from the one held a month earlier by its determined call for alternative regulations for the empire’s Muslim administration, who should direct this machinery remained a vexed question.

The final surge of debates over the mufti’s qualifications came with the death of Mufti Mukhamed’iar Sultanov on 12 June 1915 and the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ abrupt nomination of Safâ Bâyezîdî, the âkhûnd of Petrograd, as his successor. *Dîn wa Ma’îshat* was the most forceful advocate of the idea that the mufti should be from the ‘ulamâ’. It reported on an assembly of Kazan mullahs held on 12 July, where ‘Âlimjân Bârûdî and Sâdiq Îmânqûlî (1870–1932) upheld the return to the tradition of the “Grandmother Empress” (*Abî Pâdishâh*)—namely, Catherine II.⁴⁷ Elsewhere some mullahs openly praised Safâ Bâyezîdî for integrating religious expertise, proficiency in Russian, and the government’s trust: forty-five mullahs in the area surrounding Chârdâqlî Village, Cheliabinsk District, sent the minister of internal affairs a petition supporting his candidacy.⁴⁸ Indeed, Bâyezîdî kept a close relationship with the Ministry of Internal Affairs: as its regular consultant on Muslim affairs he had been one of three Muslim participants in the government’s special conference of 1914 and had worked as a Muslim chaplain in Petrograd before becoming the mufti.⁴⁹ In contrast to the contributors to *Dîn wa Ma’îshat*, a meeting in Ufa one week after Sultanov’s death proposed State Duma deputies with a Russian secondary education, such as Qutlûgh Muhammad Tâfkîlif (b. 1850), the leader of the Muslim faction, and Sadr al-Dîn Maqsûdî (1878–1957) from Kazan.⁵⁰ Prompted by letters soliciting his opinion, Fâtih Karîmî (1870–1937), the editor of *Waqt*, made clear that the Spiritual Assembly as a state institution required its head to be as proficient in Russian as possible and as well educated as the high-ranking bureaucrats with whom he would negotiate on behalf of the Muslim community. While the qadis should be from the ‘ulamâ’ so as to resolve Islamic legal questions, the mufti should be an intellectual well versed in secular science (*dunyâwî ‘ilm*) and well informed about Muslim community affairs (*millatining ahwâli*), if there was no comparable candidate among the ‘ulamâ’. Karîmî meanwhile cited Bâyezîdî, who said he would decline the mufti post, arguing that he did not enjoy the support of public opinion (*afkâr-i ‘umûmiya*) and the press on which the mufti’s operation

was now dependent.⁵¹ In reality Bâyezîduf agreed to be mufti, which incited criticism and protests particularly among the secular intellectuals: whereas *Dîn wa Ma'îshat* showed its full satisfaction, the Kazan intellectuals sent out telegraphs expressing disappointment to the chair of the State Duma and the Muslim faction.⁵² Under the conditions of the Great War, the government's neglect of the intellectuals' voice led to a shift among those engaged on the home front from loyalty to the tsar to solidarity with fellow Muslims.⁵³ Yet the mufti question decisively split the Muslim public sphere from then on.

The dispute over the leadership of the Spiritual Assembly in the Tatar press and at a variety of meetings clearly reveals the desire of the Muslim public to make this state agency profoundly engage with coreligionist society and represent its collective interests. It was with these goals in mind, and not in support of individual decisions on matters of faith, that the Muslim public invested hopes in the government's declaration of religious freedom (*hurriyat-i dîniya*) in 1905. While they agreed that the election of the mufti and qadis in coordination with mid-level institutions could serve their ends most effectively, the question of whom precisely to choose remained highly contentious. Those considering the Spiritual Assembly to be the shield of religious autonomy against state interference often invoked Catherine II's tradition to argue for both the mufti and qadis being from the 'ulamâ'; they also supported the idea of establishing the supreme head of the 'ulamâ' (*ra'îs al-'ulamâ'*), whom one religious scholar anticipated could substitute for functions of the existing Department of Religious Affairs.⁵⁴ In contrast, those who emphasized negotiation with the state to enable the Islamic way of life maintained that the mufti in particular should have good a command of Russian and administrative competence. Still, this group also concurred in working with the Spiritual Assembly to keep Islamic practice intact. This raised another question that also needed to be grappled with: what exactly was the religious domain that the assembly was supposed to oversee?

HOW TO CONTROL ISLAMIC KNOWLEDGE

"Why does every nation [*millat*] attach its religious affairs to one center?" asked Sadr al-Dîn Maqsûdî, a former deputy of the Second and Third State Dumas. In January 1914 at the Oriental Club (*Vostochnyi klub*), the most active Tatar cultural center in Kazan, five hundred people listened to Maqsûdî's lecture on the reform of the empire's Muslim administration. He asserted that a single "hierarchical clergy" (*tabaqalargha bûlingân rûhânîlar*) could work to preserve "the original purity of the religious tenets" (*mu'taqadât-i dîniyaning safwat-i asliyasi*) and to keep the believers in "the unity of faith" (*wahdat-i 'aqîda*). Otherwise, he cautioned, "there is no doubt that multi-

ple directions and various schools [*muta'addid ta'limât, túrlî madhhablar*] will emerge in Islam very soon.” Interestingly enough, Maqsûdî buttressed his argument by drawing analogies with the Greeks, Armenians, Jews, and Bulgarians in the Ottoman Empire.⁵⁵ This lecture clearly demonstrates not merely the profound extent to which discussions of the Muslim administration now figured in the Tatar public sphere but also the disciplining role of the Spiritual Assembly that this Tatar intellectual envisioned in the era of religious freedom. Apparently Maqsûdî’s priority was not in appreciating individual views on religion, as conventionally meant by freedom of conscience, but in reinforcing unanimity in the Muslim community. This section of my chapter focuses on three issues that the Muslim public discussed in elaborating reform designs for the Spiritual Assembly: its supervision of Islamic education, codification of sharia, and inspection of holy texts such as the Quran. At issue in all three was the extent to which the assembly and Muslim society should be involved in maintaining the consistency of Islamic knowledge.

The most established disciplinary role that the Spiritual Assembly had exercised since its foundation was the examination (*imtihân*) of candidates for the Muslim clergy.⁵⁶ The assembly could control and to some degree standardize the corpus of scholarly knowledge required of mullahs under its command by issuing a certificate for each madrasa professor (*mudarris*) and mosque leader (*imâm* and *khatib*). To be sure, against the backdrop of the Great Reforms, the Orenburg governor-general and the Ufa governor attempted to abolish the examination for the mullahs, hoping to overcome Muslim isolation by making the candidates study Russian.⁵⁷ But the Spiritual Assembly’s grip on clerical qualification did not change even after the transfer of the control of Muslim confessional schools (*maktabs* and *madrasas*) from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Education in 1874.⁵⁸ The main motivation behind the provincial governors’ interference in the examination was bribery.⁵⁹ While one of Mukhamed’iar Sultanov’s first efforts as mufti was to eliminate bribe taking, an inspector from the Ministry of Internal Affairs in November 1910 found that it continued nonetheless: after the test examinees would bring money or gifts (they called them “alms” [*sadaqa*]) worth 3 to 20 rubles to the qadis, among whom ‘In-âyat Allâh Kâpçâyif received the most.⁶⁰

Nevertheless, after the promulgation of religious freedom in 1905 Muslim petitioners, meetings, and the Tatar press insisted on returning maktabs and madrasas to the jurisdiction of the Spiritual Assembly. Their voice prevailed over that of such opponents as Ridâ’ al-Dîn b. Fakhr al-Dîn, then qadi, who asserted that the assembly, burdened by such a vast territorial

jurisdiction, was too overwhelmed by the existing obligations to handle the maktabas and madrasas in need of reform.⁶¹ Here again intermediary institutions between the assembly and the mahallas were on the agenda: proponents argued that they could not only facilitate the election of the mufti and the qadis but also enable the supervision of the schools attached to mosques and significantly ease the burden of the long journey to Ufa for the examination.⁶² The assembly's assessment of clerical candidates remained indispensable even to the new type of teachers (*mu'allims*) at reformist maktabas and madrasas if they were to hold any sort of certificate, as these schools themselves took shape within the autonomous space of the Muslim administration insulated from the educational authorities.⁶³ When the state interfered with the examination of these dubious pedagogues, the Tatar press firmly protested that this measure was a devastating blow to the progress of "our national schools" (*milli maktablarmiz*), to which the mu'allims made a huge contribution.⁶⁴ Yet as the state launched, then intensified, universal education, Muslim intellectuals in the southern Urals began to collaborate with the zemstvos in developing the reformist maktabas into a foundation for official primary schools.⁶⁵ This suggests that empirical exigency made the Muslim public revise its stance that the Spiritual Assembly was the sole authority supervising Islamic knowledge.

Another realm where the Spiritual Assembly exerted its discipline was family affairs: that is, the application of sharia to marriage, divorce, testament, and inheritance, with the mullahs as the first instance, the Spiritual Assembly as the appellate court, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs as the final judge.⁶⁶ Accordingly, the mullahs administered metrical records, too.⁶⁷ This religious domain could not remain unaffected by the Great Reforms, however, and by their juridical component in particular. The Orenburg governor-general proposed to the minister of internal affairs that the government should eradicate abuse that was occurring "under the veil of religious rites" and transfer metrical registration to the provincial administration; the Ufa governor complained that sharia itself was so hazy as to open up scores of arbitrary interpretations by the mullahs.⁶⁸ In addition, Muslim individuals who found parental and communal decisions as well as those of the Spiritual Assembly unbearable, particularly women struggling for their property rights, turned to the new circuit courts, which assured equality before the law more than any other imperial institution.⁶⁹ Furthermore, Orientalists who were even more proficient than the 'ulamâ' in analyzing Islamic texts, such as Mirza Alexander Kazem-Bek (1802–1870), intervened in the assembly's operation.⁷⁰ Mufti Sultanov also depended on the Orientalists' works—including the Russian translations of the Quran, the *Hidâya*



(a twelfth-century juridical treatise), and the *Farâ'id* (a book on dividing inheritances).⁷¹ On the eve of the Great War the central government, aspiring to imbue Muslim subjects with “common norms of our civil law,” was confident enough to propose the transfer of Muslim family lawsuits to civil courts: the 12 May 1914 conference on the Muslim administration argued that this would not infringe on religious freedom but enable the “impartial deliberation” of what “completely ignorant” mullahs were now dealing with.⁷²

Yet the ‘ulamâ’ after 1905 strove to maintain their sphere of activity through the Tatar print media, arguing that family affairs must be part of religion. Ridâ’ al-Dîn b. Fakhr al-Dîn blamed the regular transfer of family lawsuits to the civil courts on the incompetence of Muslim judges who could neither infer decisions directly from the Quran or the Prophet’s traditions (*hadîth*) nor adapt the accumulated legal literature for present-day conditions.⁷³ Moreover, Ridâ’ al-Dîn together with Mûsâ Bigîyif advocated the compilation of the “Sharia Code” (*ahkâm-i shar‘iyya majallasi*). While sharia was the legal tradition in which scholars had been trained to extract proper judgments from the piles of interpretations accumulated over centuries, modern empires—including the Ottoman, British, French, and the Russian polities—attempted to codify sharia based on limited texts out of expediency.⁷⁴ In fact, Ridâ’ al-Dîn and Mûsâ drew their inspiration from the inspection of the Turkestan administration led by Count Konstantin Pahlen in 1909. Pahlen’s commission took the Anglo-Muhammadan Law of British India and its primary source, *Hidâya*, as the model for a single Sharia Code. Criticizing the Tashkent ‘ulamâ’ for having done so little in this regard, Ridâ’ al-Dîn and Mûsâ tried to convince their Volga-Urals counterparts of the importance of having the ‘ulamâ’ themselves, rather than the bureaucrats, undertake the task of codification.⁷⁵ In this period, as an “entry” (*madkhal*) to the planned Sharia Code, Mûsâ Bigîyif published a 232-page text of “Legal Maxims” (*Qawâ'id-i Fiqhiyya*) with guidance and assurances from Ridâ’ al-Dîn.⁷⁶ But again the state moved faster: in 1912, based on the Quran and other legal texts, the Department of Religious Affairs compiled manuals on inheritance, wardship, and matrimony and distributed them not only to the relevant central officials and provincial governors but to the Muslim press, such as *Waqt* and *Shûrâ* (Council) in Orenburg, and to Ismail Gasprinsky in Bakhchisarai.⁷⁷ The Ufa paper *Tûrmush* lamented that it was the lack of a mufti proficient in religion that explained the failure of the Spiritual Assembly to make a compendium of either juridical opinions (*fatwâ*) or sharia. This assessment led this newspaper to push Mûsâ Bigîyif as one of the future candidates for the post of mufti.⁷⁸

In addition to the codified sharia, the Muslim public demanded that the Spiritual Assembly supervise the printing and circulation of the Quran as the central source of juridical practice. This question created a sensation at the end of 1913, when readers of the Tatar press found that the Kharitonov Publishing House in Kazan had printed an abundance of Qurans with some passages missing and others repeated; worse, Kharitonov had contracted with his Muslim counterparts for distribution so that purchasers would believe their copies had been verified by Muslims.⁷⁹ In Kazan the first printed Quran had appeared in the city's gymnasium in 1802; Kazan University Press, once it opened in 1809, dominated Arabic script bookmaking throughout the nineteenth century. At the beginning of the twentieth century the inability of the university press to innovate its technology and to meet Tatar customers' demand paved the way for the supremacy of private publishers, among whom Kharitonov enjoyed high reputation among the Tatars.⁸⁰ To be sure, in 1889 the Spiritual Assembly had gained the right to oversee the printing of the Quran and excerpts from it (*Haftiyak*); when it found mistakes, it could alert the St. Petersburg Censorship Committee charged with printed products in Oriental languages.⁸¹ Yet the general abolition of censorship by the laws of 24 November 1905 and 26 April 1906 made control by Ufa impossible. Thus the Kharitonov scandal triggered the Muslim public's aspiration to restore scrutiny of the holy texts to the Spiritual Assembly.

The Volga-Urals Muslims' concern for the Quranic text is comparable to that of the Ottomans under Abdülhamid II, whose government established a Commission for the Inspection of Qurans and made the printing of the Quran a state monopoly.⁸² The wide range of contributors to the Tatar press, from the 'ulamâ' to secularized intellectuals, agreed on the need for inspection by the Spiritual Assembly but wavered on its monopoly over the publishing business.⁸³ On the one hand, Mufti Sultanov himself asserted that the law should stipulate an inspection commission consisting of the 'ulamâ' within the assembly; the Muslim deputies to the State Duma were ready to support the legislative process.⁸⁴ On the other hand, *Waqt* contended that the assembly's monopoly over printings of the Quran and price increases due to the absence of competition would hamper circulation and profit the Treasury at Muslims' expense. The Orenburg newspaper instead suggested the establishment of an association (*jam'iyat-shirkat*) promoting the spread of low-priced but high-quality Qurans.⁸⁵ The St. Petersburg newspaper *Il* (Country) also proposed that profits from the sale of Qurans be used to administer madrasas.⁸⁶ Yet the Russian state vetoed all these Muslim suggestions: the government conference held on 30 April 1914 argued that recognition of the Spiritual Assembly's right to inspect printed Qurans would

create a privilege distinct from other non-Orthodox faiths and deter private entrepreneurship.⁸⁷

As can be seen in proposals for the disciplinary role of the Spiritual Assembly in the Muslim community, the Tatar public regarded religious freedom not as the recognition of individual wishes but as the opportunity to buttress the rights of the confessional collective. As a consequence of some of its proposals, those unhappy with Islamic juridical decisions would have been deprived of the option to go to circuit courts, and the assembly's interference in the printing of Qurans could have diminished freedom of the press. Simultaneously, other proposals were intended to boost the Muslim public sphere through "parastatal" arrangements: the planned intermediary institutions under the assembly and the existing zemstvos to supervise the maktabas; the 'ulamâ's initiative in codifying sharia; and an association for the inspection and circulation of Qurans. After all, it was the Tatar press that lay beneath the interaction of all these voices. To tsarist officials, however, who increasingly saw multiconfessional subjects in terms of ethnic nationalism, the Tatar discourse on the reinforcement of the assembly's authority appeared menacing, as if the Tatars were trying to transform the multiethnic Muslim community into the single Tatar entity. When E. V. Menkin, the director of the Department of Religious Affairs, visited the Spiritual Assembly in July 1914, he asked Qadi Hasan 'Atâ in what language the clerical examination was conducted; the qadi replied "in Tatar," as "we are the Turkic peoples [*Türki khalqlar*]." Fervently supporting him, *Waqt* asserted that "the Muslims wish to speak Turkic [*Türki*], the common mother tongue, and to live as Muslims based on the Quran, the common holy book."⁸⁸ How then did the Tatar public imagine the boundaries of the Muslim community as a subject of collective rights?

WHO SHOULD BELONG TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE SPIRITUAL ASSEMBLY?

Despite profound dissatisfaction with and criticism of the existing Spiritual Assembly and the state's reluctance to solve the complications that surrounded it, by the end of the tsarist regime the Volga-Urals Tatars recognized this state agency as the privileged foundation of their collective rights, particularly when they had occasion to compare themselves with other coreligionists within and even outside the empire. A week after the 17 April 1905 law, 'Inân al-Dîn Vaisov, whose father Bahâ' al-Dîn had once gathered numerous adherents with his apocalyptic messages and anti-mufti stance, petitioned the head of the Department of Religious Affairs to grant his brotherhood a separate Spiritual Assembly modeled after the most elaborate Transcaucasian structure.⁸⁹ When one Tatar traveled to Chinese Turkestan and saw

among the Muslims disorder in religious affairs and the lack of “national spirit and identity” (*millî rûh wa âng*), he suggested that a Spiritual Assembly be introduced to regulate education and to impose sharia, particularly to address women’s grievances concerning marriage and divorce.⁹⁰ This last section of my chapter clarifies the boundaries of *Dâr al-Islâm* that the Tatar public articulated concerning eligibility for collective rights embodied by the Spiritual Assembly, by analyzing the discourse of Tatar relationships with their southern neighbors, the Kazakhs in particular.

Based on Catherine II’s edict that the Spiritual Assembly of Ufa had control over the Muslim clergy of the empire except in Crimea, the Kazakh steppe had been under Ufa’s jurisdiction until 1868, when the regulations of the steppe administration removed the Kazakhs from that jurisdiction, leaving only the Tatars and the Kazakh Inner (Bökey) Horde (after 1876 part of Astrakhan Province). Before the 1860s the state built mosques and schools in the Russo-Kazakh borderlands, printed Qurans for the Kazakhs, and dispatched Tatar officials and mullahs “to bridle these savages’ willfulness” (*k obuzdaniiu svoevoliia etikh dikarei*). Thereafter it saw the Kazakhs, distinct in tradition and history, as capable of future progress only if they could be segregated from the Tatars.⁹¹ This state perspective by no means signified the Kazakhs’ actual separation from Islam, however. The incorporation of the steppe into the empire intensified its integration into the economic dynamism and Islamic educational networks of inner Russia, with the Tatar merchants and scholars continuing to work as intermediaries.⁹² By the beginning of the twentieth century the Kazakhs themselves began to request from the government either their return to Ufa’s jurisdiction or the establishment of their own separate Islamic authority.

One of the main rationales behind the Kazakhs’ petitions was their desire to bring order to the “people’s courts” (*narodnye sudy*) that dealt with family disputes based on customary law, with the judges (*bîs*) elected from among the Kazakh notables and supervised by township (*volost’*) administrators.⁹³ This court system, introduced in 1868, had reinforced the kinship politics of the notables, who were attempting to assert their right to monopolize the nomads’ traditions. But the state policy of opposing customary law to sharia did not effectively unravel the tightly knit combination of sharia and popular customs in local juridical practice; sharia was always accessible as an alternative to litigants unhappy with the *bîs*’ decisions.⁹⁴ A week after the tsar’s edict of 12 December 1904, Ahmad Hâjji Rahmânqûlî, the âkhûnd of Troitsk District, Orenburg Province, appealed, apparently on behalf of his Kazakh neighbors, to the minister of internal affairs to end the limitation of one mosque per township in the steppe and to replace customary law



with sharia so that marital and property affairs could be subordinated to the Spiritual Assembly of Ufa.⁹⁵ Some Kazakhs made their grievances heard in the Tatar press, too. Ascribing the Kazakhs' gradual approach to civilization to their association and "religious brotherhood" (*din qardâshligi*) with the Tatars, one Kazakh from Ui Township, Kustanai District, Turgai Province, complained to the Orenburg paper *Waqt* that confusion inflicted by custom (*âdat*) in terms of inheritance and bride money led the Kazakhs to economic downfall. He testified that Kazakh meetings in his township had repeatedly produced resolutions calling for the application of sharia to family disputes and the inclusion of Kazakh regions in the jurisdiction of the Spiritual Assembly of Ufa.⁹⁶

Elaborating on the law of religious tolerance that would be issued on 17 April 1905, the Committee of Ministers planned to convene a special conference to examine the possibility of establishing new spiritual assemblies modeled after the Crimean structure for the Kazakh steppe, the North Caucasus, and Turkestan.⁹⁷ In April 1906 this question was placed on the agenda of the Special Conference chaired by A. P. Ignat'ev to discuss the imperial administration of non-Orthodox faiths. Here ethnicity was the dominant language. V. P. Cherevanskii, who provided the conference with a report on the Sunni Muslims, argued that the dismemberment of the Ufa jurisdiction would forestall the assimilation of Russia's Muslim world by the Tatars (*otatarivanie*). Leaving Turkestan without any spiritual assembly, he proposed to partition the empire's Muslim administration into seven jurisdictions: the St. Petersburg area; Crimea; the Caucasus; Siberia, with its center in Troitsk or Petropavlovsk; Orenburg; the Steppe, centered in Akmolinsk, Atbasar, or Irgiz; and the Bashkir region, with its headquarters in Ufa. Cherevanskii believed that the government should protect the Bashkirs, administered by distinct regulations (*Polozhenie o bashkirakh*), from Tatar influence (*tatarizm*); such protection was to take place through education, which he argued would also facilitate the development of Bashkir "nationalism." Meanwhile, A. S. Budilovich from the Ministry of Education criticized Cherevanskii's proposal to establish a single spiritual assembly for the vast Kazakh steppe, contending that it could enable the Kazakhs' "national" integration—a dangerous prospect, as Russo-Kazakh relations before the second half of the nineteenth century indicated.⁹⁸

The Tatar press countered the government's arguments on ethnicity and nationalism by emphasizing mutual affinity among Muslims.⁹⁹ Pointing to a petition to the Ministry of Internal Affairs by people from Cheliabinsk District asking for the appointment of one of the three qadis from the Bashkirs (*Bâshqurd tâ'ifasî*), *Waqt* censured them, along with Cherevanskii, for

infringing on common Muslim interests. Here the paper adhered to the spirit of the Third Muslim Congress, which had declared the establishment of a *ra'is al-'ulamâ'* to be the mainstay of Russian Muslim unity.¹⁰⁰ *Waqt* insisted that “tribal sentiment” (*qaum wa qabilalik hissî*) not overwhelm the question of affiliation with the spiritual assemblies; “Islamic fraternity” (*ukhûwat-i Islâmîya*) could allow the division of jurisdictions on a territorial basis only for administrative purposes.¹⁰¹ Moreover, *Waqt* effectively used Kazakh voices to buttress its own stance: like the above-mentioned contribution from Turgai Province, another from Pavlodar District, Semipalatinsk Province, lamented that general ignorance among the Kazakhs had alienated them from the rights that the Tatars enjoyed over their religion and community; he expected that Inner Russia’s Muslim press would guide the Kazakhs to a unified movement.¹⁰² Yet there was an argument that took Kazakh particularities into account. As a reply to one Kazakh from Akmolinsk who asked whether the Kazakhs should return to the Spiritual Assembly or have a separate mufti, Ridâ’ al-Dîn b. Fakhr al-Dîn, the editor of the Orenburg journal *Shûrâ*, argued for the latter, suggesting that the former could also work if the Spiritual Assembly accepted three Kazakh qadis proficient in supplementing sharia with Kazakh customary law (*urf wa ‘âdatlar*).¹⁰³

Meanwhile Kazakh intellectuals maintained an ambivalent attitude toward the implementation of sharia under the guidance of the Spiritual Assembly. This ambivalence led to controversy in 1914, provoking the intervention of the Tatar press. Whereas those Kazakh intellectuals around the journal *Ay-qap* (Alas) in Troitsk advocated returning to the Islamic authority of Ufa, those around the newspaper *Qazaq* (Kazakh) in Orenburg, although not opposing this idea, still espoused maintaining *‘âdat* in solving inheritance and land disputes.¹⁰⁴ One Tatar contributor with “more than twenty years’ association with the Kazakhs” disparaged *Qazaq*’s position, saying that they were trying to apply “tales of the Genghis Khan era” to the people of the twentieth century.¹⁰⁵ The height of the discord among Kazakh intellectuals was the All-Russian Muslim conference in June 1914, when Âlikhân Bûkâykhanuf, one of *Qazaq*’s opinion leaders, collided with Bakht Jân Qârâtâyif, a former State Duma deputy from Ural’sk and an energetic supporter of *Ay-qap*. To set the general tone of the conference, Shakir Tukaev, who had chaired the Bashkir meeting in Ufa in 1905, invoked “the tsar’s orders” (*Fermân-i ‘Âlîlar*) of 17 April and 17 October 1905 and asserted that the current division of the Muslim administration into Crimean, Caucasian, and Orenburg jurisdictions generated an inequality of rights among the empire’s fellow believers; the conference should elaborate

a bill relevant to all Russian Muslims.¹⁰⁶ In reporting the Kazakh dispute, the Tatar press deliberately gave preference to Bakht Jân Qârâtâyif. Adducing Catherine II's tradition, the 17 April law, and the October Manifesto, Qârâtâyif insisted that Russian imperial law reinforce the unity of the Turkic peoples by granting the Kazakhs the rights that their counterparts in Russia enjoyed, including religious freedom (*dîn îregî*).¹⁰⁷

The friendship between Tatars and Kazakhs presented in the Tatar press did not by any means square with the reality of life in the contact zones between these peoples or with the government's obsession with Tatar influence over the Kazakhs. At the northern edge of the steppe, where Tatar immigrants and local Kazakhs mixed in the cities, the former attempted to separate from the latter by having their own mosque community (*mahalla*).¹⁰⁸ In doing so, the Tatars invoked the 1868 Steppe Regulations, arguing that the Kazakhs were not eligible for the same mahalla membership, as they had left the Ufa jurisdiction of their own free will. A Tatar representative from Omsk grumbled to the Spiritual Assembly that "Kazakhs were alien to our race, language, and culture" (*kirgizy chuzhdy nashei rase, narechiiu, kul'ture*).¹⁰⁹ One of the settled Kazakhs in Semipalatinsk complained to the assembly that their Tatar neighbors called them "dogs" and tried to drive them out, even threatening violence.¹¹⁰ Furthermore, when the 25 June 1916 decree on labor conscription triggered revolts in the Kazakh steppe and Turkestan, the absence of reliable metrical records fueled the turmoil: some Kazakhs desperately pleaded to take the clerical examination before the Spiritual Assembly, hoping that it might either help exempt them from conscription or let them become mullahs if mobilized.¹¹¹ While Mufti Safâ Bâyzîduf not only supported the Kazakh request but also suggested that the circulation of his message could ameliorate tensions in the steppe, the Ministry of Internal Affairs took into account neither the Kazakh petitions nor the mufti's proposal, arguing that the enhancement of the mufti's authority and thereby the Tatars' significance did not serve state interests.¹¹² The state's juridical and administrative practice, which had segregated the Tatars from the Kazakhs, and the Tatars' exclusive identification with the Spiritual Assembly as a result of that practice hampered not only the ideal of a unified Muslim community in Russia that the Tatar public had imagined but also the Kazakhs' freedom of conscience.

The tsar's declarations of religious freedom in 1905 spurred the Volga-Urals Muslims to focus their attention on the "grievous state" (*bîk kûngilsiz bir hâlat*) of the Spiritual Assembly in Ufa, as one imam from Shâlchäle Village, Bugulma District, Samara Province, lamented in his letter to the Orenburg

newspaper *Waqt*. He had read about the present situation of the Islamic authority also in the two Kazan newspapers, *Qûyâsh* (Sun) and *Yûlduz*, as well as in Ismail Gasprinsky's *Tarjumân* (Interpreter) from Bakhchisarai. "It is possible that the Spiritual Assembly's task will remain only that of an examination commission [imtîhân kâmissîyasî]." He was aware that endless disagreements over religious questions had led inheritance and family disputes to be solved more by circuit courts than by the Spiritual Assembly. In the end the imam made five proposals to the assembly with a view toward bringing it much nearer to and giving it more influence over the people by exercising its existing rights: (1) establishing a close connection between the *âkhûnds* and imams; (2) organizing commissions composed of *âkhûnds* and respectable imams to inspect the metrical records; (3) appointing those trained by competent imams to supervise education; (4) formulating regulations of primary schools; and (5) compiling and publishing a compendium of sharia (*ahkâm-i shar'îya majmû'asi*).¹¹³

In the last decade of the tsarist regime there were many who, like this imam, gained access to a manifold choice of Tatar newspapers and journals, witnessed different opinions on the Muslim administration and various plans for its reform exchanged in the press and booklets, and as a result envisioned an ideal operation of the Spiritual Assembly with reference to available legal articles. The Tatar press was a competitive forum open to broad social groups with an expansive geography. It involved the rural and urban 'ulamâ', the State Duma deputies, the mu'allims, the young leftist literati, and possibly even the illiterate if materials were read aloud by others or at gatherings. The newspapers and journals of St. Petersburg, Kazan, Ufa, Orenburg, and Bakhchisarai cited, commented, criticized, and supported each other. Moreover, contributors to the debate over the Spiritual Assembly reform referred to models and lessons within and outside the Russian Empire. While they often invoked the regulations governing the spiritual assemblies in Crimea and Transcaucasia, their remarks about the Kazakh steppe and Turkestan displayed arrogance toward coreligionists of these regions and harbored warnings learned from them. They also looked at the Christian and Jewish communities as well as the centralization of the Islamic administration in the Ottoman Empire, the codification of sharia in British India, and even the absence of a spiritual assembly in Chinese Turkestan. The Spiritual Assembly of Ufa had long been an institution of the confessional state controlling the faith and loyalty of recognized religious collectives; after 1905 local Muslims began to draw this institution into the public sphere to test the possibility of making it work for their benefit.

The new designs for the Muslim community—*Dâr al-Islâm* or *millat*—that took shape in the name of “religious freedom” (*hurriyat-i dinîya*) featured ways of conducting negotiations with the state, creating an autonomous religious domain, and demarcating boundaries defining entitlement to collective rights. Despite each editor’s preference in selecting contributions, the Tatar press provided its readership with a wide range of views, extending from calls for the overt imposition of the Spiritual Assembly’s discipline to the search for self-management in religious affairs. As clearly seen in the controversy over the mufti’s qualifications, some mullahs persistently demanded a mufti from the ‘ulamâ’ to maintain religious autonomy, calling for a return to the tradition of the “Grandmother Empress” Catherine II. Others, including reformist scholars and intellectuals, contended that the Spiritual Assembly as a purely bureaucratic agency required a mufti proficient in the Russian language, law, and other forms of secular expertise for better communication with the state. To regulate the religious domain, opinion makers offered “parastatal” solutions: intermediary institutions between Ufa and the mahallas to facilitate the election of the mufti and the qadis and the supervision of maktabas and madrasas; collaboration with the zemstvos in organizing primary education; leadership by the ‘ulamâ’ in compiling the Sharia Code; and an association to oversee the distribution of accurate Qurans. Finally, the Tatar public envisaged that the spiritual assemblies should cover all the Muslim communities of the empire. In the name of “Islamic fraternity” (*ukhûwat-i Islâmîya*), they invited Kazakh readers to bring the steppe back under Ufa’s jurisdiction. Kazakh intellectuals around the journal *Ay-qap*, Kazakhs sympathetic to the Tatar discourse, and even some Turkestanis, like Mahmudkhoja Behdudiy from Samarkand, also considered the Spiritual Assembly of Inner Russia the best expression of prestigious collective rights.¹¹⁴

Was all this freedom of conscience? If that term means the right to follow one or another religion in accordance with individual conviction, then the answer is most likely no: the Volga-Urals Muslim public attempted to preserve and even expand the collective rights that the state assigned to the Muslim community under the Spiritual Assembly, and this expansion would in some sense occur at the expense of its individual members’ freedom. Muslims who dissented from decisions by the mullahs and the Islamic authority would have lost the possibility to bring their grievances to circuit courts; the Spiritual Assembly’s control of the printing and circulation of Qurans could have undermined private publishers’ business; the Tatar press was silent about the tensions in the northern Kazakh steppe arising from attempts by Tatar immigrants to throw their Kazakh neighbors out of

parishes based on their ties with the Spiritual Assembly. Indeed, the Tatar press might well denounce or just shun individual views if they threatened to work against Muslim collective interests, which a vast array of opinion makers now articulated and tried to reconcile with existing administrative practices. But it did contribute to transforming Muslim society per se by making connections among these multiple voices in an unprecedented manner. Freedom of conscience understood as *hurriyat-i dîniya* served as a driving force in the debate over the empire's Muslim administration in the Tatar print media and at a variety of public gatherings, thereby generating a Muslim civil society within Russia's confessional state.

8. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, THE RELIGIOUS MARKET, AND SPIRITUAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN RUSSIA AFTER 1997

J. EUGENE CLAY

In 1990, in an effort to conform to global standards of human rights, both the USSR and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) promulgated new laws on religious freedom that provided broad liberties for religious expression and proselytization.¹ But by 1997, alarmed by a large influx of foreign missionaries and the rise of new religious movements, the Russian Duma passed a more restrictive law designed to favor the “traditional” religions of the peoples of Russia, which were enumerated in the law’s preamble as Orthodox Christianity, Christianity in general, Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, and “other religions.”² Domestic and foreign critics predicted that the new law would result in a significant diminution of religious freedom, and although their worst fears were not realized, the legislation drastically transformed the Russian religious marketplace.

By identifying and favoring certain religious organizations as “traditional,” the Russian state tried to choose the winners in the religious economy—just as it had chosen the winners in its privatization program, which sold public assets at favorable rates to well-connected and politically reliable “oligarchs.”³ The 1997 law likewise sought to leave religion in the dependable hands of well-connected institutions whose interests would be securely tied to the Russian homeland. Yet even as the new law created a highly regulated religious market, dedicated spiritual entrepreneurs from minority faiths nonetheless found and successfully exploited opportunities to build their religious institutions.⁴ In doing so, they have had to contend with related laws—on land use (2001), nongovernmental and noncommercial organizations (2006), counterterrorism (2006), foreign finance (2012), and education (2012)—that have also tended to favor Russia’s “traditional” religions. In July 2016 the Russian government further restricted religious liberty by adopting the “Iarovaia” counterterrorism laws (named for the conservative parliamentary deputy, Irina Iarovaia, who sponsored them), which severely limited missionary activity, especially for unregistered groups. A state campaign in 2016 and 2017 to ban the Jehovah’s Witnesses as an extremist organization illustrated the increasingly narrow vision of religious freedom held by Russian policymakers.⁵

The four groups examined in this essay—two Buddhist denominations, the growing Presbyterian movement, and a new religion called the Ortho-

dox Church of the Sovereign Mother of God (OCSMG)—illustrate the entrepreneurial strategies that minority religions have used to survive in Russia’s spiritual marketplace. These four religious communities each sought, more or less successfully, to adapt to the conditions set out by the 1997 law, which, first of all, promoted the traditional religions of Russia, including both the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church (Table 1) and the traditional faiths of ethnic minorities, such as the Buddhism of the Buriats and Kalmyks. The law (and subsequent registration procedures) also discouraged “foreign” faiths; only Russian citizens can form religious associations, which must submit annual financial reports to the Ministry of Justice detailing all funds received from abroad. Finally, the law sought to decrease the influence of new, nontraditional religious movements, which Orthodox heresiologists often denigrated as “totalitarian destructive cults”—a term borrowed from the anticult movement in Western Europe and North America.⁶

In response to this new legal framework, minority religions portrayed themselves as “traditional,” emphasized their ties to the Russian homeland, and downplayed innovations in doctrine or organization. Presbyterian churches that had been established by South Korean missionaries, for example, published histories of Reformed Christianity in Russia, sought alliances with more established Protestant groups, championed traditional heterosexual marriage, condemned homosexuality, and issued patriotic proclamations on national holidays. Likewise, the Westernized Karma Kagyu Buddhist movement, led by the Danish lama Ole Nydahl, secured support from ethnic Kalmyk politicians and scholars who officially declared it to be a traditional faith of the Kalmyk people. In 1997 the dominant Soviet-era Buddhist denomination, the Central Buddhist Spiritual Directorate, adopted a new name that emphasized its traditional character—the Buddhist Traditional Sangha of Russia—and engaged in a vigorous campaign of recovering autochthonous relics and restoring holy places on Russian territory. Even the Orthodox Church of the Sovereign Mother of God, a new religious movement led by a Marian seer who published a series of novel revelations, increasingly styled itself as “traditional” in the wake of the 1997 law. The new legislation certainly reshaped Russia’s spiritual marketplace, but the leaders of minority religions adapted to its requirements as best they could—by presenting their movements as traditional, patriotic, and tied to the motherland.

FROM “CONFESSIONAL STATE” TO OFFICIAL ATHEISM AND BACK

The 1997 law moved the Russian Federation closer toward its prerevolutionary heritage as a “confessional state” (to use Robert Crews’s helpful

Table 1: Registered Religious Organizations of the Russian Orthodox Church--Moscow Patriarchate in the Russian Federation, 1991–2014

Year (as of 1 Jan.)	Centers or Centralized Religious Organizations	Local Religious Organizations	Educational institutions	Monasteries	Other institutions*	Total ROC- MP
1991	-	-	-	-	-	3451
1992	-	-	-	-	-	2880
1993	-	-	-	-	-	4566
1994	-	-	-	-	-	5559
1995	-	-	-	-	-	6414
1996	68	6709	31	264	123	7195
1997	74	7440	38	309	141	8002
1998	77	8061	38	329	148	8653
1999	77	8278	42	335	147	8897
2000	78	8556	43	374	147	9236
2001	78	10188	46	374	226	10912
2002	72	10395	41	378	79	10965
2003	89	10586	47	499	78	11299
2004	82	10767	49	354	237	11525
2005	83	11072	49	366	267	11837
2006	84	11464	50	391	225	12214
2007	85	11726	52	398	238	12499
2008	83	11807	51	404	241	12586
2009	7	11957	34	389	48	12435
2010	78	12158	57	424	224	12941
2011	79	12471	59	429	229	13265
2012	100	13119	59	429	236	13943
2013	127	13628	58	440	269	14522
2014	152	14206	58	453	327	15196

All registered religious organizations	ROC-MP organizatons as a percentage of all registered religious organizations	Source
5502	62.72	A.P. Torshin et al., Istoriiia gosudarstvennoi politiki SSSR i Rossii v otnoshenii religioznykh organizatsii (Moscow: OLMA Media Grupp, 2010), 89.
4846	59.43	Torshin et al., Istoriiia, 89, 129.
8612	53.02	Torshin et al., Istoriiia, 89, 129.
11088	50.14	Torshin et al., Istoriiia, 89, 129.
11532	55.62	Torshin et al., Istoriiia, 129.
13073	55.04	Sotsial'naia sfera Rossii, No. 1, 1996, p. 194.
14688	54.48	Sotsial'noe polozhenie i uroven' zhizni naseleniia Rossii 1997 p. 314.
16017	54.02	Rossiiia v tsifrakh, 1998 p. 17-18.
16749	53.12	Rossiiia v tsifrakh, 1999, p. 35
17427	53.00	Rossiiia v tsifrakh 2000, Table 2.6, p. 49
20215	53.98	Sotsial'noe polozhenie i uroven' zhizni naseleniia Rossii 2001, Table 12.3, p. 365-66
20441	53.64	Sotsial'noe polozhenie i uroven' zhizni naseleniia Rossii 2002, Table 12.3, p. 365
21450	52.68	Rossiiia v tsifrakh 2003, table 2.7, p. 49
21664	53.20	Sotsial'noe polozhenie i uroven' zhizni naseleniia Rossii 2004, Table 12.3, p. 418
22144	53.45	Sotsial'noe polozhenie i uroven' zhizni naseleniia Rossii 2005, Table 12.3, p. 411
22513	54.25	Sotsial'noe polozhenie i uroven' zhizni naseleniia Rossii 2006, Table 12.3, p. 309
22956	54.45	Rossiiia v tsifrakh 2007, Table 2.7, p. 61
22866	55.04	Rossiiia v tsifrakh 2008, Table 2.8, p. 65
22507	55.25	Sotsial'noe polozhenie i uroven' zhizni naseleniia Rossii 2009, Table 12.3, p. 401
23494	55.08	Sotsial'noe polozhenie i uroven' zhizni naseleniia Rossii 2010, Table 12.3, p. 400.
23848	55.62	Sotsial'noe polozhenie i uroven' zhizni naseleniia Rossii 2011
24624	56.62	Sotsial'noe polozhenie i uroven' zhizni naseleniia Rossii 2012, Table 12.5, p. 248
25541	56.86	Sotsial'noe polozhenie i uroven' zhizni naseleniia Rossii 2013,
26442	57.47	Rossiiia v tsifrakh 2014, Table 2.7, p. 67

expression).⁷ The law helped articulate a hierarchy of religions similar to the prerevolutionary order that was developed over the course of the nineteenth century. As revised in 1857 and in subsequent editions, the Code of Laws included rules governing the recognized “foreign faiths” of the empire, which were administered by the Department of Spiritual Affairs of Foreign Confessions.⁸ In the legal hierarchy of faiths embedded in the code Orthodox Christianity, the “predominant and ruling” religion of the state, stood at the summit of the list of legally recognized confessions.⁹ Just below Orthodox Christianity stood the recognized heterodox Christian confessions (known in Russian as *inoslavie*), including Roman Catholicism, Protestantism (most notably the Evangelical Lutheran Church), and the Armenian Gregorian Church. Below Christianity stood *inoverie*, the recognized non-Christian religions of Judaism (in both its rabbinic and Karaite forms), Islam, Lamaism (i.e., Tibetan Buddhism), and “paganism,” the traditional religions practiced by certain ethnic groups, especially in Siberia and the Volga-Kama region. Recognizing the contribution that established religious communities could make (especially in regulating marriage, promoting morality, and educating the faithful), the prerevolutionary Russian state became a patron of the recognized religious faiths and shaped their ecclesiastical organizations to fulfill civic roles. Heresies, schisms, and sects in all traditions stood outside this carefully constructed hierarchy and threatened it; they were categorized according to the political harm that they represented and prosecuted accordingly.¹⁰ After the 1905 revolution Russian reformers like Petr Stolypin (1862–1911) tried to extend the legal hierarchy and to incorporate the Old Believers and some sectarian groups within it, but the basic hierarchical scheme, with its guarantee of Orthodox Christian supremacy, remained intact until 1917.¹¹

The 1917 Bolshevik revolution created the first officially atheistic state in history, and the new communist regime quickly separated church from state. Initially the new rulers of Russia engaged in antireligious policies that targeted primarily the Russian Orthodox Church, the favored religion of the old regime. Although Soviet authorities allowed Buddhist, Muslims, Baptists, and Spiritual Christians to hold national councils and conferences in the 1920s, the Russian Orthodox Church was granted such permission only in 1943. By 1929, however, the Bolshevik regime initiated a particularly brutal campaign against all religious belief and institutions. In April of that year the Central Executive Committee adopted a harsh law on religious associations that sharply limited the scope of their licit activities. The new law, which remained in effect until 1990, required religious organizations to register with the local state organs, while at the same time it made such

registration more difficult. In the decade that followed adoption of the new legislation, the government destroyed or nationalized tens of thousands of churches, monasteries, mosques, temples, synagogues, and chapels. Of the 39,530 Orthodox churches that were open in 1917 within the 1936 territorial boundaries of the USSR, only 950 were still functioning in 1940. The continuous workweek, introduced in the fall of 1929, directly challenged the religious significance of Friday, Saturday, and Sunday (the holy days of Islam, Judaism, and Christianity, respectively); the new calendar made every day of the week an ordinary workday for most citizens. On 15 May 1932 the Soviet government initiated the “godless” five-year plan, which aimed to eliminate religion altogether by 1937. The plan failed, for in the 1937 census 56 percent of the Soviet population identified themselves as believers. Iosif Stalin, the general secretary of the Communist Party and the effective dictator of the USSR, suppressed these disappointing results and had many of the census workers arrested and executed.¹²

Soviet antireligious policy extracted a terrible human cost. In the five years from 1937 to 1941 alone, approximately 175,800 Orthodox clergy were arrested, of whom 110,700 were executed.¹³ Other denominations also suffered. In 1930 Petr Smidovich, a member of the All-Union Central Executive Committee, reported that ten thousand out of twelve thousand mosques had been closed and at least 90 percent of mullahs and muezzins had no means of conducting religious services.¹⁴ Between 1932 and 1935 the number of Buddhist clergy in the Buriat-Mongol Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) dropped from 7,619 to 1,200, and by 1940 not a single legal religious institution existed in the entire republic.¹⁵

The most brutal phase of the Soviet antireligious campaign ended only with the German invasion of 1941. Unlike Stalin, who made no public statement for ten days after the offensive began on 22 June, Metropolitan Sergii (Ivan Stragorodskii, 1867–1944), the acting patriarch (and one of the four Russian Orthodox bishops still at liberty), immediately issued a call to resist the invaders.¹⁶ In an effort to unite and mobilize all Soviet citizens against the enemy, Stalin allowed limited legal religious expression by creating a handful of centralized, hierarchical religious boards that the state could monitor closely. In the eighteenth century Catherine the Great had created similar centralized directorates for fractious religious minorities, including Muslims and Buddhists; Stalin drew on this historical experience to exercise more effective control over religion. Two new central government agencies became responsible for implementing religious policy: the Council for Russian Orthodox Church Affairs (1943) and the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults (1944). In 1943 the Russian Orthodox Church was finally

permitted to convene a council and elect a patriarch. At the same time, the government allowed Muslims to open a spiritual directorate in Ufa. In 1944 Protestants formed the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians and Baptists (AUCECB). A Buddhist spiritual directorate opened in 1946, as did the All-Union Council of Seventh-Day Adventists.

Under the new paradigm of church-state relations, which lasted until the late 1980s, religion was permitted very limited public expression. Registration of individual congregations and parishes remained difficult, and large areas of the USSR had no legal religious communities. Nevertheless, certain favored religions were allowed to have their own spiritual administrations, educational institutions, and publications. Religious leaders, who were carefully vetted by the state, served as Soviet diplomats, attending international peace conferences and actively espousing the government's positions on a range of foreign policy issues. The new *modus vivendi* did not end religious persecution, however, and Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet premier from 1958 to 1964, launched a major antireligious campaign. Under these difficult conditions much religious activity was driven underground, and believers who sought greater religious freedom joined together to resist Soviet antireligious restrictions and censorship. The Council of Churches of Evangelical Christian-Baptists, the True and Free Seventh-Day Adventists, and various groups of Orthodox, Catholic, Muslim, and Buddhist and other believers rejected the Soviet laws on religion and were pursued and prosecuted for their principled stand.¹⁷

Only in the late 1980s under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the Communist Party from 1985 to 1991, did the state end its hostility to religion. As part of his effort to restructure and democratize the Soviet system, Gorbachev helped end the ideological monopoly of the Communist Party and invited greater religious liberty. In 1990 the Soviet and the Russian legislatures adopted laws that abolished the restrictive Stalinist registration requirements of 1929 and allowed believers wide freedom to worship and propagate their convictions. After the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, the Russian Federation adopted a strictly secular constitution in 1993 that guaranteed the equality of all religions before the law.¹⁸

Anxiety over foreign missionaries and new religious movements, however, led to calls for greater regulation of the religious marketplace. The 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations, while claiming to be true to Russia's constitution, suggested that the state should reestablish a hierarchy among religious communities. In its preamble, which recognized "the special contribution of Orthodoxy to the history of Russia and to the establishment and development of Russia's spirituality and culture"



and offered “respect” for “Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism, and other religions that constitute an inseparable part of the historical heritage of Russia’s peoples.”¹⁹ While Orthodox Christianity was singled out for its unique contribution to Russian culture, other religions owed their special legal recognition to their relationship with one or more of the ethnic groups within Russia. By this criterion Islam, which is an “inseparable part of the historical heritage” of approximately fourteen million people who belong to traditionally Muslim ethnic groups, has a much more important ranking in the new legal hierarchy than it did in the old imperial system. Protestant and Catholic Christianity, in contrast, are the traditional religions of much smaller ethnic minorities, and so are correspondingly less significant—and on a much lower rank than they were in the prerevolutionary period.

Subsequent interpretations of the law have affirmed the “traditional” status of the four religious traditions that are specifically named in the preamble: Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism. In December 2007, when an interviewer from *Time* magazine pointed out that Russia is a secular state, President Vladimir Putin interrupted: “No, no, that’s not true. In our law it is written that we have four traditional religions, four. Our American partners criticize us for this, but that’s what our legislators have decided. These four traditional Russian religions are Orthodox Christianity, Judaism, Islam, and Buddhism.”²⁰ Remarkably, Putin not only ignored the precise words of the law’s preamble, which clearly states that the traditional religions of Russia include non-Orthodox Christianity as well as other religions that have contributed to the history and culture of the peoples of Russia, he also denied article 14 of the Russian constitution, which unambiguously declares Russia to be a secular state. At the highest levels of government the idea that Russia’s “traditional” religions should be afforded special treatment and that their number is limited to those four specifically named in the preface to the 1997 law has clearly taken hold.

Putin’s discourse reflects a long-standing Russian view that religious freedom is a collective rather than an individual right. If religion is largely understood as beliefs or doctrines that are held by individuals, religious freedom is consequently an individual right; each person has the power to decide what he or she will believe. The Russian 1997 law, in contrast, emphasizes the function of religion rather than its content. Like the French sociologist Emile Durkheim, who posited that religions create moral communities, the 1997 law values religions because of what they contribute to ethnic cultures.²¹ Such an approach naturally raises the historiographical stakes for competing religious communities, which must demonstrate their historical contribution to the peoples of Russia. Would-be spiritual leaders

compete to represent the legitimate tradition of their ethnic and religious communities.

This new legal hierarchy of religions was put into practice through a process of registration overseen by local branches of the Ministry of Justice. The law divided religious organizations into three categories: (1) unregistered “religious groups” that had no rights of juridical personhood but might seek registration; (2) registered “local religious organizations,” consisting of at least ten adults; and (3) “centralized religious organizations” that included at least three “local religious organizations” as members. To enjoy the full benefits of juridical personhood, registered individual congregations had either to have existed legally for at least fifteen years or to belong to a national centralized religious organization that had similar tenure. Many of the new churches that had been founded in the 1990s naturally had difficulty meeting such a requirement, but without registration a church could not purchase real estate, rent a building, or publish religious literature. The fifteen-year rule clearly favored those few religious denominations and congregations that had had a legal existence in 1982 under the officially atheist Soviet regime: the Russian Orthodox Church, the two Muslim muftiates of Ufa and Makhachkala, the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christian Baptists, the Seventh-Day Adventists, the Central Buddhist Spiritual Directorate in Ulan-Ude, and a handful of independently registered religious communities. After nearly two decades of controversy over this requirement, the Russian parliament abolished the fifteen-year rule only in July 2015.²²

TWO BUDDHIST PATHS: THE TRADITIONAL SANGHA AND THE DIAMOND WAY

Buddhism illustrates some of the difficulties facing policymakers who want to support “traditional” religions. A minority with no more than about five hundred thousand adherents, Russian Buddhism is also quite diverse, including many rival schools. The two most successful Buddhist religious organizations have followed distinct strategies to ensure their share of the religious market. The Buddhist Traditional Sangha of Russia (BTSR), the successor to the Soviet-era Central Spiritual Directorate of Buddhists, has sought to monopolize its position as the traditional confession of the Buriat people with autochthonous relics that solidly link it to the Russian soil. Sticking strictly to the Gelug “Yellow Hat” school of Tibetan Buddhism, the Pandito Khambo Lama Damba Aiusheev has used his position to promote Buriat language and culture, to build Buddhist monasteries, to speak for Buddhists in Russian state councils, and to control the most important Buddhist theological institutions in Russia. By contrast, the Russian Association of Buddhists of the Diamond Way Karma Kagyu Tradition, founded by

the Danish lama Ole Nydahl, pursued a different strategy to gain acceptance for its Westernized version of Tibetan Buddhism. Despite its foreign origins, the association has established seventy-nine meditation centers across the Russian Federation, of which at least fifty are registered.²³ Rather than building monasteries only in traditionally Buddhist regions, Nydahl and his Russian followers have opened meditation centers designed to attract lay people in many of Russia's major cities.²⁴

Like many other religious minorities (including Jews, Catholics, and Muslims), Buddhists became part of the Russian Empire as it expanded. In the seventeenth century Tibetan Buddhist lamas had established a foothold among the nomadic Kalmyks, the Tuvans, and the Buriats. As Russia expanded into Siberia, its rulers sought to co-opt the Buddhist clergy. In 1741 Empress Elizabeth officially declared Buddhism a permitted religion and registered 150 lamas.²⁵ Similarly, Catherine II created an official Buddhist religious establishment, including the office of Pandito Khambo Lama, twenty-three years later. By the end of the old regime a Buriat diaspora had spread as far as the capital of St. Petersburg, where in 1915 a new temple was consecrated.²⁶

In its revolutionary zeal to create a godless society, the Soviet government launched an anti-Buddhist campaign in 1925, and by 1939 all the Buddhist monasteries had been closed. Soviet propagandists portrayed Buddhism not only as a backward and oppressive religion but as a front for pro-Japanese forces.²⁷ In 1945–1946, as part of a broader rapprochement with religion, the Soviet state once again legalized Buddhism, allowed two monasteries to open, and created an official Central Spiritual Directorate of Buddhists to oversee and train Buddhist temples and lamas and to represent the USSR to the Buddhist world abroad.²⁸

In the post-Soviet period the Central Directorate of Buddhists, like the other official Soviet religious organizations, faced internal schism, as it suddenly lost its legal monopoly over Buddhist institutions. After the death of the widely respected head of the directorate, Pandito Khambo Lama Munko Tsybikov (1909–1992), who had spent many years in Stalinist prison camps for his faith, several ambitious lamas struggled to succeed him; three years later, the young and vigorous Damba (Vasilii) Aiusheev (b. 1962) was elected. He instituted a series of reforms designed to centralize authority in the directorate, which was renamed and adopted a new charter. Since 1995 Aiusheev has been reelected several times and is fully in control of the BTRS, which unites thirty-four registered monasteries (*datsans*) under its aegis.²⁹

Aiusheev has achieved this success by vigorous institution building, focused on opening or reopening *datsans* and training cadres to run them.

He has also, in contrast to his rivals, Danzan-Khaibzun (Fedor) Samaev (1954–2005), Nimazhap Iliukhinov, and Choi-Dorje Budaev (who have each founded competing Buddhist centralized religious organizations), positioned himself as the leader of *traditional Buriat Buddhism in Russia*.³⁰ He dismisses all forms of Buddhism other than the Gelug “Yellow Hat” school of Tibetan Buddhism as nontraditional; he promotes the use of the Buriat language (rather than Russian or Tibetan); and he emphasizes the autochthonous nature of Buriat Buddhism—most notably expressed in the veneration of the uncorrupted body of the twelfth Pandito Khambo Lama Dashi-Dorzho Itigelov (1852–1927).

During Putin’s first year in office as president, Aiusheev stressed the lack of international help that distinguished his movement from all others: “We place special hope in Putin, because the president’s personality has an enormous role in Russia. We always place our hope only in Russia. We do not receive any help from abroad. At the same time, Russian-speaking Buddhists [non-Lamaists—notes the newspaper reporter] receive a lot of international aid.”³¹

Aiusheev also sharply distinguishes traditional Buddhism from its rivals:

There is in fact no exchange of views or experience between the traditional Buddhists of Russia and the representatives of new Buddhist movements. This is because the new Buddhist movements, such as Zen Buddhism, are not sufficiently open for dialogue. Many of them have not yet reached knowledge of the essence of Buddhism. Preachers who come from abroad, as a rule, return back home after a month. They leave behind disciples and followers who in fact are not familiar with Buddhist practice and do not constitute a serious force for the spread of Buddhism in Russia. Therefore, we do not conduct a serious dialogue with the representatives of these movements.³²

As the leader of a traditional confession, Aiusheev considers the leaders of the other recognized confessions as “brothers in the spiritual service of Russian citizens.” Together, they face the common task of “opposing new totalitarian cults of any type.”³³

Aiusheev’s devotion to a form of Buddhism that is traditional and directly connected to the Russian land is perhaps best expressed in the veneration of the body of Dashi-Dorzho Itigelov. In 1927 Itigelov called his disciples together and began to chant his own funeral service. By the end of the service he had died while seated in a position of meditation. His uncorrupted body was exhumed in 2002 and now is regularly brought out in religious



FIGURE 8.1. The Moscow office of the representative of the Buddhist Traditional Sangha of Russia (located in the Vsevolozhskii mansion, ul. Ostozhenko 49). Photograph © J. Eugene Clay.

processions several times a year. Housed in a special temple in Ivolginskii Datsan, the headquarters of the BTSR, the body attracts many pilgrims and curiosity seekers from across Russia.³⁴

Aiusheev has succeeded in maintaining a monopoly on the official representation of Buddhism in state structures. Since its creation by Russian President Boris Yeltsin in 1995, Aiusheev has served continuously on the presidential Council for Cooperation with Religious Associations.³⁵ Likewise, he has continuously served as the sole Buddhist representative on the Interreligious Council of Russia (a body chaired by the patriarch of Moscow that includes the leaders of the “traditional” confessions of Russia), founded in 1998.³⁶ President Putin chose Aiusheev to serve on the first and second convocations of the Civic Chamber, the consultative body created in 2005 to represent civil society. Later convocations have always included a delegate from the BTSR, as of 2017 Sanzhai Lama Andrei Bal’zhirov (b. 1968), the permanent representative of the BTSR in Moscow.³⁷ The BTSR also controls the two registered Buddhist institutions for theological education in Russia: the Dashi Choinkhorlin Buddhist University named for Damba Darzha Zaiev (the first Pandito Khambo Lama) and the Aginsk Buddhist

Academy. The BTSR has also successfully pursued state funding for many of its projects.

By contrast, the Westernized Tibetan Buddhism of the Russian Association of Buddhists of the Diamond Way Karma Kagyu Tradition has remained on the fringes of the religious establishment. It has no representation in the Civic Chamber or the other expert councils that advise the president and legislature on religious matters. The association's Buddhist university, a branch of the Karmapa International Buddhist Institute, which opened with great fanfare in 1995 in Elista, the capital of the Kalmyk Republic, is no longer functioning.³⁸ Russian officials sometimes regarded the association with disdain; for example, a 1998 handbook on religion published by the Russian Academy of State Service dismissed Karma Kagyu as "one of the pseudo-Oriental, neo-Buddhist organizations that has appeared in Russia in recent years."³⁹ Nevertheless, by refusing to limit itself to the relatively small ethnic minorities that traditionally practiced Buddhism, by cultivating important political patrons, by exploiting its global network, and by persistently promoting the Karma Kagyu school, the association has established nearly eighty centers across Russia.⁴⁰

The association's success owes much to its Danish leader, Ole Nydahl, who undertakes an annual lecture tour of Russia every winter. Converted to the Karma Kagyu school (one of four traditional sects of Tibetan Buddhism) during trips to South Asia in the late 1960s, Nydahl gave up illegal drugs to spread the Buddhist message to the West. In 1972 the sixteenth Karmapa (spiritual leader of the Karma Kagyu lineage) Rangjung Rigpe Dorje (1924–1981) sent Nydahl back to Denmark to promote Buddhism to a modern, Western lay audience. In a sharp break with traditional Tibetan practice, which requires years of asceticism and study to master Buddhist philosophy, Nydahl and his wife, Hannah, began to organize dharma and meditation centers designed for the laity who remained fully engaged in the world. Far from practicing celibacy, Nydahl enthusiastically embraced sexuality; in the 1970s and 1980s he was openly promiscuous, sleeping with many of his female students—a practice that he curtailed only with the AIDS crisis. At the same time, he remained happily married to Hannah until her death in 2007, even as he took another disciple, Cathrin (Caty) Hartung, as a lover from 1990 to 2004.⁴¹ Needless to say, Nydahl makes no claim to being a monk but does brandish his credentials as a lama, or Buddhist teacher; nevertheless, Russian journalists are often shocked by his apparent hedonism.⁴²

In 1989 Nydahl first visited Russia and gave lectures in Leningrad and Moscow, where he opened his talk by sharing a bottle of Armenian cognac

with the small crowd that had come to hear him.⁴³ In the early 1990s Nydahl regularly returned to Russia and helped organize meditation centers in fifty major cities across the Federation.⁴⁴ He integrated these new centers with his international network of some 650 Diamond Way centers, and in 1993 his followers formally registered the International Association of Buddhists of the Karma Kagyu School, which included centers in Ukraine as well as Russia.⁴⁵ During these early years he cultivated important contacts with the eccentric and authoritarian president of the Republic of Kalmykia, Kirsan Iliumzhinov (b. 1962), who believed that his government had a significant role to play in the religious revival and provided significant resources to construct Orthodox and Catholic churches, Protestant prayer houses, and Buddhist temples. Soviet repression of religion had been especially brutal in Kalmykia. In 1931 Soviet authorities arrested the Shajin Lama (the chief Kalmyk Buddhist cleric) Luvsan-Sharap Tepkin (1875–1948).⁴⁶ Within ten years all Buddhist institutions (which had numbered over one hundred before the revolution) had been closed, and in December 1943 the Council of People's Commissars dissolved the Kalmyk ASSR and deported all Kalmyks to Siberia. They were allowed to return to their homeland only in 1957.⁴⁷ For the next three decades Buddhism remained an underground religion; only in 1988 was a Buddhist community permitted to register legally. To help restore religion to the republic, in 1993 President Iliumzhinov created a Department of Religious Affairs, co-chaired by the chief Buddhist and Orthodox clerics of the republic.⁴⁸ Iliumzhinov was sympathetic to Nydahl's Karma Kagyu movement, and Nydahl in turn helped raise funds for the many Buddhist construction projects that the president undertook. In 1995 Nydahl opened a branch of the Karmapa International Buddhist Institute in Elista, and his international network provided substantial financial support for the Stupa of Enlightenment (completed in 1999) and the vast temple complex "the Golden Home of the Buddha Shakyamuni," which opened in 2005.⁴⁹

After the passage of the 1997 law Ole Nydahl's organization seemed to be particularly vulnerable. As a foreign charismatic spiritual teacher with unusual sexual practices who demanded and received his followers' loyalty, Nydahl appeared to be a perfect target for the new law. Indeed, Orthodox Christians, politicians, and local journalists often attacked Diamond Way Buddhism as a destructive cult.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, Nydahl and his movement enjoy several significant advantages that aid the growth of the Diamond Way. First, because he promotes Buddhism, Nydahl can legitimately claim to represent a traditional Russian religion; official Russian statistics do not distinguish among different Buddhist sects but lump them all together (Ta-

ble 2). Second, he has bolstered this claim through the support of President Iliumzhinov, whose government quickly provided attestations of the traditional character of the Diamond Way. Third, Nydahl's sympathizers include members of Russia's academic elite, who have skillfully defended the Karma Kagyu movement against its detractors. For example, the physicist Aleksandr Koibagarov (b. 1953), who serves as the president of the Russian Association of Buddhists of the Diamond Way Karma Kagyu Tradition, has proved to be an articulate spokesman for Buddhism.⁵¹ The association has also claimed the valuable Internet address buddhism.ru and propagates its teacher's lectures via a YouTube channel. Fourth, Nydahl's seemingly inexhaustible energy has also played in the success of his movement—he crisscrosses the Russian Federation every year, delivering lectures, and several of his books have become Russian bestsellers.⁵² Fifth, since the two religious leaders officially met in 2009, Nydahl has achieved a *modus vivendi* with the most important Russian Buddhist leader, Pandito Khambo Lama Aiusheev, who clearly does not regard him as a threat; Nydahl's target audience is not primarily the Buriat ethnos.⁵³ Finally, as a representative of the Karma Kagyu school of Tibetan Buddhism, Nydahl provides an alternative to the Gelug school led by the Dalai Lama, who has not been granted a Russian visa since 2004. Wary of antagonizing the People's Republic of China, which regards the Dalai Lama as a dangerous separatist, the Russian Federation officials may welcome a version of Tibetan Buddhism that follows a different leader.⁵⁴

Nydahl's success may yet prove to be ephemeral. He is aging, and his strong supporter Iliumzhinov is no longer president of Kalmykia. From 2014 to 2017 the number of Diamond Way meditation centers listed on buddhism.ru dropped from eighty-seven to seventy-four. Nevertheless, Nydahl has clearly succeeded, in spite of all the apparent obstacles created by the 1997 law, in laying a foundation for an impressive network of registered and unregistered religious organizations that stretches from Kaliningrad to Vladivostok. His activity and the success of his organization show the possibilities for religious innovation and development that exist despite the restrictive dimensions of the 1997 law.

THE PRESBYTERIANS

While Aiusheev and Nydahl both successfully claimed to promote the traditional Russian religion of Buddhism—despite their radically different approaches—Presbyterians faced a greater challenge to their legitimacy. Even so, Presbyterian missionaries in post-Soviet Russia (many of whom are ethnic Koreans) have made significant progress in advancing their religion; al-

Table 2. Registered Buddhist Religious Organizations in the Russian Federation, 1996-2014

Year (as of 1 Jan.)	Centers or Centralized Religious Organizations	Local religious organizations	Seminaries, Theological Academies	Monasteries	Other institutions (missions, brotherhoods)	TOTAL
1996	7	113	1		3	124
1997	7	135	1	2	4	149
1998	8	145	1	2	4	160
1999	8	152	1	2	4	167
2000	8	161	1	2	4	176
2001	8	182	1		2	193
2002	11	188	3			202
2003	11	205	2			218
2004	10	180	2			192
2005	10	179	2		1	192
2006	10	184	2	1		197
2007	9	191	2	1		203
2008	9	188	2	1		200
2009	5	191	2			198
2010	9	196	3			208
2011	11	203	3			217
2012	11	207	3			221
2013	10	218	2			230
2014	11	228	2			241

though a much smaller and “nontraditional” faith, by the beginning of 2014 the Presbyterians had registered nearly as many organizations as had the much larger Buddhist community (194 to 241).⁵⁵ Faced with the challenges of the 1997 law, Presbyterians created strategic alliances with other Protestants, highlighted their historical connections with Russia, and emphasized their traditional and patriotic values, even as they also drew support from international Christian networks.

The 1997 law created substantial difficulties for Russian Protestants in general and significantly slowed the growth of their registered congregations (Table 3). Despite Russia’s long history of Protestant peoples (including the Volga Germans and the Lutheran Karelians), the law’s preamble did not specifically mention any Protestant confession as a “traditional” religion. In the Soviet Union the AUCECB, formed in 1944, had dominated the Protestant share of the religious marketplace; although other Protestant groups, such as the Lutherans and Seventh-Day Adventists, enjoyed limited legal recognition, the AUCECB was by far the largest and most active Soviet-era Protestant denomination. By 1997 most other Protestant groups were smaller and could not claim the fifteen years of legal existence that the Evangelical Christians and Baptists had enjoyed. For example, Pentecostals legally registered some independent individual congregations in the Soviet period but formed their own union only in May 1990. Likewise, by 1997 Presbyterian missionaries, primarily from the Republic of Korea, had successfully planted 153 religious organizations that had been registered with the Ministry of Justice; many others existed without juridical personhood.⁵⁶ The new legislation threatened all these fledgling communities; by the beginning of 2003 the number of registered Presbyterian organizations had fallen to 140 from a high of 192 two years earlier—a 27 percent decline. Over the past ten years, as they have learned to negotiate the bureaucratic maze required for registration, Russian Presbyterians have slowly recovered (Table 4).

Neither the Russian legislators nor the new Russian Presbyterians were completely aware of the rich history of Reformed Christianity on Russian soil. Dutch Calvinist merchants established trading posts in the Kholmogory region in the sixteenth century; by 1616 the Dutch in Moscow had built a wooden chapel, and they managed to hire a pastor thirteen years later.⁵⁷ In 1632 Dutch metallurgists settled in Tula at the tsar’s invitation and soon constructed a Reformed church that received a permanent pastor from Holland in 1654. A generation later, in 1689, the regent Sophia issued an invitation to Huguenot refugees fleeing French persecution after Louis XIV’s revocation of the Edict of Nantes.⁵⁸ Anxious to attract Western specialists, Peter the Great (r. 1682–1725) also encouraged Calvinists to immigrate to

Table 3: Protestant Registered Religious Organizations, 1996–2014

Year (as of 1 Jan)	Centers or Centralized religious organizations	Local religious organizations	Seminaries and theological academies	Missions, fraternities and other religious organizations	Total	All rel. organizations	Protestant religious organizations as a % of all rel. orgs.
1996	67	1906	6	292	2271	13073	17.4
1997	86	2245	6	318	2655	14688	18.1
1998	91	2539	8	340	2978	16017	18.6
1999	91	2729	8	339	3167	16749	18.9
2000	93	2915	9	337	3354	17427	19.2
2001	207	3944	27	154	4332	20215	21.4
2002	197	4070	27	7	4301	20441	21.0
2003	216	4128	23	8	4377	21450	20.4
2004	206	4205	28	20	4459	21664	20.6
2005	206	4254	27	22	4509	22144	20.4
2006	220	4235	28	22	4505	22513	20.0
2007	227	4277	28	22	4554	22956	19.8
2008	227	4159	29	21	4436	22866	19.4
2009	104	4125	10	1	4240	22507	18.8
2010	217	4146	35	24	4422	23494	18.8
2011	221	4075	33	23	4382	23848	18.4
2012	219	4104	30	23	4376	24624	17.8
2013	231	4133	30	7	4401	25541	17.2
2014	235	4188	27	7	4457	26442	16.9

Table 4. Registered Presbyterian Religious Organizations in the Russian Federation, 1996–2014

Year (as of 1 Jan)	Centralized Religious Organizations	Local Religious Organizations	Seminaries	Missions/ Religious Foundations	Total
1996	2	124	0	3	129
1997	3	146		4	153
1998	3	159	-	4	166
1999	3	164		4	171
2000	3	178		4	185
2001	9	179	4	0	192
2002	7	130	4	0	141
2003	8	128	4	0	140
2004	9	161	6	0	176
2005	9	175	6	2	192
2006	10	169	6	2	187
2007	10	166	6	2	184
2008	10	162	5	2	179
2009	5	163	2	0	170
2010	7	167	3	0	177
2011	7	169	3	0	179
2012	7	179	3	0	189
2013	7	182	3	1	193
2014	7	183	3	1	194

Russia. The Dutch and the French Calvinists who came to the new capital of St. Petersburg each built Reformed churches in 1732.⁵⁹ Thirty years later, the newly enthroned Catherine II enticed German-speaking Reformed colonists to settle on the Volga River with promises of religious freedom and tax privileges; immigrants from Hesse, Switzerland, and the Palatinate created three large Reformed parishes there. Alexander I allowed Scottish Presbyterians and British evangelicals to labor in the frontier regions of Astrakhan and Lake Baikal.⁶⁰ American Presbyterian missionaries working in Persia and the Ottoman Empire regularly traveled to the Russian Caucasus, where they occasionally defied local authorities by preaching.⁶¹ The Russian census of 1897 numbered 85,400 Reformed Christians.⁶²

In the early twentieth century the first Korean Presbyterian missionaries began carrying their gospel to Russia, where thousands of Koreans had fled to escape an increasingly oppressive Japanese occupation. Americans had first brought Reformed Christianity to the “hermit kingdom” (as Korea was

known) in 1884, and a major revival in 1907 in Pyongyang helped spread and deepen the faith among the Korean population. During this “Great Revival,” the young Presbyterian Choi Kwanheul committed himself to proselytizing among the Korean diaspora in Russia. From 1909 to 1913 he successfully started several Presbyterian churches with hundreds of members among the Koreans of Vladivostok and Siberia. Forced to convert to Orthodoxy in 1913, Choi returned to his Reformed faith after the revolution and led several Presbyterian churches in the 1920s.⁶³ The Stalinist antireligious campaigns of the 1930s destroyed this burgeoning Presbyterian movement, which remained forgotten until the turn of the twenty-first century.⁶⁴

In the post-Soviet period Reformed Christianity again took root in Russia. After years of spiritual searching Evgenii Kashirskii independently turned to Calvinism and in 1992 formed the Union of Evangelical-Reformed Churches headquartered in his hometown of Tver'. Since then, however, the union has suffered schism and remained small and fractured; as of 2017, there are only four registered churches that identify themselves with the “Reformed” label.⁶⁵ Presbyterianism has had much greater success. Korean Presbyterian missionaries took full advantage of the new religious freedom in Russia, planting churches first among the Soviet Korean diaspora, then reaching beyond it. For example, in 1992 the South Korean Presbyterian businessman Li Heung-rae (b. 1941) arrived in Moscow to fulfill his adolescent vow to bring ten thousand people to Christ. By establishing one hundred churches with one hundred members each, Li calculated that he could accomplish the promise he had made to God.⁶⁶ Using his life savings, he founded the Moscow Christian Presbyterian Spiritual Academy in 1993 to train church planters; today it is one of only three registered Presbyterian educational institutions operating in Russia.⁶⁷ A 1993 Russian government handbook on religious organizations included a special section on Korean churches, which were notable for their missionary zeal among all ethnic groups.⁶⁸ Two years later, four Presbyterian congregations joined to form the Union of Christian Presbyterian Churches in Russia.⁶⁹ Korean Presbyterian missionaries were especially effective in Siberia, the island of Sakhalin (with its large Korean diaspora), and the Far Eastern Federal District, where they established dozens of new congregations in the 1990s.⁷⁰ By 1998 the Ministry of Justice had registered 166 Presbyterian religious organizations. Korean missionaries, who numbered at least 557 in 1996, had founded the majority of these new churches.⁷¹

To survive and thrive under the 1997 legislation, Presbyterians had to formulate creative strategies, allying themselves with like-minded, sympathetic Protestants—and especially the increasingly influential Pentecos-



FIGURE 8.2. The headquarters of the Union of Christian Presbyterian Churches in Moscow. Photograph © J. Eugene Clay.

tal movement, which first began registering autonomous congregations in 1968. For example, the new Union of Christian Presbyterian Churches, like many other small Protestant churches, entered the large Russian Pentecostal denomination, the Russian Associated Union of Christians of the Evangelical Faith (Pentecostals). Organized in 1996 by Sergei Riakhovskii (b. 1956), a moderate Pentecostal bishop, the union welcomed other evangelical Protestant churches threatened by the possible loss of their legal status after the passage of the 1997 law. Methodists, Presbyterians, charismatics, and Messianic Jews all found refuge in the new national denomination, whose statement of faith was intentionally broad enough to cover all its members.⁷² Other Presbyterians also sought refuge within other recognized Protestant organizations: the Russian Church of Christians of the Evangelical Faith, a more conservative Pentecostal denomination than Riakhovskii's, includes a Presbyterian group headed by the Korean-Russian bishop Viktor Pak.⁷³

The law encouraged Presbyterians to indigenize and consolidate their communities. For example, the Hope Christian Presbyterian Church, founded among the Korean diaspora in Blagoveshchensk in 1994, initially

was organized under the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Churches of South Korea, which provided a pastor, religious literature, and substantial material support. After the 1997 law was passed, the church joined a Russian centralized religious organization, the Association of Independent Churches of Christians of the Evangelical Faith, which in turn was part of Riakhovskii's Pentecostal denomination, the Russian Associated Union of Christians of the Evangelical Faith.⁷⁴ In 1997 the difficulties of registration forced two Korean Presbyterian missionaries in Ulan-Ude, each of whom had established a church in the city, to unite into a single congregation.⁷⁵ The resulting Ulan-Ude Christian Presbyterian Church was stronger than its predecessors and has since grown to three hundred members, even as it has started new congregations in nearby towns and villages. Although initially dependent on support from South Korea, the missionaries took care to train Russian and Buriat pastors (some of whom traveled to Moscow to study in the Presbyterian academy) to succeed them. When the missionaries departed around 2003, they left a thoroughly indigenized Presbyterian network that today includes nearly twenty-five churches.⁷⁶

Presbyterians also formed several regional centralized religious organizations and succeeded in obtaining registration for these networks in Primorskii krai, Sakhalin, and Buriatia. Overall, however, Presbyterians have faced considerable obstacles to obtaining legal recognition for their communities. As of December 2017, 113 of 298 Presbyterian organizations had either lost or failed to obtain registration, a failure rate of about 38 percent—much higher than the approximately 9 percent failure rate of Ole Nydahl's Karma Kagyu movement.⁷⁷ Not acknowledged as a traditional religion of Russia, Presbyterianism is also a minority even among Russian Protestants. Only in 2010 did the president of the Union of Christian Presbyterian Churches gain a seat on the Consultative Council of the Heads of Protestant Churches of Russia, an organization created in 2002 by Pentecostals, Baptists, and Seventh-Day Adventists to provide a united Protestant voice on important social questions.⁷⁸

The strategic alliance with Pentecostals has had a profound impact on Russian Presbyterianism. Although Reformed theology traditionally rejects speaking in tongues (a gift that ended in the apostolic age), some Russian Presbyterian churches (such as the Hope Church in Blagoveshchensk) practice glossolalia, the chief sign of the baptism of the Holy Spirit in Pentecostal thought. Others, however, decisively reject this practice yet, because of the constraints of the 1997 law, are forced to be part of centralized religious organizations that promote glossolalia. In Sakhalin, for example, traditional Korean Presbyterian churches have negotiated a compromise with their

Pentecostal bishop so that they can continue their traditional form of worship, including infant baptism. Baptists have been less flexible.⁷⁹

By providing theological, material, and media resources, international Pentecostal networks have also significantly influenced Russian Presbyterianism. In 2006 the Ulan-Ude Christian Presbyterian Church became part of the Trinity Broadcasting Network (TBN, *Teleradioset' blagikh novostei*—lit. Good News TV and Radio) when it joined the Union of Christians Association of Christian Churches, a centralized religious organization consisting primarily of charismatic churches. Founded by the American Pentecostal evangelist Paul Crouch (1934–2013), TBN expanded into Russia in the early 1990s; the Russian branch is headquartered in St. Petersburg.⁸⁰ Because it has its own television studio, the Ulan-Ude church creates its own programs, as well as disseminating TBN's professionally produced evangelical Protestant content. Likewise, the Word of Life movement founded by the Swedish Pentecostal pastor Ulf Ekman (b. 1950) has provided substantial material support for Russian Presbyterians, organizing trips to Israel and offering educational seminars.⁸¹

With such contacts Presbyterians struggle against the perception that their religion is foreign. In 2002 Veniamin (Boris Pushkar', b. 1938), the Orthodox bishop of Vladivostok, urged the local government to restrict the rapidly growing Protestant churches in Primorskii krai: "The main danger of all these religious movements from abroad is that they are not patriotic. Will Americans, Koreans, and others really teach their flocks to love our motherland, our native country, Russia, to care for it, as does our Church, which has united the nation for centuries?"⁸² Even the present pastor of the Ulan-Ude Christian Presbyterian Church, Viktor Kolmynin, a retired Russian military officer, recalls that before his conversion he considered all Protestants to be CIA agents, just as his political education instructors had taught him.⁸³ Presbyterians have responded to such perceptions with strong affirmations of their patriotism and their traditional values, calling on Russian Presbyterians "to serve our country, . . . to pray for it, for the president, and the government."⁸⁴ In 2011 the Union of Christian Presbyterian Churches strongly rebuked the Presbyterian Church (USA), the largest US Presbyterian denomination, for its decision to ordain sexually active gay clergy: "To our great sorrow, we must confess that the religious association calling itself 'the Presbyterian Church of the USA' cannot be regarded as a Christian organization." The union "openly condemns all agreement with the ideas of the Sodomites."⁸⁵ Russian Presbyterians note with sorrow that the United States is suffering from a "spiritual cancer" and is headed toward self-destruction, while President Putin champions traditional, civilized values.

The 1997 law had consequences that were probably not foreseen by the Russian legislators who fashioned it. Although the law did pose significant challenges for Presbyterians, they responded creatively by working with Pentecostals, who provided an umbrella organization that facilitated the process of registration. The law made such ecumenical cooperation necessary; unwittingly, the legislators encouraged a significant exchange of ideas, practices, and resources between Pentecostals and Presbyterians that would have been much less likely before 1997. Moreover, with its emphasis on tradition, the 1997 law pushed Presbyterians to explore and celebrate their history in Russia. The Presbyterians of Buriatia now celebrate the Protestant missionaries who labored in the Trans-Baikal region in the nineteenth century. The church has restored the graves of several of the missionaries, recovered and published their observations about life in the region, planned the construction of a monument memorializing their lives, and sponsored a historical monograph about their work and legacy. The church also publishes a journal of local history, *Barguzhin Takum*, and cooperates with the local historical museum.⁸⁶ Likewise, the 1997 law encouraged Chung Ho-Sang, a Korean pastor of a church in Vladivostok, to rediscover the history of Presbyterianism in Siberia at the beginning of the last century.⁸⁷ Russian Presbyterians can now make a better case that their religion, too, should be regarded as “traditional,” respected for its contribution to the “historical heritage of Russia’s peoples.”

THE ORTHODOX CHURCH OF THE SOVEREIGN MOTHER OF GOD

The OCSMG was the kind of organization that the 1997 law especially targeted—a new religious movement with new revelations and a charismatic leader, Father Ioann (Veniamin Bereslavskii, b. 1946), who receives messages from divine figures, including the Virgin Mary. Ioann has proven to be a skilled spiritual entrepreneur, drawing inspiration from a variety of sources and tailoring his message to the changing conditions of post-Soviet society. In the 1980s he developed ties to one branch of the underground True Orthodox Church; in the 1990s he internationalized his movement, proselytized aggressively both domestically and abroad, and reached out to Marian visionaries across the globe, organizing large councils that included Catholic seers. After the 1997 law Ioann increasingly emphasized the traditional Russian Orthodox roots of his church, celebrating those places made holy by the sacrifice of the True Orthodox martyrs. Despite his efforts to carve out a niche for his church as one of Russia’s traditional religions and to ingratiate himself with President Vladimir Putin, in late 2006 Ioann became the target of an antisectarian campaign launched by United Rus-

sia, Putin's party. This hostility ultimately drove him in 2009 to surrender administrative leadership of his church and emigrate to Spain, where he now pursues the spiritual revival of Catharism, a medieval dualistic movement that flourished in southern France in the twelfth century. In this latest phase of his evolution Ioann has largely given up on his earlier enthusiasm for Catholic Marian seers and expresses deep pessimism about traditional Christianity altogether.⁸⁸

In 1989, as the Soviet Union became more tolerant of religion, Veniamin Bereslavskii emerged in public as one of several people who claimed to represent the underground True Orthodox Church, which had refused to compromise with the Soviet state—unlike the official Moscow Patriarchate. After Patriarch Tikhon (Vasilii Bellavin, 1865–1925) of Moscow died in prison, Metropolitan Sergii of Nizhnii Novgorod advocated a policy of cooperation with the Bolshevik rulers. As one of the few bishops who was not under arrest in July 1927, Sergii was serving as the deputy patriarchal locum tenens. In his effort to normalize ecclesiastical life and assure government authorities that the Church did not represent a security threat, Sergii, who himself had just been released from prison, issued a controversial declaration of loyalty to the Soviet Union on behalf of the Church. In a particularly contentious sentence, Sergii identified the interests of Orthodox believers with that of their atheist persecutors: “We want to be Orthodox and at the same time to recognize the Soviet Union as our civil motherland, whose joys and successes are our joys and successes, and whose failures are our failures.”⁸⁹ For many of Sergii's fellow bishops, who had suffered imprisonment and witnessed the arrest and execution of their priests and parishioners, this policy was reprehensible: the Church could not declare its loyalty to an atheistic regime that actively persecuted Christians for their faith. Several bishops broke communion with Sergii and tried to organize the Church as an underground resistance movement that ultimately outlived the USSR. The True Orthodox Church, as this movement came to be known, split into many different branches, but all of them rejected Sergii's declaration of loyalty as a profound error.⁹⁰

In the late 1980s Bereslavskii, a lifelong resident of Moscow, made two remarkable assertions: that he was a prophet of the Mother of God and a priest-monk of the True Orthodox Church. The Virgin Mary had begun sending him revelations in November 1984, and a few months later a secret metropolitan of the underground church ordained him and gave him the name Ioann.⁹¹ In December 1990 Ioann convinced another bishop to raise him to the episcopate, so that he could take his place at the head of a new Orthodox jurisdiction, the Russian Autocephalous Orthodox Church,

which was soon renamed the Church of the Mother of God. About the same time, in April 1991, Ioann registered the Mother of God Center as a philanthropic and educational organization; despite the church's many subsequent name changes, Orthodox heresiologists continue to call the movement by that name.

Sharply critical of the Moscow Patriarchate, the new church initially preached an apocalyptic message of imminent divine judgment: in these last days Mary had appeared to deliver a third and final testament, calling on the world to fast, pray, and repent. Ioann presented himself as the latest Marian seer, the successor to the Roman Catholic apparitions of Lourdes, Fatima, and Medjugorje, Bosnia, all of which he accepted as authentic.⁹² Ioann had a global vision; his movement would unite Eastern and Western Christianity under the Virgin's banner. He reached out to devotees of Mary around the world, adopted Catholic practices such as praying the rosary, and in 1995 organized a world congress of Marian visionaries in Moscow.⁹³ Between 1991 and 1998 the church held eighteen councils, with attendance that ranged from three hundred to four thousand.⁹⁴

Faced with the requirements of the 1997 law, however, the church increasingly emphasized its traditional Russian roots, its connection to the True Orthodox Church, and its spiritual link to the Romanov dynasty. It adopted a new name: the Orthodox Church of the Sovereign Mother of God, a reference to the miracle-working "Sovereign" icon of the Theotokos, which a peasant visionary had mysteriously discovered on the very day that Tsar Nicholas II abdicated in 1917. Now housed in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior (the seat of the patriarch of Moscow), the icon depicts Mary with the symbols of sovereignty: a scepter in her right hand and an orb in her left. In 1997 the Moscow Patriarchate commissioned numerous copies of the holy image to celebrate the eightieth anniversary of its appearance.⁹⁵

By incorporating the icon into the name of his religious organization, Ioann emphasized his connection to the Romanov dynasty and to the persecuted True Orthodox Church. Without abandoning his claim to be part of an international Marian movement, Ioann linked his church to the suffering church in the Gulag, and in particular to Emperor Nicholas II's brother, Grand Duke Mikhail Aleksandrovich Romanov (1878–1918). Although Mikhail was killed by the Bolsheviks in 1918, some monarchists (including Ioann) insist that he miraculously escaped execution, took on the identity of the peasant Mikhail Pozdeev, and became the monk Serafim, who was then secretly consecrated a bishop by Patriarch Tikhon. As the successor to the legitimate patriarch, Serafim was the true spiritual leader of the underground church, spending his life pursued by atheistic persecutors.⁹⁶ Al-

Table 5: Registered Religious Organizations of the Orthodox Church of the Sovereign Mother of God, 1994–2013

Year (as of 1 January)	Centers or Centralized Religious Organizations	Local Religious Organizations	Monasteries	TOTAL
1994	-	3	-	3
1995	-	3	-	3
1996	-	4	-	4
1997	1	8	-	9
1998	1	15	-	16
1999	1	17	-	18
2000	1	19	-	20
2001	1	26	1	28
2002	1	28	1	30
2003	1	27	1	29
2004	1	26	-	27
2005	1	25	-	26
2006	1	26	-	27
2007	1	24	-	25
2008	1	22	-	23
2009	-	21	-	21
2010	1	19	-	20
2011	1	19	-	20
2012	1	18	-	19
2013	1	18	-	19
2014	1	18	-	19

though he did not invent this monarchist myth, Ioann adopted and popularized it in his many books and pamphlets that celebrated Serafim as the Victor of the Gulag and as Serafim Solovetskii.⁹⁷

Even as he criticized the Soviet past, Ioann cultivated government officials, and in 2002 he declared that the Russian president was under the Virgin Mary's special protection.⁹⁸ Despite such overtures, Putin and his United Russia Party have proven unsympathetic to Ioann and his church. By 2002 the OCSMG had successfully registered thirty religious organizations, but at least fifty congregations remained unregistered; in subsequent years Russian officials have liquidated several congregations, so that by 2012 the church had only eighteen registered parishes (Table 5).⁹⁹ Moreover, as a matter of public policy, Putin has increasingly allied himself with the Moscow Patriarchate, which had long targeted Ioann and the OCSMG as a "totalitarian destructive cult."¹⁰⁰



FIGURE 8.3. The headquarters of the Orthodox Church of the Sovereign Mother of God. Photograph © J. Eugene Clay.

In the year running up to the 2007 parliamentary elections, United Russia (Putin's party) portrayed itself as the defender of traditional Russian religious values against dangerous sectarians. In December 2006, when the OCSMG organized an exposition titled "Solovki—the Second Golgotha" in a storefront in the provincial town of Lipetsk, the Federal Security Service (FSB) shut it down and arrested several church members for allegedly causing "psychological harm" to seventeen high school students who had visited the exhibit. Significantly, the high school teacher who denounced the exhibit was a member of the United Russia Party. News reports emphasized that while local officials had ignored her concerns, the party responded quickly and effectively to protect the children from a "destructive cult." Ioann and his movement found themselves on the defensive in the national news over the next several months, even though none of the outlandish charges were ever proven.¹⁰¹

Extralegal pressure also created a hostile atmosphere for the church during the Putin era. A group of thugs who claimed to represent an Orthodox brotherhood attacked Ioann's Center for Russian Spirituality in Moscow

in 2005, and the church chronicled a series of similar disturbing incidents.¹⁰² Defamed in his own country, Ioann began making longer and longer pilgrimages abroad. In May 2014 an OCSMG priest in Moscow complained of “silent persecution” (*neglasnoe presledovanie*); although the church continues to publish its books, maintain its headquarters, and operate its website, it no longer has access to the large venues, such as the Dinamo Stadium, that it had used for its councils in the 1990s.¹⁰³

In the post-1997 religious market the OCSMG has survived, but it has not thrived for two major reasons. First, by claiming to be the True Orthodox Church, the OCSMG positioned itself as a rival to the powerful Moscow Patriarchate, the most important traditional religion in post-Soviet Russia. Second, because it is led by a charismatic virtuoso who is constantly receiving new divine revelations, the OCSMG challenges the conception of religion that undergirds Russian religious policy. The OCSMG is not the property of an ethnic group but an expression and outgrowth of Ioann’s individual spiritual vision, which has changed radically over the last three decades. Today Ioann embraces Cathar dualism, rejects the Creator-God of Christianity as a mere demiurge, and promotes the veneration of a Buddhist maternal deity—not traditional Orthodox views by any measure.¹⁰⁴ The effort of the OCSMG to style itself as “traditional” has clearly failed.

The 1997 law (and the new laws, policies, and legal interpretations that followed it) transformed the religious marketplace. In the face of these new legal requirements the minority religious movements examined in this chapter sought legal registration for their communities, engaged in institution building, emphasized their traditional character, and made a case for their historical connection and loyalty to the Russian motherland. In every case these religious entrepreneurs have found creative ways to survive in the new regulatory environment. Even the OCSMG, the least successful of the four movements, still has nineteen registered organizations in Russia and continues to promote, publish, and sell the visionary works of its founder. All the other religions are larger and stronger than they were when the law was passed.

Certainly, the 1997 law placed limits on religious freedom, but the worst fears of its critics were not realized. Within three years of the law’s adoption the Constitutional Court significantly liberalized its application by grandfathering religious entities that had been registered before 1997.¹⁰⁵ The absolute numbers and variety of religious associations continue to increase: since 1997 the number of registered religious organizations has practically doubled (Table 1). From an economic perspective the law has not created

insuperable obstacles to the spiritual entrepreneurs who create religious entities. Religion, even minority religion, remains a growing business in the Russian marketplace.

At the same time, the law revealed three significant tensions in Russia's religious market that complicate its regulation: first, the tension between Russia's constitutional guarantee of religious equality and its commitment to promoting traditional religion; second, the tension between the right of an ethnicity to preserve its collective religious heritage and the right of an individual to pursue a personal spiritual vision; and third, the tension between Russian policymakers' efforts to protect the domestic religious market and the ongoing globalization of that market. The law and its subsequent interpretations have not created a unified, coherent religious policy with a definite goal; it has instead created a religious field with multiple polarities that preachers and politicians (the producers of religious goods and their regulators) must negotiate.¹⁰⁶

The framers of the 1997 law committed themselves to promote traditional religion in a multiconfessional state. In so doing, they made the term "traditional" contested territory. The Constitutional Court soon diluted the one concrete definition of "traditional" offered in the law: fifteen years of continuous legal existence in the province where registration was sought. In its stead, drawing on the vaguer, more subjective definition in the preamble, religious entrepreneurs contended that their religion had contributed to the history and culture of the peoples of Russia. Pandito Khambo Lama Damba Aiusheev, as the successor to the Buddhist ecclesiastical structures of tsarist Russia and the USSR and the guardian of Itigelov's body, successfully claimed that his form of Buddhism was traditional, but so did Ole Nydahl, who garnered crucial support from the Kalmyk president. To bolster their legitimacy, Presbyterians uncovered and promoted the history of Russian Protestantism and trumpeted their traditional family values, defended by the Russian president against the assaults of American apostates. Even a religious virtuoso like Father Ioann, who continually received new and surprising revelations, affirmed the traditional nature of his church, the true successor to the Apostle Andrew and the Orthodoxy of Kievan Rus'.

Russian policy clearly favors the view that religion is an expression of ethnic groups rather than a personal spiritual vision. The charismatic Father Ioann, who celebrates spontaneity and is highly critical of religious authority and ecclesiastical institutions, has been poorly served by the 1997 law; over the last ten years he has seen local authorities liquidate one OCSMG parish after another. To preserve their legal existence, Presbyterians have had to set aside parts of their theological vision and find common ground

with Pentecostals or other sympathetic Protestants. However, the maturation of the religious market raises questions about this relationship between religion and ethnicity. If Ole Nydahl attracts ethnic Russians rather than Buriats to Buddhism, is his movement still traditional? If Korean Russians continue to embrace Protestant Christianity, should Protestantism be regarded as a traditional religion of a people of Russia?

Russian policymakers also must contend with the global nature of religion in the twenty-first century. International religious networks are important for all the religious movements analyzed in this chapter, as they are for the whole of Russia, which has become increasingly integrated into a global legal system. Aiusheev, who is wary of Tibetan teachers, nevertheless honors the Dalai Lama; Presbyterians who criticize American sexual values still welcome TBN. Without his international contacts Nydahl would probably not have been able to win Iliumzhinov's support for his version of Karma Kagyu Buddhism. Likewise, by participating in the European Court of Human Rights, Russia recognizes the authority of this international body.

However, in 2016 the Russian government used counterterrorism measures to sharply restrict religious liberty. In March Deputy Prosecutor General Viktor Grin' issued a formal finding that the entire denomination of Jehovah's Witnesses was an extremist organization, because it believes itself to be the only true church. In this unprecedented action Grin' sought to have the courts liquidate a centralized religious organization, as well as all its daughter congregations. Despite the Witnesses' protests, the judiciary has consistently sided with the Ministry of Justice; on 20 April 2017 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation ruled against the Witnesses, ordered them to immediately cease their activities, and approved state expropriation of all the denomination's property. The Witnesses lost their final appeal in Russian courts in July and promised to take their case to the European Court of Human Rights.¹⁰⁷

The Iarovaia counterterrorism laws, adopted in July 2016, helped buttress the case against the Witnesses. The law prohibits missionary activity in residential areas and bans "extremist" groups from engaging in proselytizing at all. Registered religious organizations can conduct mission work on the property that they own or rent, but unregistered religious groups cannot legally own or rent property.¹⁰⁸

These newest efforts to regulate religion may have the unintended consequence of weakening, rather than strengthening, the "traditional" religions of Russia. In their seminal 1993 article Roger Finke and Laurence Iannaccone argued that excessive regulation stifles religious innovation; religious institutions prosper when they have free access to the religious market-

place.¹⁰⁹ Having abandoned the free-market approach of the 1990 law, Russian legislators seem intent on restricting religious liberty in the interest of security. However, the dynamic tensions in the Russian religious field ensure that these policies will continue to change—and that savvy spiritual entrepreneurs will find ways to bring their religious goods to interested consumers.



1. INTRODUCTION

1. Sergius [Sergei] Bulgakov, *Unfading Light: Contemplations and Speculations*, trans. and ed. Thomas Allan Smith (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012), 7. For a Russian edition, see S. N. Bulgakov, *Svet nevechernii: Sozertsaniia i umozreniia* (Moscow: Respublika, 1994).

2. For Bulgakov the possibility of experience of the transcendent in immanent reality was a deep mystery.

3. James wrote that the life of religion “consists of the belief that there is an unseen order, and that our supreme good lies in harmoniously adjusting ourselves thereto.” See William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature* (New York: Penguin, 1985), 53. Bulgakov refers to James (*Unfading Light*, 26).

4. Of course, Bulgakov did not think that such truths and ideals were merely subjective ones. Inner (or a priori) truths can be objective, like those of mathematics, for example. He held that the “truths of faith” are authenticated by the Church and the community of the faithful, but that ultimately they must be freely and inwardly recognized by persons—persons whose process of discerning and recognizing truth is formed/informed by church community and tradition. I am grateful to Dr. Gary Boelhower for his insights on this point.

5. Émile Durkheim’s *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse* was published in 1912. The modern English edition is Émile Durkheim, *Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, trans. and ed. Karen E. Fields (New York: Free Press, 1995). Rudolf Otto’s *Das Heilige: Über das Irrationale in der Idee des Göttlichen und sein Verhältnis zum Rationalen* was published in 1917. The English edition is Rudolf Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, trans. John W. Harvey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1923). Bulgakov discusses their predecessor in the study of religious experience or feeling, Friedrich Schleiermacher (*Unfading Light*, 39–44, 46–47). He remarks: “It may appear unexpected if we place Kant along side of Schleiermacher in a ‘theology of feeling.’ Yet, as far apart as they might be in theoretical philosophy, in their understanding of the nature of faith they converge. If Schleiermacher acknowledges feeling as the domain of religion in general, Kant considers for that domain *moral* feeling, which is the organ of *faith*” (46). Bulgakov’s observation has direct bearing on my effort in this essay to relate Russian religious experience to the Russian (and Kantian) neo-idealist defense of freedom of conscience.

6. Major works in English, focusing on the imperial period, include Brenda Meehan, *Holy Women of Russia: The Lives of Five Orthodox Women Offer Spiritual Guidance for Today* (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1997 [1993]); Nadieszda Kizenko, *A Prodigal Saint: Father John of Kronstadt and the Russian People*

(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000); Christine D. Worobec, *Possessed: Women, Witches, and Demons in Imperial Russia* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2003); Mark D. Steinberg, *Proletarian Imagination: Self, Modernity, and the Sacred in Russia, 1910–1925* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002); Chris J. Chulos, *Converging Worlds: Religion and Community in Peasant Russia, 1861–1917* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2003); Valerie A. Kivelson and Robert H. Greene, eds., *Orthodox Russia: Belief and Practice under the Tsars*, (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003); Vera Shevzov, *Russian Orthodoxy on the Eve of Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Page Herrlinger, *Working Souls: Russian Orthodoxy and Factory Labor in St. Petersburg, 1881–1917* (Bloomington, IN: Slavica Publishers, 2007); Steinberg and Heather J. Coleman, eds., *Sacred Stories: Religion and Spirituality in Modern Russia* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), which includes chapters on non-Orthodox Christian, Jewish, and Muslim religions; Jennifer Hedda, *His Kingdom Come: Orthodox Pastorship and Social Activism in Revolutionary Russia* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2008); Laurie Manchester, *Holy Fathers, Secular Sons: Clergy, Intelligentsia, and the Modern Self in Revolutionary Russia* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2008); Irina Paert, *Spiritual Elders: Charisma and Tradition in Russian Orthodoxy* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2010); Robert H. Greene, *Bodies Like Bright Stars: Saints and Relics in Orthodox Russia* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2010); Scott M. Kenworthy, *The Heart of Russia: Trinity-Sergius, Monasticism, and Society after 1825* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); and Patrick Lally Michelson and Judith Deutsch Kornblatt, eds., *Thinking Orthodox in Modern Russia: Culture, History, Context* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014). Catherine Evtuhov, *The Cross and the Sickle: Sergei Bulgakov and the Fate of Russian Religious Philosophy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), is attentive to how Bulgakov's own religious experiences helped form his religious thought. For good syntheses, see Simon Dixon, "The Russian Orthodox Church in Imperial Russia, 1721–1917," and Chris Chulos, "Russian Piety and Culture from Peter the Great to 1917," both in *The Cambridge History of Christianity*, vol. 5: *Eastern Christianity*, ed. Michael Angold (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 325–70; and Gregory L. Freeze, "Russian Orthodoxy: Church, People, and Politics in Imperial Russia," in *The Cambridge History of Russia*, vol. 2: *Imperial Russia, 1689–1917*, ed. Dominic Lieven (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). See also the following review essays in *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*: Gregory L. Freeze, "Recent Scholarship on Russian Orthodoxy: A Critique," 2, no. 2 (2001): 269–78; Christine D. Worobec, "Lived Orthodoxy in Imperial Russia," 7, no. 2 (2006): 329–50; Paul W. Werth, "Lived Orthodoxy and Confessional Diversity: The Last Decade on Religion in Modern Russia," 12, no. 4 (2011): 849–65; and William G. Wagner, "Religion in Modern Russia: Revival and Survival," 15, no. 1 (2014): 151–68.

7. Heather J. Coleman, *Russian Baptists and Spiritual Revolution, 1905–1929* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005).

8. R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956), 282–302.

9. Steinberg and Coleman, *Sacred Stories*, 15.

10. Essentially, “ideal self-determination” is Kant’s concept. He distinguishes between negative and positive aspects of free will, the first being the capacity for choice and thus basic freedom from external determination, the second being autonomy or self-determination. See *Critique of Practical Reason* and *The Metaphysics of Morals*, both in Immanuel Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor, intro. Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 166, 373–82. In *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Moral*, Kant wrote that autonomy is “the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature” (*Practical Philosophy*, 85). Terry Pinkard has written of the Kantian revolution in philosophy: “Overthrowing the old metaphysics, it inserted a new idea into the vocabulary in terms of which modern Germans and Europeans spoke about their lives: self-determination. After Kant, nothing would be the same again” (*German Philosophy, 1760–1860: The Legacy of Idealism* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002], 15).

11. Paul Valliere, “Theological Liberalism and Church Reform in Imperial Russia,” in *Church, Nation, and State in Russia and Ukraine*, ed. Geoffrey A. Hosking (London: Macmillan, 1991), 108. Here his case studies of Russian theological liberalism are Boris Chicherin (1828–1904) and Mikhail Tareev (1866–1934).

12. Paul Valliere, “The Liberal Tradition in Russian Orthodox Theology,” in *The Legacy of St. Vladimir: Byzantium, Russia, America*, ed. John Breck, John Meyendorff, and E. Silk (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1990), 98–99.

13. In John Plamenatz’s reliable judgment, the concept of freedom of conscience had “fully emerged” by the end of the seventeenth century. See his excellent essay “Liberty of Conscience,” in Plamenatz, *Man and Society: A Critical Examination of Some Important Social and Political Theories from Machiavelli to Marx*, 2 vols. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), 1:67.

14. The history of this idea has been written numerous times, including very well by Perez Zagorin, *How the Idea of Religious Toleration Came to the West* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003). Zagorin traces the development of the concept of freedom of conscience in the writings of such figures as Roger Williams, whose book *The Bloody Tenent of Persecution* (1644) anticipates and goes deeper than John Locke’s *A Letter concerning Toleration* (1689); the Quaker William Penn, whose book *The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience* appeared in 1670; Spinoza, whose *Tractatus theologico-politicus* was published the same year in Amsterdam; and finally Pierre Bayle, whose *Commentaire philosophique* was published three years before Locke’s *Letter* and emphasized that an erring but sincere conscience deserves the same re-

spect as one in possession of the truth. All these thinkers justified toleration in liberal terms of its good for the individual, not merely in cameralist terms of a political expedient necessary for civil peace and the well-ordered society or *Polizeistaat*. For them toleration was very close in meaning to freedom of conscience. For example, both Bayle and Locke spoke of toleration “without distinguishing it from liberty of conscience,” according to Zagorin (*How the Idea of Religious Toleration*, 287). Locke’s formulation of freedom of conscience is justly famous: “the care of each man’s salvation belongs only to himself” and rests on genuine faith, which can only be a matter of inward conviction, not external compulsion. See John Locke, *A Letter concerning Toleration* (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1990), 57, 19–20.

15. K. K. Arsenëv, *Svoboda sovesti i veroterpimost’: Sbornik statei* (St. Petersburg: Obshchestvennaia pol’za, 1905), 21, 22, 24). A comparable work, also highly valuable, is Sergei P. Mel’gunov, *Tserkov’ i gosudarstvo v Rossii (K voprosu o svobode sovesti): Sbornik statei*, 2 vols. (Moscow: I. D. Sytin, 1907, 1909).

16. As Robert P. Geraci and Michael Khodarkovsky write, toleration “was not based on any notion of civil or human rights.” See their introduction to *Of Religion and Empire: Missions, Conversion, and Tolerance in Tsarist Russia*, ed. Geraci and Khodarkovsky (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 7.

17. Peter Waldron, “Religious Toleration in Late Imperial Russia,” in *Civil Rights in Imperial Russia*, ed. Olga Crisp and Linda Edmundson (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), 103–19, quotation on 109. See also Waldron, “Religious Reform after 1905: Old Believers and the Orthodox Church,” *Oxford Slavonic Papers* 20 (1987): 110–39; here he details the failure of the government’s legislative proposals, introduced in 1906–1907, to make the transition from toleration to freedom of conscience and thus to fulfill the promise made in the Manifesto of 17 October 1905.

18. Laura Engelstein, “The Dream of Civil Society in Tsarist Russia: Law, State, and Religion,” in *Civil Society before Democracy: Lessons from Nineteenth-Century Europe*, ed. Nancy Bermeo and Philip Nord (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 32, repr. in Engelstein, *Slavophile Empire: Imperial Russia’s Illiberal Path* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), 78–98. She examines Russian religious policy in relation to the skoptsy in Engelstein, *Castration and the Heavenly Kingdom: A Russian Folktale* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), esp. 45–56.

19. M. A. Reisner, “Moral’ pravo i religiiia po deistvuiushchemu russkomu zakonu,” pts. 1–4, *Vestnik prava*, no. 3 (1900): 1–18; no. 4–5 (1900): 1–49; no. 8 (1900): 1–34; no. 10 (1900): 1–46, as quoted by Engelstein, “Dream of Civil Society,” 34–35. I am grateful to Engelstein for providing me with a copy of Reisner’s essay, which is reprinted in his *Gosudarstvo i veruiushchaia lichnost’: Sbornik statei* (St. Petersburg: Obshchestvennaia pol’za, 1905), 141–267. Reisner’s intellectual and political evolution was dramatic: he later became a Bolshevik and deputy commissar of justice. In 1928, the last year of his life, he remarked that the easiest way to deal with the idle

intelligentsia (idle from the perspective of cultural revolution) might be to put them in “concentration camps.” See Michael David-Fox, *Revolution of the Mind: Higher Learning among the Bolsheviks, 1918–1929* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 107.

20. Robert D. Crews, “Empire and the Confessional State: Islam and Religious Politics in Nineteenth-Century Russia,” *American Historical Review* 108, no. 1 (2003): 66. Mikhail Dolbilov, *Russkii krai, chuzhaia vera: Etnoreligioznaia politika imperii v Litve i Belorusii pri Aleksandre II* (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2010) also emphasizes the *Polizeistaat* nature of the regime’s religious policy, which Dolbilov understands in terms of its “disciplining” and “discrediting” of the empire’s religions.

21. Robert D. Crews, *For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 9–10, 30.

22. Aleksandr Safonov, “The Right to Freedom of Conscience and of Confession in Late Imperial Russian Public Discourse (The View of a Legal Historian),” *Russian Studies in History* 51, no. 3 (2012–2013): 20–55; for the overview of Russian religious policy, see 22–29. Safonov is the author of *Svoboda sovesti i modernizatsiia veroisповедного zakonadatel’stva Rossiiskoi Imperii v nachale XX veka* (Tambov: Pershin, 2007). His book was preceded by two other notable works on freedom of conscience in Russia: Diliara Usmanova, *Musul’manskaia fraktsiia i problemy “svobody sovesti” v Gosudarstvennoi Dume Rossii, 1906–1917* (Kazan: Master Lain, 1999); and Aleksandra Dorskaia, *Svoboda sovesti v Rossii: Sud’ba zakonoproektov nachala XX veka* (St. Petersburg: Izdatel’stvo RGPU imeni A. I. Gertsena, 2001). These three books, following Waldron, deal with the fate of the legislative program to enact freedom of conscience into law after the October Manifesto. See also Paul W. Werth, “Arbiters of the Free Conscience: Confessional Categorization and Religious Transfer in Russia, 1905–1917,” in *Rebounding Identities: The Politics of Identity in Russia and Ukraine*, ed. Dominique Arel and Blair A. Ruble (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006), 181–207; and especially Werth, *The Tsar’s Foreign Faiths: Toleration and the Fate of Religious Freedom in Imperial Russia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), chap. 8, “Freedom of Conscience as Legislative Project.”

23. Safonov, “Right to Freedom of Conscience,” 33.

24. Safonov defines the confessional state as one “that enlists the powers available to it to support a particular religious belief system and asserts the latter’s monopoly position and perquisites, while arranging the other confessions hierarchically and limiting their rights according to the priorities of national policy and the significance of the nations and nationalities professing the given faith” (“Right to Freedom of Conscience,” 53n42).

25. Safronov, “Right to Freedom of Conscience,” 50.

26. Werth, *Tsar’s Foreign Faiths*, 5.

27. For my further remarks about Hamburg’s chapter, see Poole, “Religious Tol-

eration, Freedom of Conscience, and Russian Liberalism,” *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 13, no. 3 (2012): 617–19.

28. For my further remarks about Frede’s chapter, see Poole, “Religious Toleration,” 623–24.

29. Aleksandr Polunov also refers to Stead’s statement (“Poniatie svoboda sovesti i veroterpimost’ v obshchestvenno-politicheskom diskurse Rossii kontsa XIX–nachale XX veka,” in “Poniatiiia o Rossii”: *K istoricheskoi semantike imperskogo perioda*, ed. Aleksei Miller, Denis Sdvizhkov, and Ingrid Shirle [Schierle] [Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2012], 1:563n7). Polunov concentrates on K. P. Pobedonostsev’s understanding of toleration as Russian religious freedom, contrasting it to the views of Stead, M. A. Reisner, K. K. Arsen’ev, and others.

30. Werth, *Tsar’s Foreign Faiths*, 8.

31. John Strickland, *The Making of Holy Russia: The Orthodox Church and Russian Nationalism before the Revolution* (Jordanville, NY: Holy Trinity Publications, 2013).

32. See also John Witte Jr. and Michael Bourdeaux, eds., *Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia: The New War for Souls* (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2009 [1999]); and Zoe Knox, *Russian Society and the Orthodox Church: Religion in Russia after Communism* (New York: Routledge, 2005).

33. Perhaps the most widely cited history of the Russian Church in this period is Igor Smolitsch, *Geschichte der russischen Kirche 1700–1917* (Leiden: Brill, 1964). There are now Russian translations, including vol. 8 in the new and expanded edition of Makarii (Bulgakov), *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 10 vols. (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Spaso-Preobrazhenskogo Valaamskogo monastyria, 1994–1997). A useful handbook, with an extensive bibliography of works in Russian, as well as sources and documents, is V. A. Fedorov, *Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ i gosudarstvo: Sinodal’nyi period, 1700–1917* (Moscow: Russkaia panorama, 2003). In English, see Dimitry Pospelovsky, *The Orthodox Church in Russian History* (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1998).

34. Article 64 of the 1906 Fundamental Laws, as quoted by Marc Szeftel, “Church and State in Imperial Russia,” in *Russian Orthodoxy under the Old Regime*, ed. Robert L. Nichols and Theofanis George Stavrou (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1978), 131. According to Szeftel, the rule was formulated in 1721 and made part of the Fundamental Laws in 1832. The classic study of Peter’s ecclesiastical reform is P. V. Verkhovskoi, *Uchrezhdenie Dukhovnoi kollegii i dukhovnyi reglament*, 2 vols. (Farnborough: Gregg, 1972 [1916]). See also James Cracraft, *The Church Reform of Peter the Great* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1971); and V. M. Zhivov, *Iz tserkovnoi istorii vremen Petra Velikogo: Issledovaniia i materialy* (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2004).

35. Alexander V. Muller, ed. and trans., *The Spiritual Regulation of Peter the Great* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), 13–15, 29. An abridged version of the

Russian text of the *reglament* and its supplement can be found in Fedorov, *Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov' i gosudarstvo*, 310–47.

36. Shevzov, *Russian Orthodoxy*, 20.

37. Gregory L. Freeze, *The Russian Levites* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977).

38. Muller, *Spiritual Regulation of Peter the Great*, 60–61.

39. Kenworthy, *Heart of Russia*, 15–18; Gregory L. Freeze, “Russian Orthodoxy,” 290.

40. David W. Edwards, “The System of Nicholas I in Church-State Relations,” in *Russian Orthodoxy under the Old Regime*, 154–69; Robert F. Byrnes, *Pobedonostsev: His Life and Thought* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968), esp. 165–209, 238–315; A. Iu. Polunov, *Pod vlast'iu ober-prokurora: Gosudarstvo i tserkov' v epokhu Aleksandra III* (Moscow: AIRO-XX, 1996); Polunov, K. P. *Pobedonostsev v obshchestvenno-politicheskoi i dukhovnoi zhizni Rossii* (Moscow: Rosspen, 2010).

41. Quoted by Gregory L. Freeze, *The Parish Clergy in Nineteenth-Century Russia: Crisis, Reform, Counter-Reform* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 450.

42. Victoria Frede, *Doubt, Atheism, and the Nineteenth-Century Russian Intelligentsia* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011). She shows how doubt and atheism could be a liberating, self-affirming response to the autocracy's efforts to use religion to control its subjects. Frede pinpoints the actual articulation of atheism to 1849 among the merchants.

43. The classic study is Nicolas Zernov, *The Russian Religious Renaissance of the Twentieth Century* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963).

44. See the title of the first section of chap. 7 in Werth, *Tsar's Foreign Faiths*.

45. Georges Florovsky, “The Reawakening of Russian Monasticism,” in his *Ways of Russian Theology (Part One)*, trans. Robert L. Nichols (Belmont, MA: Büchervertriebsanstalt/Notable and Academic Books, 1979), 156–61. Florovsky writes of “an unmistakable intensification and increase of spiritual life” by the end of the eighteenth century (156). For another concise and characteristically insightful account of the revival of hesychasm and monasticism, see James H. Billington, *The Icon and the Axe: An Interpretive History of Russian Culture* (New York: Vintage, 1970), 200–205.

46. Timothy Ware, *The Orthodox Church* (New York: Penguin, 1993), 62–70.

47. For a concise overview, see Paul Valliere, “Introduction to the Modern Orthodox Tradition,” in *The Teachings of Modern Christianity on Law, Politics, and Human Nature*, ed. John Witte Jr. and Frank S. Alexander, 2 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 1:507–12. He organizes his account around the philokalic and philosophical streams in modern Orthodoxy. The *Philokalia* is available in English: *The Philokalia: The Complete Text*, trans. and ed. G. E. H. Palmer, Philip Sherrard, and Kallistos Ware, 4 vols. (London: Faber and Faber, 1979–95). For a valuable collection

of scholarly articles, see Brock Bingaman and Bradley Nassif, eds., *The Philokalia: A Classic Text of Orthodox Spirituality* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

48. See *The Life of Paisij Velyckov'skyj*, trans. J. M. E. Featherstone (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989); and Sergii Chetverikov, *Moldavskii starets Paisii Velichkovskii: Ego zhizn', uchenie, i vliianie na pravoslavnoe monashevstvo* (Paris: YMCA Press, 1938, 1976).

49. Paert, *Spiritual Elders*, 31–40.

50. Muller, *The Spiritual Regulation of Peter the Great*, 80.

51. Robert L. Nichols, “The Orthodox Elders (*Startsy*) of Imperial Russia,” *Modern Greek Studies Yearbook* 1 (1985): 1–30; G. M. Zapal'skii, *Optina pustyn' i ee vospitanniki v 1825–1917 godakh* (Moscow: Rukopisnye pamiatniki drevnei Rusi, 2009); Sergii Chetverikov, *Optina Pustyn': Istoricheskii ocherk i lichnye vospominaniia* (Paris: YMCA Press, 1926).

52. Robert L. Nichols, “Orthodox Spirituality in Imperial Russia: Saint Serafim of Sarov and the Awakening of Orthodoxy,” *Modern Greek Studies Yearbook* 16/17 (2000–2001): 19–42; Natal'ia Chugreeva, ed., *Prepodobnyi Serafim Sarovskii: Agiografiia, pochitanie, ikonografiia* (Moscow: Indrik, 2004).

53. Paert, *Spiritual Elders*, chap. 3, quotation on 85.

54. Freeze, “Russian Orthodoxy,” 291; Igor Smolitsch, *Leben und Lehre der Starzen*, 2nd ed. (Cologne: J. Hegner, 1952), which is now available in Russian translation; Nickolas Lupinin, “The Tradition of Elders (*Startsy*) in Nineteenth-Century Russia,” in *Tapestry of Russian Christianity: Studies in History and Culture*, ed. Lupinin, Donald Ostrowski, and Jennifer B. Spock (Columbus: Department of Slavic and East European Languages and Cultures and the Resource Center for Medieval Slavic Studies, The Ohio State University, 2016), 327–52.

55. John B. Dunlop, *Staretz Amvrosy: Model for Dostoevsky's Staretz Zossima* (Belmont, MA: Nordland, 1972). Dostoevskii and Vladimir Solov'ev made the pilgrimage together.

56. On Kireevskii and his religious development, see Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, *Russia and the West in the Teaching of the Slavophiles: A Study of Romantic Ideology* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1952); Eberhard Müller, *Russischer Intellekt in europäischer Krise: Ivan V. Kireevskij (1806–1856)* (Cologne: Böhlau, 1966); Peter K. Christoff, *An Introduction to Nineteenth-Century Russian Slavophilism: A Study in Ideas*, 4 vols. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991 [1961]), vol. 2 (*I. V. Kireevskii*), esp. 75, 78–80, 125–30, 143–204; Abbott Gleason, *European and Muscovite: Ivan Kireevsky and the Origins of Slavophilism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), 137–53, 236–94; Andrzej Walicki, *The Slavophile Controversy: History of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth-Century Russian Thought*, trans. Hilda Andrews-Rusiecka (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975), chap. 4; Laura Engelstein, “Orthodox Self-Reflection in a Modernizing Age: The Case of Ivan and Natal'ia Kireevskii,” in her *Slavophile Em-*

pire, 125–50; K. M. Antonov, *Filosofia I. V. Kireevskogo: Antropologicheskii aspekt* (Moscow: Pravoslavnyi Sviato-Tikhonovskii gumanitarnyi universitet, 2006); and M. M. Panfilov, ed., *Ivan Kireevskii: Dukhovnyi put' v russkoi mysli XIX–XXI vv. (K 200-letiiu so dnia rozhdeniia)*, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Rossiiskaia gosudarstvennaia biblioteka, 2007).

57. V. V. Zenkovsky, *A History of Russian Philosophy*, trans. George L. Kline, 2 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953), 1:213.

58. The twenty-seven letters that Kireevskii wrote to Makarii between 1846 and 1855 testify to his deep faith and dedication to Orthodoxy. All but one can be found in Chetverikov, *Optina Pustyn'*, 107–57.

59. Engelstein, “Orthodox Self-Reflection in a Modernizing Age,” 138.

60. Robert F. Slesinski, “Believing Thought as a Category in Russian Religious Philosophy,” *Communio* 26 (Fall 1999): 571–82.

61. As Kireevskii put it in his most influential essay, “On the Necessity and Possibility of New Principles in Philosophy,” published just after his death in 1856. It is translated in James M. Edie et al., eds., *Russian Philosophy*, 3 vols. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1976 [1965]), 1:171–213; and in Boris Jakim and Robert Bird, trans. and eds., *On Spiritual Unity: A Slavophile Reader* (Hudson, NY: Lindisfarne Books, 1998), 240.

62. Nikolai Berdiaev, *Aleksei Stepanovich Khomiakov* (Moscow: Put', 1912), 115. Selections from this book are translated in Jakim and Bird, *On Spiritual Unity*, 326–50.

63. Khomiakov, *Quelques mots par un chrétien orthodoxe sur les communions occidentales, à l'occasion d'une brochure de M. Laurentie* (Paris : C. Meyreuis, 1853), excerpts from which are translated in Jakim and Bird, *On Spiritual Unity*, 57–62; Kireevskii, “On the Necessity and Possibility of New Principles in Philosophy,” 236.

64. Berdiaev, *Aleksei Stepanovich Khomiakov*, 109; Jakim and Bird, *On Spiritual Unity*, 334.

65. Studies of Khomiakov include the massive V. Z. Zavitnevich, *Aleksei Stepanovich Khomiakov*, 2 vols. (Kiev: Petr Barskii, 1913 [1902]); Berdiaev, *Aleksei Stepanovich Khomiakov*; Albert Gratieux, *A. S. Khomiakov et le mouvement Slavophile*, 2 vols. (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1939); Riasanovsky, *Russia and the West*; Christoff, *Introduction to Nineteenth-Century Russian Slavophilism*, vol. 1; Walicki, *Slavophile Controversy*, chap. 5; Viacheslav Koshelev, *Aleksei Stepanovich Khomiakov: Zhizneopisanie v dokumentakh, v rassuzhdeniiakh i razyskaniiaxh* (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2000); and Vladimir Tsurikov, ed., *A. S. Khomiakov: Poet, Philosopher, Theologian* (Jordanville, NY: Holy Trinity Seminary Press, 2004).

66. Samarin did so in his famous introduction to the first edition of Khomiakov's theological writings, published in Prague in 1867 (“Introduction to the Theological Writings of Aleksei Khomiakov,” in *On Spiritual Unity*, 161–83). The Holy Synod

did not approve the publication of Khomiakov's works until 1879 (Walicki, *Slavophile Controversy*, 199). Berdiaev, in *Aleksei Stepanovich Khomiakov*, also stressed the experiential character of Khomiakov's religious thought, as did Georges Florovsky and Sergey Horujy [Khoruzhii] in Florovsky, *Ways of Russian Theology (Part Two)*, trans. Robert L. Nichols (Belmont, MA: Büchervertriebsanstalt/Notable and Academic Books, 1987), 38–53; Sergey Horujy, "Slavophiles, Westernizers, and the Birth of Russian Philosophical Humanism," in *A History of Russian Philosophy, 1830–1930: Faith, Reason, and the Defense of Human Dignity*, ed. G. M. Hamburg and Randall A. Poole (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 45–48; S. S. Khoruzhii, "Khomiakov i printsip sobornosti," in Khoruzhii, *Posle pereryva: Puti russkoi filosofii* (St. Petersburg: Aleteia, 1994), 17–31; and Khoruzhii, "Bogoslovie sobornosti i bogoslovie lichnosti: Simfoniia dvukh putei pravoslavnogo bogomudriia," in A. S. *Khomiakov: Poet, Philosopher, Theologian*, 38–65. Laura Engelstein states that Khoruzhii understands *sobornost'* "not as an abstract idea susceptible to systematic elaboration, but as a formulation expressing the lived experience of Eastern Orthodoxy in its Russian form" ("Holy Russia in Modern Times: An Essay on Orthodoxy and Cultural Change," *Past and Present*, no. 173 [2001]: 146).

67. See Khomiakov's famous essay, "The Church Is One," written in 1846 but first published in 1864. There is an excellent translation by Robert Bird in *On Spiritual Unity*, 29–53.

68. Khoruzhii, "Khomiakov i printsip sobornosti," 20–21.

69. Samarin, "Introduction to the Theological Writings," 165, 167, 168.

70. According to Leonard Schapiro, the Slavophiles did not use the language of natural rights, "but it is not very far off from what they believed." See his *Rationalism and Nationalism in Russian Nineteenth-Century Political Thought* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), 71–72. From the 1850s to the 1880s Konstantin Aksakov (1817–1860) and his younger brother Ivan (1823–1886), although they were not liberals (Ivan was a pan-Slavist), forcefully championed freedom of conscience and church autonomy. See Poole, "Religious Toleration," 620.

71. Kenworthy, *Heart of Russia*, 3, 6. On the monastic revival, see also Kenworthy, "Monasticism in Modern Russia," in *Monasticism in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Republics*, ed. Ines Angeli Murzaku (London: Routledge, 2016), 265–84; Fedorov, *Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov' i gosudarstvo*, chap. 3; P. N. Zyrianov, *Russkie monastyri i monashestvo v XIX i nachale XX veka* (Moscow: Verbum, 2002); and N. V. Sinitsyna, ed., *Monashestvo i monastyri v Rossii, XI–XX veka: Istoricheski ocherki* (Moscow: Nauka, 2005). Igor Smolitsch, *Russisches Mönchtum: Entstehung, Entwicklung und Wesen, 988–1917* (Würzburg: Augustins-Verlag, 1953) is now available in Russian translation.

72. Kenworthy, *Heart of Russia*, 2–3; William G. Wagner, "Paradoxes of Piety: The Nizhegorod Convent of the Exaltation of the Cross, 1807–1935," in *Orthodox Russia*,

211–38, tables on 236–38; Wagner, “The Transformation of Female Orthodox Monasticism in Nizhnii Novgorod Diocese, 1764–1929, in Comparative Perspective,” *Journal of Modern History* 78, no. 4 (2006): 793–845; Wagner, “Fashioning Ideals of Monasticism and Womanhood: The Nizhnii Novgorod Convent of the Exaltation of the Cross, 1802–1857,” in *Everyday Life in Russian History: Quotidian Studies in Honor of Daniel Kaiser*, ed. Gary Marker et al. (Bloomington, IN: Slavica Publishers, 2010), 85–102.

73. Brenda Meehan, “The Authority of Holiness: Women Ascetics and Spiritual Elders in Nineteenth-Century Russia,” in *Church, Nation, and State in Russia and Ukraine*, 38–51; Meehan, *Holy Women of Russia*; O. V. Kirichenko, *Zhenskoe pravoslavnoe podvizhnichestvo v Rossii (XIX–seredina XX v.)* (Moscow: Sviato-Aleksievskaia pustyn', 2010).

74. Kenworthy, *Heart of Russia*, 5, chaps. 1–5.

75. See Kenworthy, *Heart of Russia*, 110, for one statement of this thesis.

76. Such as Father John of Kronstadt (1829–1908), whose personal charisma, liturgical celebration, charity and ministry to the poor, and healing abilities made him a saint. Kronstadt became one of the leading pilgrimage sites in Russia. See Kizenko, *Prodigal Saint*. One of the merits of Kizenko's study is the detailed attention it gives to the religious experiences of Father John's people (especially women).

77. Sergei Bulgakov, “Heroism and Asceticism: Reflections on the Religious Nature of the Russian Intelligentsia,” in *Vekhi/Landmarks: A Collection of Articles about the Russian Intelligentsia*, trans. and ed. Marshall S. Shatz and Judith E. Zimmerman (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), 17–49.

78. Kenworthy, *Heart of Russia*, 109–10.

79. Kenworthy, *Heart of Russia*, chap. 5; Chulos, *Converging Worlds*, chap. 5; Greene, *Bodies Like Bright Stars*, chap. 3; Roy R. Robson, *Solovki: The Story of Russia Told through Its Most Remarkable Islands* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), chap. 13; Robson, “Pilgrimage at Solovki in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,” *Les cahiers slaves* 7 (2004): 281–302; Robson, “Transforming Solovki: Pilgrim Narratives, Modernization, and Late Imperial Monastic Life,” in *Sacred Stories*, 44–60; Christine D. Worobec, “The Long Road to Kiev: Nineteenth-Century Orthodox Pilgrimages,” *Modern Greek Studies Yearbook* 30–31 (2014–2015): 1–22.

80. Kenworthy refers to Ivan Shmelev's *Pilgrimage* (1931), a fictionalized account of the author's own first pilgrimage to the Trinity–St. Sergius Lavra: “In Shmelev's portrayal, the characters experience a sense of liminality during the pilgrimage. . . . Everything on the road, even the road itself, is somehow touched with a sense of holiness that sets it apart from the ordinary” (*Heart of Russia*, 190).

81. Kenworthy, *Heart of Russia*, 177.

82. Shevzov, *Russian Orthodoxy*, 236.

83. In addition to the work of Kenworthy and Shevzov highlighted here, see especially Greene, *Bodies Like Bright Stars*.

84. Shevzov, *Russian Orthodoxy*, 194. See also Shevzov, “Icons, Miracles, and the Ecclesial Identity of Laity in Late Imperial Russia,” *Church History* 69 (2000): 610–31.

85. A. I. Gertsen, *Byloe i dumy*, 2 vols. (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1987), 1:390 (ellipsis in original).

86. Shevzov, “The Struggle for the Sacred,” in *Thinking Orthodox in Modern Russia*, 140, 143.

87. Shevzov, “Struggle for the Sacred,” 140, quoting I. Nikolin, “O sverkhlestvennom otkrovennii,” *Dushepoleznoe chtenie*, pt. 2 (1902): 63.

88. Similarly, the laity’s desire to control its ecclesial life was expressed through its construction of chapels, which were dedicated to various holy places, objects, and events significant in the lives of the faithful. See Shevzov, *Russian Orthodoxy*, chap. 3. Chris Chulos’s observation is relevant here: “the ascetic and eremitic traditions of the faith, which emphasized independent piety, resonated with the peasantry, and challenged the institutional authority of the church” (*Converging Worlds*, 27). See also Gregory L. Freeze, “Institutionalizing Piety: The Church and Popular Religion, 1750–1850,” in *Imperial Russia: New Histories for the Empire*, ed. Jane Burbank and David L. Ransel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 210–49.

89. Shevzov, *Russian Orthodoxy*, 199, 209.

90. Worobec, “Lived Orthodoxy in Imperial Russia,” 344.

91. Shevzov, *Russian Orthodoxy*, 233, 235–36, 261.

92. On women’s religious communities, see Brenda Meehan, “To Save Oneself: Russian Peasant Women and the Development of Women’s Religious Communities in Pre-Revolutionary Russia,” in *Russian Peasant Women*, ed. Beatrice Farnsworth and Lynne Viola (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 121–33; and Meehan, “Popular Piety, Local Initiative, and the Founding of Women’s Religious Communities in Russia, 1764–1907,” in *Seeking God: The Recovery of Religious Identity in Orthodox Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia*, ed. S. K. Batalden (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1993), 83–105. O. V. Bukova, *Zhenskie obiteli prepodobnogo Serafima Sarovskogo: Istoriia desiati nizhegorodskikh monastyrei* (Nizhnii Novgorod: Knigi, 2003), is a study of women’s religious communities founded on the initiative or under the influence of St. Serafim of Sarov.

93. Brenda Meehan, “From Contemplative Practice to Charitable Activity: Russian Women’s Communities and the Development of Charitable Work, 1861–1917,” in *Lady Bountiful Revisited: Women, Philanthropy and Power*, ed. Kathleen D. McCarthy (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1990), 142–56.

94. William G. Wagner, “‘Orthodox Domesticity’: Creating a Social Role for Women,” in *Sacred Stories*, 119–45.

95. A. V. Govorov, *Zhenskii vopros v sviazi s istoricheskimi sud’bami zhenshchiny* (Kazan: Tsentral’naia tipografiia, 1907–1908), as cited by Wagner, “‘Orthodox Domesticity.’”

96. Wagner, “Orthodox Domesticity,” 125, 126, 128–29.

97. Wagner, “Orthodox Domesticity,” 136–37. His citation is E. Liuleva, *Svobodaia zhenshchina i khristianstvo* (Moscow, 1906).

98. The Russian is *dukhovnaia akademiia*, literally “spiritual academy” or “clerical academy” (the Russian word for clergy is *dukhovnost'*). The literature includes B. V. Titlinov, *Dukhovnaia shkola v Rossii v XIX stoletii*, 2 vols. (Farnborough: Gregg, 1970 [1908–1909]); Maria Koehler-Bauer, *Die Geistlichen Akademien in Russland im 19. Jahrhundert* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1997); V. A. Tarasova, *Vysshaia dukhovnaia shkola v Rossii v kontse XIX–nachale XX veka: Istoriia imperatorskikh pravoslavnykh dukhovnykh akademii* (Moscow: Novyi khronograf, 2005); N. Iu. Sukhova, *Vysshaia dukhovnaia shkola: Problemy i reformy (vtoraia polovina XIX veka)* (Moscow: PST-GU, 2006); and Hyacinthe Destivelle, *Les sciences théologiques en Russie: Réforme et renouveau des académies ecclésiastiques au début du XXe siècle* (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2010).

99. For concise accounts of the reform, see Florovsky, *Ways of Russian Theology (Part 1)*, 175–81; and Fedorov, *Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov' i gosudarstvo*, 93–104.

100. Robert L. Nichols, “Orthodoxy and Russia’s Enlightenment, 1762–1825,” in *Russian Orthodoxy under the Old Regime*, 84–85. On Filaret, see Vladimir Tsurikov, ed., *Philaret, Metropolitan of Moscow, 1782–1867: Perspectives on the Man, His Works, and His Times* (Jordanville, NY: Variable Press, 2003). Sean Gillen, “V. D. Kudriavtsev-Platonov and the Making of Russian Orthodox Theism,” in *Thinking Orthodox in Modern Russia*, 111–25, highlights one of the fruits of Filaret’s efforts: Kudriavtsev-Platonov’s philosophical defense of theism in the Moscow Theological Academy. This defense relied heavily on Kant, so much so that Gillen remarks, “Kudriavtsev’s intellectual career can be seen as a profound engagement with Kant” (112).

101. Florovsky, *Ways of Russian Theology (Part 1)*, 220.

102. Florovsky, *Ways of Russian Theology (Part 1)*, 222–23, 227.

103. Valliere, “Theological Liberalism and Church Reform,” 125–28, referring to M. M. Tareev, *Osnovy khristianstva: Sistema religioznoi mysli*, 4 vols. (Sergiev Posad, 1908), 4: *Khristianskaia svoboda*. Kudriavtsev-Platonov (1828–1891) can be regarded as another theological liberal at the Moscow Theological Academy. Theological liberalism was not the only product of the academies. Simon Dixon argues that by the 1880s the search, which began with Filaret, for an authentic Russian Orthodoxy “had crystallized into a sharply confessionalized sense of *tserkovnost'* (church-mindedness) derived from research at the theological academies of Moscow, Kiev, St. Petersburg and Kazan” (“Russian Orthodox Church in Imperial Russia,” 332).

104. Florovsky, *Ways of Russian Theology (Part 1)*, 230–32.

105. Patrick Michelson has established the project’s importance in his “In the Image and Likeness of God: The Patristic Tradition of Human Dignity and Freedom in Nineteenth-Century Russia,” chapter 1 of “‘The First and Most Sacred Right’: Re-

ligious Freedom and the Liberation of the Russian Nation, 1825–1905” (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin, Madison, 2007).

106. Michelson, “First and Most Sacred Right,” 41–44, 54.

107. Michelson, “First and Most Sacred Right,” 59–73.

108. Michelson, “First and Most Sacred Right,” 73–92, in a section titled “Moral Deification and the Neo-Patristic Foundations of Human Dignity and Freedom in Late Imperial Russia.”

109. Michelson, “First and Most Sacred Right,” 80–81, quoting Archpriest Pavel F. Soliarskii, *Nravstvennoe pravoslavnoe bogoslovie*, 2nd ed. (St. Petersburg: M. M. Stasiulevich, 1875), 19–20.

110. Michelson, “First and Most Sacred Right,” 79, 84, 90–93; he also makes the link to liberalism on 35 and to freedom of conscience on 52.

111. Gregory L. Freeze, “Handmaiden of the State? The Church in Imperial Russia Considered,” *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 36, no. 1 (1985): 99–100; see also Freeze, “Russian Orthodoxy,” 292, 295.

112. I. S. Belliustin, *Description of the Clergy in Rural Russia: The Memoir of a Nineteenth-Century Parish Priest*, trans. and ed. Gregory L. Freeze (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985). On the “Belliustin affair,” see also Freeze, *Parish Clergy*, 210–12 (quotation on 210).

113. Quoted in Freeze, *Parish Clergy*, 240.

114. Werth, *Tsar’s Foreign Faiths*, 132–38; Paul W. Werth, “The Emergence of ‘Freedom of Conscience’ in Imperial Russia,” *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 13, no. 3 (2012): 594–99.

115. Chicherin, “Contemporary Tasks of Russian Life,” in *Liberty, Equality, and the Market: Essays by B. N. Chicherin*, ed. and trans. G. M. Hamburg (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 134–35. This essay was written in the summer of 1855. Curiously, Chicherin also writes here, “The legal code itself recognizes this principle, and it proclaims freedom of conscience as the fundamental right of all citizens in the Russian empire.” In the imperial period Russian law never acknowledged freedom of conscience, not even after the Manifesto of 17 October 1905. There were other instances when freedom of conscience was referred to, mistakenly, as a right already recognized by Russian law. Werth cites two of them: by the head of the Caucasus administration in 1871 and by the Committee of Ministers in early 1905 (“Emergence of ‘Freedom of Conscience,’” 594, 606).

116. G. M. Hamburg, *Boris Chicherin and Early Russian Liberalism, 1828–1866* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), chap. 4, esp. 107–17, 141–42.

117. Freeze, *Parish Clergy*, 346, 354.

118. Freeze, *Parish Clergy*, 394.

119. Simon Dixon, “The Church’s Social Role in St. Petersburg, 1880–1914,” in *Church, Nation and State in Russia and Ukraine*, 167–92; Dixon, “Church, State,

and Society in Late Imperial Russia: The Diocese of St. Petersburg, 1880–1914 (PhD diss., School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London, 1993); Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*; Daniel Scarborough, “The White Priest at Work: Orthodox Pastoral Activism and the Public Sphere in Late Imperial Russia” (PhD diss., Georgetown University, 2012); Scarborough, “Faith without Works Is Dead: Sacred Space and Civil Society in Late Imperial Moscow and Tver,” *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 63, no. 2 (2015): 207–32; Scott Kenworthy, “An Orthodox Social Gospel in Late-Imperial Russia,” *Religion and Society in Central and Eastern Europe* 1 (May 2006): 1–29, a valuable review essay.

120. One of the main prerevolutionary historians of the Russian parish was A. A. Papkov. His works include *Upadok pravoslavnogo prikhoda (XVIII–XIX veka): Istoricheskaia spravka* (Moscow: V. Chicherin, 1899); *Nachalo vozrozhdeniia tserkovno-prikhodskoi zhizni v Rossii* (Moscow: V. Chicherin, 1900); *Tserkovno-obshchestvennye voprosy v epokhu Tsaria-Osvoboditelia (1855–1870)* (Farnborough: Gregg, 1972 [1902]); and *O blagoustroistve pravoslavnogo prikhoda* (St. Petersburg: Sinodal'naia tipografiia, 1907). For more about him, see Shevzov, *Russian Orthodoxy*, 35–40.

121. Adele Lindenmeyr, *Poverty Is Not a Vice: Charity, Society, and the State in Imperial Russia* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 129–36.

122. Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*, 10.

123. Lindenmeyr, *Poverty Is Not a Vice*, 135; S. G. Runkevich, *Prikhodskaiia blagotvoritel'nost' v Peterburge: K voprosu o prikhode* (St. Petersburg, 1914).

124. Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*, 85.

125. Shevzov, *Russian Orthodoxy*, 25–26, quoting contemporary sources; Lindenmeyr, *Poverty Is Not a Vice*, 132–35; Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*, 56–58.

126. The major study is Kizenko, *Prodigal Saint*.

127. Kizenko, *Prodigal Saint*, 80–82, 233–60, quotation on 81.

128. For Father John's rejection of freedom of conscience and a statement of his anthropological grounds for it, see Werth, “Emergence of ‘Freedom of Conscience,’” 608.

129. Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*, 35–51.

130. Quoted by Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*, 40. On the academies after the statute, see also Fedorov, *Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov' i gosudarstvo*, 113–15, and Heather J. Coleman, “Theology on the Ground: Dmitrii Bogoliubov, the Orthodox Anti-Sectarian Mission, and the Russian Soul,” in *Thinking Orthodox in Modern Russia*, 71–72.

131. There is a nice sketch of Bishop Antonii in James W. Cunningham, *A Vanquished Hope: The Movement for Church Renewal in Russia, 1905–1906* (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1981), 52–59. According to Cunningham, “No other nineteenth-century prelate, with the exception of Filaret Drozdov (1782–1867), metropolitan of Moscow, enjoyed such influence and esteem” (56). The main source

on him is Antonii (Vadkovskii), *Rechi, slova, i poucheniia*, 3rd ed. (St. Petersburg: Sinodal'naia tipografiia, 1912).

132. Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*, 47–49.

133. Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*, 46–51; Dixon, “Church’s Social Role in St. Petersburg,” 173–74. Among the founders of the ORRP was Father Ioann L. Ianyshv (1826–1910), the rector of the St. Petersburg Theological Academy from 1866 to 1883. On Ianyshv’s role as rector, see Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*, 35–40.

134. Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*, 86–99, gives detailed consideration to the ORRP, and its mission to the working class is central to Page Herrlinger, *Working Souls: Russian Orthodoxy and Factory Labor in St. Petersburg, 1881–1917* (Bloomington, IN: Slavica Publishers, 2007). The main sources for the ORRP are *Otchet o deiatel'nosti Obshchestva rasprostraneniia religiozno-nravstvennogo prosveshcheniia v dukhe pravoslavnoi tserkvi za [1881–1912]* (St. Petersburg: ORRP, 1882–1913) and its weekly journal, *S. Peterburgskii dukhovnyi vestnik* (1895–1901).

135. Radstock visited St. Petersburg in 1875 and again between 1877 and 1880 and found a warm welcome there. See Edmund Heier, *Religious Schism in the Russian Aristocracy: Radstockism and Pashkovism* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970). One of Radstock’s Russian followers was Fedor Terner, a minor state official. In 1876, speaking before the Society of Lovers of Spiritual Enlightenment, he proposed the legal recognition of freedom of conscience and criticized the Synodal system as violating Orthodox teaching, going back to the Byzantine period, on church-state relations, according to which the ideal of “harmony” (the Greek *symphonia*) should govern such relations, not subordination of church to state. His speech caused something of a sensation and was widely reported in the press. Terner published his ideas: F. G. Terner, “Svoboda sovesti i otnosheniia gosudarstva k tserkvi,” in *Sbornik gosudarstvennykh znaniia*, ed. V. P. Bezobrazov, 8 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1874–1880), 3:1–57. See Basil, *Church and State in Imperial Russia*, 75; and Werth, *Tsar’s Foreign Faiths*, 194.

136. Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*, 87–91, 96–105 (quotation on 87).

137. Herrlinger, *Working Souls*, chap. 1.

138. Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*, 48–51.

139. In addition to her book, see K. Page Herrlinger, “The Religious Landscape of Revolutionary St. Petersburg, 1905–1918,” *Journal of Urban History* 37, no. 6 (2011): 842–57; see also Simon Dixon, “The Orthodox Church and the Workers of St. Petersburg,” in *European Religion in the Age of Great Cities, 1830–1930*, ed. Hugh McLeod (London: Routledge, 1995), 119–41; and Kenworthy, “Orthodox Social Gospel,” 15–17.

140. Mark D. Steinberg, “A Path of Thorns’: The Spiritual Wounds and Wandering of Worker-Poets,” in *Sacred Stories*, 306; Steinberg, *Proletarian Imagination: Self, Modernity, and the Sacred in Russia, 1910–1925* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002).

141. Herrlinger, “Religious Landscape of Revolutionary St. Petersburg,” 850. She bases her conclusion on her study of the spiritual lives and religious experiences of St. Petersburg workers in *Working Souls* (the index entry for “freedom of conscience” refers to cases of workers who recognized this right through their own experience).

142. Kenworthy, “Orthodox Social Gospel,” 6.

143. Kenworthy, “Orthodox Social Gospel,” 3.

144. Hedda frames her book partly in response to the question, “Did the social gospel movement have any influence in Russia, or was there any parallel in the Russian Orthodox Church stimulated by similar developments?” (*His Kingdom Come*, 5). Paul Valliere made the comparison to the American Social Gospel in his early article, “Modes of Social Action in Russian Orthodoxy: The Case of Father Petrov’s *Zateinik*,” *Russian History/Histoire russe* 4, no. 2 (1977): 142–58.

145. Gregory L. Freeze, “Die Laisierung des Archimandriten Feodor (Bukharev) und ihre kirchenpolitischen Hintergründe: Theologie und Politik im Russland der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts,” *Kirchen im Osten: Studien zur osteuropäischen Kirchengeschichte und Kirchenkunde* 28 (1985): 26–52.

146. On Bukharev, see Paul Valliere’s classic work on the liberal theological tradition in Russia, *Modern Russian Theology: Bukharev, Soloviev, Bulgakov. Orthodox Theology in a New Key* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000), part 1. *On Orthodoxy in Relation to the Modern World* was reprinted early in the twentieth century: Arkhimandrit Feodor (A. M. Bukharev), *O pravoslavii v otnoshenii k sovremennosti* (St. Petersburg: Sinodal’naia tipografiia, 1906), as cited in Valliere, *Modern Russian Theology*, 35. On Bukharev, see also Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*, 54–58.

147. A. S. Bukhareva, “Aleksandr Matveevich Bukharev (Arkhimandrit Feodor): Iz materialov dlia biografii,” *Svobodnaia sovest’: Literaturno-filosofskii sbornik*, bk. 1 (Moscow: I. D. Sytin, 1906), 1–20. The chapter was written by Bukharev’s widow, née Anna Sergeevna Rodyshevskaiia. The unidentified editor/compiler of the volume makes the point that Bukharev’s fate, which turned on his refusal to compromise his conscience, represented “profound social interest” in the circumstances of Russia in 1905–1906 (1–2n). Bukharev himself said that his decision to leave the clergy in 1863 was motivated by his desire not to betray his conscience, which was no longer possible while remaining under monastic vows and ecclesiastical authority (Valliere, *Modern Russian Theology*, 73). The *Svobodnaia sovest’* volume also includes, among others, a chapter by Boris Vysheslavtsev on B. N. Chicherin and a chapter by Sergei Kotliarevskii, “Svoboda sovesti.” Further, the volume contains G. A. Rachinskii’s translation of Vladimir Solov’ev’s “Troichnoe nachalo i ego obshchestvennoe prilozhenie,” the third part of Solov’ev’s *La Russie et l’Église universelle* (1889), which was not included in his collected works. Chicherin, Solov’ev, and Kotliarevskii were important figures in the Russian neo-idealist defense of freedom of conscience. It is very likely that the volume’s editor/compiler was P. Astrov, the author of the last two chapters,

“Pravda marksizma” and “Na puti k svobode sovesti,” both of which are notable and make clear Astrov’s admiration for Solov’ev. No doubt this was Pavel Ivanovich Astrov, who was a judge on the Moscow District Court and an organizer of a Moscow religious-literary circle. According to Zernov, he was “a man of integrity and a convinced member of the Church.” A member of the Russian Orthodox Church council (*sobor*), he was executed by the Bolsheviks in 1918. See Zernov, *Russian Religious Renaissance*, 107. For his role on the church council, see James W. Cunningham, *The Gates of Hell: The Great Sobor of the Russian Orthodox Church, 1917–1918* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Modern Greek Studies Program, 2002).

148. Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*, 64–72, quotation on 68.

149. P. Ia. Svetlov, *Ideia Tsarstva Bozhiia v ee znacheniiia dlia khristianskogo mirosozertsaniia: Bogoslovsko-apologeticheskoe issledovanie* (Sergiev Posad: Sviato-Troitskaia Sergieva Lavra, 1905).

150. For a classic account of Solov’ev as a philosopher of Russian liberalism, see Andrzej Walicki, *Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), chap. 3.

151. Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*, chap. 6; Kenworthy, “Orthodox Social Gospel,” 17–19.

152. G. S. Petrov, *Evangeliie kak osnova zhizni*, 2nd ed. (St. Petersburg: Tipografia “Artilleriiskogo Zhurnala,” 1898). It went through seventeen editions by 1905. For summary and analysis, see Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*, 108–11; and Valliere, “Modes of Social Action,” 142–58.

153. Petrov, *Evangeliie kak osnova zhizni*, 8, 81, as quoted in Valliere, “Modes of Social Action,” 147.

154. Dixon, “Russian Orthodox Church in Imperial Russia,” 343.

155. Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*, 122, 244n74.

156. Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*, 123–25, 244n79.

157. In addition to Zernov, *Russian Religious Renaissance*, see Billington, *Icon and the Axe*, 464–518; Gleb Struve, “The Cultural Renaissance,” in *Russia under the Last Tsar*, ed. Theofanis George Stavrou (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969), 179–201; Georges Florovsky, “On the Eve,” in *Ways of Russian Theology (Part Two)*, 233–83; Christopher Read, *Religion, Revolution, and the Russian Intelligentsia, 1900–1912: The Vekhi Debate and Its Intellectual Background* (London: Macmillan, 1979); Ruth Coates, “Religious Renaissance in the Silver Age,” in *A History of Russian Thought*, ed. William Leatherbarrow and Derek Offord (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 169–93; Hamburg and Poole, *History of Russian Philosophy, 1830–1930*, parts 2–4; and P. P. Gaidenko, *Vladimir Solov’ev i filosofiiia Serebriianogo veka* (Moscow: Progress-Traditsiia, 2001).

158. The “revolt against populism” was a Europe-wide movement characteristic of fin-de-siècle culture. See H. Stuart Hughes, *Consciousness and Society: The Reori-*

entation of *European Social Thought, 1890–1930*, rev. ed. (New York: Vintage, 1977).

159. The term “God-seeking” was probably coined in response to Maksim Gor’kii’s “God-building.” See George L. Kline, *Religious and Anti-Religious Thought in Russia* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 102–27.

160. For Solov’ev’s views on the subordination of church to state in Russian history, see his series of articles published from 1881 to 1883 in Ivan Aksakov’s *Rus’*: “O dukhovnoi vlasti v Rossii,” “O tserkvi i raskole,” and “Velikii spor i khristianskaia politika.” An edition with useful editorial matter is V. S. Solov’ev, *Sochineniia*, 2 vols., vol. 1: *Filosofskaia publitsistika* (Moscow: Pravda, 1989). For summary and analysis, see E. N. Trubetskoi, *Mirosozertsanie Vl. S. Solov’eva*, 2 vols. (Moscow: Put’, 1913), 1:437–48; A. F. Losev, *Vladimir Solov’ev i ego vremia* (Moscow: Progress, 1990), 342–47; Konstantin Mochul’skii, *Vladimir Solov’ev: Zhizn’ i uchenie* (Paris: YMCA Press, 1951), 134–44; and Dimitri Strémooukhoff, *Vladimir Soloviev and His Messianic Work*, trans. Elizabeth Meyendorff (Belmont, MA: Nordland, 1979), 141–46, 187–88. An important essay for Solov’ev’s views on religious intolerance is *Evreistvo i khristianskii vopros* (Jewry and the Christian Question, 1884), in *Sobranie sochinenii Vladimira Sergeevicha Solov’eva*, ed. S. M. Solov’ev and E. L. Radlov, 2nd ed., 10 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1911–1914), 4:135–85.

161. Inessa Medzhibovskaya, *Tolstoy and the Religious Culture of His Time: A Biography of a Long Conversion, 1845–1887* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008), 250. This work is the focus of my review essay, “Russia’s First Modern Man: Tolstoy, Kant, and Russian Religious Thought,” *Tolstoy Studies Journal* 22 (2010): 99–117.

162. Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*, 92. Five years earlier Lopukhin published a book on the topic (*Religiia v Amerike* [St. Petersburg: S. Dobrodeev, 1882]). According to Werth, who cites the book, Lopukhin did not argue that freedom of conscience was absolute but rather that it was dependent on historical circumstances. In this connection Werth also refers to Fr. Ioann Ianyshv, who in 1876 remarked, “Conscience cannot be free because it represents the consciousness of [one’s] dependence on an internal moral law” (*Tsar’s Foreign Faiths*, 193). Ianyshv’s statement is an example of the semantic difficulties associated with “freedom of conscience”: as I indicated above, the *term* might seem to suggest a relativistic notion of morality and conscience, but the *concept* holds that the ideals of conscience (including truth and the moral law) must be freely recognized from within in order to have the power of self-determination. The concept does not imply moral relativism (as Ianyshv and other Russian ecclesiastical critics thought).

163. Michelson reviews some of these historical arguments (“First and Most Sacred Right,” 236–44, 254–70). The prominent Russian liberals Petr Struve and Pavel Novgorodtsev made these arguments, as did their colleague Sergei Kotliarevskii, on whom see my articles: “Sergei Kotliarevskii and the Rule of Law in Russian Liberal Theory,” *Dialogue and Universalism* 16, no. 1–2 (2006): 81–104; and “William James

in the Moscow Psychological Society: Pragmatism, Pluralism, Personalism,” in *William James in Russian Culture*, ed. Joan Delaney Grossman and Ruth S. Rischin (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003), 131–58.

164. Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*, 95.

165. Gregory L. Freeze, “Going to the Intelligentsia’: The Church and Its Urban Mission in Post-Reform Russia,” in *Between Tsar and People: Educated Society and the Quest for Public Identity in Late Imperial Russia*, ed. Edith W. Clowes, Samuel D. Kasow, and James L. West (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 221–23.

166. The protocols of the meetings were first published in the journal *Novyi put’* and then collected in a separate volume: *Zapiski Peterburgskikh religiozno-filosofskikh sobranii (1902–1903 gg.)* (St. Petersburg, 1906), republished as S. M. Polovinkin, ed., *Zapiski Peterburgskikh religiozno-filosofskikh sobranii, 1901–1903* (Moscow: Respublika, 2005). Also see Jutta Scherrer, *Die Petersburger religiös-philosophischen Vereinigungen: Die Entwicklung des religiösen Selbstverständnisses ihrer Intelligencija-Mitglieder (1901–1907)* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1973).

167. James P. Scanlan, “The New Religious Consciousness: Merezhkovskii and Berdiaev,” *Canadian Slavic Studies* 4, no. 1 (1970): 17–35; Robert Bird, “Imagination and Ideology in the New Religious Consciousness,” in *History of Russian Philosophy, 1830–1930*, 266–84; Chris Alan Stroop, “Providential Empire: Russia’s Religious Intelligentsia and the First World War” (PhD diss., Stanford University, 2012); Stroop, “Nationalist War Commentary as Russian Religious Thought: The Religious Intelligentsia’s Politics of Providentialism,” *Russian Review* 72, no. 1 (2013): 94–115; M. A. Kolerov, *Ne mir, no mech: Russkaia religiozno-filosofskaia pechat’ ot ‘Problem idealizma’ do ‘Vekh’ 1902–1909* (St. Petersburg: Aleteia, 1996); Evgenii Gollerbach, *K nezrimomu gradu: Religiozno-filosofskaia gruppа “Put’” (1910–1919) v poiskakh novoi russkoi identichnosti* (St. Petersburg: Aleteia, 2000); A. V. Sobolev, “K istorii Religiozno-Filosofskogo Obshchestva pamiati Vladimira Solov’eva,” *Istoriko-filosofskii ezhegodnik ’92*, ed. N. V. Motroshilova (Moscow: Nauka, 1993), 102–14; Kristiane Burchardi, *Die Moskauer “Religiös-Philosophische Vladimir-Solovyov-Gesellschaft” (1905–1918)* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1998); *Vzyskuiushchie grada: Khronika chastnoi zhizni russkikh religioznykh filosofov v pis’makh i dnevnikakh*, ed. V. I. Keidan (Moscow: Iazyki russkoi kul’tury, 1997).

168. John D. Basil, *Church and State in Late Imperial Russia: Critics of the Synodal System of Church Government (1861–1914)* (Minneapolis: Minnesota Mediterranean and East European Monographs, 2005), 77–81, quotation on 77.

169. S. M. Volkonskii, “K kharakteristike obshchestvennykh mnenii po voprosu o svobody sovesti,” in *Zapiski Peterburgskikh religiozno-filosofskikh sobranii (1902–1903 gg.)* (St. Petersburg, 1906), 113–32.

170. Volkonskii, “K kharakteristike obshchestvennykh mnenii,” 121, 131–33.

171. V. M. Skvortsov, in *Zapiski Peterburgskikh religiozno-filosofskikh sobranii (1902–1903 gg.)*, 147.

172. Basil, *Church and State*, 79–81.

173. Bishop Sergei (Stragorodskii), in *Zapiski Peterburgskikh religiozno-filosofskikh sobranii (1902–1903 gg.)*, 163–64, 169; in this paragraph I have generally followed the exposition in Sergei Firsov, *Russkaia Tserkov' nakanune peremen (konets 1890-kh–1918 gg.)* (St. Petersburg: Kruglyi stol po religioznomu obrazovaniiu i diakonii, 2002), 115–17. There is also a good account in Safronov, “Right to Freedom of Conscience,” 36–40.

174. Basil, *Church and State*, 76–77; Werth, *Tsar's Foreign Faiths*, 194–95.

175. Randall A. Poole, ed. and trans., *Problems of Idealism: Essays in Russian Social Philosophy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003); M. A. Kolerov, ed., *Problemy idealizma: Sbornik statei* (Moscow: Tri Kvadrata, 2002), with introductory essays by Kolerov and N. S. Plotnikov.

176. On the Psychological Society, see the introductory essays in the English and Russian editions of *Problems of Idealism*.

177. Poole, *Problems of Idealism*, 83.

178. On this intellectual evolution, see Walicki, *Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism*, chap. 2, esp. 132–39, 155–64; Hamburg, *Boris Chicherin and Early Russian Liberalism*, 244–342; and Hamburg, “An Eccentric Vision: The Political Philosophy of B. N. Chicherin,” in *Liberty, Equality, and the Market*, 1–65, esp. 53–65.

179. B. N. Chicherin, *Nauka i religiia*, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Kushnerev, 1901), 132.

180. Chicherin, *Nauka i religiia*, 103–34 (“The Moral World”), esp. 103, 111–16, 119–20, 126.

181. Chicherin, *Nauka i religiia*, 231.

182. B. N. Chicherin, *Mistitsizm v nauke* (Moscow: Martynov, 1880), 62. Chicherin makes the distinction between external and inner liberty in several places, including the key first chapter (“Liberty”) of *Sobstvennost' i gosudarstvo*, 2 vols. (Moscow: Martynov, 1882–1883), translated in *Liberty, Equality, and the Market*, 353–79. Here Chicherin writes that “legal constraints upon freedom of conscience, once so common, are now rejected as violations of the most sacred rights of the individual” (373).

183. In *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785), Kant wrote that autonomy is “the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature” (*Practical Philosophy*, 85). Chicherin explicates Kant’s argument in a number of places: in an essay on Kant in his *Istoriia politicheskikh uchenii*, 5 vols. (Moscow, 1869–1902), 3:324–74, which contains a good exposition of the *Groundwork* (330–36); in *Nauka i religiia*, 113–14; and in his *Filosofia prava* (Moscow: Kushnerev, 1900), 170–77. (In the last two works he presents the main conclusions of the *Groundwork* as his own.) Autonomy is the very concept of freedom of conscience, which for Kant, as for his Russian followers, was the first foundation of liberalism. See Paul Guyer, “Kantian Foundations for Liberalism,” in his *Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 235–61. Freedom of conscience as

autonomy or self-determination is a “global concept” in Kant, but he also deals with it in the specific context of religion. See the concluding section (“Concerning the Guiding Thread of Conscience in Matters of Faith”) of *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* in Immanuel Kant, *Religion and Rational Theology*, trans. and ed. Allen W. Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 202–15.

184. Chicherin, *Filosofia prava*, 191–92. See also G. M. Hamburg, “Boris Chicherin and Human Dignity in History,” in *A History of Russian Philosophy, 1830–1930*, 111–30 (he quotes the last sentence on 125). In this essay Hamburg reconstructs Chicherin’s philosophy of history, showing how it achieved a powerful synthesis of Kant and Hegel.

185. Valliere, “Theological Liberalism and Church Reform,” 119–24.

186. This section draws on my essays: “Vladimir Solov’ev’s Philosophical Anthropology: Autonomy, Dignity, Perfectibility,” in *A History of Russian Philosophy, 1830–1930*, 131–49; and “Kant and the Kingdom of Ends in Russian Religious Thought (Vladimir Solov’ev),” in *Thinking Orthodox in Modern Russia*, 215–34.

187. In *Critique of Abstract Principles*, Solov’ev closely paraphrases and directly translates large parts of the *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*. See *Kritika otvlechennykh nachal*, in V. S. Solov’ev, *Sobranie sochinenii Vladimira Sergeevicha Solov’eva*, 2nd ed., ed. S. M. Solov’ev and E. L. Radlov, 10 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1911–1914), 2:44–62. In addition to these two chapters, he devotes three more, plus an appendix, to Kant’s ethics and conception of rational autonomy, drawing also on (paraphrasing and quoting at length) the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Critique of Practical Reason*. See Solov’ev, *Sobranie sochinenii*, 2:62–72, 89–116, 371–97.

188. Chicherin attributes this conception of human nature and the type of idealism that follows from it specifically to Kant. “There is not and cannot be any other foundation of inner freedom and morality,” he declared. See his essay on Kant in *Istoriia politicheskikh uchenii*, 3:339–40; and *Liberty, Equality, and the Market*, 360–63.

189. Solov’ev, “Istoricheskie dela filosofii” (1880), in *Sobranie sochinenii Vladimira Sergeevicha Solov’eva*, 2:410.

190. Solov’ev, *Kritika otvlechennykh nachal*, viii–ix. His combination of autonomy and theocracy confounded his fellow Russian idealists, beginning with Chicherin, who was an implacable critic of the younger philosopher. Chicherin wrote an entire book (*Mistitsizm v nauke*) against *Critique of Abstract Principles*, taking issue with “free theocracy” in particular, which he saw as plainly incompatible with freedom of conscience, Solov’ev’s assurances aside. In a long essay against *Justification of the Good* (1897), Chicherin compared Solov’ev to Torquemada. See Chicherin, “O nachalakh etiki,” *Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii*, 8, no. 4, bk. 39 (1897): 644–45; and Walicki, *Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism*, 188–89, 206–9. The most sophisticated and sensitive treatment of Solov’ev’s ideal of free theocracy can be found in Valliere, *Mod-*

ern Russian Theology, 127–37; and Paul Valliere, “Vladimir Soloviev (1853–1900),” in *Teachings of Modern Christianity*, 1:547–51.

191. The journal was the “flagship of Russian liberalism,” as Anton Fedyashin describes it in his study, *Liberals under Autocracy: Modernization and Civil Society in Russia, 1866–1904* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012), part 2. Konstantin Arsenëv was one of four liberal intellectuals who edited it (the others were Mikhail Stasiulevich, Aleksandr Pypin, and Leonid Slonimskii). In the journal’s April 1882 issue, Arsenëv published a “liberal program” that listed freedom of the press and freedom of conscience as liberalism’s primary demands (Fedyashin, *Liberals under Autocracy*, 149). In the course of nearly twenty-five years Arsenëv published many articles in *Vestnik Evropy* on religious freedom, which were collected in his important book *Freedom of Conscience and Toleration* (1905).

192. V. S. Solov’ev, *Natsional’nyi vopros v Rossii*, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg: M. M. Stasiulevich, 1888, 1891). Also Solov’ev, *Sobranie sochinenii*, 5:3–401; and Solov’ev, *Sochineniia*, 1: *Filosofskaia publitsistika*. For an excellent analysis of these and related writings, see Greg Gaut, “Can a Christian Be a Nationalist? Vladimir Solov’ev’s Critique of Nationalism,” *Slavic Review* 57, no. 1 (1998): 77–94.

193. Solov’ev, *Opravdanie dobra: Nравstvennaia filosofiia, Sobranie sochinenii*, 8:3–516. Conceived as a new edition of *Critique of Abstract Principles*, the project grew into a new book.

194. Vladimir Solovyov, *The Justification of the Good: An Essay on Moral Philosophy*, trans. Natalie A. Duddington, ed. and annotated Boris Jakim (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2005), 150. I have modified the translation in accordance with the Russian text.

195. Solovyov, *Justification of the Good*, 324–25. The philosopher himself adds here that one of the consequences of the necessary autonomy of virtue and truth is “the principle of unlimited religious tolerance.” In his conception of the autonomy of virtue, Solov’ev likely drew on Kant’s *Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Virtue*, the second part of *The Metaphysics of Morals*. See Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. and ed. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

196. Chicherin, *Filosofiia prava*, 55.

197. Solovyov, *Justification of the Good*, 145.

198. Solovyov, *Justification of the Good*, 176. According to Solov’ev, we become conscious of the “double infinity” through our moral-religious experience. The nature of religious experience (reverence) occupies Solov’ev in the second part of *Justification of the Good*. See Poole, “Vladimir Solov’ev’s Philosophical Anthropology,” 145–49. It is clear that Bulgakov’s understanding of the experiential basis of religion, with which I began the present essay, owes very much to Solov’ev.

199. P. Borisov [Struve], “V chem zhe istinnyi natsionalizm?” *Voprosy filosofii i*

psikhologii 12, no. 4, kn. 59 (1901): 493–528; reprinted in his collection *Na raznye temy* (St. Petersburg: A. E. Kolpinski, 1902), 526–55. For analysis, see Richard Pipes, *Struve: Liberal on the Left, 1870–1905* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), 300–307.

200. Borisov [Struve], “V chem zhe istinnyi natsionalizm?” 503, 504, 511, 520.

201. Borisov [Struve], “V chem zhe istinnyi natsionalizm?” 507, 512. Struve later reversed himself on nationalism. In his famous 1908 essay, “Great Russia,” he advanced a Darwinian conception of the state as a “special organism” that lived by its own supreme laws of existence (such as the striving for power) and was not subject to any higher law. See P. B. Struve, “Velikaia Rossiia: Iz razmyshlenii o probleme russkogo mogushchestva,” *Russkaia mysl'* 29 (January 1908): 143–57. For analysis, see Richard Pipes, *Struve: Liberal on the Right, 1905–1944* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 88–92.

202. Borisov [Struve], “V chem zhe istinnyi natsionalizm?” 505–8. Struve identifies his source: Novgorodtsev, whose course, “The History of the Philosophy of Law,” provides “an extraordinarily clear and elegant exposition of this important moment in the development of man’s legal consciousness.” Struve does not provide a specific citation for Novgorodtsev. In the fourth edition of his *Lektsii po istorii filosofii prava: Ucheniia novogo vremeni, XVI–XIX vv.* (Moscow: G. V. Vasil'ev, 1918), Novgorodtsev’s consideration of Williams is on 66–68. Both Novgorodtsev and Struve refer to a series of articles by M. M. Kovalevskii, “Rodonachal'niki angliiskogo radikalizma,” *Russkaia mysl'* (January–March 1892).

203. S. N. Bulgakov, *Ot marksizma k idealizmu: Sbornik statei (1896–1903)* (St. Petersburg: Obshchestvennaia pol'za, 1903).

204. Bulgakov’s essay, “Basic Problems of the Theory of Progress,” opens *Problems of Idealism*. In it he argues that the idea or category of the absolute is intrinsic to human consciousness but that it must be freely and candidly recognized. Otherwise, it will enter into thought as a type of “contraband,” resulting in various connotations and distortions of the relative and absolute. His case study is the positivist theory of progress.

205. Zernov, *Russian Religious Renaissance*, 293.

206. S. N. Bulgakov, *Avtobiograficheskie zametki*, ed. L. A. Zander (Paris, YMCA Press, 1946), 61–66; Zernov, *Russian Religious Renaissance*, 145–48; Evtuhov, *Cross and the Sickle*, 38–45. On the Zosimova Hermitage and German (Gomzin), see Kenworthy, *Heart of Russia*, 106–9, 238–53. According to Kenworthy, German revered the *starchestvo* tradition and was himself widely regarded as an elder (109).

207. Michelson, “First and Most Sacred Right,” analyzes the articles at some length (290–92, 321–31); I rely on his exposition. He provides the following citations: Ak. [Sergei Bulgakov], “Pis'ma iz Rossii, II: Samoderzhavie i pravoslavie,” *Osvobozhdenie*, no. 4 (2 August 1902): 59–60; no. 5 (19 August 1902): 72–73; and no. 6 (2

September 1902): 86–87; K. T-n. [Nikolai Berdiaev], “Politicheskii smysl religioznogo brozheniia v Rossii,” *Osvobozhdenie*, no. 13 (2 December 1903): 218–20; and no. 14 (25 December 1903): 242–45.

208. In March 1903, on the pages of *Osvobozhdenie*, Struve, referring specifically to Solov’ev and *Problems of Idealism*, wrote that the liberation movement should base its “self-consciousness and dignity” on the ideas and principles that idealism showed to be irrefutable. See P. B. Struve, “O chem dumaet odna kniga?,” *Osvobozhdenie*, no. 18 (2/15 March 1903): 311–12; and Catherine Evtuhov, *Cross and the Sickle*, 88. On the centrality of religious liberty, see Michelson, “First and Most Sacred Right,” 335–36.

209. Basil, *Church and State*, 74. “All but a handful of Russians” surely overstates the degree of popular support for freedom of conscience. Werth writes that freedom of conscience had achieved “broad currency” in early twentieth-century Russia (“Emergence of ‘Freedom of Conscience,’” 586). The extent of popular support for freedom of conscience would seem to be an important measure of how many Russian subjects had become aware of themselves as “citizens”—that is, as bearers and defenders of rights. I suggest (though it is virtually a tautology to do so) that freedom of conscience had wide support in civil society—the body of self-conscious citizens, a small but dynamic and growing part of the Russian population as a whole—but much less support outside it.

210. Cunningham, *Vanquished Hope*, 83–94; Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*, 126–52; and Herrlinger, *Working Souls*, 165–75, give much more attention to the religious context of Gapon’s movement than does Walter Sablinsky, *The Road to Bloody Sunday: Father Gapon and the St. Petersburg Massacre of 1905* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). Also see Kenworthy, “Orthodox Social Gospel,” 1–2, 19–24.

211. The petition prepared by Gapon for presentation to the emperor listed, in its first paragraph of “principal needs”: “1. The immediate release and return of those who suffered for their political and religious convictions. . . . 2. *An immediate* proclamation of freedom and inviolability of the person, freedom of speech, press, association, and worship. . . . 6. *Separation of the church from the state.*” The petition is included as an appendix to Sablinsky, *Road to Bloody Sunday*, 344–49.

212. Herrlinger, *Working Souls*, 200–201.

213. Werth, *Tsar’s Foreign Faiths*, 218.

214. Firsov, *Russkaia Tserkov’ nakanune peremen*, emphasizes this interpretation: “the question of freedom of conscience was connected with a solution to the question of church reforms and wholly depended on it” (352). Church reform has been extensively studied. For my overview, I drawn on Firsov; Cunningham, *Vanquished Hope* (which remains highly valuable); A. A. Bogolepov, “Church Reforms in Russia, 1905–1918,” *St. Vladimir’s Seminary Quarterly* 10, no. 1 (1966): 12–66; Werth, *Tsar’s Foreign Faiths*; Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*; Basil, *Church and State*; John Meyendorff,

“Russian Bishops and Church Reform in 1905,” in *Russian Orthodoxy under the Old Regime*, 170–82; and Paul Valliere, “The Idea of a Council in Russian Orthodoxy in 1905,” in *Russian Orthodoxy under the Old Regime*, 183–204. An important collection of documents (which remained beyond my reach) is I. V. Preobrazhenskii, ed., *Tserkovnaia reforma: Sbornik statei dukhuvnoi i svetskoï periodicheskoi pečati po voprosu o reforme* (St. Petersburg: E. Arnol’d, 1905).

215. Werth, *Tsar’s Foreign Faiths*, 202–3.

216. Cunningham, *Vanquished Hope*, 80.

217. Antonii’s memo, “Voprosy o zhelatel’nykh preobrazovaniiax v postanovke u nas pravoslavnoi tserkvi,” can be found in Fedorov, *Ruskaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ i gosudarstvo*, 387–90 (quotation on 388). Freeze, *Parish Clergy*, 469, quotes the first part of the passage.

218. Witte’s memo, “O sovremennom položenii pravoslavnoi tserkvi,” can be found in Fedorov, *Ruskaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ i gosudarstvo*, 390–402.

219. The decree can be found in Fedorov, *Ruskaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ i gosudarstvo*, 402–5.

220. Gruppa peterburgskikh sviashchennikov, “O neotlozhnosti vozstanovleniia kanonicheskoi svobody pravoslavnoi tserkvi v Rossii,” in the group’s *K tserkovnomu soboru: Sbornik* (St. Petersburg: M. Merkushev, 1906), 1–8, quotation on 1. The manifesto appeared first in *Tserkovnyi vestnik* under the title “O neobkhodimosti peremen v russkom tserkovnom upravlenii.”

221. Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*, 164–65, 205–9.

222. Firsov, *Ruskaia Tserkov’ nakanune peremen*, 338–42.

223. Firsov, *Ruskaia Tserkov’ nakanune peremen*, 340; Hedda, *His Kingdom Come*, 191. In 1917 it was revived as the Living Church.

224. On the role of these two groups, see Gregory L. Freeze, “Church and Politics in Late Imperial Russia: Crisis and Radicalization of the Clergy,” in *Russia under the Last Tsar: Opposition and Subversion, 1894–1917*, ed. Anna Geifman (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1999), 269–97. On clergy and autocracy in the last years of the old regime, see also Argyrios Pisiotis, “Orthodoxy versus Autocracy: The Orthodox Church and Clerical Political Dissent in Late Imperial Russia, 1905–1914” (PhD diss., Georgetown University, 2000); and M. A. Babkin, *Dukhovenstvo russkoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi i sverzhenie monarkhii (nachalo XXv.–konets 1917 g.)* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennaia publichnaia istoricheskaiia biblioteka Rossii, 2007).

225. Their replies were published and are an important historical source: *Otzyvy eparkhial’nykh arkhieerev po voprosam o tserkovnoi reforme*, 3 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1906). They have been extensively analyzed by Meyendorff, Cunningham, Basil, and Firsov, among others.

226. Werth, “Emergence of ‘Freedom of Conscience,’” 608–9. For a biographical portrait of Khrapovitskii, see Cunningham, *Vanquished Hope*, 59–66. Another exam-

ple is Nikon (Rozhdestvenskii), who became bishop of Vologda in 1906, a member of the State Council in 1907, and a member of the Holy Synod in 1912. He was a staunch conservative and thought autocracy had a “religious character.” He was a harsh critic of freedom of conscience, indeed of freedom more generally. In the State Council he worked hard to ensure that freedom of conscience did not become law. See Kenworthy, *Heart of Russia*, 263–65.

227. Cunningham, *Vanquished Hope*, 173–76, 267–69.

228. Richard S. Wortman, *Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy*, 2 vols. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995, 2000), 2, pt. 3. The monarchy’s new myth of power, which took shape in the reign of Alexander III, held that the Russian Orthodox Church, autocratic state, and Russian people (*narod*) were one. The myth continued under Nicholas II but emphasized the tsar’s personal divine authority, unencumbered by institutions of church and state; in both forms it excluded freedom of conscience and liberalism more generally.

229. Dorskaia was among the first to emphasize the basic reasons for the failure of the post-1905 legislative program to enact freedom of conscience into law: freedom of conscience was incompatible with the autocracy and its ideology, which was essentially a form of divine right located in the state church (*Svoboda sovesti v Rossii*, esp. 120). Dorskaia’s book is among those included in Paul Werth’s review essay “Toward ‘Freedom of Conscience’: Catholicism, Law, and the Contours of Religious Liberty in Late Imperial Russia,” *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 7, no. 4 (2006): 843–63.

230. As Gregory Freeze argued in one of his most admired essays: “Subversive Piety: Religion and the Political Crisis in Late Imperial Russia,” *Journal of Modern History* 68, no. 2 (1996): 308–50.

2. RELIGIOUS TOLERATION IN RUSSIAN THOUGHT, 1520–1825

The author is grateful to Terence Emmons, Elise Wirtschafter, Randall Poole, Semion Lyandres, Paul Werth, Alexander Martin, and the anonymous referees for their assistance with this essay.

1. See John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty*, in *Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, vol. 18: *Essays on Politics and Society* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 225–26.

2. Mill, *On Liberty*, 222.

3. Amartya Sen, *The Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian History, Culture, and Identity* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2005), 3, 15–19.

4. Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 3.

5. This point is made by Jeffrey R. Collins in “Redeeming the Enlightenment: New Histories of Religious Toleration,” *Journal of Modern History* 81, no. 3 (2009): 607–36.

6. Jonathan Israel, *Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Eman-*

cipation of Man, 1670–1752 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

7. Israel, *Enlightenment Contested*, 135–63.

8. Israel, *Enlightenment Contested*, 161.

9. François Voltaire, *Traité sur la tolérance à l'occasion de la mort de Jean Calas*, in *Mélanges de Voltaire*, ed. Jacques van der Heuvel (Paris: Gallimard, 1961), 587.

10. Edward Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, vol. 1 (New York: Modern Library, 1946).

11. Peter Gay, *The Enlightenment: An Interpretation. The Rise of Modern Paganism* (New York: Knopf, 1966).

12. For a careful study of the word and concept over fifteen hundred years, see Klaus Schreiner, “Toleranz,” in *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* 6, ed. Otto Brunder, Werner Conze, Reinhart Koselleck (Stuttgart: Klett, 1990), 524–605. On the term’s medieval uses, see István Bejczy, “Tolerantia: A Medieval Concept,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 58, no. 3 (1997): 365–84; and Cary J. Nederman, *Worlds of Difference: European Discourses of Toleration, c. 1100–1500* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000).

13. See for the early period Maria Rosa Menocal, *Ornament of the World: How Muslims, Jews, and Christians Created a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain* (Boston: Little Brown, 2002); and Jerrilyn D. Dodds, Menocal, and Abigail Krasner Balbale, *The Arts of Intimacy: Christians, Jews, and Muslims in the Making of Castilian Culture* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). For late medieval Spain, see Mark D. Meyerson, *The Muslims of Valencia in the Age of Fernando and Isabel: Between Coexistence and Crusade* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).

14. For a commentary on this historiography, see Collins, “Redeeming the Enlightenment,” 617.

15. Collins, “Redeeming the Enlightenment,” 620–21. Benjamin Kaplan’s first book, *Calvinists and Libertines: Confessional and Community in Utrecht, 1578–1620* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), analyzed the rise of toleration in interaction between state-supported Calvinism and small nonconformist communities in Reformation-era Utrecht. His second book covers toleration in the entire early modern period but makes the pessimistic argument that toleration actually declined in the eighteenth century. See Kaplan, *Divided by Faith: Religious Conflict and the Practice of Toleration in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2009).

16. Kaplan, *Divided by Faith*, 8–9.

17. Kaplan, *Divided by Faith*, 47.

18. Howard Louthan, *The Quest for Compromise: Peacemakers in Counter-Reformation Vienna* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

19. See François Fejtö, *Joseph II: Kaiser und Revolutionär. Ein Lebensbild* (Stuttgart: Koehler, 1956); and Derek Beales, *Joseph II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). See also Charles H. O’Brien, *Ideas of Religious Toleration at the Time*

of *Joseph II: A Study of the Enlightenment among Catholics in Austria* (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1969).

20. For the revocation, see Janine Garrisson, *L'édit de Nantes et sa révocation: Histoire d'une intolérance* (Paris: Seuil, 1985).

21. Neither the Soviet Academy of Sciences' dictionary of Pushkin's language nor the dictionary of spoken Russian compiled by Vladimir Dal' carried an entry for *tolerantnost'*. See Akademiia nauk SSSR, Institut iazykoznaniiia, *Slovar' iazyka Pushkina*, 4 vols. (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo inostrannykh i natsional'nykh slovarei, 1956); and V. I. Dal', ed., *Tolkovyi slovar' zhivogo velikorusskogo iazyka: Sovremennoe napisanie slov*, 4 vols. (St. Petersburg: M. O. Vol'f, 1880–1882). Dmitrii Ushakov's standard twentieth-century dictionary of spoken Russian categorized *tolerantnost'* as a “literary” or “bookish” word (*Tolkovyi slovar' russkogo iazyka* [Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo inostrannykh i natsional'nykh slovarei, 1940], 4:726). The 1963 edition of the Academy of Sciences' dictionary of contemporary Russian categorized *tolerantnost'* as an “anachronism”: Akademiia nauk SSSR, Institut iazykoznaniiia, *Slovar' sovremennogo russkogo literaturnogo iazyka* (Moscow: Akademiia nauk SSSR, 1963), 15:538.

22. The standard French-Russian dictionary reported *veroterpimost'* as the only translation for the French phrase *tolérance religieuse*. See K. A. Ganshina, ed., *Frantsuzsko-russkii slovar'*, 6th ed. (Moscow: Sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 1971), 836.

23. See Imperatorskaia akademiia nauk, *Slovar' Akademii Rossiiskoi po azbuchnomu poriadku raspolozheniia*, pt. 1: A–D (St. Petersburg: Pri Imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk, 1806), cited in Akademiia nauk SSSR, Institut iazykoznaniiia, *Slovar' sovremennogo russkogo literaturnogo iazyka* (1951), 2:166.

24. See I. I. Sreznevskii, ed., *Materialy dlia slovaria drevnerusskogo iazyka* (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Imperatorskoi akademii nauk, 1903), 3:1087–88.

25. Dal', *Tolkovyi slovar' zhivogo velikorusskogo iazyka*.

26. The Academy of Sciences' dictionary of contemporary Russian defines *veroterpimost'* as “permission of free religious practice to any religion” and “a tolerant attitude toward people confessing another religion.” As an illustration of the second definition, the dictionary cites Timofei Granovskii: “Among the most favorable consequences of advancing enlightenment must surely be the practical application of principles of toleration [*veroterpimost'*] to individuals and peoples.” See Akademiia nauk SSSR, Institut iazykoznaniiia, *Slovar' sovremennogo russkogo literaturnogo iazyka*, 2:166.

27. N. M. Karamzin, *Istoriia gosudarstva rossiiskogo*, 4 bks. (Moscow: Kniga, 1989), bk. 3, 10:162.

28. Karamzin, *Istoriia gosudarstva rossiiskogo*, bk. 3, 9:212.

29. Karamzin, *Istoriia gosudarstva rossiiskogo*, bk. 3, 9:217.

30. Karamzin, *Istoriia gosudarstva rossiiskogo*, bk. 3, 11:48.

31. Karamzin, *Istoriia gosudarstva rossiiskogo*, bk. 3, 11:52–54.

32. On the German settlement, see V. A. Kovrigina, *Nemetskaia sloboda Moskvyy i ee zhiteli v kontse XVII–pervoi chetverti XVIII v.* (Moscow: Arkheograficheskii tseñtr, 1998); and V. N. Alekseev, E. Miklashevskaiia, and M. S. Tsipliaeva, *Nemetskaia sloboda na Iauze: Istoriia v litsakh* (Moscow: Nauka, 2004).

33. Karamzin, *Istoriia gosudarstva rossiiskogo*, bk. 3, 10:162.

34. The dating of this polemic is uncertain. The best monographic study of Maksim's manuscripts dated the beginning of his correspondence with Nikolai Nemchin to 1518–1519 and the bulk of the exchange to 1519–1525; Maksim's letters to Nikolai concerning astrology have been dated "late 1524/early 1525" and "before 1533." See N. V. Sinitsyna, *Maksim Grek v Rossii* (Moscow: Nauka, 1977), 78–83, 89–90.

35. For the polemic, see "Protiv latinian, o tom chto ne sleduet nichego ni pribavliat', ni ubavliat' v Bozhestvennom ispovedanii neporochnoi khristianskoi very," 208–81; "Poslanie ko mnogouchitel'nomu Nikolaiu Nemchinu," 282–86; "Protiv lzhevogo sochineniia Nikolaiia Nemchina o soedinenii pravoslavnykh s latinianami," 287–304; "Protiv Nikolaiia latiniana: Slovo ob iskhozhdenii Sviatogo Dukha," 305–20; and "Otvēt Nikolaiu latinianu," 321–40—all in Maksim Grek, *Slovo i poucheniia*, ed. A. F. Zamaleev (St. Petersburg: Akademiia samopoznaniia "Tropa Troianova," 2007). Quotation from "Protiv lzhevogo sochineniia," 304.

36. Nikolai Nemchin's letters to Maksim have not survived. Sinitsyna believed that they were deliberately destroyed by church or government authorities (*Maksim Grek v Rossii*, 100).

37. The dating of this tale is a matter of debate among specialists. See Sinitsyna, *Maksim Grek v Rossii*, 111–13. The bulk of scholarly opinion holds that the tale must have been written before Maksim's trial in 1525.

38. "Povest' strashnaia i dostoprimechatel'naia: Zdes' zhe i o sovremennom inocheskom zhitel'stve," in Maksim Grek, *Slovo i poucheniia*, 109.

39. "Povest' strashnaia i dostoprimechatel'naia," 112.

40. "Povest' strashnaia i dostoprimechatel'naia," 114–15.

41. The tract appeared in Polish in 1597, then in Russian translation in 1598. The Russian translation is Khristofor Filelet [Chrystophor Philaleth], *Apokrisis, albo: Ot-poved' na knizhky o sobore Beresteiskom* (Ostrog: n.p., 1598). The manuscript, apparently copied in Old Russian by a clerk but corrected by a second hand (perhaps by Philaleth himself) and illustrated, runs over five hundred pages. Portions of it have deteriorated and are unreadable; certain folios are barely legible because of apparent water damage. The manuscript is available in a 16-millimeter microfilm, negative print, at the University of Alberta Library. I want to thank the Inter-Library Loan Department of the Honnold-Mudd Library in Claremont for obtaining this microfilm and Omega Microfilm of Upland, California, for helping me recover readable images.

The Brest Convocation of 1595–1596, a gathering of church leaders of the Pol-

ish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, proclaimed the end of the schism between the Roman Church and the Orthodox Church in Ruthenia. It announced the return of Ruthenians to papal control but specified that the Ruthenian Rite should be maintained in sacred worship. For details of the council's preparation, see Borys Gudziak, *Crisis and Reform: The Kyivan Metropolitanate, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and the Genesis of the Union of Brest* (Cambridge, MA: Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University, 2001).

42. Quoted in A. S. Lappo-Danilevskii, *Istoriia russkoi obshchestvennoi mysli i kul'tury XVII–XVIII vv.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1990), 45.

43. See Anon., *Rzym albo stolica Rzymska iésli co ma do praw Korony Polskiej u W. X. Litewskiego polityckich, krotkie uwazenia, roku 1633 stom koronnym na Sejm koronaciej podane*. For a discussion of these texts, see Lappo-Danilevskii, *Istoriia russkoi obshchestvennoi mysli*, 46–47.

44. Robert O. Crummey, *The Old Believers and the World of Antichrist: The Vyg Community and the Russian State, 1694–1855* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970), 16–19, 22, 41. On the Solovetskiï uprising, see O. V. Chumicheva, *Solovetskoe vosstanie 1667–1676 godov* (Moscow: OGI, 2009).

45. Crummey, *Old Believers*, 47–51. For a survey of Old Believer resistance, see V. S. Rumiantseva, *Narodnoe antitserkovnoe dvizhenie v Rossii v XVII veka* (Moscow: Nauka, 1986). See also P. S. Smirnov, *Istoriia russkogo raskola staroobriadstva*, 2nd ed. (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Glavnogo upravleniia udelov, 1895); and D. I. Sapozhnikov, *Samosozhzhenie v russkom raskole (so vtoroi poloviny XVII veka do kontsa XVIII veka): Istoricheskii ocherk po arkhivnym dokumentam* (Moscow: Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1891).

46. N. N. Pokrovskii, “Predislovie,” *Dukhovnaia literatura staroverov Vostoka Rossii XVIII–XX vv.* (Novosibirsk: Sibirskii khronograf, 1999), 12–14, 20.

47. N. F. Kapterev, *Patriarkh Nikon i tsar' Aleksei Mikhailovich: Reprintnoe vosproizvedenie izdaniia. Sergiev Posad, 1912* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Spaso-Preobrazhenskogo Valaamskogo Monastyr'ia, 1996), 1:167; also quoted in Georg Bernhard Michels, *At War with the Church: Religious Dissent in Seventeenth-Century Russia* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 112.

48. Kapterev, *Patriarkh Nikon i tsar' Aleksei Mikhailovich*, 1:177.

49. *Zhitie protopopa Avvakuma*, in *Zhitie protopopa Avvakuma im samim napisannoe i drugie ego sochineniia*, ed. N. K. Gudziï (Moscow: Svarog, 1992), 137–38.

50. Avvakum, “Pervaia chelobitnaia tsariu Alekseiu Mikhailovichu,” in *Zhitie protopopa Avvakuma*, 285–86; Avvakum, “Chelobitnaia tsariu Alekseiu Mikhailovichu,” in *Zhitie protopopa Avvakuma*, 301.

51. For an incisive portrait of Simeon in the context of Muscovite church history, see Paul Bushkovitch, *Religion and Society in Russia: The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 163–72.

52. Simeon was a poet who enjoyed elaborate word games. The Russian title, *Zhezl pravleniia*, can be translated either as *Scepter of Governance* or *Rod of Correction*. Simeon was pointing to the need for coercion to enforce church authority. For an analysis of Simeon's language in *Scepter of Governance*, see A. S. Demin, "Zhezl pravleniia i aforistika Simeona Polotskogo," in *Simeon Polotskii i ego knigoizdatel'skaia deiatel'nost'*, ed. A. N. Robinson (Moscow: Nauka, 1982), 60–92.

53. See Simeon Polockij, *Žezl pravlenija: Moskva 1753* (Switzerland: Interdocumentation Company AG, 1967), a, a verso, b.

54. See L. N. Pushkarev, "Simeon Polotskii," in D. A. Zhukov and Pushkarev, *Russkie pisateli XVII veka* (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1972), 208.

55. Voltaire, *Histoire de l'empire de Russie sous Pierre le Grand*, in *Oeuvres historiques*, ed. René Pomeau (Paris: Gallimard, 1957), 357–58.

56. Voltaire, *Histoire de l'empire de Russie*, 385.

57. Voltaire, *Histoire de l'empire de Russie*, 386.

58. Voltaire, *Histoire de l'empire de Russie*, 388, 340.

59. Lindsey Hughes was surely correct to argue that the All-Drunken Assembly did not attempt to teach the Russian people "a lesson about the evils of overpowerful organized religion." However, her effort to understand the assembly's essence as "rooted in personal relationships and private jokes" missed Peter's inner resistance to the pretensions of the church hierarchy and his manifest irritation over lengthy, elaborate services (*Russia in the Age of Peter the Great* [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998], 256). For a monographic treatment of the All-Drunken Assembly, see Ernest A. Zitser, *The Transfigured Kingdom: Sacred Parody and Charismatic Authority at the Court of Peter the Great* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004). Zitser argues that behind Peter's conduct in the assembly was not a plan to secularize the empire but instead a belief in the tsar as special repository of charismatic grace.

60. Hughes was among them. See her *Russia in the Age of Peter the Great*, 354–55.

61. Hughes, *Russia in the Age of Peter the Great*, 351–53.

62. V. F. Sreznevskii, ed., *Sbornik pisem I. T. Pososhkova k Mitropolitu Stefanu Iavorskomu* (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Imperatorskoi akademii nauk, 1900), "Per-voe pis'mo," 10.

63. Sreznevskii, *Sbornik pisem I. T. Pososhkova*, "Tre'te pis'mo," 33.

64. Pososhkov had in mind something like the *metricheskie knigi* created later in the eighteenth century.

65. Sreznevskii, *Sbornik pisem I. T. Pososhkova*, "Tre'te pis'mo," 35.

66. Sreznevskii, *Sbornik pisem I. T. Pososhkova*, "Tre'te pis'mo," 40.

67. Sreznevskii, *Sbornik pisem I. T. Pososhkova*, "Tre'te pis'mo," 47.

68. Sreznevskii, *Sbornik pisem I. T. Pososhkova*, "Vtoroe pis'mo," 21–22.

69. For a later edition of the book, see Stefan Iavorskii, *Kamen' very*, 3 vols. (Moscow: Sinodal'naia tipografiia, 1841–1842).

70. Quoted in I. F. Samarin, *Stefan Iavorskii i Feofan Prokopovich*, in *Sochineniia* (Moscow: D. Samarin, 1880), 5:240–41.

71. See “Sochineniia Stefana Iavorskogo ‘Apologiia ili slovesnaia oborona,’” in Viktor Zhivov, *Iz tserkovnoi istorii vremen Petra Velikogo: Issledovaniia i materialy* (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2004), 255.

72. Samarin, *Stefan Iavorskii*, 267–68.

73. Samarin, *Stefan Iavorskii*, 267–68.

74. P. O. Morozov, *Feofan Prokopovich kak pisatel’: Ocherk iz istorii russkoi literatury v epokhu preobrazovaniia* (St. Petersburg: V. S. Balashev, 1880), 105–6.

75. Feofan’s lectures have been published by Matvei Baiurov and Semen Denisëv, eds., *Christiana orthodoxa theologia*, in *Akademia kiowiensi a Theofane Prokopowicz . . . adornatae et propositae*, vols. 1–5 (Kiev: Regiomonti Kanter, 1773–75), vols. 6–7 (Moscow: n.p., 1776); quoted in Morozov, *Feofan Prokopovich kak pisatel’*, 128.

76. Feofan Prokopovich, *Sochineniia*, ed. I. Eremin (Moscow: Akademiia nauk SSSR, 1961), 33–34.

77. *Dukhovnyi reglament* (Moscow: Sinodal’naia tipografiia, 1765), 32–35.

78. *Ibid.*, 42.

79. V. N. Tatishchev, “Razgovor dvu[kh] priiatelei,” in Tatishchev, *Izbrannye proizvedeniia* (Moscow: Nauka, 1975), 61.

80. Tatishchev, “Razgovor dvu[kh] priiatelei,” 79.

81. Tatishchev, “Razgovor dvu[kh] priiatelei,” 82.

82. Tatishchev, “Razgovor dvu[kh] priiatelei,” 88.

83. Tatishchev, “Razgovor dvu[kh] priiatelei,” 87.

84. Tatishchev, “Razgovor dvu[kh] priiatelei,” 99.

85. On Tatishchev as chief of the Orenburg Commission and as the governor of Astrakhan, see the relevant chapters in N. A. Popov, *V. N. Tatishchev i ego vremia* (Moscow: K. Soldatenkov & N. Shchepkin, 1861). For Tatishchev’s role in the subjugation of the Bashkirs, see Alton S. Donnelly, *The Russian Conquest of Bashkiria 1552–1740: A Case Study of Imperialism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), esp. 96–122.

86. Donnelly, *Russian Conquest*, 138.

87. See D. A. Korsakov, *Iz zhizni russkikh deiiatelei XVIII veka* (Kazan: Tipografiia imperatorskogo universiteta, 1891), 307–17.

88. On Lipsius, see R. Birelay, *The Counter-Reformation Prince: Anti-Machiavelianism or Catholic Statecraft in Early Modern Europe* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990). From Korsakov we know that Volynskoi owned a Russian translation of Lipsius’s *Politicorum sive civilis doctrinae libri sex* (1589); see Korsakov, *Iz zhizni russkikh deiiatelei*, 303.

89. For one treatment of religious persecution in ancient Rome, see G. W. Bowersock, *Martyrdom and Rome* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); see also

H. A. Drake, *Constantine and the Bishops: The Politics of Intolerance* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000).

90. M. V. Lomonosov, *Kratkoi Rossiiskoi letopisets s rodosloviem* (St. Petersburg: Imperatorskaia akademiia nauk, 1760), 54.

91. M. V. Lomonosov, “Oda, vybrannaia iz Iova,” in *Sochineniia* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennaia izdatel'stvo khudozhestvennoi literatury), 142.

92. Iu. M. Lotman, “Ob ‘Ode, vybrannoi iz Iova’ Lomonosova,” in Lotman, *Iz istorii russkoi kul'tury*, vol. 4: *XVIII–nachalo XIX veka* (Moscow: Shkola russkoi kul'tury, 1991), 654.

93. See Lomonosov, “Iavlenie Venery na Solntse: Pribavlenie,” *Sochineniia*, 494–98.

94. For the latest and best edition of this correspondence, see *Correspondance: 1763–1778. Voltaire, Catherine II, texte présenté et annoté par Alexandre Stroev* (Paris: Non lieu, 2006); see also A. Lentin, ed., *Voltaire and Catherine the Great: Selected Correspondence* (Newtonville, MA: Oriental Research Partners, 1974); and W. F. Reddaway, ed., *Documents of Catherine the Great: The Correspondence with Voltaire and the Instruction of 1767* (Cambridge: University Press, 1931).

95. On the logic of Catherine's secularization policy, see Isabel de Madariaga, *Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 111–19.

96. Peter III had issued an edict of toleration for the Old Believers that also encouraged the repatriation from Poland of seventy thousand fugitives from Russian religious persecution. See Carol S. Leonard, *Reform and Regicide: The Reign of Peter III of Russia* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 20–21. Catherine continued this policy of amnesty and toleration for some time. See Madariaga, *Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great*, 122.

97. See A. M. Ammann, S.J., “Church Affairs,” in *Catherine the Great: A Profile*, ed. Marc Raeff (New York: Hill and Wang, 1972), 294–95.

98. Madariaga, *Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great*, 507–8.

99. The phrase “passive toleration” is Madariaga's (*Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great*, 509–10).

100. Madariaga, *Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great*, 511–15.

101. The best discussion of the “Jewish question” in this period remains John Doyle Klier, *Russia Gathers Her Jews: The Origins of the “Jewish Question” in Russia, 1772–1825* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1986). See also the remarks in A. I. Miller and M. D. Dolbilov, eds., *Zapadnye okrainy Rossiiskoi imperii* (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2006), 303–15.

102. On the Sheikh Mansur rebellion, see Alexandre Bennigsen, “Au mouvement populaire au Caucase au XVIII siècle,” *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* 5, no. 2 (1964): 159–97. For the case that Catherine's policy toward Muslims was tolerant, see Robert D. Crews, *For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central*

Asia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006). However, Crews makes the important observation that the state scheme of toleration was instrumental in that it provided “a structure for integrating non-Christian subjects, whose number increased as the empire expanded” (9–10).

103. N. D. Chechulin, “Vvedenie,” *Nakaz Imperatritsy Ekateriny II, dannyi kommissii o sochinenii proekta novogo ulozheniia* (St. Petersburg: Imperatorskaia akademiia nauk, 1907), cxxix–cxliv.

104. *Nakaz Imperatritsy Ekateriny II*, 1. Here I quote the Russian text. The French “translation” put secular and religious law on the same basis.

105. *Nakaz Imperatritsy Ekateriny II*, 103.

106. *Nakaz Imperatritsy Ekateriny II*, 134.

107. *Nakaz Imperatritsy Ekateriny II*, 16.

108. *Nakaz Imperatritsy Ekateriny II*, 17.

109. *Sochineniia Imperatritsy Ekateriny II*, vol. 8: *Trudy istoricheskie: Zapiski katelet’no Rossiiskoi istorii* (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Imperatorskoi akademii nauk, 1901), 75–83.

110. *Sochineniia Imperatritsy Ekateriny II*, 8:231.

111. *Sochineniia Imperatritsy Ekateriny II*, 8:253.

112. See [Anon.], *Le secret de la société antiabsurde, dévoilé par quelqu’un qui n’en est pas* (Cologne: n.p., 1758). Although actually published in 1780, the pamphlet carried a false date to preserve the empress’s anonymity.

113. See Nikolai Novikov, “O dostoinstve cheloveka v otnosheniakh k Bogu i miru,” *Utrennii svet* (December 1777), reprinted in I. V. Malyshev, ed., *N. I. Novikov i ego sovremenniki: Izbrannye socheniia* (Moscow: Akademiia nauk SSSR, 1961), 187.

114. Novikov, “O dobrodeiateli,” *Utrennii svet* (July 1780), reprinted in Malyshev, *N. I. Novikov i ego sovremenniki*, 193–96.

115. Raffaella Faggionato, *A Rosicrucian Utopia in Eighteenth-Century Russia: The Masonic Circle of N. I. Novikov* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005).

116. Radishchev, “Vol’nost,” in *Izbrannye filosofskie proizvedeniia*, ed. I. Ia. Shchimpanova (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1949), 426.

117. Radishchev, “Vol’nost,” 424.

118. Radishchev, *Puteshestvie iz S. Peterburga v Moskvu*, in *Izbrannye filosofskie proizvedeniia*, 145–52.

119. Radishchev, *Puteshestvie iz S. Peterburga v Moskvu*, 141.

120. M. M. Shcherbatov, “Zamechaniia Shcherbatova na Bol’shoi Nakaz Ekateriny,” in *Kniaz’ Shcherbatov: Neizdannye socheniia*, ed. Nikolai Rubinshtein (Moscow: Ogiz, Sotsekgiz, 1935), 16.

121. Shcherbatov, “Zamechaniia Shcherbatova na Bol’shoi Nakaz Ekateriny,” 18.

122. Shcherbatov, “Zamechaniia Shcherbatova na Bol’shoi Nakaz Ekateriny,” 19–20.

123. Shcherbatov, “Zamechaniia Shcherbatova na Bol’shoi Nakaz Ekateriny,” 33–34.
124. M. M. Shcherbatov, *Istoriia rossiiskaia ot drevneishikh vremen*, ed. I. Khrushchov and A. G. Voronov (St. Petersburg: M. Akinfiev & I. Leont’ev, 1901), 1:367, 2:682–84.
125. Shcherbatov, “Razmyshleniia o zakonodatel’stve voobshche,” in *Sochineniia kniazia M. M. Shcherbatova*, ed. I. Khrushchov and A. G. Voronov (St. Petersburg: M. Akinfiev & I. Leont’ev, 1896–98), 1:391.
126. See M. M. Shcherbatov, “Puteshestvie v zemliu ofirskuiu g-na S. . . , shvedskogo dvorianina,” in *Sochineniia kniazia M. M. Shcherbatova*, 749–1060.
127. I follow the excellent English version: Andrew Kahn, *Nikolai Karamzin, Letters of a Russian Traveler: A Translation and Study* (Oxford: Voltaire Society, 2003), 192.
128. Kahn, *Nikolai Karamzin, Letters of a Russian Traveler*, 60–61.
129. Kahn, *Nikolai Karamzin, Letters of a Russian Traveler*, 115–16.
130. Kahn, *Nikolai Karamzin, Letters of a Russian Traveler*, 397.
131. Kahn, *Nikolai Karamzin, Letters of a Russian Traveler*, 417–19.
132. Kahn, *Nikolai Karamzin, Letters of a Russian Traveler*, 370–71.
133. M. M. Speranskii, “Vvedenie k ulozheniiu gosudarstvennykh zakonov (plan vseobshchego gosudarstvennogo obrazovaniia),” in *Rukovodstvo k poznaniuu zakonov*, ed. I. D. Osipov (St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2002), 347.
134. Speranskii, “Vvedenie k ulozheniiu gosudarstvennykh zakonov,” 383.
135. Marc Raeff, *Michael Speransky: Statesman of Imperial Russia, 1772–1839* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1957), 275.
136. On this, see I. D. Osipov, “Istinnaiia monarkhiia Grafa M. M. Speranskogo,” in *Rukovodstvo k poznaniuu zakonov*, 11–40.
137. For an abridged English version of the charter, see Marc Raeff, ed., *Plans for Political Reform in Imperial Russia, 1730–1905* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966), 110–20; for the original French text, see Theodor Schiemann, *La charte constitutionnelle de l’empire de Russie: Publiée après l’original des archives de St. Pétersbourg* (Berlin: F. Gottheiner, 1903).
138. For this variant of the Murav’ev constitution, see “Konstitutsiia N. Murav’eva (Tekst, naidennyi v bumagakh kn. S. Trubetskogo,” in N. M. Druzhinin, *Dekabrist Nikita Murav’ev*, reprinted in *Izbrannye trudy: Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii v XIX v.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1985), 253–67.
139. Druzhinin, *Dekabrist Nikita Murav’ev*, 253, 256.
140. “Konstitutsiia Nikity Murav’eva (iz bumag I. I. Pushchina),” in Druzhinin, *Dekabrist Nikita Murav’ev*, 271.
141. Druzhinin, *Dekabrist Nikita Murav’ev*, 279.
142. See Druzhinin, *Dekabrist Nikita Murav’ev*, 248–53, for an inventory of Murav’ev’s library.

143. “Zapiska o gosudarstvennom pravlenii,” in *Vosstanie dekabristov: Materialy* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1958), 7:229–30.

144. “Otvety na dopolnitel'nye voprosy [Mikhailu Pavlovichu] Bestuzhevu ot 14 apreliia. No. 618,” in *ibid.*, 9:111.

145. “Russkaia pravda,” in *Vosstanie dekabristov*, 7:143–45.

146. “Russkaia pravda,” 140–41.

147. “Russkaia pravda,” 141–46.

148. “Russkaia pravda,” 150.

149. See esp. O. I. Kiiianskaia, *Pavel Pestel': Ofitser, razvedchik, zagovorshchik* (Moscow: Nauka, 2002).

150. For the better of the two English translations, see Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments*, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002). On Marcuse, see Herbert Marcuse, “Repressive Tolerance,” in Robert Paul Wolf, Barrington Moore, Jr., and Marcuse, *A Critique of Pure Tolerance* (Boston: Beacon, 1965), 95–137. For Foucault, see Michel Foucault, *Les mot et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines* (Paris: Gallimard, 1966), translated as *The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences* (New York: Vintage, 1973); and Foucault, *Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison* (Paris: Gallimard, 1975), translated as *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Pantheon, 1977); and for Moore, see Barrington Moore, Jr., *Moral Purity and Persecution in History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).

151. Robert Wokler, “Multiculturalism and Ethnic Cleansing in the Enlightenment,” in *Toleration in Enlightenment Europe*, ed. Ole Peter Grell and Roy Porter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 69–85; Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter, “Thought on the Enlightenment and on the Enlightenment in Russia,” *Journal of Modern Russian History and Historiography* 2, no. 2 (2009): 1–26.

152. In his analysis of human diversity in French thought, Tzvetan Todorov pointed to Montesquieu's “well-tempered humanism” as a provisional ideal (*On Human Diversity: Nationalism, Racism, and Exoticism in French Thought* [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993], 353–400).

3. FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE IN THE CLERICAL IMAGINATION OF RUSSIAN ORTHODOX THOUGHT, 1801–1865

1. *Svod zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii, poveleniem Gosudaria Imperatora Nikolaia Pavlovicha sostavlennyi*, vol. 1, pt. 1 (St. Petersburg: Tipografia Vtorogo otdeleniia Sobstvennoi Ego Imperatorskoi Velichestva Kantseliarii, 1857), 10.

2. Richard Wortman, *Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy from Alexander II to the Abdication of Nicholas II* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), chaps. 7 and 11.

3. Faith Hillis, *Children of Rus': Right-Bank Ukraine and the Invention of a Russian Nation* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013).

4. Makarii (Bulgakov), *Istoriia russkogo raskola, izvestnogo pod imenem starobriadstva* (St. Petersburg: Korolev, 1855).

5. Makarii (Bulgakov), *Pravoslavno-dogmaticheskoe bogoslovie*, 2 vols., 4th ed. (St. Petersburg: R. Golike, 1885), 2:187–313.

6. On the relationship between Protestantism and freedom of conscience, see Georg Jellinek, *Die Erklärung der Menschen- und Bürgerrechte: Ein Beitrag zur modernen Verfassungsgeschichte* (Leipzig: Duncker & Humboldt, 1895); Martha C. Nussbaum, *Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America's Tradition of Religious Equality* (New York: Basic Books, 2010). On Protestantism's complicated reception in Russian Orthodox thought, see Vera Shevzov, "The Burdens of Tradition: Orthodox Constructions of the West in Russia (Late 19th–Early 20th cc.)," in *Orthodox Constructions of the West*, ed. George Demacopoulos and Aristotle Papanikolaou (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 83–101.

7. S. L., "K voprosu o svobode sovesti," *Pravoslavnoe obozrenie* (April 1879): 700–21; V. F. Kiparisov, *O svobode sovesti: Opyt istoriko-kriticheskogo issledovaniia voprosa v oblasti tserkvi i gosudarstva s I po IX v.* (Moscow: M. N. Lavrov, 1883); Kiparisov, "O katolitsizme i protestantstve v otnoshenii k svobode sovesti," *Pravoslavnoe obozrenie* (October 1881): 283–318; (January 1882): 29–59; (February 1882): 315–52; Kiparisov, "Distiplina drevnei tserkvi v otnoshenii k svobodu sovesti," *Pribavleniia k tvoreniim sv. ottsov*, pt. 33, bk. 2 (1884), 383–482; pt. 37, bk. 2 (1886), 856–915; Platon (Rozhdestvenskii), "K voprosu o svobode sovesti," *Trudy Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii* (August 1902): 573–617; P. Linit'skii, "Znachenie filosofii dlia bogoslovia," *Trudy Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii* (February 1904): 208–42; Simeon, "Russkaia literatura po voprosu o svobode sovesti i pravil'naia postanovka etogo voprosa," *Pravoslavnyi sobesednik*, pt. 1 (1905): 70–91.

8. Sean Gillen, "V. D. Kudriavtsev-Platonov and the Making of Russian Theism," and Vera Shevzov, "The Struggle for the Sacred: Russian Orthodox Thinking about Miracles in the Modern Age," in *Thinking Orthodox in Modern Russia: Culture, History, Context*, ed. Patrick Lally Michelson and Judith Deutsch Kornblatt (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014), 111–30, 131–50.

9. See the essays by Paul Werth, Victoria Frede, and Randall Poole in "Freedom of Conscience in Russia," special issue of *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 13, no. 3 (2012): 561–634. Frede's essay is reprinted in the present volume.

10. T. V. Barsov, "Zametka ob uchenykh trudakh preosviashchennogo Ioanna," *Khristianskoe chtenie*, no. 4 (1869): 639–54; P. V. Znamenskii, *Istoriia Kazanskoi dukhovnoi akademii za pervyi (doreformennyi) period ee sushchestvovaniia (1842–1870 gody)*, 3 vols. (Kazan: Tipografiia Imperatorskogo universiteta, 1891–1892), 1:136–215.

11. Victoria Frede, “Materialism and the Radical Intelligentsia: The 1860s,” in *A History of Russian Philosophy 1830–1930: Faith, Reason, and the Defense of Human Dignity*, ed. G. M. Hamburg and Randall A. Poole (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 69–89; Patrick Lally Michelson, *Beyond the Monastery Walls: The Ascetic Revolution in Russian Orthodox Thought, 1814–1914* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2017), chap. 3.

12. S. M. Polovinkin, ed., *Zapiski peterburgskikh religiozno-filosofskikh sobranii (1901–1903 gg.)*, (Moscow: Respublika, 2005), 90–173.

13. Feofan Prokopovich, “Sermon on Royal Authority and Honor,” in *Russian Intellectual History: An Anthology*, ed. Marc Raeff (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1978), 14–30, esp. 28–30; Platon (Levshin), “Slovo v den’ rozhdeniia ee Imperatorskogo Velichestva Blagochestiveishei Gosudaryni, Ekateriny Alekseevny, Samoderzhitsy Vserossiiskoi,” in *Pouchitel’nye slova pri Vysochaishem Dvore ee Imperatorskogo Velichestva* (Moscow: n.p., 1780), 2:361–75, esp. 365–69; Petr Alekseev, ed., *Tserkovnyi slovar’, ili istolkovanie rechenii slavenskikh drevnikh*, 4 vols., 4th ed. (St. Peterburg: Ivan Glazunov, 1817–1819), 3:361; Ioakim Kochetov, *Nachertanie khristianskikh obiazannostei, po ucheniiu pravoslavnoi greko-rossiiskoi tserkvi*, 4th ed, rev. and enl. (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Imperatorskoi akademii nauk, 1842), chap. 1; Filaret (Drozdov), *Slova i rechi sinodal’nogo chlena Filareta, Mitropolita moskovskogo* (Moscow: A. Semen, 1845), 2:111, 201, 254, 420.

14. “Radutesia! I raki reku: Radutesia!,” *Khristianskoe chtenie*, no. 36 (1829): 91–124, esp. 102–9.

15. Alekseev, *Tserkovnyi slovar’*, 3:361; Makarii (Petrovich), *Tserkvi vostochnoi pravoslavnoe uchenie* (St. Petersburg: Imperatorskaia akademii nauk, 1783), 68; Tikhon (Sokolov), *Sochineniia preosviashchennogo Tikhona, episkopa voronezhskogo i eletskogo*, 15 vols. (St. Petersburg: Ivan Glazunov, 1825–1826), 10:190–93; 11:190–99.

16. Examples can be found in Irina Paert, *Spiritual Elders: Charisma and Tradition in Russian Orthodoxy* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2010), chaps. 1–2; Scott Kenworthy, *The Heart of Russia: Trinity-Sergius, Monasticism, and Society after 1825* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 139–52; William G. Wagner, “‘Orthodox Domesticity’: Creating a Social Role for Women,” in *Sacred Stories: Religion and Spirituality in Modern Russia*, ed. Mark D. Steinberg and Heather J. Coleman (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), 119–45, esp. 122–24.

17. I. M. Skvortsov, *Zapiski po tserkovnomu zakonovedeniiu* (Kiev: Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1848).

18. Makarii (Petrovich), *Tserkvi vostochnoi pravoslavnoe uchenie*, 69; Platon (Levshin), “Slovo v den’ Sviatoi Troitsy,” in *Pouchitel’nye slova Sviateishego Pravitel’stvuiushchego Sinoda chlenom, preosviashchenneishim Platonom Mitropolitom* (Moscow: Moskovskaia tipografiia, 1792), 15:675–83, esp. 681–82.

19. On strong versus weak conscience, see 1 Corinthians 8:7–12, 10:25–29, in

Gospoda nashego Iisusa Khrista sviatoe evangelie (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Rossiiskogo bibleiskogo obshchestva, 1821), 591–92, 597–98. See the exegesis of those verses in Nikifor (Feotoki), *Tolkovanie voskresnykh apostolov s nravouchitel'nymi besedami* (Moscow: Sinodal'naia tipografiia, 1839), 2:412–15.

20. D. I. Fonvizin, “Nedorosl’” in *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii D. I. Fonvizina* (Moscow: Semen Selivanovskii, 1830), 1:205, 206; I. I. Dmitriev, “Sovest’” in *Stikhotvoreniia Ivana Ivanovicha Dmitrieva*, 6th ed. (St. Petersburg: N. Grech, 1823), 2:104–5; I. F. Bogdanovich, “Russkie poslovitsy,” in *Sobranie sochinenii i perevodov Ippolita Fedorovicha Bogdanovicha*, 2nd ed., ed. Platon Beketov (Moscow: Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1818), 3:235, 273–74; F. V. Bulgarin, “Chelovek i sovest’,” in *Sochineniia Faddeia Bulgarina*, 2nd ed. (St. Petersburg: Aleksandr Smirdin, 1830), 7:160–70.

21. M. M. Speranskii, *Rukovodstvo k poznaniuu zakonov* (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Vtorogo otdeleniia Sobstvennoi Ego Imperatorskogo Velichestva Kantseliarii, 1845), 1–38, esp. 2–4, 12–21; *Pamiati Grafa Mikhaila Mikhailovicha Speranskogo: 1772–1872* (St. Petersburg: Izdanie Imperatorskoi publichnoi biblioteki, 1872), 787, 837–40.

22. I. Tatishchev, ed., *Polnyi frantsuzskii i rossiiskii leksikon*, 2nd ed. (St. Petersburg: Imperatorskaia tipografiia, 1798), 2:36; *Polnyi nemetsko-rossiiskii leksikon* (St. Petersburg: Imperatorskaia tipografiia, 1798), 1:689. Nor was there a definition for *svoboda sovesti* in V. I. Dal', ed., *Tolkovyi slovar' zhivogo velikorusskogo iazyka*, 4 vols., 2nd ed. (St. Petersburg: M. O. Volf, 1880–1882), 4:154, even though there were run-on entries for “freedom of the press,” “freedom of thought,” “freedom of speech,” and “freedom of peasants.”

23. *Slovar' Akademii Rossiiskoi, po azbuchnomu poriadku raspolozhennyi*, 6 vols. (St. Petersburg: Imperatorskaia rossiiskaia akademiia, 1806–1822), 6:325–26; *Slovar' tserkovno-slavianskogo i russkogo iazyka* (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Imperatorskoi akademii nauk, 1847), 4:173. The word *sovest'* was not included in the first edition of the *Slovar' Akademii rossiiskoi* (1789–1794).

24. Olga Crisp and Linda Edmondson, eds., *Civil Rights in Imperial Russia* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989).

25. *Svod zakonov*, vol. 1, pt. 1, 11.

26. See the various laws about religious conduct compiled in *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii s 1649 goda* (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Vtorogo otdeleniia Sobstvennoi Ego Imperatorskogo Velichestva Kantseliarii, 1830–1916).

27. Makarii (Bulgakov), *Vvedenie v pravoslavnoe bogoslovie* (St. Petersburg: K. Fisher, 1847), 95–98; “Predvaritel'nye poniatiiia o pravoslavnom dogmaticheskom bogoslovii,” *Khristianskoe chtenie*, pt. 1 (1848): 262–308, esp. 300–301; Platon (Levshin), *The Present State of the Greek Church in Russia: Or, a Summary of Christian Diversity*, trans. Robert Pinkerton (New York: n.p., 1815), 52–62 (originally 1765).

28. Stefan (Iavorskyi), *Kamen' very pravoslavnyim Tserkve sviatiya synom na utverzhdenie i dukhovnoe sozidanie, pretykaiushchymisia zhe o kamen' pretykaniia i soblaz-*

na, *na vostanie i ispravlenie*, 3 vols. (Moscow: Sinodal'naia tipografiia, 1841–1842), 3:290–93. Earlier editions were published in 1728, 1730, and 1749. For Filaret's interpretation of “Christian freedom,” see Pavel Khondzinskii, “O bogoslovii sviatitelia Filareta, Mitropolita Moskovskogo,” in Filaret (Drozdov), *Izbrannye trudy, pis'ma, vospominaniia* (Moscow: Pravoslavnyi sviato-tikhonovskii bogoslovskii institut, 2003), 81–84.

29. Tikhon (Sokolov), *Sochineniia*, 10:28–33, 42–44, 215–18, 246–55; 11:103–7, 141–43; Innokentii (Smirnov), *Sochineniia Innokentii, episkopa penzenskogo i sara-tovskogo* (St. Petersburg: K. Fisher, 1845), 1:69–79, 93–106.

30. “Khristianskaia svoboda ot strakha smerti,” *Voskresnoe chtenie*, no. 53 (1850): 555–58.

31. Nikolai Bantysh-Kamenskii, *Istoricheskoe izvestie o vosnikshei v Pol'she Unii* (Moscow: Sinodal'naia tipografiia, 1805); Nikolai Rudnev, *Rassuzhdenie o eresiakh i raskolakh, byvshikh v russkoi tserkvi so vremeni Vladimira Velikogo do Ioanna Grozno-go* (Moscow: Sinodal'naia tipografiia, 1838); A. N. Murav'ev, *Istoriia rossiiskoi tserkvi*, 2nd ed. (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Tret'ego otdeleniia Sobstvennoi Ego Imperator-skogo Velichestva Kantseliarii, 1840); Filaret (Gumilevskii), *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 5 vols. (Khar'kov: Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1848–1853); Ignatii (Semenov), *Istoriia o raskolakh v tserkvi rossiiskoi* (St. Petersburg: K. Fisher, 1849).

32. Makarii (Bulgakov), *Vvedenie*, 551–86; Innokentii (Borisov), *Sobranie slov, besed, i rechei na raznye dni i sluchai*, 2 vols. (Kiev: Tipografiia Kievopecherskoi lavry, 1836–1837); Hieromonakh Ioann, *Dokazatel'stva nepokolebimosti i vazhnosti sviatoi, sobornoj, i apostol'skoi kafolicheskoi tserkvi vostochnoi* (Moscow: Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1849).

33. N. Z., “Ob indifferentizme i veroterpimosti,” *Dukhovnaia beseda*, no. 31 (1859): 137–45; no. 32 (1859), 170–80.

34. For a sense of clerical hermeneutics common to the Moscow Academy, see S. K. Smirnov, *Istoriia Moskovskoi dukhovnoi akademii do ee preobrazovaniia (1814–1870)* (Moscow: Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1879), 29–33.

35. On views of the Crimean War, see Mara Kozelsky, *Christianizing Crimea: Shaping Sacred Space in the Russian Empire and Beyond* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2009), chap. 5; and L. V. Mel'nikova, *Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov' i Krymskaia voina 1853–1856 gg.* (Moscow: Kuchkovo pole, 2012). For the first use of the phrase *svoboda sovesti*, see Archbishop Innokentii (Borisov), “Slova i rechi, proizn. po sluchaiu poslednei voiny,” *Moskvitianin*, no. 5 (1855): 7–9.

36. Gregory L. Freeze, *The Parish Clergy in Nineteenth-Century Russia: Crisis, Reform and Counter-Reform* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), chaps. 5–6.

37. A. A. Papkov, *Tserkovno-obshchestvennye voprosy v epokhu Tsaria-Osvobodite-lia* (St. Petersburg: A. P. Lopukhin, 1902), 1–12.

38. A. P. Shchapov, *Russkii raskol staroobriadstva* (Kazan: Ivan Dubrovin, 1859).

39. N. V. Asipova, “Tserkovnyi raskol v obshchestvennom mnenii Rossii (konets 1850-kh–1860-e gg.)” (PhD diss., M. A. Sholokhov Moscow State Humanities University, 2009). See also Victoria Frede’s chapter in the present volume and Randall A. Poole, “Religious Toleration, Freedom of Conscience, and Russian Liberalism,” *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 13, no. 3 (2012): 611–34.

40. Paul W. Werth, *The Tsar’s Foreign Faiths: Toleration and the Fate of Religious Freedom in Imperial Russia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 132–38.

41. I would like to thank Seth Perry for suggesting the restorationist analogy. For an introduction to restorationist thought in US history, see Richard T. Hughes and C. Leonard Allen, *Illusions of Innocence: Protestant Primitivism in America, 1630–1875* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988). For a suggestive account that links nineteenth-century restorationist thinking in Europe to German Romanticism, see Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 2nd ed. (New York: Continuum, 2004), 275–77. On Slavophilism, see Patrick Lally Michelson, “Slavophile Religious Thought and the Dilemma of Russian Modernity,” *Modern Intellectual History* 7, no. 2 (2010): 239–67; and Shevzov, “Burdens of Tradition,” 94–99. For Slavophilism’s influence on Ioann, see N. I. Barsov, “Preosviashchennyi Ioann, episkop smolenskii, kak propovednik,” *Khristianskoe chtenie* (November 1872): 420–40.

42. Freeze, *Parish Clergy*, 12–22; A. I. Iakovlev, “Sviatitel’ Filaret v tserkovnoi i obshchestvennoi zhizni Rossii XIX veka,” in Filaret (Drozdov), *Izbrannye trudy*, 9–55. See also F. V. Blagovidov, *Ober-Prokurory sviateishego sinoda v XVII i v pervoi polovine XIX stoletia: Opyt tserkovno-istoricheskogo issledovaniia* (Kazan: Tipo-litografiia Imperatorskogo universiteta, 1900), 325–442; and Iu. E. Kondakov, *Dukhovno-religioznaia politika Aleksandra I i russkaia pravoslavnaia oppozitsiia (1801–1825)* (St. Petersburg: Nestor, 1999).

43. I. S. Belliustin, *Description of the Clergy in Rural Russia: The Memoir of a Nineteenth-Century Parish Priest*, trans. and intro. Gregory L. Freeze (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985).

44. For a Slavophile version of the restorationist narrative, which was to become central to Russian Orthodox ecclesiastical thought, see Aleksei Khomiakov’s so-called theological writings in *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii Alekseia Stepanovicha Khomiakova*, vol. 2, ed. Iu. Samarin (Prague: F. Skreishovskii, 1867).

45. Patrick Lally Michelson, “‘The First and Most Sacred Right’: Religious Freedom and the Liberation of the Russian Nation, 1825–1905” (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin, 2007), chap. 1.

46. *Polnoe sobranie zakonov*, 32:910–54, esp. 925–27.

47. Smirnov, *Istoriia Moskovskoi dukhovnoi akademii*, 45–52; Filaret (Drozdov), *Izbrannye trudy*, 580–81. Filaret made this claim in 1855.

48. D. K. Burlaka, ed., *Fridrikh Shelling: Pro et Contra. Tvorchestvo Fridrikha Shell-*

inga v otsenke russkikh myslitelei i issledovatelei, antologii (St. Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo Russkogo khristianskogo gumanitarnogo instituta, 2001).

49. Frederick C. Beiser, *The Romantic Imperative: The Concept of Early German Romanticism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 149–52; Bernard M. G. Reardon, *Religion in the Age of Romanticism: Studies in Early Nineteenth Century Thought* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), chap. 5; Jerrold Seigel, *The Idea of the Self: Thought and Experience in Western Europe since the Seventeenth Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 382–90.

50. These terms, and the quotation in the preceding sentence, belong to Schelling, cited in Mika Ojakangas, *The Voice of Conscience: A Political Genealogy of Western Ethical Experience* (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 173–74.

51. A. I. Galich, *Kartina cheloveka: Opyt nastavitel'nogo chteniia o predmetakh samopoznaniia dlia vsekh obrazovannykh soslovii* (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Imperatorskoi akademii nauk, 1834); Archimandrite Gavriil (Voskresenskii), *Istoriia filosofii*, 6 vols. (Kazan: Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1839), 4:104–10; K. A. Nevolin, *Entsiklopediia zakonovedeniia* (Kiev: Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1839), 1:597–610; O. M. Novitskii, *Rukovodstvo v opytnoi psikhologii* (Kiev: Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1840).

52. Galich, *Kartina cheloveka*, 264–72; Novitskii, *Rukovodstvo v opytnoi psikhologii*, 383–410, 439–68.

53. Galich, *Kartina cheloveka*, 342–48.

54. Galich, *Kartina cheloveka*, 348–49.

55. Werth, “The Emergence of ‘Freedom of Conscience’ in Imperial Russia,” *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 13, no. 3 (2012): 601–2.

56. Archimandrite Ioann (Sokolov), “O svobode sovesti: Religioznye osnovaniia i istoricheskie nachala etoi svobody,” *Khristianskoe chtenie* (September 1864): 39–103; (October 1864): 115–72; (November 1864): 227–72; (December 1864): 392–416; (March 1865): 255–86; (October 1865): 427–58; (November 1865): 459–502. For a history of *Christian Reading*, see D. A. Karpuk, “Periodicheskie izdaniia Sankt-Peterburgskoi dukhovnoi akademii (1821–1917): K 190-letiiu zhurnala ‘Khristianskoe chtenie,’” *Khristianskoe chtenie*, no. 6 (2011): 41–89; no. 4 (2012): 24–83.

57. Ioann, “O svobode sovesti” (September 1864), 39–44; (December 1864), 415–16.

58. V. R. Zotov and F. G. Toll, eds., *Nastol'nyi slovar' dlia spravok po vsem otrasliam znaniia*, 3 vols. (St. Petersburg: V. Bezobrazov i Komp., 1863–1864), 3:292. See also “Vzgliad na mnieniia noveishikh ratsionalistov o sushchestve religii,” *Pravoslavnyi sobesednik*, pt. 3 (1860): 162–95, 446–80.

59. For a study that examines the many different ways in which the concept and practice of asceticism became dominant in Russian Orthodox thought around this time, see Michelson, *Beyond the Monastery Walls*.

60. Ioann, “O svobode sovesti” (September 1864), 39–40, 45–47.
61. Ioann, “O svobode sovesti” (September 1864), 41–42.
62. Ioann, “O svobode sovesti” (September 1864), 40.
63. Ioann, “O svobode sovesti” (September 1864), 49–54. English translations of the Bible in this article come from the New Revised Standard Version.
64. Ioann, “O svobode sovesti” (September 1864), 54–57.
65. Ioann, “O svobode sovesti” (September 1864), 57–58.
66. Ioann, “O svobode sovesti” (September 1864), 58–59.
67. Ioann, “O svobode sovesti” (September 1864), 59–60.
68. Ioann, “O svobode sovesti” (September 1864), 60, 102–3; (October 1864), 115–22.
69. Ioann never identified these critics, but such arguments about the Russian Church belonged to N. G. Chernyshevskii, N. A. Dobroliubov, and other members of Russia’s reform-era intelligentsia.
70. Ioann, “O svobode sovesti” (October 1864), 139–54.
71. Ioann, “O svobode sovesti” (November 1864), 234–36; (March 1865), 278–79.
72. Ioann, “O svobode sovesti” (November 1864), 268; (March 1865), 286.
73. Ioann, “O svobode sovesti” (December 1864), 414–15; (March 1865), 284–85.
74. Ioann, “O svobode sovesti” (November 1865), 500–501.
75. Ioann, “O svobode sovesti” (October 1864), 153, 155–57, 160; (November 1864), 271; (March 1865), 268–69; (November 1865), 462, 501.
76. Jennifer Hedda, *His Kingdom Come: Orthodox Pastorship and Social Activism in Revolutionary Russia* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2010), chap. 2. See also Daniel Beer, “The Medicalization of Religious Deviance in the Russian Church (1880–1905),” *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 5, no. 3 (2004): 451–82.

4. FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE, FREEDOM OF CONFESSION, AND “LAND AND FREEDOM” IN THE 1860S

I would like to thank Raymond Geuss, Thomas Laqueur, Jochen Hellbeck, and the two anonymous reviewers for their critical insights into earlier drafts of this chapter.

1. John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty*, ed. Elizabeth Rapaport (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978), 8, 26–28.

2. Paul W. Werth, *At the Margins of Orthodoxy: Mission, Governance, and Confessional Politics in Russia’s Volga–Kama Region, 1827–1905* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 27; Robert D. Crews, *For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 2, 8–9; Robert P. Geraci and Michael Khodarkovsky, “Introduction,” in *Of Religion and Empire: Missions, Conversion, and Tolerance in Tsarist Russia*, ed. Geraci and Khodark-

ovsky (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 6–8. For more information about the state's inconsistent policies toward Catholics and Lutherans, see S. V. Rimskii, "Konfessional'naia politika Rossii v Zapadnom krae i Pribaltike XIX stoletii," *Vo-prosy istorii*, no. 3 (1998): 25–44; Theodore R. Weeks, *Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863–1914* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1996), 51–56, 174–78; Witold Rodkiewicz, *Russian Nationality Policy in the Western Provinces of the Empire (1863–1905)* (Lublin: Scientific Society of Lublin, 1998); and Heide W. Whelan, *Adapting to Modernity: Family, Caste, and Capitalism among the Baltic German Nobility* (Cologne: Böhlau, 1999), 81–82, 221.

3. On state policies toward dissenters, see P. S. Smirnov, *Istoriia russkogo raskola staroobriadchestva* (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Glavnogo upravleniia udelov, 1895), 217–58; A. V. Stadnikov, *Moskovskoe staroobriadchestvo i gosudarstvennaia konfessional'naia politika XIX—nachala XX v.* (Moscow: Mosgorarkhiv, 2002).

4. Much about the group remains unknown, along with the precise date it was founded, as well as when and why it fell apart. Ia. I. Linkov, for example, offered both 1861 and 1862 as times of formation (*Revoliutsionnaia bor'ba A. I. Gertsena i N. P. Ogareva i tainoe obshchestvo "Zemlia i volia" 1860-kh godov* [Moscow: Nauka, 1964], 170–71). M. V. Nechkina was certain it had been conceived around May 1861, but her evidence for this early date is weak ("Vozniknovenie pervoi 'Zemli i voli,'" in *Revoliutsionnaia situatsiia v Rossii v 1859–1861 gg.* [Moscow: Akademiia nauk, 1960], 294). A second revolutionary organization called "Land and Freedom" was founded in the 1870s; my comments in this article pertain only to the organization in the early 1860s.

5. Because it was an umbrella organization, rather than a revolutionary circle, Land and Freedom's participants in the early 1860s did not hold anything like a tightly coherent ideology. This point is emphasized in Franco Venturi, *Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in 19th-Century Russia*, rev. ed., trans. Francis Haskell (London: Phoenix, 2001), 253, 268.

6. Abbott Gleason, *Young Russia: The Genesis of Russian Radicalism in the 1860s* (New York: Viking, 1980), 113.

7. See Reginald E. Zelnik, "To the Unaccustomed Eye: Religion and Irreligion in the Experience of St. Petersburg Workers in the 1870s," in *Christianity and the Eastern Slavs, 2: Russian Culture in Modern Times*, ed. Robert P. Hughes and Irina Paperno, *California Slavic Studies* 17 (1994): 49–82, esp. 70–71.

8. Pre-Soviet historians had an easier time acknowledging the influence of liberal ideas on radicals. One famous example is M. K. Lemke, *Ocherki osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniia "shestidesiatykh godov"* (St. Petersburg: O. N. Popova, 1908). Predictably, Soviet historians emphasized the hostility between liberalism and revolutionaries, including members of Land and Freedom. See, e.g., Sh. M. Levin, *Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie v Rossii v 60–70-e gody XIX veka* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo sotsial'no-ekonom-

micheskoi literatury, 1958), 168–69; Linkov, *Revoliutsionnaia bor'ba*, 34–36, 121–24. Neither discusses freedom of confession as an aim of Land and Freedom. Nor is it discussed in M. V. Nechkina, “Zemlia i volia’ 1860-kh godov,” *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 1 (1957): 105–34. The oversight was not purely Soviet: Venturi does not mention it either in his chapter on the group in *Roots of Revolution*. The only study in which it is discussed is Michel Mervaud, “Une alliance ambiguë: Herzen, Ogarev et les vieux-croyants,” *Revue des études slaves* 69, no. 1–2 (1997): 131.

9. Mill had declared his refusal to answer questions about his faith while running for Parliament. See Isaiah Berlin, “John Stuart Mill and the Ends of Life,” in *J. S. Mill: On Liberty in Focus*, ed. John Gray and G. W. Smith (London: Routledge, 1991), 159.

10. A. I. Gertsen [Herzen], “Vvedenie,” *Poliarnaia zvezda*, no. 1 (1855): iii; Gertsen, “Ot izdatelia,” *Golosa iz Rossii*, no. 1 (1856): 7.

11. M. Partridge, “Alexander Herzen and the English Press,” *Slavonic and East European Review* 36, no. 87 (1958): 455. See also “Prospectus,” *The Leader*, no. 1 (30 March 1850).

12. B. N. Chicherin, “Sovremennye zadachi russkoi zhizni,” *Golosa iz Rossii*, no. 4 (1857): 112–14; quoted in G. M. Hamburg, *Boris Chicherin and Early Russian Liberalism: 1828–1866* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 135.

13. On the intimidation of refugees and restriction of the press, see Howard C. Payne, *The Police State of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, 1851–1860* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1966). On the relationship between the French state and the Church, see Jean Maurain, *La politique ecclésiastique du second Empire de 1862 à 1869* (Paris: Alcan, 1930). On Alexander Herzen’s experience among European refugees and the turn in public opinion, see Judith E. Zimmerman, *Midpassage: Alexander Herzen and European Revolution, 1847–1852* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989).

14. In his correspondence with the exiled Italian revolutionary Giuseppe Mazzini Herzen criticized Arnold Ruge, an atheist, for signing a revolutionary political manifesto by Mazzini that drew heavily on religious terminology. See A. I. Herzen to Giuseppe Mazzini, 1/13 September 1850, *Sobranie sochinenii*, 30 vols. (Moscow: Akademiia nauk, 1954–1965), 24:139. Herzen’s letter is discussed in Zimmerman, *Midpassage*, 180. Arnold Ruge had encountered difficulties in this regard even before 1848. In Paris in the mid-1840s many French socialists had refused to contribute to the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*, which Ruge edited, precisely because Ruge was an atheist. See Walter Neher, *Arnold Ruge als Politiker und politischer Schriftsteller* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1933), 103–6.

15. Carl Vogt to A. I. Herzen, 3 January 1853, 28 March 1855, 24 October 1855, *Literaturnoe nasledstvo* 96 (1985): 102, 132–33, 138.

16. Martin Malia, *Alexander Herzen and the Birth of Russian Socialism* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1961), 373.

17. Herzen to Mazzini, 13 September 1840, *Sobranie sochinenii*, 24:141.

18. According to S. Frederick Starr, the socialist Mikhail Butashevich-Petrashvskii had begun to explore this view shortly after the appearance of the first two volumes of August von Haxthausen's *Studien über die inneren Zustände . . . Russlands* in 1847 ("August von Haxthausen and Russia," *Slavonic and East European Review* 46, no. 107 [1968]: 473–74).

19. [V. A. Engel'son], "Videniia sv. Ottsa Kondratiia" (1854), reprinted in *Desiatiletie vol'noi russkoi tipografii v Londone*, ed. L. Chernetskii (London: Vol'naia russkaia tipografia, 1863), 55–68.

20. On the attraction of revolutionaries to sectarians in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Aleksandr Etkind, *Khlyst: Sekty, literatura i revoliutsiia* (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 1998).

21. "The *pugachevshchina* was a last desperate resort, which he was willing to embrace only if the enlightened elite failed to act" (Malia, *Herzen and the Birth of Russian Socialism*, 413). See also 414–15.

22. A. I. Gertsens, *Byloe i dumy*, *Sobranie sochinenii*, 11:331–32. Kel'siev confirmed this in the "Confession" he wrote in 1867 for the Third Section. He had been an "atheist" who found atheism intellectually unsatisfying. Shortly before he surrendered to the Russian authorities, he claimed, he had returned to the Russian Orthodox Church (V. I. Kel'siev, "Ispoved," *Literaturnoe nasledstvo* 41–42 [1941]: 292–93).

23. Published under the pseudonym Vadim, this work appeared as *Bibliia: Sviashchennoe pisanie Vetkhogo i Novogo zaveta, perevedennoe s evreiskogo nezavisimo ot vs-tavok v podlinnike i ot ego izmenenii, nakhodiashchikhsia v grecheskom i slavianskom perevodakh. Vetkhii zavet. Otdel pervyi, zakliuchaiushchii v sebe Zakon ili Piatiknizhie*, 5 vols. (London: Trübner, 1860).

24. Mervaud, "Alliance ambiguë," 119–21.

25. Laura Engelstein refers to his response as "visceral repulsion" in her *Castration and the Heavenly Kingdom: A Russian Folktale* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 73.

26. The omission was probably motivated by the wish not to alienate Russian Orthodox readers. It seems unlikely that at this point Kel'siev preferred Orthodoxy to Catholicism, Protestantism, Old Belief, and sectarianism.

27. V. I. Kel'siev, *Sbornik pravitel'stvennykh svedenii o raskol'nikakh*, 4 vols. (London: Trübner, 1860–62), 1:xix, xx, xxv, xxvii–xxviii. See esp. xxvii: "We are fully convinced that freedom of confession, combined with *civic* freedom, will, if not eradicate these deformities, then in any case substantially weaken them."

28. Kel'siev, *Sbornik pravitel'stvennykh svedenii*, 1:xviii.

29. Mill, *On Liberty*, 90. This particular point is interesting, because in advancing it, Mill departs from the overall concern of the book, which is to defend the liberty of the individual.

30. Kel'siev, *Sbornik pravitel'stvennykh svedenii*, 1:xviii.

31. Kel'siev, "Ispoved," 292. In a memoir published a year later Kel'siev again presented himself differently. He explained that in the early 1860s he had been a firm believer in "a constitutional order, freedom of the person [*svoboda lichnosti*], federalism, freedom of speech [*svoboda slova*]." See V. I. Kel'siev, *Perezhitoe i peredumannoe: Vospominaniia* (St. Petersburg: V. Golovin, 1868), 16.

32. Kel'siev, "Ispoved," 294.

33. Kel'siev, *Perezhitoe i peredumannoe*, 47.

34. Serno-Solov'evich co-owned the bookstore on Nevskii Prospekt with Aleksandr Sleptsov. Sleptsov, too, became a member of Land and Freedom and is said to have joined its Central Committee, together with Nikolai Utin, Petr Pushtorskii, and Mikhail Gulevich. Yet historians have disagreed about whether there in fact was a Central Committee, who belonged to it, and when exactly it was formed. The most convincing account of its membership is Nechkina, "'Zemlia i volia' 1860-kh godov," 112.

35. N. P. Ogarev, "Chto nuzhno narodu?," *Izbrannye sotsial'no-politicheskie i filosofskie proizvedeniia* (hereafter *Izbrannye sotsial'no-politicheskie proizvedeniia*), ed. Ia. Z. Cherniak, 2 vols. (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1952–56), 1:527. Some have claimed that Ogarev consulted with radicals from St. Petersburg in composing this article. See Levin, *Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie v Rossii*, 214; and E. L. Rudnitskaia, *N. P. Ogarev v russkom revoliutsionnom dvizhenii* (Moscow: Nauka, 1969), 245.

36. N. A. Serno-Solov'evich, "Otvét 'Velikorussu,'" *Publitsistika. Pis'ma*, ed. I. B. Volodarskii and G. A. Kaikova (Moscow: Akademiia nauk, 1963), 234–38. The article was published anonymously, signed "Vash. Odin iz mnogikh." Though historians disagreed for some years over the authorship of the article, a consensus emerged that it was indeed by Nikolai Serno-Solov'evich.

37. The first was written in 1858 before his antimonarchical turn and concerned the emancipation of the serfs. Serno-Solov'evich presented it to Alexander II early one morning when he stole into the garden where the emperor was taking a walk. The petition had no effect other than to bring Serno-Solov'evich to Alexander II's attention. This seems to have whetted his appetite for further communications with the emperor. See I. Volodarskii, "N. A. Serno-Solov'evich—vydaiushchiisia deiatel' russkoi revoliutsionnoi demokratii," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 10 (1946): 26, 39, 42.

38. N. A. Serno-Solov'evich, "Proekt Ulozheniia imperatora Aleksandra II," *Publitsistika. Pis'ma*, 186.

39. "Proshenie Serno-Solov'evicha," 12 January 1864, and "Vtoroe proshenie Serno-Solov'evicha," 26 January 1864, in Lemke, *Ocherki osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniia*, 201–2, 205, 212–13, 215–16. In referring to "opinions," Serno-Solov'evich speaks generically, without specifying what kinds of opinions (religious, political, social) he

has in mind. He notes that such distinctions are necessarily artificial and that the state itself, in prosecuting them, is incapable of distinguishing between them (“It is impossible to draw sharp lines between opinions”).

40. “Proshenie Serno-Solov’evicha,” 194.

41. The precise nature of Serno-Solov’evich’s views on religion is unknown. To demonstrate that he was an atheist, Soviet scholars often cited an article he wrote in prison on science, in which he advocated a separation between the sciences and “metaphysical banalities.” It was later published in the radical journal *Russkoe slovo*. See N. A. Serno-Solov’evich, “Ne trebuet li nyneshnee sostoianie znanii novoi nauki?,” *Publitsistika. Pis’ma*, 190.

42. “People at the level of Old Believers can be directed toward political goals only if their fanaticism is enflamed to the point of cruelty. But in that state, no political party will be in a position to control them” (“Proshenie Serno-Solov’evicha,” 194–95).

43. The conspiracy is described in greater detail in “N. A. Serno-Solov’evich—Gertsenu i Ogarevu: Prilozhenie,” *Literaturnoe nasledstvo* 62 (1955): 561–63.

44. N. A. Serno-Solov’evich to P. A. Benevolenskii, December 1865, *Publitsistika. Pis’ma*, 276.

45. N. A. Serno-Solov’evich, “[Vo imia pravdy i voli. . .],” *Publitsistika. Pis’ma*, 232–33.

46. The first known publication, titled “Svoboda no. 1,” was printed in December 1862, though it does not seem to have been distributed until two months later. It was directed at an educated audience.

47. The man responsible for its printing, I. G. Zhukov, together with an associate, worried that the printing press would be discovered by the authorities and fled with seventy copies of the completed section. They were arrested on the road. See *Russko-pol’skie revoliutsionnye sviazi*, vol. 3: *Vosstanie 1863 goda* (Moscow: Akademiia nauk, 1963), 2, 74.

48. “Zemlia i volia. Zhurnal obshchestva ‘Zemlia i volia’” (hereafter “Zemlia i volia. Zhurnal”), in *Russko-pol’skie revoliutsionnye sviazi* 3, pt. 2:68.

49. “Zemlia i volia. Zhurnal,” 68–69.

50. “Zemlia i volia. Zhurnal,” 69.

51. “[Podlozhnyi manifest],” December 1862, in *Russko-pol’skie revoliutsionnye sviazi* 3, pt. 2:299. Iulii Benzenger, an affiliate of a branch of Land and Freedom in Moscow, has been identified as its author.

52. “Zemlia i volia. Svoboda veroispovedaniia. Vremennoe narodnoe pravlenie,” in *Russko-pol’skie revoliutsionnye sviazi* 3, pt. 2:310.

53. “Zemlia i volia. Svoboda veroispovedaniia. Brattsy!” in *Russko-pol’skie revoliutsionnye sviazi* 3, pt. 2:311–13.

54. I discuss them in chap. 5 of *Doubt, Atheism, and the Nineteenth-Century Russian Intelligentsia* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011).

55. Of the four people included in Nechkina's list of Central Committee members, three belonged to the nobility and one was the son of a millionaire banker.

56. N. P. Ogarev to J. S. Mill, ca. July–August 1862, *Izbrannye sotsial'no-politicheskie proizvedeniia*, 2:466–68. The letter was written in response to Mill's *Considerations on Representative Government*, though Ogarev indicated he had long been an admirer of Mill's writings. In his letter he enclosed his *Essai sur la situation russe* (London: Trübner, 1862). There he argued for communal self-government in Russia.

57. P. G. Ryndziunskii, "V. I. Kel'siev—Gertsenu i Ogarevu," *Literaturnoe nasledstvo* 62 (1955): 161–62. See also Kel'siev to N. F. Petrovskii, 21 May/1 June 1862, in Lemke, *Ocherki osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniia*, 29–30. There Kel'siev expressed an interest in publishing works by the church fathers for Old Believers, as well as Protestant theological works. In *Obshchee veche* he would publish "grievances of the lower clergy against members of the higher orders, against theological censorship, grievances against the persecution of Old Believers, and so on." In a letter to another friend he described *Obshchee veche* as a "purely civil journal" (*zhurnal chisto grazhdanskii*), in which "nothing theological" could be published. He said he was planning on opening a "purely theological" journal for that purpose (Kel'siev to Ivan Ivanovich, 23 June/5 July 1862 in Lemke, *Ocherki osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniia*, 33–34).

58. Ogarev viewed low-ranking clergymen as fundamentally alienated from the Church as an institution. He claimed that they identified primarily with Russian peasants and could be counted on to support the people in the event of a revolution (*Essai sur la situation russe*, 57).

59. N. P. Ogarev, "Predislovie k zhurnalu 'Obshchee veche' no. 1, 15 iulia 1862," *Izbrannye sotsial'no-politicheskie proizvedeniia*, 2:87.

60. "Après un examen plus attentif, on se rend compte que la plupart d'entre eux sont dus à un seul et même auteur. . . . Le vieux-croyant anonyme, qui signe simplement 'Staroobrjadec,' exprime pour l'essentiel des vues politiques analogues à celles d'Ogarev" (Mervaud, "Alliance ambiguë," 129).

61. As Ogarev knew, some Priestist Old Believers had issued an oath of allegiance to Alexander II in 1862, hoping that the tsar would reward them for their loyalty by granting them greater freedom. See Paul Call, *Vasily L. Kelsiev: An Encounter between the Russian Revolutionaries and the Old Believers* (Belmont, MA: Nordland, 1979), 125.

62. N. P. Ogarev, "Staroobriadtsu i ego obshchestvu," *Obshchee veche*, no. 19 (10 July 1863): 89–90. References to a *Zemskii sobor* in Ogarev's writings can be traced back to 1862.

63. The title gestured toward the Old Believer monastery in Belokrinitsa, Austria-Hungary.

64. N. P. Ogarev, "[Pervoe] pis'mo k inoku," *Izbrannye sotsial'no-politicheskie proizvedeniia*, 2: 132–33, 134. This letter appeared in *Obshchee veche* in November 1863.

65. N. P. Ogarev to E. V. Salias de Turnemir, [19 June 1862], *Literaturnoe nasledstvo* 61 (1953): 810.

66. Ogarev, “[Pervoe] pis’mo k inoku,” 131.

67. Call, *Vasily L. Kelsiev*, 123–24. Call cites G. [N. I. Subbotin], “Raskol kak orudie vrazhdebnykh Rossii partii,” *Russkii vestnik* 69 (May 1867): 328–29.

68. Mervaud, “Alliance ambiguë,” 133. Gonchar’s defection may have been caused by Cyril’s accusations of the London editors’ “atheism.” Ogarev had attempted to reassure him on this score: Ogarev did not contradict the accusation that he was an atheist but said he was “sincerely devoted to freedom of faith.” He begged Gonchar to “believe in the sincerity of our devotion to any kind of popular freedom, especially freedom of faith and of conscience, because without that freedom it is impossible for a person to live like a human being, but one would have to be a slave or a beast” (N. P. Ogarev to O. S. Gonchar, 28 February/10 March 1864, *Izbrannye sotsial’no-politicheskie proizvedeniia*, 2:497–98).

69. N. P. Ogarev, “Pis’ma k ‘odnomu iz mnogikh,” *Izbrannye sotsial’no-politicheskie proizvedeniia*, 1:665.

70. E. S. Vilenskaia, *Revoliutsionnoe podpol’e v Rossii (60-e gody XIX v.)* (Moscow: Nauka, 1965), 181–82.

71. For the purposes of this article, it does not matter whether in fact peasants, including Old Believers and sectarians, were as dogmatic as members of Land and Freedom believed them to be. Rightly or wrongly, those members were motivated by the assumption that peasants held an exclusionary, religious outlook.

72. Raymond Geuss, *Public Goods, Private Goods* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 83.

73. “What attitude should I take toward freedom of religion once I perceive a faint probability that one of the competing creeds is actually true? *If* the creed is true, then as we have seen I ought to be intolerant of all other creeds, for what each creed says is that it is the one true faith. And since each creed holds out the promise of infinite reward, any probability of its truth, however small, makes it rational for me to choose it and commit myself to it over all merely secular alternatives. . . . On Mill’s own principles, then, men who have no religious beliefs should favor religious toleration, while men who have any faith at all, however tentative, should be dogmatic, illiberal, and exclusionary. In short, religious liberty is a principle for agnostics, not for true believers” (Robert Paul Wolff, *The Poverty of Liberalism* [Boston: Beacon, 1968], 13–14).

5. THE MODERN MARTYRS OF RUSSIA

1. Hesba Stretton, *The Highway of Sorrow at the Close of the Nineteenth Century* (London: Cassell, 1895), v–vii. The book was repeatedly republished and translated into French, German, Czech, Spanish, Finnish, Danish, Portuguese, Dutch, and Russian; it is currently in print in Russian.

2. Hesba Stretton, *In the Hollow of His Hand* (London: Religious Tract Society, 1897).

3. Elaine Lomax, *The Writings of Hesba Stretton: Reclaiming the Outcast* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 208.

4. On the deluge of coverage in the early 1890s, see “The Coming Storm in Russia,” *The Speaker*, 27 December 1890, 710; “Persecution in Russia,” *The Outlook*, 21 March 1894, 595; and W. Durban, “Russia as It Is,” *The Contemporary Review* (May 1897): 730. Other novels include Oliver M. Norris, *Nadya: A Tale of the Steppes* (Oxford: Religious Tract Society, 1895), reprinted as *White Nadya of the Ferry: A Tale of the Russian Steppes* (London: Religious Tract Society, 1905); Samuel Keller, *Das Salz der Erde: Erzählung aus dem Leben des russischen Stundisten* (Hagen in Westfalen: Rippel, 1902); and Louise Châtelain, *Le secret du manoir: Un épisode des persécutions stundistes* (Neuchâtel: Sack, 1907).

5. Norman E. Saul, *Concord and Conflict: The United States and Russia, 1867–1914* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996), 78–90; Sam Johnson, *Pogroms, Peasants, Jews: Britain and Eastern Europe’s “Jewish Question,” 1867–1925* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Troy R. E. Paddock, *Creating the Russian Peril: Education, the Public Sphere, and National Identity in Imperial Germany, 1890–1914* (Rochester: Camden House, 2010), 110; Keith Neilson, *Britain and the Last Tsar: British Policy and Russia, 1894–1917* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 88. Great Britain, *Correspondence respecting the Treatment of the Members of the United Greek Church in Russia [1871–1875] Presented to the House of Lords by Command of Her Majesty, 1877* (London: Harrison and Sons, 1877).

6. Quoted in “Russia and Religious Liberty,” *New York Times*, 15 March 1896, 30.

7. Paul Miliukov, *Russia and Its Crisis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1906), 126.

8. Stepniak, *The Russian Peasantry: Their Agrarian Condition, Social Life, and Religion* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1888); Stepniak, *King Stork and King Log: A Study of Modern Russia*, 2nd ed. (London: Downey, 1896), 1:210.

9. See, e.g., Durban, “Russia as It Is,” 730. For an example of a casual comparison to the stundists in an article on an unrelated topic, see “The Lesson of the Outbreak in South Carolina,” *The Spectator*, 7 April 1894, 7.

10. Heather J. Coleman, *Russian Baptists and Spiritual Revolution, 1905–1929* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 23–24; A. S. Prugavin, *Raskol i sektantstvo v russkoi narodnoi zhizni: S kriticheskimi zamechaniiami dukhovnogo tsenzora* (Moscow: I. D. Sytin, 1905); Ronald Vroon, “The Old Belief and Sectarianism as Cultural Models in the Silver Age,” in *Russian Culture in Modern Times*, ed. Robert H. Hughes and Irina Paperno (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); Alexander Etkind, “Whirling with the Other: Russian Populism and Religious Sects,” *Russian Review* 62, no. 4 (2003): 565–88; M. P. Dragomanov, “Ukrainskaia ‘shtunda’

i mudrateli nashoi khaty,” *Narod*, no. 4 (1891); M. Tkachenko, *Nova vira na Ukraini* [sic] (Lviv: Persha Zviazkova drukarn’a, 1878).

11. Martin Malia, *Russia under Western Eyes: From the Bronze Horseman to the Lenin Mausoleum* (Cambridge: Belknap, 1999), chap. 3; Saul, *Concord and Conflict*; Neilson, *Britain and the Last Tsar*, chap. 3; Paddock, *Creating the Russian Peril*.

12. David S. Foglesong, *The American Mission and the “Evil Empire”: The Crusade for a “Free Russia” since 1881* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 2, 11.

13. Donald Mackenzie Wallace, *Russia on the Eve of War and Revolution*, ed. and intro. Cyril E. Black (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), part 5; Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, *The Empire of the Tsars and the Russians*, part 3: *The Religion*, trans. from the 3rd French ed. Zenaide A. Ragozin (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1896).

14. Neilson, *Britain and the Last Tsar*, 45–47, 94–96.

15. David W. Bebbington, *Evangelicalism in Modern Britain: A History from the 1730s to the 1980s* (London: Routledge, 1993), 149–50; Mark A. Noll, *The Work We Have to Do: A History of Protestants in America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 77–90; Hugh McLeod, *Secularization in Western Europe, 1848–1914* (New York: St. Martin’s, 2000), 199–202, 216–17.

16. Joseph McAleer, *Popular Reading and Publishing in Britain, 1914–1950* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), 206–14; Margaret Nancy Cutt, *Ministering Angels: A Study of Nineteenth-Century Evangelical Writing for Children* (Wormley: Five Owls Press, 1979), xi–xiii.

17. Peter van der Veer, “Transnational Religion: Hindu and Muslim Movements,” *Global Networks* 2, no. 2 (2002): 104.

18. David W. Bebbington, *The Nonconformist Conscience: Chapel and Politics, 1870–1914* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1982), 1–17; Hugh McLeod, “Protestantism and British National Identity, 1815–1945,” in *Nation and Religion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia*, ed. Peter Van Der Veer and Hartmut Lehmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 50.

19. Accounts of the stundists remarkably frequently specified that they were, in fact, ethnically “Little Russians” (Ukrainians) rather than Great Russians, but nationality was not the issue that animated outsiders’ interest in them, except in Galicia.

20. Albert W. Wardin Jr., “Baptists (German) in Russia and the USSR,” in *Modern Encyclopedia of Religions in Russia and the Soviet Union*, ed. Paul D. Steeves (Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1991), 3:192–93; William L. Wagner, *New Move Forward in Europe: Growth Patterns of German-Speaking Baptists in Europe* (South Pasadena, CA: William Casey Library, 1978), 7, 107–9. I use the term “evangelical” in the English-language sense to designate a movement in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Protestantism for an experiential, biblicist, and activist faith rather than the continental European use of the term to designate Protestantism in general. See Bebbington, *Evangelicalism*, 2–3; and Mark Hutchinson and John Wolfe,

A Short History of Global Evangelicalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 2–23.

21. Coleman, *Russian Baptists*, 14–17. On the Pashkovites, see Edmund Heier, *Religious Schism in the Russian Aristocracy, 1860–1900: Radstockism and Pashkovism* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1970); and Mark Myers McCarthy, “Religious Conflict and Social Order in Nineteenth-Century Russia: Orthodoxy and the Protestant Challenge, 1812–1905” (PhD diss., University of Notre Dame, 2004).

22. Paul W. Werth, *The Tsar’s Foreign Faiths: Toleration and the Fate of Religious Freedom in Imperial Russia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 5.

23. Robert Crews, “Empire and the Confessional State: Islam and Religious Politics in Nineteenth-Century Russia,” *American Historical Review* 108, no. 1 (2003): 50–83.

24. Paul Werth, “Schism Once Removed: Sects, State Authority, and the Meaning of Religious Toleration in Imperial Russia,” in *Imperial Rule*, ed. Alexei Miller and Alfred J. Rieber (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2004), 83–105, esp. 88–90, 97.

25. Coleman, *Russian Baptists*, chap. 1, 95; Sergei I. Zhuk, *Russia’s Lost Reformation: Peasants, Millennialism, and Radical Sects in Southern Russia and Ukraine, 1830–1917* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), chap. 3.

26. David S. Foglesong, “Redeeming Russia? American Missionaries and Tsarist Russia, 1886–1917,” *Religion, State and Society* 25, no. 4 (1997): 353–68; Saul, *Concord and Conflict*, 298–300.

27. Stephen K. Batalden, *Russian Bible Wars: Modern Scriptural Translation and Cultural Authority* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 35–38.

28. Batalden, *Russian Bible Wars*, 147, 155, 185, 187.

29. Batalden, *Russian Bible Wars*, 189.

30. Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv (RGIA) f. 821, op. 5, d. 1014, l. 66 ob.

31. Robert Sloan Latimer, *Under Three Tsars: Liberty of Conscience in Russia, 1856–1909* (London: Morgan and Scott, 1909), 219–21.

32. RGIA f. 821, op. 5, d. 1014, ll. 21–21 ob.; Gregory L. Nichols, *The Development of Russian Evangelical Spirituality: A Study of Ivan V. Kargel (1849–1937)* (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2011), 110–14; Robert Sloan Latimer, *Dr. Baedeker and His Apostolic Work in Russia* (London: Morgan and Scott, 1907); Batalden, *Russian Bible Wars*, 191. At the Evangelical Alliance’s 1896 jubilee, the resolutions on work in Russia were not published to protect the alliance’s workers; Baedeker emphasized in his speech that he was a distributor of bibles, not a missionary: A. J. Arnold, ed., *Jubilee of the Evangelical Alliance: Proceedings of the Tenth International Conference Held in London June–July 1896* (London: J. F. Shaw, 1897), 435, 410.

33. Michael Andrews Morrison, *The Stundists: The Story of a Great Religious Re-*

volt, intro. John Brown (London: James Clarke, 1893); Capel Chernilo, *Queer Stories from Russia* (London: James Clarke and Col, 1892); Norris, *Nadya*. Morrison's books received positive reviews in major venues of the secular press; see, e.g., "Books of the Week," *The Times*, 15 December 1893, 3.

34. George M. Thomas, "Religions in Global Civil Society," *Sociology of Religion* 62, no. 4 (2001): 520, 531; Coleman, *Russian Baptists*, chap. 4.

35. David Bebbington, "The Growth of Voluntary Religion," in *World Christianities c. 1815–c. 1914*, vol. 8 of *The Cambridge History of Christianity*, ed. Sheridan Gilley and Brian Stanley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 53–57, 65–69; Dag Thorkildsen, "Scandinavia: Lutheranism and National Identity," in *World Christianities*, 349.

36. Thorkildsen, "Scandinavia," 349; James C. Deming, "Martyrs for Modernity: The Three Hundredth Jubilee of the French Reformation and the Catholic-Protestant Debate on the Huguenot Martyrs," in *The Development of Pluralism in Modern Britain and France*, ed. Richard Bonney and D. J. B. Trim (Bern: Peter Lang, 2007), 244–50; Hugh McLeod, *Secularization in Western Europe*, 9, 28.

37. Ian Randall and David Hilborn, *One Body in Christ: The History and Significance of the Evangelical Alliance* (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 2001), 1–9; Hutchinson and Wolffe, *Short History of Global Evangelicalism*, 1–3.

38. Randall and Hilborn, *One Body in Christ*, 75–100, esp. 89; see also John Wolffe, "British Protestants and Europe, 1820–1860: Some Perceptions and Influences," in *Development of Pluralism*, 217–23.

39. Randall and Hilborn, *One Body in Christ*, 91.

40. "Russia: Imprisonment and Release of Baptist Converts," *The Wesleyan-Methodist Magazine* (November 1874): 1046–47. Baptists in the United States also appealed to Baron Andrei de Rozen, grand master of the court in 1874. See Ian M. Randall, "Eastern European Baptists and the Evangelical Alliance, 1846–1896," in *Eastern European Baptist History: New Perspectives*, ed. Sharyl Corrado and Barry Pritzker (Prague: International Baptist Seminary, 2007), 22.

41. Randall and Hilborn, *One Body in Christ*, 94; Charles H. H. Wright, "Stamping Out Protestantism in Russia," *The Nineteenth Century* (December 1889): 916, 921.

42. "Religious Liberty in Russia," *Evangelical Christendom* (3 June 1888): 230–32.

43. A. Iu. Polunov, "Poniatiiia svoboda sovesti i veroterpimost' v obshchestvenno-politicheskom diskurse Rossii kontsa XIX–nachala XX veka," in "Poniatiiia o Rossii": *K istoricheskoi semantike imperskogo perioda*, ed. A. I. Miller, D. A. Sdvizhkov, and I. Shirle [Ingrid Schierle] (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2012), 1:566.

44. "Religious Liberty in Russia," *Evangelical Christendom* (March 1889): 94–96; "Religious Liberty in the Baltic Provinces of Russia," *Evangelical Christendom* (September 1889): 287–88; (October 1889): 317–20; Hermann Dalton, *Offenes Sendschreiben an den Oberprokureur des russischen Synods Herrn Wirklichen Geheimrat Kon-*

stantin Pobedonoszeff (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1889). (The last was translated into French and English).

45. See, e.g., Wright, “Stamping Out Protestantism,” 921–22; Leroy-Beaulieu, *Empire of the Tsars*, 514–15; [untitled], *New York Times*, 2 May 1905, 4. On the alliance’s appeal forcing the regime to enunciate its policy, see Paul W. Werth, “The Emergence of ‘Freedom of Conscience’ in Imperial Russia,” *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian Studies* 13, no. 3 (2012): 599. See also Robert F. Byrnes, *Pobedonostsev: His Life and Thought* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968), 189–92.

46. See, among many examples, A. J. Arnold, “Persecution of Christians,” *The Times* (24 June 1893), 6; and *The Persecution of the Stundists in Russia* (London: Evangelical Alliance, 1893). The fate of the Jews constituted a second, lesser, focus.

47. “Special Prayer for the Persecuted Stundists of Russia,” *Evangelical Christendom* (January 1895): 22–23.

48. Arnold, *Jubilee of the Evangelical Alliance*, 60; “Persecution of the Stundists in Russia,” *Evangelical Christendom* (April 1896): 116–18; Gabrielle Godet, *Persécutions actuelles en Russie*, 2nd ed. (Neuchâtel: Attinger Frères, 1896).

49. “Evangelical Alliance,” *The Times*, 18 May 1899, 16.

50. “Ecclesiastical Intelligence,” *The Times*, 10 March 1897, 10.

51. Randall, “Eastern European Baptists,” 28–32.

52. Individuals also essayed this route of personal contact with Pobedonostsev or the Russian ruler himself. For example, in February 1895 Nicholas II received two English Quakers who pleaded for “tolerance towards the Stundists and other Dissenters.” See Friends of Russian Freedom, *The Religious Persecutions in Russia, Being an Account of the Russian Non-Conformists and the Treatment Meted Out to them by the Government*, Pamphlet no. 9 (Cardiff: Chapple and Kemp, 1897), 15.

53. Norman E. Thomas, *Missions and Unity: Lessons from History, 1792–2010* (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2010), 31; Hutchinson and Wolffe, *Short History of Global Evangelicalism*, 19.

54. In fairness, evangelicalism remained a highly diffuse, unorganized phenomenon among Russians and Ukrainians in this period; Godet did allow that the Baptists had acquired a leading role (*Persécutions actuelles en Russie*, 29).

55. F. Townley Lord, *Baptist World Fellowship: A Short History of the Baptist World Alliance* (Nashville: Broadman Press, 1955), 4, 11–12.

56. J. H. Shakespeare, ed., *The Baptist World Congress: London, July 11–19, 1905. Authorized Record of Proceedings* (London: Baptist Union Publication Department, 1905), 183, vi, viii.

57. J. H. Rushbrooke, *First European Baptist Congress, Held in Berlin, 1908 (August 29th to September 3rd): Authorized Record of Proceedings* (London: Baptist Union Publication Department, 1908), 21–22. See also Latimer, *Under Three Tsars*, 109.

58. J. A. Packer, *Among the Heretics in Europe* (London: Cassell, 1912), 22–23.

59. Latimer, *Under Three Tsars*, 184; see also J. N. Prestridge, ed., *Modern Baptist Heroes and Martyrs* (Louisville: World Press, 1911), 154.
60. G. B., “Les stundistes ou protestants russes,” *Revue chrétienne*, no. 13 (1893): 117.
61. H. Yooll, “The Stundists,” *Primitive Methodist Quarterly Review* (January 1892): 35.
62. Chernilo, *Queer Stories from Russia*, 25. See also Edward P. Field, “The Modern Martyrs of Russia,” *Quiver* (January 1904): 62.
63. Arnold, *Jubilee of the Evangelical Alliance*, 311.
64. Indeed, after the 1905 revolution Prokhanov would try to organize a Russian evangelical alliance that crossed ethnic and denominational lines. Despite ardent protests from the Holy Synod, it was registered legally but does not appear to have been very active, in part due to tensions between Russian Baptists and Prokhanov (RGIA f. 821, op. 133, d. 310; Nichols, *Development of Russian Evangelical Spirituality*, 200–203).
65. Rev. Henry Smith, “The Stundists in Russia,” *The Wesleyan-Methodist Magazine* (April 1892): 275.
66. *The Baptist World Alliance: Second Congress*, 3; Bebbington, *Nonconformist Conscience*, 141–46.
67. Hutchinson and Wolffe, *Short History of Global Evangelicalism*, chap. 5; Noll, *The Work We Have to Do*, 84–86; Thomas, *Missions and Unity*, 29–30, 38, 45–46. Bebbington points out that in this period these complaints reflected the extent of evangelical ambition as much as any reality of decline (*Evangelicalism*, 149–52).
68. *Stundists*, 76; Yool, “Stundists,” 23; G. H. P., “Religion in Russia—The Peasantry,” *The Sunday at Home* (1 September 1888): 556.
69. Yool, “Stundists,” 29–30. See also Chas. T. Byford, *Peasants and Prophets (Baptist Pioneers in Russia and South Eastern Europe)*, 2nd ed. (London: Kingsgate Press, [1914]); Latimer, *Under Three Tsars*, vii; Packer, *Among the Heretics in Europe*, 21–22.
70. Arnold, *Jubilee of the Evangelical Alliance*, 412–13.
71. Rushbrooke, *First European Baptist Congress*, 114.
72. *The Baptist World Alliance: Second Congress, Philadelphia, June 19–25, 1911: Record of Proceedings* (Philadelphia: Harper and Brother, 1911), 234, 242.
73. Prestridge, *Modern Baptist Heroes and Martyrs*, 151, 216.
74. Michael Hughes, “The English Slavophile: W. J. Birkbeck and Russia,” *Slavonic and East European Review* 82, no. 3 (2004): 680–96; Athelstan Riley, ed., *Birkbeck and the Russian Church* (London: S.P.C.K., 1917); George Bernard Hamilton Bishop, *The Religion of Russia: A Study of the Orthodox Church in Russia from the Point of View of the Church of England* (London: Society of SS Peter and Paul, 1915).
75. C. T. Hagberg Wright, “Russian Sects,” *National Review*, 16 September 1890, 94–95. See also “Flogged by an Angry Mob: Brutal Assault on Stundists in a Russian

Village,” *New York Times*, 28 April 1892, 2; and “Russia,” *The Times*, 17 July 1894, 5. On Kennan, see Saul, *Concord and Conflict*, 281–92. On Russophobia in Britain, see Michael J. Hughes, “British Opinion and Russian Terrorism in the 1880s,” *European History Quarterly* 41, no. 2 (2011): 257–58.

76. W. Durban, “Russia as It Is,” 711; Malia, *Russian under Western Eyes*, 175, 180–82; Paddock, *Creating the Russian Peril*, 5–6; Ezequiel Adamovsky, *Euro-Orientalism: Liberal Ideology and the Image of Russia in France (c. 1740–1880)* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2006); Saul, *Concord and Conflict*, 311–13.

77. Neilson, *Britain and the Last Tsar*, 108.

78. Caroline Emily Shaw, “The British, Persecuted Foreigners, and the Emergence of the Refugee Category in Nineteenth-Century Britain,” *Immigrants and Minorities* 30, no. 2–3 (2012): 240.

79. Neilson, *Britain and the Last Tsar*, 108; Hughes, “British Opinion,” 264, 367, 271.

80. Wallace, *Russia on the Eve of War*, 427. See also William Hepworth Dixon, *Free Russia* (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1870), 1:284.

81. Leroy-Beaulieu, *Empire of the Tsars*, 2–4, 504. See also Jean-Marie Mayeur, “Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu: Un catholique libéral devant l’orthodoxie,” *Cristianesimo nella storia* 19, no. 2 (1998): 371–81.

82. “Russia from Three Standpoints,” *The Speaker* (30 May 1896): 591.

83. E. B. Lanin, “The Tsar Persecutor,” *The Contemporary Review* 61 (January 1892): 1–25.

84. Emile Joseph Dillon, *Russian Characteristics: Reprinted, with Revisions, from the “Fortnightly Review”* (London: Chapman and Hall, 1892).

85. Lanin, “Tsar Persecutor,” 7.

86. Lanin, “Tsar Persecutor,” 16.

87. Lanin, “Tsar Persecutor,” 1.

88. On the stundists’ potential “Englishness,” see also Wright, “Russian Sects,” 104.

89. Durban, “Russia as It Is,” 731, 732–33. This assertion was approvingly reprinted by the *New York Times*: “The God of Russia,” *New York Times*, 13 June 1897, 22.

90. “The Shadow on the Throne,” *Review of Reviews* (March 1891): 266; Joseph O. Baylen, “W. T. Stead, Apologist for Imperial Russia, 1870–1880,” *International Communication Gazette* 6, no. 4 (1960): 281–97.

91. Quoted in “Russia’s Persecution of Religious Dissenters,” *Literary Digest* 26 (February 1898): 258.

92. “The Czar’s Government Grows Fanatical in Its Policy of ‘Russifying Russia,’” *The Spectator*, 12 September 1891, 2. See also Durban, “Russia as It Is,” 731.

93. W. T. Stead, *The Truth about Russia* (London: Cassell, 1888), 325–26.

94. Lanin, “Tsar Persecutor,” 25.

95. Bebbington, *Nonconformist Conscience*, ix–12. Not all Nonconformists were evangelicals and not all evangelicals were Nonconformists, but there was considerable overlap between the categories.

96. Simon Goldsworthy, “English Nonconformity and the Pioneering of the Modern Newspaper Campaign: Including the Strange Case of W. T. Stead and the Bulgarian Horrors,” *Journalism Studies* 7, no. 3 (2006): 387–402.

97. See, e.g., Smith, “Stundists in Russia,” 275.

98. Stead, *Truth about Russia*, 362–63; “The London Nonconformist Council,” *The Times*, 26 November 1895, 11.

99. A third magazine, published in 1891–1892 (revived in 1912–1914), *Darkest Russia*, focused on the plight of the Jews; it too sought to draw on widespread public commitment to the ideal of religious liberty. See Sam Johnson, “Confronting the East: ‘Darkest Russia,’ British Opinion and Tsarism’s ‘Jewish Question,’ 1890–1914,” *East European Jewish Affairs* 36, no. 2 (2006): 200–201.

100. Barry Hollingsworth, “The Society of Friends of Russian Freedom: English Liberals and Russian Socialists, 1890–1917,” *Oxford Slavonic Papers*, n.s. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1970), 3:48–49. See also Donald Senese, *S. M. Stepniak-Kravchinskii: The London Years* (Newtonville, MA: Oriental Research Partners, 1987), 46–55; and Maurice Comtet, “S. M. Stepniak-Kravčinskij et la Russie sectaire, 1851–1895,” *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* 12, no. 4 (1971) : 422–38.

101. See Victoria Frede’s chapter in this volume.

102. Senese, *S. M. Stepniak-Kravchinskii*, 46–48.

103. Senese, *S. M. Stepniak-Kravchinskii*, 55.

104. Hollingsworth, “Society of Friends of Russian Freedom,” 51.

105. *Religious Persecutions in Russia*, 1.

106. *Religious Persecutions in Russia*, 8.

107. M. M. [Stepniak], “The Russian Baptists or Stundists,” *Free Russia*, no. 3 (1890): 11; F. Volkhovsky, “National Character and Stundism,” *Free Russia*, no. 3 (1894): 27; “Fearful Persecution of the Stundists,” *Free Russia*, no. 7 (1893): 91. See also Carol Peaker, “We Are Not Barbarians: Literature and the Russian Émigré Press in England, 1890–1905,” *Interdisciplinary Studies in the Long Nineteenth Century* 19, no. 3 (2006): 1–18.

108. “The Annual Meeting,” *Free Russia*, no. 6 (1894): 52.

109. “Hesba Stretton at Home,” *Review of Reviews* (July 1894): 47.

110. S. M. Stepniak-Kravchinskii, *Sochineniia* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo khudozhestvennoi literatury, 1958), 2:571–73.

111. D. B. Saunders, “Stepniak and the London Emigration: Letters to Robert Spence Watson, 1887–1890,” *Oxford Slavonic Papers*, n.s. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980), 13:93.

112. John Slatter, “Jaakoff Prelooker and *The Anglo-Russian*,” in *From the Other Shore: Russian Political Emigrants in Britain, 1880–1917*, ed. John Slatter (London: Frank Cass, 1984), 53–54; Jaakoff Prelooker, *Under the Czar and Queen Victoria: The Experiences of a Russian Reformer* (London: James Nisbett, 1895), 239–40.

113. “Stundist Documents,” *The Anglo-Russian*, no. 1 (1897): 3–4; “A New Crusade against Nonconformists,” *The Anglo-Russian*, no. 2 (1897): 20–21; “Robbing Nonconformists of their Children,” *The Anglo-Russian*, no. 10 (1898): 111.

114. “Reunion of the Anglican and Russian Churches,” *The Anglo-Russian*, no. 6 (1897): 68; “The Bishop of London on Christianity and Liberty,” *The Anglo-Russian*, no. 3 (1896): 179.

115. Jaakoff Prelooker, *Russian Flashlights* (London: Chapman and Hall, 1911), 23.

116. “The Stundists,” *The Times*, 21 May 1878, 7; “House of Commons,” *The Times*, 16 February 1892, 6; “House of Commons,” *The Times*, 26 April 1904, 6.

117. What attention there was focused on anti-Jewish pogroms and, surprisingly, the Uniate question in the western borderlands: D. C. B. Lieven, *British Documents on Foreign Affairs—Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part 1: From the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the First World War: Series A, Russia, 1859–1914*, 6 vols. (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1983).

118. Fogleson, *American Mission*, 25.

119. “The Overflow of Europe,” *New York Times*, 8 February 1892, 3.

120. Prelooker, *Under the Czar*, 175–76;

121. Werth, “Emergence of ‘Freedom of Conscience,’” 599; RGIA f. 821, op. 133, d. 196, l. 207 ob.

122. Polunov, “Poniatii svoboda sovesti i veroterpimost’,” 563.

123. Randall A. Poole, “Religious Toleration, Freedom of Conscience, and Russian Liberalism,” *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian Studies* 13, no. 3 (2012): 611–34.

124. Geraldine Fagan, *Believing in Russia: Religious Policy after Communism* (London: Routledge, 2013), 3.

125. See, e.g., this brochure, based almost entirely on Lanin and *The Stundists*: C. A. W., *The Stundists: The Persecution of Believers in Russia at the Close of the Last Century* (Oak Park, IL: Bible Truth Publishers, 1976). See also Christian Philip Peterson, *Globalizing Human Rights: Private Citizens, the Soviet Union, and the West* (New York: Routledge, 2012).

126. For example, this book, published in the early 1920s but dealing with the stundists before the revolution in similar terms to the literature explored here, was reprinted in 1992 and 1997 and is still available: N. I. Saloff-Astakoff, *Willie’s Acquaintance with Christ or the Suffering of a Boy in Russia for Jesus* (Crockett, KY: Rod and Staff Publishers, 1997).

6. MISSIONARIES OF OFFICIAL ORTHODOXY

1. Adele Lindenmeyr, *Poverty Is Not a Vice: Charity, Society, and the State in Imperial Russia* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); Daniel Scarborough, “The Pastoral Dilemma: Clerical Mutual-Aid and Famine Relief during Russia’s Crop Failure of 1905,” *Russian History* 41, no. 1 (2014): 68–83; Richard G. Robbins Jr., *Famine in Russia, 1891–1892: The Imperial Government Responds to a Crisis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), 96–103.

2. Henning Hillmann and Brandy L. Aven, “Fragmented Networks and Entrepreneurship in Late Imperial Russia,” *American Journal of Sociology* 117, no. 2 (2011): 522.

3. Galina Ulianova, “Old Believers and New Entrepreneurs: Religious Belief and Ritual in Merchant Moscow,” in *Merchant Moscow: Images of Russia’s Vanished Bourgeoisie*, ed. James L. West and Iurii Petrov (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 61–71; Thomas C. Owen, “Impediments to a Bourgeois Consciousness in Russia, 1880–1905: The Estate Structure, Ethnic Diversity, and Economic Regionalism,” in *Between Tsar and People: Educated Society and the Quest for Public Identity in Late Imperial Russia*, ed. Edith W. Clowes, Samuel D. Kassow, and West (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 75–89; Alfred J. Reiber, *Merchants and Entrepreneurs in Imperial Russia* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 415.

4. Liudmila Gatagova, “Orthodoxy, Ethnicity, and Mass Ethnophobias in the Late Tsarist Era,” in *Religion and Identity in Modern Russia: The Revival of Orthodoxy and Islam*, ed. Juliet Johnson, Marietta Stepaniants, and Benjamin Forest (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005), 39–51.

5. Walter Laqueur, *Black Hundred: The Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia* (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), 54.

6. Gregory L. Freeze, *The Parish Clergy in Nineteenth-Century Russia: Crisis, Reform, Counter-Reform* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 251; A. Papkov, *Tserkovnye bratstva: Kratkii statisticheskii ocherk o polozhenii tserkovnykh bratstv k nachalu 1893 goda* (St. Petersburg: Sinodal’naia tipografiia, 1893), 92–110.

7. John Strickland, *The Making of Holy Russia: The Orthodox Church and Russian Nationalism before the Revolution* (Jordanville, NY: Holy Trinity Publications, 2013), xii–xvii.

8. Strickland, *Making of Holy Russia*, xiii.

9. *Obzor deiatel’nosti vedomstva pravoslavnogo ispovedaniia za vremia tsarstvovaniia imperatora Aleksandra III* (St. Petersburg: n.p., 1901), 269.

10. All other dioceses contributed a greater proportion of their resources to church building and beautification. See, e.g., *Vsepoddanneishii otchet Ober-prokuro-ra Sviatishhego Sinoda po vedomstvu Pravoslavnogo ispovedaniia za 1892–1893 gody* (St. Petersburg: Sinodal’naia tipografiia, 1895), 144–51. For the charitable activities

of Orthodox brotherhoods in Moscow and Tver’; see Papkov, *Tserkovnye bratstva*, 26, 38.

11. In 1902, 93 percent of the population of the city of Moscow and its surrounding districts adhered to the official Orthodox Church (A. N. Kazakevich, ed., *Pravoslavnaia Moskva v 1917–1921 godakh: Sbornik dokumentov i materialov* [Moscow: Glavarkhiv Moskvy, 2004], 7). In 1897 the total population of Tver’ Province was 1,796,135 people, 99 percent of whom belonged to the official Orthodox Church. Old Believers constituted the largest religious minority, of whom there were 15,651 people or 0.88 percent of the population in the same year (*Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis’ naseleniia rossiiskoi imperii 1897 g.: Izdanie Tsentral’nogo statisticheskogo komiteta Ministerstva vnutrennikh del*, vol. 43: *Tverskaia guberniia* [St. Petersburg: n.p., 1904], 84–85).

12. For a Synodal report on the twenty-eight dioceses with the largest Old Believer populations in 1901, see *Obzor deiatel’nosti*, 239.

13. *Obzor deiatel’nosti*, 269.

14. Vladimir Rozhkov, *Tserkovnye voprosy v gosudarstvennoi Dume* (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Krutitskogo podvor’ia, Obshchestvo liubitelei tserkovnoi istorii, 2004), 17–19.

15. Quoted in M. A. Babkin, *Dukhovenstvo russkoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi i sverzhenie monarkhii (nachalo XXv.–konets 1917 g.)* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennaia publichnaia istoricheskaiia biblioteka Rossii, 2007), 88.

16. T. V. Barsov, *Sbornik deistvuiushchikh i rukovodstvennykh tserkovnykh i tserkovno-grazhdanskikh postanovlenii po vedomstvu pravoslavnogo ispovedaniia* (St. Petersburg: Sinodal’naia tipografiia, 1885), 259.

17. T. G. Leont’eva, *Vera i progress: Pravoslavnoe sel’skoe dukhovenstvo Rossii vo vtoroi polovine XIX–nachale XX veka* (Moscow: Novyi khronograf, 2002), 22.

18. On state support for official churches, see Robert Lee, *Rural Society and the Anglican Clergy, 1815–1914: Encountering and Managing the Poor* (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 2006); and William D. Bowman, *Priest and Parish in Vienna, 1780 to 1880* (Boston: Humanities Press, 1999).

19. Babkin notes that only one case is recorded of a priest reporting a confession to the police between the establishment of this requirement in 1721 and 1917 (*Dukhovenstvo russkoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi*, 63).

20. Gregory L. Freeze, *The Russian Levites: Parish Clergy in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 31.

21. Mikhail Koialovich, *Litovskaia tserkovnaia uniiia*, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg: Stranik, 1861), 2:84.

22. *Obzor deiatel’nosti*, 311.

23. O. V. Kravchenko, “Tserkovnye bratstva: Istoriia i istoriografiia,” in *Provintsi-al’noe dukhovenstvo dorevoliutsionoi Rossii: Sbornik nauchnykh trudov vserossiiskoi*

zaochnoi konferentsii, ed. T. G. Leont'eva (Tver': Tverskoi gosudarstvennyi universitet, 2006), 248–49.

24. Papkov, *Tserkovnye bratstva*, 11–12, 44–45.

25. Papkov, *Tserkovnye bratstva*, 11.

26. For example, see the report of a brotherhood founded in the Moscow diocese in 1884: Tsentral'nyi istoricheskii arkhiv goroda Moskvy (TsIAM) f. 1408, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 1–3 ob. (Sokolovskoe sviato-pokrovskoe pravoslavnoe bratstvo).

27. In 1865 parish clergymen were permitted to assemble in “pastoral councils” at the level of the superintendent district. See “Pastyrskie sobrannia,” *Pribavleniia k tserkovnym vedomostiam*, no. 2 (1908): 52–61. In 1867 clergymen were permitted to elect representatives to “diocesan congresses.” See V. Beliaev, A. Viktorov, and M. Mansurov, *Eparkhial'nye s'ezdy: Sbornik deistvuiushchikh zakonopolozhenii ob eparkhial'nykh s'ezdakh. Ikh praktika za 1903–1907 gg. Predstoiashchaia reforma s'ezdov, prilozheniia* (St. Petersburg: Bereg, 1908). The parish reform of 18 November 1905 authorized the laity to directly participate in these clerical assemblies and to take part in the allocation of diocesan resources for the relief of poverty. See “Opredeleniia Sviateishego Sinoda ot 18-go noiabria 1905 g., za no. 5900, po voprosu ob ustroenii tserkovno-prikhodskoi zhizni i pastyrskikh sobranii,” *Pribavleniia k tserkovnym vedomostiam*, no. 48 (1905): 523–25. Another popular Orthodox association was the sobriety society, which priests began organizing in the 1880s to perform a wide variety of local functions. See Patricia Herlihy, *The Alcoholic Empire: Vodka and Politics in Late Imperial Russia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 69–89.

28. Freeze, *Parish Clergy*, 252–59.

29. *Obzor deiatel'nosti*, 367.

30. Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Tverskoi oblasti (GATO) f. 160, op. 1, d. 34398, l. 21 (Svedeniia o sostoianii tserkvei i blagochinnikh okrugov Tverskoi gubernii).

31. Rozhkov, *Tserkovnye voprosy*, 23.

32. Lindenmeyr, *Poverty Is Not a Vice*, 211.

33. A. Iu. Bendin, *Problemy veroterpimosti v Severo-Zapadnom krae Rossiiskoi imperii (1863–1914)* (Minsk: BGU, 2010), 147.

34. Leont'eva, *Vera i progress*, 110.

35. Bendin, *Problemy veroterpimosti*, 147–48.

36. For official statistics indicating that the majority of support came from within the parishes, see *Istoricheskii ocherk razvitiia tserkovnykh shkol za istekshee dvadtsatipiatiletie (1884–1909)* (St. Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo Uchilishnogo soveta pri Sviatishem Sinode, 1909), 493.

37. Priest [Sviashchennik] V. O. “Tserkovno-prikhodskaia shkola i zemstvo,” *Moskovskie tserkovnye vedomosti*, no. 4 (1902): 48.

38. For example, see the following brotherhood report from 1901 describing two parish schools. In one school eighteen out of twenty-nine students were Old Believ-

ers. In the other twenty-eight out of thirty students were Old Believers (“Otchet po Bratstvu sv. Petra mitropolita za 1901 god,” *Moskovskie tserkovnye vedomosti*, no. 29 [1902]: 350–51).

39. “Otchet eparkhial’nogo nabliudatel’ia o sostoianii tserkovnykh shkol moskovskoi eparkhii v uchebno-vospitatel’nom otnoshenii za 1901–1902 uchebnyi god,” *Moskovskie tserkovnye vedomosti: Offitsial’nyi otdel*, no. 3 (1903): 12.

40. Heather J. Coleman, “Tales of Violence against Religious Dissidents in the Orthodox Village,” in *Sacred Stories: Religion and Spirituality in Modern Russia*, ed. Mark D. Steinberg and Coleman (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), 200–221.

41. For an example of the official policy of surveillance, prosecution, and conversion of Orthodox apostates, see *Vsepoddanneishii otchet Ober-prokurora Sviateishego Sinoda po vedomstvu Pravoslavnogo ispovedaniia za 1903–1904 gody* (St. Petersburg: Sinodal’naia tipografiia, 1909), 134–44.

42. TsIAM f. 203, op. 551, d. 18, l. 47 (Predstavleniia raznykh lits Moskovskomu i Kolomenskomu Mitropolitu Vladimiru o nagrazhdenii sviashchennotserkovnosluzhitelei tserkvei Moskovskoi eparkhii, 1909).

43. TsIAM f. 203, op. 551, d. 71, l. 4 (Delo o nagrazhdenii dukhovnykh lits za zaslugi po eparkhial’nomu vedomstvu, 1909). For more letters from parishioners to the consistories of Moscow and Tver’, see TsIAM f. 203, op. 550, d. 267, ll. 1–35 ob. (Delo o sostavlenii spiskov lits dukhovnogo zvaniia, predstavlennykh k nagradam, 1908); f. 203, op. 550, d. 267, l. 24 (Delo o sostavlenii spiskov); and GATO f. 160, op. 1, d. 34475, l. 8 (Khodataistva o nagrazhdenii dukhovnykh lits).

44. For example, Thomas Pearson points out that before the creation of the land captains in 1889, many peasants had submitted petitions to government inspectors expressing distrust of both elected peasant officials and the zemstva (“The Origins of Alexander III’s Land Captains: A Reinterpretation,” *Slavic Review* 40, no. 3 [1981], 394). Over the same period conservative noblemen had argued for the replacement of elected zemstvo officials with state bureaucrats to stabilize local governance (A. L. Zhukova, “Vyrabotka konservativnoi kontseptsii mestnogo upravleniia v Rossii: Komissiiia M. S. Kakhanova, 1881–1885,” in *Zemskoe samoupravlenie v Rossii, 1864–1918*, 2 vols., ed. N. G. Koroleva [Moscow: Nauka, 2005], 237).

45. Freeze, *Parish Clergy*, 446–47.

46. *Obzor deiatel’nosti*, 269.

47. TsIAM f. 203, op. 544, d. 35, l. 45 ob.

48. “Ustav Pravoslavnykh Dukhovnykh Seminarii 1884 g.” Printed in full in A. I. Mramornov, *Dukhovnaia seminariia v Rossii nachala XX veka: Krizis i vozmozhnosti ego preodoleniia. Na Saratovskikh materialakh* (Saratov: Nauchnaia kniga, 2007), 209.

49. Freeze, *Parish Clergy*, 447.

50. *Obzor deiatel’nosti*, 276.

51. Strickland, *Making of Holy Russia*, 46.

52. Strickland, *Making of Holy Russia*, 95.

53. Eugene Clay, “Orthodox Missionaries and ‘Orthodox Heretics’ in Russia, 1886–1917,” in *Of Religion and Empire: Missions, Conversion, and Tolerance in Tsarist Russia*, ed. Robert P. Geraci and Michael Khodarkovsky (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 38–42. Quotation from Strickland, *Making of Holy Russia*, 37.

54. *Obzor deiatel'nosti*, 293–97. See also Heather J. Coleman, *Russian Baptists and Spiritual Revolution, 1905–1929* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 21.

55. For an example of police involvement in the surveillance of sectarians, see TSIAM f. 1381, op. 1, d. 9, ll. 14–16 ob. (Doklad i pis'ma dukhovenstva Moskovskoi oblasti v eparkhial'noi missionerskoi sovete o sobranniakh religioznykh sekt).

56. See, e.g., GATO f. 644, op. 1, d. 409, l. 1 (Zhurnaly soveta bratstva Kniazia Mikhaila Iaroslavicha Tverskogo za 1900); and TSIAM f. 203, op. 544, d. 35, ll. 1–3 (Delo o naznachenii na dolzhnost' eparkhial'nogo protivoraskol'nicheskogo missionera prepodavatel'ia Moskovskoi dukhovnoi seminarii Polianskogo).

57. GATO f. 160, op. 1, d. 34382, l. 5 (Delo s predstavleniiem protokolov s'ezda Tverskogo eparkhial'nogo dukhovenstva, 1901–1902).

58. TSIAM f. 203, op. 544, d. 35, l. 4 (Delo o predpisanii poriadke vydachi deneg missioneru).

59. For a discussion of the “pastoral care movement,” see Laurie Manchester, *Holy Fathers, Secular Sons: Clergy, Intelligentsia, and the Modern Self in Revolutionary Russia* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2011), 19–22.

60. “O vnutrennei missii,” *Moskovskie tserkovnye vedomosti*, no. 47 (1902): 564. For another example of this understanding of the “internal mission,” see Archpriest [Protoierei] I. Petropavlovskii, “Missiia Pravoslaviia vnutri Pravoslavnago mira: Slovo v den' zakladki khrama v eparkhial'nom dome v Moskve,” *Moskovskie tserkovnye vedomosti*, no. 25 (1901): 303–6.

61. “O vnutrennei missii,” 305.

62. See, e.g., Jennifer Hedda, *His Kingdom Come: Orthodox Pastorship and Social Activism in Revolutionary Russia* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2011), 73–85; and G. N. Ul'ianova, “Tserkovnoprikhodskie popechitel'stva kak strukturnaia edinit'sa blagotvoritel'nosti vnutri mestnogo soobshchestva v pozdneimperskoi Rossii,” in *Blagotvoritel'nost' v Rossii: Istoricheskie i sotsial'noe-ekonomicheskie issledovaniia*, ed. B. V. Anan'ich, S. A. Basov, and V. M. Voronkov (St. Petersburg: Novikov, 2004), 166–76.

63. “Imennoi Vysochaishii ukaz, dannyi Senatu: Ob ukreplenii nachal veroterpimosti” (no. 26125), *Polnoe sobranie zakonov rossiiskoi imperii*, ser. 3, 33 vols. (St. Petersburg: Gosudarstvennaia tipografiia, 1905), 25:257–58, as cited in Laura Engelstein, *Slavophile Empire: Imperial Russia's Illiberal Path* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), 95–96.

64. “Pastyrskoe sluzhenie,” *Moskovskie tserkovnye vedomosti*, no. 36 (1905): 374.

65. For example, revolutionaries in the Baltic provinces staged demonstrations outside Lutheran churches, which they associated with the German nobility. See James D. White, “The 1905 Revolution in Russia’s Baltic Provinces,” in *The Russian Revolution of 1905: Centenary Perspectives*, ed. Jonathan D. Smele and Anthony Heywood (New York: Routledge, 2005), 65.

66. GATO f. 160, op. 1, d. 34398, l. 103 (Svedeniia o sostoianii tserkvei i blagochinnikh okrugov Tverskoi gubernii, 1906).

67. Metropolitan Evlogii, *Put’ moei zhizni: Vospominaniia mitropolita Evlogii* (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1994), 160.

68. Georgii Florovskii, *Puti russkogo bogosloviia* (Paris: YMCA Press, 1983), 476.

69. “Opredeleniia Sviateishego Sinoda ot 18-go noiabria 1905 g., za no. 5900, po voprosu ob ustroenii tserkovno-prikhodskoi zhizni i pastyrskikh sobranii,” *Tserkovnye vedomosti*, no. 48 (1905): 523–25. See also Leont’eva, *Vera i progress*, 124.

70. “Opredeleniia ot 18-go noiabria 1905,” 523.

71. Previously the parish priest and one lay elder had managed the use of tithes once they were collected. Parish trusteeships had to raise their own funds, separately from regular tithes. See Gregory L. Freeze, “All Power to the Parish? The Problems and Politics of Church Reform in Late Imperial Russia,” in *Social Identities in Revolutionary Russia*, ed. Madhavan K. Palat (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 174–208.

72. Engelstein, *Slavophile Empire*, 95–96.

73. Strickland, *Making of Holy Russia*, 114.

74. This approach was explicitly adopted at the fourth missionary council, held in Kiev in 1908. See Heather J. Coleman, “Defining Heresy: The Fourth Missionary Congress and the Problem of Cultural Power after 1905 in Russia,” *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 52, no. 1 (2004): 70–91. Coleman notes that this large congress temporarily turned many parish clergymen against the idea of an all-church council because of its domination by reactionary churchmen (89).

75. Coleman, “Defining Heresy,” 81.

76. “Po povodu Vysochaishego ukaza Pravitel’stvuiushchemu Senatu ot 17 aprelia 1905 g. v otnoshenii k staroobriadtsam (Prodolzhenie),” *Moskovskie tserkovnye vedomosti*, no. 3 (1906): 30.

77. Coleman, “Defining Heresy,” 75.

78. Coleman, *Russian Baptists*, 81–82.

79. TsIAM f. 1381, op. 1, d. 9, ll. 1–1 ob. (Doklady i pis’ma dukhovenstva Moskovskoi oblasti v eparkhial’noi missionerskoi sovete o sobranniakh religioznykh sekt).

80. TsIAM f. 1381, op. 1, d. 9, l. 6 (Doklady i pis’ma v eparkhial’noi missionerskoi sovete).

81. TsIAM f. 1381, op. 1, d. 9, l. 7.

82. TsIAM f. 1381, op. 1, d. 9, l. 7.

83. TsIAM f. 1381, op. 1, d. 9, ll. 8–8 ob.

84. TsIAM f. 1381, op. 1, d. 9, l. 11.

85. For the educational background of official missionaries, see Clay, “Orthodox Missionaries,” 38–42.

86. TsIAM f. 1381, op. 1, d. 11, l. 2 ob. (Donesenie Moskovskogo uezdnogo missionera Alekseia Zvereva Moskovskomu eparkhial’nomu protivosektantskomu missioneru).

87. TsIAM f. 1381, op. 1, d. 7, ll. 1–3 ob. (Vypiska iz sledstvennogo dela Moskovskogo mirovogo sud’i).

88. TsIAM f. 1381, op. 1, d. 9, l. 13 (Doklad i pis’ma).

89. TsIAM f. 1381, op. 1, d. 9, l. 13.

90. TsIAM f. 1381, op. 1, d. 9, l. 13.

91. Coleman, *Russian Baptists*, 83.

92. Argyrios Pisiotis, “Orthodoxy versus Autocracy: The Orthodox Church and Clerical Political Dissent in Late Imperial Russia, 1905–1914” (PhD diss., Georgetown University, 2000), 401.

93. For Vostorgov’s role in Orthodox patriotism, see Strickland, *Making of Holy Russia*, 132–40.

94. Pisiotis, “Orthodoxy versus Autocracy,” 409–15.

95. For discussions of clerical parties in Italy, Germany, and Austria, see Richard Webster, *The Cross and the Fasces: Christian Democracy and Fascism in Italy* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1960); Margaret Lavinia Anderson, *Windthorst: A Political Biography* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981); and Bowman, *Priest and Parish in Vienna*.

96. See, e.g., Coleman, *Russian Baptists*, 74–75. Concern over superior mutual aid practices among Protestants is expressed in *Vsepoddaneishii otchet Ober-prokurora Sviatshego Sinoda po vedomstvu Pravoslavnogo ispovedaniia za 1908–1909 gody* (St. Petersburg: Sinodal’naia tipografiia, 1910), 117. For a study of mutual aid among German Lutherans in Russia, see Karl Lindeman, *Von den deutschen Kolonisten in Russland: Ergebnisse einer studienreise, 1919–1921* (Stuttgart: Ausland und heimat verlagsaktiengesellschaft, 1924).

97. Katja Richters, *The Post-Soviet Russian Orthodox Church: Politics, Culture, and Greater Russia* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 38.

98. Richters, *Post-Soviet Russian Orthodox Church*, 43.

99. For a discussion of the ideology of Pussy Riot, see Masha Gessen, *Words Will Break Cement: The Passion of Pussy Riot* (New York: Riverhead Books, 2014); on the 29 June 2013 amendment to the Law on Freedom of Conscience, see Mikhail Markelov, “Zakon o nakazanii za oskorblenie chuvstv veruiushchikh podpisan prezidentom,” 30 June 2013, <http://ria.ru/politics/20130630/946661112.html>.

7. DESIGNS FOR *DÂR AL-ISLÂM*

1. For a Tatar leftist intellectual's retrospective account, see Galimdzhan Ibragimov, *Tatary v revoliutsii 1905 goda* (Kazan: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo TSSR, 1926). The period from 1905 to 1916 saw forty-one newspapers and thirty-five journals published in Tatar. For the lists, see Dilara Usmanova, "Die tatarische Presse 1905–1918: Quellen, Entwicklungsetappen und quantitative Analyse," in *Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18th to the Early 20th Centuries*, vol. 1, ed. Anke von Kügelgen, Michael Kemper, and Allen J. Frank (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 1996), 260–63, 272–75.

2. On the transformative impacts of the revolution, see Salavat Iskhakov, *Pervaia russkaia revoliutsiia i musul'mane Rossiiskoi imperii* (Moscow: Sotsial'no-politicheskaia mys', 2007); Charles Steinwedel, "The 1905 Revolution in Ufa: Mass Politics, Elections, and Nationality," *Russian Review* 59, no. 4 (2000): 555–76; and Andrew Verner, "Discursive Strategies in the 1905 Revolution: Peasant Petitions from Vladimir Province," *Russian Review* 54, no. 1 (1995): 65–90.

3. Paul W. Werth, "The Emergence of "Freedom of Conscience" in Imperial Russia," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 13, no. 3 (2012): 585–610.

4. Agnès Nilüfer Kefeli, *Becoming Muslim in Imperial Russia: Conversion, Apostasy, and Literacy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016), 235–51.

5. Ridâ' al-Dîn b. Fakhr al-Dîn, *Rûsiya musul'manlarining ihtiyâjlarî wa ânlar haqqında intiqâd* (Orenburg: Muhammad Fâtih b. Ghilmân Karîmûf matba'ası, 1906), 25–27.

6. See Bigiyif's article in *Waqt*, 1 December 1913, 2.

7. Robert D. Crews, "Empire and the Confessional State: Islam and Religious Politics in Nineteenth-Century Russia," *American Historical Review* 108, no. 1 (2003): 50–83; Jane Burbank, "An Imperial Rights Regime: Law and Citizenship in the Russian Empire," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 7, no. 3 (2006): 397–431.

8. Robert D. Crews, *For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), esp. 342, 349.

9. This institution has been well studied. See, e.g., D. D. Azamatov, *Orenburgskoe magometanskoe dukhovnoe sobranie v kontse XVIII–XIX vv.* (Ufa: Gilem, 1999); and I. K. Zagidullin, *Islamskie instituty v Rossiiskoi imperii: Mecheti v evropeiskoi chasti Rossii i Sibiri* (Kazan: Tatarskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 2007).

10. D. Iu. Arapov, *Sistema gosudarstvennogo regulirovaniia islama v Rossiiskoi imperii (posledniaia tret' XVIII–nachalo XX vv.)* (Moscow: Moskovskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 2004), 195, 225, 227; D. M. Usmanova, *Musul'manskie predstaviteli v rossiiskom parlamente, 1906–1916* (Kazan: Fân/Akademiia nauk RT, 2005), 384, 395–96, 518.

11. R. U. Amirkhanov, *Tatarskaia demokraticheskaia pechat' (1905–1907 gg.)* (Moscow: Nauka, 1988), 62–68.

12. There had been controversy over whether the Volga-Urals region was *Dâr al-Islâm*, where Islamic legal practice thrived, or *Dâr al-Harb*, the House of War, which Muslims were obliged either to quit or transform into *Dâr al-Islâm*. See Allen J. Frank, *Islamic Historiography and “Bulghar” Identity among the Tatars and Bashkirs of Russia* (Leiden: Brill, 1998), esp. 38, 80–86; and Michael Kemper, *Sufii i uchenye v Tatarstane i Bashkortostane: Islamskii diskurs pod russkim gosподstvom* (Kazan: Rossiiskii islamskii universitet, 2008 [1998]), esp. 399–407.

13. Christian Noack, *Muslimischer Nationalismus im russischen Reich: Nationsbildung und Nationalbewegung bei Tataren und Baschkiren; 1861–1917* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2000). See also Noack, “State Policy and Its Impact on the Formation of a Muslim Identity in the Volga-Urals,” in *Islam in Politics in Russia and Central Asia (Early Eighteenth to Late Twentieth Centuries)*, ed. Stéphane A. Dudoignon and Hisao Komatsu (London: Kegan Paul, 2001), 3–26. I develop this point elsewhere, too. See my “Holidays in Kazan: The Public Sphere and the Politics of Religious Authority among Tatars in 1914,” *Slavic Review* 71, no. 1 (2012): 25–48.

14. Joseph Bradley, “Subjects into Citizens: Societies, Civil Society, and Autocracy in Tsarist Russia,” *American Historical Review* 107, no. 4 (2002): 1108, 1123.

15. On the debate in the Tatar press concerning the reform of parishes around Friday mosques (*mahallas*), see Stéphane A. Dudoignon, “Status, Strategies, and Discourses of a Muslim ‘Clergy’ under a Christian Law: Polemics about the Collection of the *Zakât* in Late Imperial Russia,” in *Islam in Politics*, 43–73; and Norihiro Nagana-wa, “Molding the Muslim Community through the Tsarist Administration: *Mahalla* under the Jurisdiction of the Orenburg Mohammedan Spiritual Assembly after 1905,” *Acta Slavica Iaponica* 23 (2006): 101–23.

16. Arapov, *Sistema gosudarstvennogo regulirovaniia*, 119–20, 188–89; Usmanova, *Musul'manskie predstaviteli*, 107–10.

17. James H. Meyer, “Speaking Sharia to the State: Muslim Protesters, Tsarist Officials, and the Islamic Discourses of Late Imperial Russia,” *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 14, no. 3 (2013): 485–505; I. K. Zagidullin, *Tatarskoe natsional'noe dvizhenie v 1860–1905 gg.* (Kazan: Tatarskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 2014); R. R. Salikhov, *Tatarskaia burzhuaziia Kazani i natsional'nye reformy vtoroi poloviny XIX–nachala XX v.* (Kazan: Master Lain, 2001), 19–27; *Materialy po istorii Tatarii vtoroi poloviny XIX veka*, pt. 1: *Agrarnyi vopros i krest'ianskoe dvizhenie, 50–70-kh godov XIX v.* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1936). On the logistics of the petition campaigns, see also Kefeli, *Becoming Muslim*, 44–50.

18. Danielle M. Ross, “From the Minbar to the Barricades: The Transformation of the Volga-Ural ‘Ulama into a Revolutionary Intelligentsia, 1860–1918” (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2011), chap. 5; Mustafa Tuna, *Imperial Russia's*

Muslims: Islam, Empire, and European Modernity, 1788–1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), chap. 8.

19. James H. Meyer describes the politics in this period as struggles over the right to speak in the name of Muslim communities. See his *Turks across Empires: Marketing Muslim Identity in the Russian-Ottoman Borderlands, 1856–1914* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), chap. 3. Here I argue that it was not so much identity politics that counted but each actor's ability to propose concrete solutions to the questions revolving around the Spiritual Assembly.

20. Rozaliya Garipova, "The Protectors of Religion and Community: Traditionalist Muslim Scholars of the Volga-Ural Region at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 59, no. 1–2 (2016): 126–65. For a comparative perspective, see Muhammad Qasim Zaman, *The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), esp. 54–59; Adeeb Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jihadism in Central Asia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); and Francis Robinson, "Technology and Religious Change: Islam and the Impact of Print," *Modern Asian Studies* 27, no. 1 (1993): 229–51.

21. *V pamiat' stoletiiia Orenburgskogo magometanskogo dukhovnogo sobraniia, uchrezhdenного v gorode Ufe* (Ufa: Tipografiia gubernskogo pravleniia, 1891), 8–9, 22–23, 24; *Svod zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii* (hereafter SZ), vol. 11, pt. 1: "Izdanie 1857 g.," articles 1236, 1237. From 1793 to 1847 the election of qadis took place at the Tatar *ratusha* (town hall) representing the merchant and lower urban estates. After 1847 the election was organized under the auspices of the Kazan City Police. See Rämil Khäyruḍdinov, "The Tatar *Ratusha* of Kazan: National Self-Administration in Autocratic Russia, 1781–1855," in *Islam in Politics*, 40–41; and Azamatov, *Orenburgskoe magometanskoe dukhovnoe sobranie*, 71, 77.

22. Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv (RGIA) f. 821 (Departament dukhovnykh del inostrannykh ispovedanii), op. 133, d. 576, ll. 294–96. On an attempt by Minister of Internal Affairs Petr Valuev in 1864 to elaborate the procedures for the election of muftis, see *Materialy po istorii Tatarii*, 169–83.

23. Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Orenburgskoi oblasti (GAOO) f. 10 (Kantseliariia orenburgskogo gubernatora), op. 9, d. 12, ll. 2–4, correspondence from Mufti Salim-Girei Tevkelev to Orenburg Governor-General Nikolai Andreevich Kryzhanovskii, 29 November 1865.

24. For Tevkelev's biography, see *Shûrâ*, no. 2 (1915): 33–36; no. 3 (1915): 65–68; and no. 4 (1915): 97–99. On his proposal on the qadi election, see *Shûrâ*, no. 4 (1915): 98. See also Charles Steinwedel, "Kutlu-Mukhammad Batyr-Gireevich Tevkelev (1850–?) and Family," in *Russia's People of Empire: Life Stories from Eurasia, 1500 to the Present*, ed. Stephen M. Norris and Willard Sunderland (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012), 190–91.

25. SZ, vol. 11, pt. 1, “Izdanie 1896 g.,” articles 1422, 1423.
26. Ridâ al-Dîn, *Rûsiya muslimânlarining ihtiyâjlarî*, 6.
27. *Shûrâ*, no. 3 (1915): 67–68. See also *Materialy po istorii Tatarii*, 168.
28. *Pis'ma N. I. Il'minskogo k Ober-prokuroru Sviateishego Sinoda Konstantinu Petrovichu Pobedonostsevu* (Kazan: Tipo-litografiia imperatorskogo universiteta, 1895), 175, 176.
29. For Sultanov's biography, see *Shûrâ*, no. 15 (1915): 449–52.
30. Mûsâ Jârullâh [Bigiyif], *Islâhât asâslarî* (Petrograd: M-A. Maksutov, 1917), 43, 54, 78.
31. He also had his village history published: Muhammad Shâkir Tûqâyif, *Tarîkh-i Istarlî Bâsh* (Kazan: B. L. Dombrovskii, 1899).
32. This seems to have been an attempt to reinvigorate the status of âkhûnds whose prestige had substantially declined by then. On the changes of âkhûnds' place in the Volga-Urals region, see Nathan Spannaus, “The Decline of the *Ākhûnd* and the Transformation of Islamic Law under the Russian Empire,” *Islamic Law and Society* 20, no. 3 (2013): 202–41.
33. In Transcaucasia the mid-level institutions were the provincial majlises. A similar structure existed in Crimea, where they were called district qadis (SZ, vol. 11, pt. 1, “Izdanie 1896 g.,” articles 1352, 1452, 1511–25, 1567, 1626–40). The scheduled Third Muslim Congress in Nizhnii Novgorod also entertained a proposal to create majlises at the provincial and district levels (1906 sana 16–21 âwghûstda ijtimâ'itmish Rusyâ muslimânlarining nadwasî [Kazan: Matba'a-i Karîmiya, 1906], 101–2, 127).
34. *Protokol ufimskogo gubernskogo soveshchaniia, obrazovannogo s razresheniia G. Ministra vnutrennikh del iz doverennykh bashkirkikh volostei ufimskoi gubernii dlia obsuzhdeniia voprosov, kasaiushchikhsia magometanskoi religii i voobshche nuzhd bashkirkogo naseleniia, 22, 23 i 25 iunia 1905 goda* (Ufa: Gubernskaia tipografiia, 1905), 2, 13–15.
35. [Bigiyif], *Islâhât asâslarî*, 136–39.
36. 1906 sana 16–21 âwghûstda, 104–5.
37. 1906 sana 16–21 âwghûstda, 103–4, 129–30.
38. 1906 sana 16–21 âwghûstda, 106.
39. 1906 sana 16–21 âwghûstda, 125, 130–32.
40. It was for the Muslim conference of June 1914 that Mûsâ Bigiyif prepared a 289-page volume assembling Muslim debates and resolutions as well as relevant tsarist laws from October 1904 to April 1906. See the front page of [Bigiyif], *Islâhât asâslarî*.
41. On the three Muslim participants, see RGIA f. 821, op. 133, d. 576, ll. 38, 47, 53, 77–78.
42. *Yûlduz*, 6 March 1914, 1; 20 March 1914, 1–2; *Din wa Ma'ishat*, no. 22 (1914): 349–50; no. 27 (1914): 425.

43. RGIA f. 821, op. 133, d. 576, ll. 300 ob.–301.
44. *Proekt polozheniia ob upravlenii dukhovnymi delami musul'man Rossiiskoi imperii* (St. Petersburg: n.p., 1914), 7–8, 11, 13, 26.
45. *Yılduz*, 29 June 1914, 1–3.
46. *Türmush*, 23 November 1914, 1.
47. *Din wa Ma'ishat*, no. 28 (1915): 442–44; no. 29 (1915): 461–64.
48. *Din wa Ma'ishat*, no. 28 (1915): 444–45; no. 33 (1915): 524.
49. RGIA f. 821, op. 133, d. 599, ll. 9–10, recommendation of Bâyezîdîf for the post of Muslim chaplain by E. V. Menkin, director of the Department of Religious Affairs, 15 April 1915.
50. *Waqf*, 25 June 1915, 3.
51. *Waqf*, 30 July 1915, 1–2.
52. *Din wa Ma'ishat*, no. 38 (1915): 599–600. See also the Kazan journal *Âng* (Consciousness), no. 14 (1915): 256.
53. I address this sea change in the Muslim public sphere in Norihiro Naganawa, “A Civil Society in a Confessional State? Muslim Philanthropy in the Volga-Urals Region,” in *Russia's Home Front in War and Revolution, 1914–22*, book 2: *The Experience of War and Revolution*, ed. Adele Lindenmeyr, Christopher Read, and Peter Waldron (Bloomington, IN: Slavica Publishers, 2016), 70–71.
54. *Waqf*, 9 July 1909, 2.
55. Natsional'nyi arkhiv Respubliki Tatarstan f. 199 (Kazanskoe gubernskoe zhandarmskoe upravlenie), op. 1, d. 948, l. 4. Maqsûdî's lecture was later supplemented and published in the local Tatar newspaper (*Yılduz*, 4 May 1914, 1–2; 18 May 1914, 2–3; 23 May 1914, 2–4). Here the citations are from *Yılduz*, 18 May 1914, 2–3.
56. *V pamiat' stoletii*, 8–9; SZ, vol. 11, pt. 1, “Izdanie 1896 g.,” article 1424.
57. GAOO f. 10, op. 9, d. 12, ll. 12 ob.–13 ob.; *Materialy po istorii Tatarii*, 197–98, 207–8.
58. The head of the Orenburg Educational District repeatedly complained to the Orenburg governor that he did not have any exact information on Muslim schools in the province. See GAOO f. 11, op. 2, d. 3366, ll. 2–3 (13 March 1900); d. 3588, l. 1 (11 July 1892).
59. On bribery in the 1860s, see *Materialy po istorii Tatarii*, 166–68.
60. On the mufti's endeavor, see *Shûrâ*, no. 15 (1915): 450. On inspection by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, see RGIA f. 821, op. 133, d. 625, ll. 5–6 ob., 14 ob.–15.
61. Ridâ' al-Dîn, *Rûsiya musulmânlarining ihtiyâjlarî*, 14–15; [Bigîyif], *Islâhât asâslarî*, 56–57.
62. *Protokol ufimskogo gubernskogo soveshchaniia*, 6–7, 9, 17. The Muslim congresses in August 1906 and June 1914 saw a model in the Transcaucasian Muslim administration, where the provincial majlises undertook school control and clerical examination, based on SZ, vol. 11, pt. 1, “Izdanie 1896 g.,” articles 1514

and 1629. See *1906 sana 16–21 áwghústda*, 101–2; and *Proekt polozheniia*, 9, 11–12, 14–15, 17.

63. On the reformist madrasas, see Mustafa Tuna, “Madrasa Reform as a Secularizing Process: A View from Late Imperial Russia,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 53, no. 3 (2011): 549–51. On the mu’allims, see also Dudoignon, “Status, Strategies, and Discourses,” 57–60.

64. *Waqf*, 20 February 1910, 1; 27 February 1910, 1; 4 March 1910, 2. See also my “Molding the Muslim Community,” 107.

65. Norihiro Naganawa, “*Maktab* or School? Introduction of Universal Primary Education among the Volga-Ural Muslims,” in *Empire, Islam, and Politics in Central Eurasia*, ed. Tomohiko Uyama (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2007), 65–97.

66. *V pamiat’ stoletiia*, 29–30; *SZ*, vol. 11, pt. 1, “Izdanie 1896 g.,” articles 1345–8, 1399, 1418.

67. Naganawa, “Molding the Muslim Community,” 105–6. For the broader context of this tsarist practice, see Paul W. Werth, “In the State’s Embrace? Civil Acts in an Imperial Order,” *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 7, no. 3 (2006): 433–58.

68. GAOO f. 10, op. 9, d. 12, ll. 19, 25 ob. (6 November 1870); *Materialy po istorii Tatarii*, 210–12.

69. Stefan B. Kirmse, “Law and Empire in Late Tsarist Russia: Muslim Tatars Go to Court,” *Slavic Review* 72, no. 4 (2013): 778–801. In another case a Muslim woman in Petropavlovsk, Akmolinsk Province, argued against the Spiritual Assembly based on the Civil Code. See Tsentral’nyi istoricheskii arkhiv Respubliki Bashkortostan (TsIARB) f. I-295 (Orenburgskoe magometanskoe dukhovnoe sobranie), op. 6, d. 124, ll. 1, 3, 8.

70. Crews, *For Prophet and Tsar*, 178–89.

71. *Shûrâ*, no. 15 (1915): 452.

72. RGIA f. 821, op. 133, d. 576, ll. 277 ob.–79, 282–83.

73. Ridâ’ al-Dîn, *Rûsiya muslimânlarining ihtiyâjları*, 28–44.

74. The Ottoman Sharia Code was also called *majalla*, which implies that Ridâ’ al-Dîn and Mûsâ emulated the Ottoman experience (Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876–1909* [London: I. B. Tauris, 1998], 50). See also Spannaus, “Decline of the *Ākhūnd*,” 236–39; Zaman, *Ulama*, 22–25; and David S. Powers, “Orientalism, Colonialism, and Legal History: The Attack on Muslim Family Endowments in Algeria and India,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 31, no. 3 (1989): 535–71.

75. For Ridâ’ al-Dîn’s article, see *Waqf*, 13 June 1909, 1–2. For Mûsâ’s, see *Waqf*, 12 January 1910, 2–3. On the Pahlen Commission, see Alexander S. Morrison, *Russian Rule in Samarkand, 1868–1910: A Comparison with British India* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 274–82; V. V. Bartold, “Istoriia kul’turnoi zhizni Turkestana,”

Sochineniia, vol. 2, pt. 1 (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo vostochnoi literatury, 1963), 386–88; and *Waqt*, 2 July 1909, 12.

76. Mûsâ Jâr Allâh Bîgîyîf, *Qawâ'id-i Fiqhiya* (Kazan: Ūrnak matba'asî, n.d.).

77. RGIA f. 821, op. 133, dd. 604, 605.

78. *Tûrmush*, 19 March 1914, 1–2.

79. *Waqt*, 27 November 1913, 2.

80. A. G. Karimullin, *Tatarskaia kniga nachala XX veka* (Kazan: Tatarskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1974), 45–55, 74–87; Kemper, *Sufii i uchenye*, 79–87.

81. *Sbornik tsirkuliarov i inykh rukovodiashchikh rasporiazhenii po okrugu Orenburgskogo magometanskogo dukhovnogo sobraniia 1836–1903 g.* (Kazan: Iman, 2004 [1905]), 37–38.

82. Deringil, *Well-Protected Domains*, 53–54. The Ottoman Ministry of Education was wary of the importation of Qurans from Kazan in particular.

83. For the voice of the 'ulamâ, see *Waqt*, 28 November 1913, 3; and *Tûrmush*, 31 January 1914, 2. For the voice of secularized intellectuals, see *Waqt*, 23 November 1913, 1–2; and *Maktab*, no. 14 (1913): 333–34. *Maktab* (School), a Kazan journal, also shows the mistakes in Kharitonov's copies (335–37).

84. *Waqt*, 28 November 1913, 2; *Tûrmush*, 5 March 1914, 3. The mufti tried in vain to address the Ministry of Internal Affairs. For the commitment of the Duma's Muslim faction, see *Tûrmush*, 18 January 1914, 2; and *Millat* 3 (1914): 7. *Millat* (Nation) was an organ of the Muslim faction.

85. *Waqt*, 24 November 1913, 1; 27 November 1913, 1–2. Here it refers to a British missionary society as a model.

86. İl's article was cited in *Waqt*, 28 November 1913, 2.

87. RGIA f. 821, op. 133, d. 576, ll. 150–51.

88. *Waqt*, 8 June 1914, 1; 11 June 1914, 1–2.

89. RGIA f. 821, op. 8, d. 631, l. 53. On the Vaysî movement, see Frank, *Islamic Historiography*, 172–78; Kemper, *Sufii i uchenye*, 527–72; and D. M. Usmanova, *Musul'manskoe "sektanstvo" v Rossiiskoi imperii: "Vaisovskii Bozhii polk staroverov-musul'man" 1862–1916 gg.* (Kazan: Kazanskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 2009).

90. *Waqt*, 11 April 1915, 1–2.

91. A. V. Vasil'ev, *Materialy k kharakteristike vzaimnykh otnoshenii tatar i kirgizov s predvaritel'nym kratkim ocherkom etikh otnoshenii* (Orenburg: P. N. Zharinov, 1898), 3–8. See also Paul W. Werth, "The Qazaq Steppe and Islamic Administrative Exceptionalism: A Comparison with Buddhism among Buriats," in *Islam, Society, and States across the Qazaq Steppe (18th–Early 20th Centuries)*, ed. Niccolò Pianciola and Paolo Sartori (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2013), 119–42.

92. For a history of the Kazakh-Tatar interactions, see G. S. Sultangalieva, *Zapadnyi Kazakhstan v sisteme etnokul'turnykh kontaktov (XVIII–nachalo XX v.v.)* (Ufa:

RIO RUNMTs Goskonnauki RB, 2002); Allen Frank, “Islamic Transformation on the Kazakh Steppe, 1742–1917: Toward an Islamic History of Kazakhstan under Russian Rule,” in *The Construction and Deconstruction of National Histories in Slavic Eurasia*, ed. Tadayuki Hayashi (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2003), 261–89; and Frank, *Muslim Religious Institutions in Imperial Russia: The Islamic World of Novouzensk District and the Kazakh Inner Horde, 1780–1910* (Leiden: Brill, 2001), esp. 308–12.

93. On the courts of the *bis*, see Virginia Martin, *Law and Custom in the Steppe: The Kazakhs of the Middle Horde and Russian Colonialism in the Nineteenth Century* (Richmond: Curzon, 2001), chap. 4. On the disarray in the court system, see an observation by one Bashkir official: I. I. Ibragimov, “Zametki o kirgizskom sude,” *Zapiski imperatorskogo Russkogo geograficheskogo obshchestva po otdeleniiu etnografii*, vol. 8: *Sbornik narodnykh iuridicheskikh obychev*, book 1 (St. Petersburg: V. Kirshbaum, 1878), 233–57.

94. For a comparison, see the predicament resulting from juridical practice based on customary law in the North Caucasus described in Michael Kemper, “‘Adat against Sharī’a: Russian Approaches toward Daghestani ‘Customary Law’ in the 19th Century,” *Ab Imperio*, no. 3 (2005): 147–72. For the broader context of this practice of contrasting sharia with customary law, see V. O. Bobrovnikov, “Russkii Kavkaz i frantsuzskii Alzhir: Sluchainoe skhodstvo ili obmen opytom kolonial’nogo stroitel’sтва?” in *Imperium inter pares: Rol’ transferov v istorii Rossiiskoi imperii (1700–1917)*, ed. Martin Aust, Rikarda Vul’pius [Ricarda Vulpius], and Aleksei Miller (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2010), esp. 189–90, 192–94, 205.

95. RGIA f. 821, op. 8, d. 631, ll. 3–4.

96. *Waqt*, 25 June 1914, 1.

97. D. Iu. Arapov, ed., *Islam v Rossiiskoi imperii: Zakonodatel’nye akty, opisaniia, statistika* (Moscow: Akademkniga, 2001), 180–81.

98. RGIA f. 1276, op. 2, d. 593, ll. 8 ob.–9, 58 ob.–59 ob., 112, 114 ob., 140 ob. Compare with a contemporaneous discourse of subverting Catholic Polish predominance by building up Belorussian national consciousness: Theodore R. Weeks, *Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863–1914* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1996), 52, 66.

99. Although Cherevanskii’s report was unlikely to be published officially, his plan for the reorganization of the spiritual assemblies appeared in Gasprinsky’s newspaper *Tarjumân* more than a month before the discussion at the Special Conference. This article was reprinted in *Waqt*, 25 March 1906, 2–3.

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101. *Waqt*, 2 February 1914, 1. See also *Waqt*, 8 May 1914, 1.

102. *Waqt*, 6 July 1914, 1–2.

103. *Shûrâ*, no. 9 (1914): 280–81.

104. *Waqt*, 8 May 1914, 1–2. See also Tomohiko Uyama, “The Changing Religious

Orientation of Qazaq Intellectuals in the Tsarist Period: Sharīʿa, Secularism, and Ethics,” in *Islam, Society, and States*, 95–115; and Uyama, “Byla li islamskaia alʿternativa? Mesto islama v natsionalʿnom dvizhenii kazakhov nachala XX veka,” *Shygys*, no. 2 (2008): 143–47.

105. *Waq̄t*, 17 May 1914, 2; 22 June 1914, 2.

106. *Yūlduz*, 22 June 1914, 1–2.

107. *Yūlduz*, 24 June 1914, 1–2; 29 June 1914, 1–3. Qārâtâyif’s speech was featured in *Waq̄t*, 27 June 1914, 2; 1 July 1914, 1–2.

108. Something similar happened in Turkestan, where Tatars had their quarters in many of the cities, and *Dungans* (Muslim Chinese), *Taranchis* (known as Uyghurs today), Kazakhs, and each group of *Sarts* (corresponding to today’s Uzbeks and Tajiks) from different cities contended for their own mosques. See P. P. Litvinov, *Gosudarstvo i islam v Russkom Turkestane (1865–1917) (po arkhivnym materialam)* (Elets: Eletsksii gosudarstvennyi pedagogicheskii institut, 1998), 88–92.

109. TsiARB f. I-295, op. 6, d. 1230, l. 13 (24 July 1906). See also d. 1352, ll. 2–4, 6–8, 10.

110. TsiARB f. I-295, op. 6, d. 3692, l. 8 (14 December 1915).

111. *Waq̄t*, 11 September 1916, 3; 16 September 1916, 3.

112. RGIA f. 821, op. 133, d. 598, ll. 373, 384, 385–85 ob., 387–88, 397–98 ob., 438–40 ob.

113. *Waq̄t*, 2 August 1913, 1–2.

114. On Behdudiy, see Hisao Komatsu, “*Dār al-Islām* under Russian Rule as Understood by Turkestan Muslim Intellectuals,” in *Empire, Islam, and Politics*, 19–21.

8. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, THE RELIGIOUS MARKET, AND SPIRITUAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN RUSSIA AFTER 1997

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